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The 5th International Meeting on Thermal Nuclear Reactor Safety was held
in Karlsruhe on September 9-13, 1984; it was attended by some 500
scientists and engineers from 25 countries. The conference was jointly
spon~ored by th~ European Nuclear Society (ENS), the American Nuclear
Society (ANS), the Canadian Nuclear Society (CNS) and the Japan Atomic
Energy Society (JAES). The meeting was furthe.r endorsed by, and
organized in cooperation with, the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ,and the Commission of the European
Communities (CEC). Host organizations were the Kerntechnische
Gesellschaft (KTG) and the Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe (KfK). The
meeting was the fifth in aseries of international meetings inthe same
subject areas with ANS and ENS as primary sponsors.
The Karlsruhe reactor safety meeting was held to reflect on the present
status of engineered safety systems in nuclear power plants and to
represent the findings of international safety research.
Seven invited experts of international reputation outlined ,the present
state of the art in survey lectures. Moreover, more than 200 technical
and scientific papers selected from 280 submitted papers, dealt with
recent findings in reactor safety technology and research in the'
following areas: safety systems and functions optimization; man machine
interface and emergency response; code development and verification;
system and component behavior; fuel behavior during severe accidents;
core debris and core concrete interaction; fission product behavior;
containment response; probabilistic risk assessment. We wish to thank
all speakers for their valuable contributions.
The meeting was concluded by a panel discussion on' "Progress and Trends
in Reactor Safety Technology and Research - What Has Been Achieved to
Date? - What Remains to Be Done?"
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It is not possible to acknowledge individually all persons who
contributed to the meeting. We are greatly indebted to H.H. Hennies,
President of the German Kerntechnische Gesellschaft (KTG), and J.M.
Hendrie, President of the American Nuclear Society (ANS) who served as
General Chairmen, and to A. Birkhofer as Chairman of the Technical
Program Committee. Many thanks are due to the members of the Steering
Committee, the Technical Program Committee, the Review Committee and the
Organizing Committee.
The 6th International Meeting on Thermal Nuclear Reactor Safety was
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MEASUREMENT AND CHARACTERIZATION OF FISSION PRODUCTS RELEASED
FROM LWR FUEL
M. F. Osborne, J. L. Collins, R. A. Lorenz, snd K. S. Norwood*
Chemical Technology Division
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831
R. V. Strain




Sampies of commercial LWR fuel have been heated under simulated acci-
dent conditions to determine the extent and the chemical forms of
fission product release. This project was sponsored by the USNRC
under a broad program of reactor safety studies. Of the five tests
discussed, the fractional releases of Kr, I, and Cs varied from ~2% at
1400°c to >50% at 2000°C; much smaller fractions of Ru, Ag, Sb, and Te
were measured in some tests. The major chemical forms in the effluent
appeared to include CsI, CsOH, ,Sb, Te, and Ag.
INTRODUCTION
Accurate information about the quantities and chemical forms of fission
products released from light-water reactors (LWRs) during overheating incidents
is required for the reliable assessment of potential hazards. For several
years, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) has sponsored experimen-
tal studies of these phenomena at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL).1-3 In
all these tests, small segments of commercial LWR fuel rods were heated under
simulated accident conditions, and the released material was collected and ana-
lyzed. The most recent test series used a new furnace design which permitted
testing at temperatures up to 2000°C. The primary objectives of the study were:
to determine the release rates and the chemical forms of the most significant
fission products, to relate these results to changes in the fuel microstructure,
and to compare these data with results from other experimental work. With the
exception of detailed studies of the fuel and cladding microstructure, which was
conducted at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) , all of this work was carried out
at ORNL. The results will be used by the USNRC in computer modeling studies of
various accident scenarios to evaluate the resulting consequences.
*Guest scientist from UKAEA-Harwell.
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EXPERIMENTAL APPARATUS AND TECHNIQUES
In the reeent test series, the fuel speeimens (15 to 20-em-Iong segments of
LWR rods of 10 to 40 MWd/kg burnup) were heated in an induetion furnaee (Fig. 1)
at 1400 to 2000°C for 20 min. 4- 7 An atmosphere of steam and helium at 0.1 MPa
pressure flowed aeross the heated speeimens, oxidizing the Zircaloy cladding and
transporting released material to the eolleetion system, eomprised of a thermal
gradient tube lined with platinum, an aerosol sampIer, aseries of glass-fiber
filters, heated ehareoal, and eooled eharcoal. The temperature in the thermal
gradient tube varied from about 850°C at the inlet to 150°C at the outlet. The
other colleetor eomponents were maintained at ~150°C to prevent steam eonden-
sation.
ORNL DWG 82-279R
Fig. 1. Fission produet release and eolleetion system.
Data were obtained before, during, and after each test. The principal
methods for analysis were (1) gamma speetrometry (GS) for the radionuelides,
(2) neutron aetivation analysis (NA) for 129r, (3) spark-source mass spectrom-
etry(SSMS), and (4) energy-dispersive x-ray analysis (EDX) via seanning elee-
tron microscopy for all exeept the lighter elements. All four methods have been
valuable in studying fission produet release and transport, and, in addition,
the SSMS and EDX analyses haveprovided data on the behavior of struetural and
impurity elements that influence fission product behavior. Fission produet
inventories in the fuel were determined by ORIGEN calculations, based on the
reaetor operating histories and on mass spectrometric analysis of the irradiated
fuel. The aecumulations of 134Cs and 137Cs on the thermal gradient tube and the
filters and of 35Kr on the eooled charcoal were measured during the tests by
gamma spectrometry. Posttest examinations included GS analysis of the entire
fuel specimen and all apparatus components, as weIl as optical microscopy and
scanning electron microscopy of selected areas (especially the fuel/cladding
interfaces and areas of melting and/or reaction).
RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION
The principal test parameters and the fractional release data for the five
tests in this series are summarized in Table r. Significant releases of fission
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Table I. Fission product release data from tests of LWR fuel
Steam flow Fraction of inventory
a
found (%)
Test Temperature Time rate
No. (OC) (min) (L/min) 85Krb 137Cs 1291 125Sbc 110mAgC
HI-1 1400 30 1.0 3.13 1.75 2.04 0.018 0
HI-2 1700 20 1.0 51.8 50.5 53.0 1.55 3.13
HI-3 2000 20 0.30 59.3 58.8 35.4 0.001 0.015
HI-4 1850 20 0.32 31.3 31.7 24.7 0.009
d 0.09~HI-5 1700 20 0.41 19.8 20.8 22.9 0.315 18.07
a
bBased on ORIGEN calculation.
clncludes Kr released during irradiation.
only.dMeasurable only after Cs removal; values represent minima
About 99% of released Sb and Ag remained in the furnace.
product Kr, I, and Cs occurred in all tests; smaller and more variable fractions
of Mo, Ru, Ag, Cd, Sb, Te, Ce, and Eu were detected also. The very high levels
of radiocesium interfered with GS analyses for the less abundant gamma emitters,
such as 106Ru, 110mAg, and 125Sb. The release fractions for rubidium and bro-
mine were similar to those for cesium and iodine, their chemical analogs. The
release and transport of Ag, Sb, and Te appeared to be influenced by the extent
of cladding oxidation by the steam.
In addition to these fission products, a number of structural elements (Zr,
Sn, Mg, Ca) and impurities (S, Cl, Pb, Bi) were identified by SSMS and EDX.
These structural and impurity elements were significant contributors to the
masses of aerosol deposited on the thermal gradient tubes and filters. Since
some of these elements are not present in LWRs, however, their behavior in our
tests is not relevant to safety considerations.
The mass distributions of fission product Cs, I, Sb, and Ag in the platinum
thermal gradient tube varied significantly. This is illustrated in Fig. 2. 8 ,9
In all tests, the iodine was deposited in a single broad peak at temperatures
ranging between 400 and 600°C. These results indicate the existence of a single
form of iodine, apparently CsI, in association with some other form of cesium.
The iodine form was somewhat less volatile than pure CsI.9 Based on our knowl-
edge of the materials present and on their thermochemical properties,10 we
believe the CsI forms a solid solution with a less volatile cesium compound.
Very little elemental or organic iodine was present, as evidenced by the small
fractions of released iodine (0.4% maximum) found on the charcoal.
The behavior of antimony was markedly different; as shown in Fig. 2, the
surface concentration decreased exponentially with distance along the platinum
tube. Our data indicate that antimony was released in elemental form, and that
gas-phase diffusion was the limiting step in deposition onto the platinum. The
antimony reacted rapidly and irreversibly with the platinum, probably forming a
solid solution of PtSb2 in platinum. 11 In addition, the antimony release
exceeded 1% only in test HI-2, indicating a correlation with cladding oxidation.
Although our data for tellurium release are limited, the release of this element
appeared to be strongly dependent on the extent of cladding oxidation, as
reported by Albrecht and Wild 12 , and by Lorenz et al. 13 Only in tests where
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Fig. 2. Mass distribution of fission products in
thermal gradient tube after test HI-2.
Cesium profiles in the thermal gradient tube have usually been complex,
indicating two or more chemical forms. In our tests, only ~30% of the released
cesium deposited in the thermal gradient tubes; the remainder either deposited
on the Zr02 at the outlet end of the furnace or was collected on the filters.
Although a large fraction of the released cesium may have existed as CsOH, the
deposition profiles indicated the presence of other, less volatile forms.
Spark-source mass spectrometry data have revealed sufficient masses of other
elements to form less volatile mixed oxides of cesium; the major possibilities
are zirconium (from the cladding), molybdenum (fission product), and sulphur
(from furnace ceramics).
In the most re cent test (HI-5), a miniature deposition sampIer was used to
collect aerosol sampIes continuously in a form convenient for posttest examina-
tion. A small graphite rod, driven by a screw, traveled across the effluent
stream prior to the filters, collecting material in a spiral path on its sur-
face. After the test, the rod was analyzed by GS, then examined by scanning
electron microscopy with EDX analysis. Particle sizes ranging from ~1 to
100 ~ were measured. A number of apparently crystalline particles with Cs/I
ratios of ~1.7 were observed with a general background of cesium, suggesting
that the particles were primarily CsI. Other elements identified by EDX
included Cd, Zr, Fe, Si, S, and Cu, listed in order of declining concentrations.
Gamma spectrometric analysis of the fuel specimen provided supplementary
data about fission product release and test temperature. The ratios of 134Cs
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(1365 keV) to 154Eu (1274 keV) for four sets of measurements are plotted in
Fig. 3. Europium was chosen for comparison because it should behave like the
UOZ fuel and be relatively immobile, while the cesium should be released in
large quantities during the test. In order to minimize attenuation effects in
the fuel, similar gamma ray energies for 134Cs and 154Eu were measured both
before and after testing. Measurements were made on both the entire specimen
(through a 3.8-cm-thick lead plate) and on l-cm-Iong sections (unshielded, as
through a collimator). Cesium release values obtained by this method and by the
conventional "summation of components" method are shown in Table 11 for the last
three tests of the series.
ORNL DWG 84 - 850
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Fig. 3. Cesium-134 content of the fuel before
and after test HI-4.
Table 11. Cesium release values found by GS analysis
and by summation of components
Cesium released from the fuel (%)


















These data show that (l) the two independent techniquesfor determining
cesium release agree reasonably weIl for three types of fuel with a burnup range
of 10 to 40 MWd/kg; (2) the slightly higher cesium release indicated for the
inlet end of the specimen is in good agreement with the predicted temperature
profile in the furnace; and (3) results from the two types of measurement of
fission products in the fuel (short sections unshielded vs total specimen with
lead attenuation) are consistent and comparable. The absence of appropriate
gamma ray energies and the generally lower release rates of elements other than
cesium, however, limits the usefulness of this technique in determining the
release of other fission products.
Posttest examination of the fuel specimens at ANL included optical and
scanning electron microscopy and scanning Auger microprobe analysis. Changes in
the fuel microstructure correlated reasonably weIl with the measured fission
product release values. 14 Test-induced increases in U0 2 grain size varied from
~20% at 1400°c to ~50% at 2000°C. Fuel fractography showed the development of









Fig. 4. Fractographs of intragranular fractures in the U02
in tests HI-l, HI-2, and HI-3, illustrating the development of
porosity both internal and on the surfaces of the grains.
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observed increases in porosity, which resulted from bubble growth and inter-
linkage, correlated reasonably weIl with test temperatures and measured fission
gas releases. Energy-dispersive x-ray analysis determined that observed inter-
granular metallic beads consisted of the noble metal fission products Zr, Ru,
Rh, and Pd.
Examination of the Zircaloy cladding showed essentially complete oxidation
to ZrOZ for test HI-2 and less, but extensive, oxidation in the other tests.
Considerable chemical interaction between the fuel and cladding was observed in
the 2000°C test (HI-3); although local uranium concentrations were quite high in
some areas of the cladding, the average content was estimated to be <3 wt %.
Compared to the observations of Hofmann and Kerwin-Peck,15 our results indicate
that the oxidizing atmosphere (steam), reduced the extent of fuel-cladding
interaction and liquifaction by converting Zr to ZrOZ'
Arecent NRC-sponsored review of all applicable fission product release
work 16 compared the data on the basis of fractional release rate, k, using a
model proposed by Albrecht and Wild 17 of the form
F = 1 - e-kt • (1)
(2)
This equation, where F is the total fractional release, t is time, and k is a
function of temperature, can be solved for k:
k = - ~ ln(l - F) •
t
Because the release of fission products from UO Z should be closely related to
the vapor pressures of the particular species, we chose to compare the data in
the Arrhenius fashion, as suggested by Andriesse and Tanke,18 rather than
directly vs temperature, as done previously.8 However, the comparison of total
release data from experiments of varying duration (20 to 30 min in this test
series vs 0.5 to 10 min in a previous series Z) introduced a significant uncer-
tainty in the release rate, k. In an effort to compare all tests more equally,
we derived k'S for Kr and Cs from the on-line release data, using results for
only a short period (generally 5 min) at the beginning of the maximum tempera-
ture phase of each test. These data, which are plotted in Fig. 5, show consis-
tent dependence On reciprocal absolute temperature, with curves from the two
types of tests exhibiting slightly different slopes. Experimental differences
that might contribute to the higher release rates found in the earlier HT tests Z
are: (1) expanded cladding, which could reduce any cladding restraints on
release and increase the accessibility of steam to the UOZ' and (2) direct
induction heating of the cladding, whichresulted in faster heatup rates. The
data points for test HI-2 appear high by all methods of comparison; the complete
oxidation and large fracture of the cladding may have resulted in some oxidation
of the UO Z, a potential cause of increased fission product release.
CONCLUSIONS
These tests of commercial LWR fuel have shown that ~50% of the fission
product cesium, iodine, and krypton may be released within a matter of minutes
at temperatures of 1700 to 2000°C. Smaller, but significant, fractions of the
Ru, Ag, Sb, and Te were released also. Rubidium and bromine release fractions
were similar to those for their respective chemical analogs, cesium and iodine.
Release rates calculated from these total release fractions compare reasonably
weIl with previous experimental values, and the release rates for cesium and














\" ,.:: \w \
!;( \ \Cl: HI TESTS \w \
(J) 10-3 \ •« •w ,
\.J ,WCl: \...
... 8~Kr; HI TESTS \
• 137Ca; HI TESTS• 8~Kr; HT TESTS




Fig. 5. Krypton and cesium release rates based
on initial 5 min at test temperature.
changes in fue1 microstructure, such as grain growth and the growth and inter-
1inkage of bubb1es, were consistent with test temperatures and fission product
releases. These resu1ts indicate that the kinetic processes controlling inert
gas release app1y simi1ar1y to the behavior of the vo1ati1e fission products,
cesium and iodine.
The re1eased iodine behaved in all cases 1ike a mixture of CsI and a 1ess-
vo1ati1e cesium compound; on1y very sma11 fractions of iodine «0.4%) passed
through the filters as I Z' RI, and/or organic iodides. Cesium, however, seemed
to exist in severa1 different forms, and the dominant cesium species probab1y
depended on the avai1abi1ity of such elements as mo1ybdenum, zirconium, and
su1phur, any of which may react with CsOR. Antimony, and probab1y si1ver and
tellurium, were re1eased in e1ementa1 form. Apparent1y the release of these
elements was strong1y inhibited in cases where metallic zirconium was present,
suggesting the formation of a110ys with the c1adding unti1 most of the zirconium
had been converted to ZrOZ'
A technique for the direct measurement of fission products in the fue1,
both before and after testing, was demonstrated to be re1iab1e and produced
independent verification of fission product release and of temperature distri-
bution in the fue1 specimen.
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BEHAVIOR OF FISSION PRODUCTS RELEASED FROM SEVERELY DAMAGED FUEL
DURING THE PBF SEVERE FUEL DAMAGE TESTS
D. J. Osetek,l A. W. Cronenberg,2 D. L. Hagrman,l
J. M. Broughton l and J. Rest,3
EG&G Idaho, Inc.
Idaho Falls, ID 83415
ABSTRACT
The results of fission product behavior during the first two Power
Burst Facility Severe Fuel Damage tests are presented. Measured
fission product release is compared with calculated release using
temperature dependent release rate correlations and FASTGRASS
analysis. The test results indicate that release from fuel of the
high volatility fission products (Xe, Kr, I, Cs, and Te) is strongly
influenced by parameters other than fuel temperature; these are
fuel/fission product morphology, fuel and cladding oxidation state,
extent of fuel liquefaction, and quench induced fuel shattering.
Fission product transport from the test fuel through the sampIe
system was strongly influenced by chemical effects. Holdup of land
Cs was affected by fission product chemistry and transport time.
Analysis demonstrates that such integral test data can be used to
confirm physical, chemical, and mechanistic models of fission product
behavior for severe accident conditions.
INTRODUCTION
The Uni ted States Nuclear Regulatory Commission has initiated an
internationally sponsored severe fuel damage research program4 to investigate
light water reactor (LWR) fuel rod and core response, and the release and
transport of fission products and hydrogen during degraded core cooling
accidents. The principal in-pile testing portion of this program is aseries
of severe fuel damage (SFD) tests being performed in the Power Burst Facility
(PBF) at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
The principal test conditions for the four bundle experiments are
summarized in Table I, and a cross-sectional view of the bundle configuration
is shown in Figure 1. The test bundle consists of zircaloy-clad U0 2 fuel
rods arranged in a 6 x 6 array, without corner rods. The first two tests, the
SFD Scoping Test (SFD-ST) and SFD 1-1, used fresh fuel wh ich was
trace-irradiated to approximately 90 MWd/MTU prior to initiation of the SFD
transient; the last two tests incorporate rods previously irradiated to
approximately 36,000 M1vd/MTU. Ag-ln-Cd control rods will be incorporated into
the last test. This paper summarizes results for the first two experiments.
Further details of the test program are described in References 1 and 2.
The on-line fission product sampling and monitoring system is shown
schematically in Figure 2. The test effluent, consisting of steam, hydrogen,
and fission products, was routed from the fuel bundle to the monitoring system
through a 1.3 cm diameter stainless steel pipe. Six effluent steam sampIes
were remotely opened at various times during the tests to provide sampIes for
posttest analysis. The remaining effluent was cooled to a temperature below
340 K. The effluent then entered aseparator vessel, where nitrogen purge gas
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF THE PBF-SFD PHASE-I TEST CONDITIONS
Nominal
Fue1 Coo1ant
Test Burnup F10w Cooldown Test
(Status) Heating Rate (at.%) (gis) Mode Conditions
SFD-ST 0.13 K/s to 1700 K 0.0089 16.0 Queneh Steam rieh,
(Oet, 1982) 10.0 K/s to 2400 K 100% oxidation
partial fue1
1ique fae t ion
genera ted
SFD 1-1 0.45 K/s to 1300 K 0.0079 0.7 Slow Steam
(Sept 1983) 1.3 K/s to 1700 K starved
30 K/s to 2400 K 30% oxidation
extensive
liquefae tion
SFD 1-3 0.5 K/s to 1200 3.6 0.7 Slow Similar to
(Ju1y 1984) 3.7 K/s to 1700 SFD I-I, but
30 K/s to 2400 4 empty guide
tubes
SFD 1-4 Similar to 3.6 0.7 Slow 4 AglnCd


























Figu~e 1. Cross seetion of the severe fue1 damage test train.
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Figure 2. SFD Fission produet and hydrogen monitoring system for test 1-1.
swept hydrogen, fission gases, and other noneondensables from the separator,
past a gamma speetrometer and a hydrogen monitor, into a eolleetion tank. The
liquid from the separator was also monitored eontinuously by gamma
speetroseopy, then passed through a partiele filter and into a eolleetion
tank. Six liquid grab samples were eolleeted at speeifie times during the
tests to assess fission produets earried with the liquid.
The prineipal differenees between test SFD-ST and test SFD 1-1 were the
mass flow rates of eoolant and the eooldown mode. The higher mass flow during
the SFD-ST (16 gm/s) resulted in a steam rieh environment within the fuel
bundle, a high volumetrie flow rate leaving the bundle (~550 em3/s), and
relatively low fission produet eoneentrations. The low mass flow during the
SFD 1-1 test (0.7 gm/s) resulted in a predominately hydrogen blanketed fuel
bundle and a low volumetrie flow rate leaving the bundle (~20 em3/s). The
rapid queneh and reflood of the SFD-ST bundle resulted in extensive fuel
shattering, whereas the slow eooling of the SFD 1-1 bundle minimized fuel
shattering and ehanges in the high temperature geometry.
In the following seetions, fission produet behavior observed during the
first two tests are eorrelated with fuel/fission produet morphology, and system
ehemistry and transport eonditions.
EFFECTS OF FUEL/FISSION PRODUCT MORPHOLOGY
Released fission produets are monitored downstream of the bundle exit
after the test effluent flows through approximately 30 meters of piping. Thus
the released fission produets ean interaet physieally and ehemieally with the
steam/hydrogen atmosphere, or the metal eomponents of the system, before
aetivity measurements are obtained. Sueh transport effeets probably influeneed
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the measured behavior of T, 'Cs, and Te which are highly reactive. However, the
noble gases are essentially inert both physically and chemically under these
conditions, and their on-line measured activity, corrected for transport time,
should provide an accurate signature of real-time release from the fuel.
The noble gas release rates from the fuel for both tests, as a function of
fuel temperature are shown in Figure 3. A small burst release was noted in
both tests at fuel temperatures of ~ 1100 K, which corresponds to the gap
inventory of noble gases at the time of cladding rupture. Fission product
release was low during both tests after the burst release until the fuel
temperatures reached ~1700 K. The indicated fractional release rates
increased from 10-6 to 10-3 min- l above 1700 K as fuel temperatures
approached the a-Zr(0)/U02 eutectic melting temperature of ~ 2170 K.
Significant fuel liquefaction would be expected at temperatures above
~2l70 K. A spike in the release of noble gases was detected at the time of
bundle quench during the scoping test. Extensive fuel fracturing along grain
boundaries is believed to be the reason for the enhanced fission product
release. The total fractional release of noble gases was approximately
0.5 during the Scoping Test and approximately 0.2 during Test 1-1. Most of the
fission gas release measured during the Scoping Test occurred during quench of
the fuel bundle from high temperaturej however, during Test 1-1, most of the
fission gas release was measured when the bundle was cooling, and is probably
related to fuel liquefaction.
M.M M ...
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Figure 3. Comparison of the noble gas behavior during the SFD-ST and
test SFD 1-1.
The mobility of the fission gases, Xe and Kr, within the fuel matrix is
primarily controlled by the local temperature, temperature gradient, and burnup
related fuel/fission product morphology. The mobility of the fission gas atoms
at temperatures less than about 1300 K is too low to permit appreciable
movement. However, motion of the gas atoms is significant at temperatures
above 1300 K. Gas bubbles will form within grains and gradually collect at
grain boundaries. Bubble motion can occur due to thermal gradients or by
sweeping of grain-boundaries[3]. Gas that collects at grain boundaries is
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released from the pellet interior only if the intergranular bubble density is
large enough to cause bubble interlinkage and pathways to open porosity, or to
sufficiently weaken the grain boundaries so that stress in the fuel causes
cracking. If such interlinkage is absent, the noble gases are effectively
trapped within the fuel pellet interior at the grain boundaries. Above 1900 K,
gas bubbles and closed pores are sufficiently mobile to be driven by the
thermal gradient to grain boundaries or open cracks where the gas is released.
Thus, the gas release during a transient might be greatly enhanced if grain
boundaries were disrupted by mechanisms such as the quench during the scoping
test or fuel liquefaction during 1-1.
The fission gas release rate correlations from NUREG-0772 [4] and
FASTGRASS [5] calculations of noble gas release are also shown in Figure 3.
Measured release rates for the SFD-ST and 1-1 Tests are, in general, much lower
during the fuel heatup than the NUREG-0772 release rate correlation. These
tests were performed with trace-irradiated fuel that acquired only 80 to 90
MWd/MT burnup during preconditioning at relatively low power and temperature.
Therefore, trace quantities of fission products were essentially distributed
uniformly within the fuel grains, with almost no accumulation (concentration)
at grain boundaries be fore the transient. Under these conditions, limited
release of noble gases would be expected. A FASTGRASS analysis was performed
for the SFD-ST and 1-1 test transients and the results indicate that the vast
majority of both the noble gases and volatiles I and Cs were retained within
the interior of individual grains as either individual atoms or newly nucleated
intergranular microbubbles during most of the heatup phase. Because atomic or
intergranular microbubble fission products are readily accommodated within the
solid fuel microstructure, they experience little release from solid fuel, even
at relatively high temperatures. The FASTGRASS calculations indicate that such
conditions probably existed up until the time grain growth caused sweeping of
intergranular atoms and microbubbles to grain boundaries (starting at about
1900 K). The predicted behavior using FASTGRASS and a model for oxidation
accelerated grain growth, indicates rather good agreement with the SFD-ST and
1-1 data during fuel heatup to 2400 K., as shown in Figure 3.
The SFD Test 1-1 was terminated with a slow cooldown requiring
approximately 16 minutes. The measured fission-gas release is in sharp
contrast with the NUREG-0772 release rates which decrease as the bundle cools.
The SFD Test 1-1 release rates and estimated fuel temperatures are plot ted on a
linear scale against time in Figure 4. The linear scale places release during
heatup in perspective with the peak release during cooldown; cooldown started
at about 41 min and was complete by about 57 min. The sharp increase in
fission product release at about 41 min was at least partly induced by fuel
liquefaction. The process of clad melting and fuel liquefaction provides an
important mechanism for enhanced fission product release from the U0 2
matrix. However, the fission product atoms and bubbles must coalesce to form
bubbles with sufficient buoyancy to overcome viscosity within the liquefied
core material and rise to a free surface. The fission gas release during
cooldown is further complicated because the U-Zr-O mixture does not freeze at
constant temperature. Instead, as the mixture slowly cools, uranium and
zirconium oxides precipitate in a uranium-zirconium liquid matrix, gradually
increasing the solid content of the original slurry. Movement of the
fission-gas bubbles would be progressively more difficult as they attempt to
coalesce and migrate to a free surface, because the effective viscosity of the
slurry gradually increases with decreasing temperature. The final U-Zr
component freezes at about 1600 K, which correlates weIl with the exponential























Figure 4. SFD 1-1 Xe release rates and estimated fuel temperatures.
In summary, the sequence of events leading to fission product release for
the trace-irradiated fuel employed in the SFD-ST and 1-1 Tests appears to be as
follows:
o Initially high fission-product retention within individual fuel grains
as individual atoms or intergranular microbubbles, with nil gas
release.
o Sweeping of fission products from the grain interior to grain
boundaries at fuel temperatures above ~1900 K; which can be enhanced
by rapid grain growth under fuel oxidation conditions.
o Destruction of the grain structure via fuel liquefaction or
quench-induced grain boundary shattering, with rapid fission gas
release.
o Sustained gas release during cooldown as the liquefied U-Zr-O mixture
remains molten to lower temperatures (~ 1600 K).
In addition to fuel/fission product morphology, fission product behavior
is also strongly influenced by chemical effects after release from the fuel.
These effects are discussed below.
CHEMICAL BEHAVIOR OF FISSION PRODUCTS
The measured I and Cs activity as a function of test fuel temperatures is
shown in Figure 5. Large differences in I and es behavior are noted between
the two tests. Such discrepancies can be explained in terms of the
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Figure S. Comparison of iodine and cesium release behavior noted during
the SFD-ST and 1-1 Tests.
Cs and I will mix and react with the steam and hydrogen released by the
steam-zircaloy reaction after release from the fuel. The ultimate chemical
composition of this vapor mixture depends on specie concentration,
temperature, pressure and oxidation/reduction conditions. The equilibrium
composition, at a particular temperature and pressure, can be found by noting
that the total free energy of formation (6Gf) approaches zero, this is:
6G f (Products) - 6Gf (Reactants) ~ 0
For an ideal gas, 6Gf can be expressed as:
where Pi is the partial pressure of a particular gaseous component of the
reacting mixture. Changes in reactant concentration and RiO ratio will produce
a change in the product composition. The results of Sallach's equilibrium
analysis [6] for the Cs-I-O-R system, were used to assess the primary chemical
forms for the SFD-ST and SFD 1-1 test conditions.
Table 11 is a summary of the fission product concentration .and
thermalhydraulic conditions in the high temperature region of the test bundle
at the beginning of enhanced fission product release. The fractional I species
concentrations as calculated by Sallach [6], at the corresponding fission
product concentration levels, Rio ratio and test pressure conditions are shown
in Figure 6. It is important to note that for trace-irradiated fuel, the
release concentrations of I in R20 are on the order of 10-9 to 10-6 mole
fraction. Since the effect of decreasing iodine and cesium concentration is
toward a diminished abundance of CsI at thermochemical equilibrium, the results
plot ted in Figure 6 may not be typical of what would be expected during an
accident with higher burnup fuel, where higher fission product concentrations
may exist. Nevertheless, for the ST and 1-1 trace irradiation conditions the
fractional partitioning of I and Cs species are estimated from Figure 6. The
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TABLE 11. SUMMARY OF THERMODYNAMIC AND CONCENTRATION CONDITIONS FOR THE
SFD-ST AND 1-1 TESTS AT THE TIME OF ENHANCED FISSION PRODUCT
RELEASE
Parameter SFD-ST SFD 1-1
Steam temperature 1400 K (. 1130° C) • 1400 K
(·1130°C)
System pressure 7.0 MPa (" 70 bar) " 6.6 MPa
(" 66 bar)
H/o mole ratio 2.06 45
Cs/I mole ratio 10 10
I/H20 mole ratio 10-9 10-8
Cs/H20 mole ratio 10-8 10-7
800 1000 1200 1400 1600
Temperature (0C)
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I/H20 = 10- 9; H/O = 2.06
CslI = 10; P = 7.0 MPa
H -9I1 20 = 10 ; H/O = 45
Cs/l = 10; P = 7.0 MPa
INEL 4 0901
Figure 6. Relative abundance of iodine species in the Cs-I-H-O system for the
conditions of the SFD-ST (A) and 1-1 (B) tests as predicted from
thermochemica1 equi1ibrium.
low boi1ing point vo1ati1es I and HI predominate for both cases and probab1y
more for the ST case where the steam supp1y di1uted the cesium and iodine more
than it did in the 1-1 test. In the near neutral environment (i,e.,
H/o " 2.06) of the SFD-ST test, iodine in the high temperature (1400 K)
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region is predicted to exist as 20 percent atomic iodine and 80 percent HI. In
the highly reducing environment of Test SFD 1-1 (H/O ~ 45), approximately
98 percent of the iodine is predicted to be in the form of HI.
The high mole fractions of volatile iodine species HI and I (assumed to
behave similar to 12) in the SFD-ST and their low vaporization temperatures
(see Table 111) suggest limited condensation potential during the rapid
transport (~3 s) through the effluent line to the detectors. However, due to
the relatively low flow rate for the SFD 1-1 test and long transport times
(~60 s), cooldown of the effluent in the piping causes transformation of I
and HI to CsI. Calculations performed with a modified version of the TRAP MELT
code [7] show that the iodine which transforms to CsI will condense on the
inlet side of the condenser while the HI and I pass through the condenser.
This is the reasonfor the nil iodine and cesium measured at the downstream
detector location during the SFD 1-1 Test. Only upon bundle reflood and
washout of reversible CsI deposits was significant iodine measured for Test SFD
l~.
TABLE 111. VAPORIZATION TEMPERATURES OF lAND Cs SPECIES
Tvap (K) at 1 atm
















In summary, the high mole fractions of HI and I, and the rapid transport
conditions account for the high iodine measurement during the SFD-scoping
test. However, the transformation of land HI to CsI, due to higher
concentration and to cooldown effects during the long transport time associated
with the low flow rate of the 1-1 test, explain the observation that only upon
bundle reflood was significant iodine measured for Test SFD 1-1.
CONCLUSIONS
From the foregoing analysis, the following conclusions can be drawn
relative to noble gas and volatile fission product release from fuel and
transport behavior in the SFD-ST and 1-1 tests:
o Fission product release is strongly influenced by prior irradiation
induced fuel/fission product morphology. Analysis of the SFD-ST and
SFD-l-l data for trace-irradiated fuel indicates limited release on
heatup to fuel temperatures up to 2000 K, where the majority of the
noble gases and volatiles are retained within the grain interior as
individual atoms. Only upon grain growth and sweeping of fission
products to grain boundaries is enhanced noble gas and volatile
release predicted for trace-irradiated fuel in the solid state.
Subsequent fuel liquefaction and quench-induced grain boundary
shattering result in rapid fission product release
o Iodine and cesium chemistry are strongly influenced by concentration
and oxidation/reduction conditions. The low land Cs concentrations
and the relatively neutral (H/O ~ 2.06) high steam flow rate
conditions of the Scoping Test resulted in predominately free iodine
and CsOH transport in steam. However, the low flow rate, highly
reducing (H/O ~ 45) environment of Test 1-1 combined with the
concentration and cooldown-induced transformation of land HI to CsI
accounts for the observation of limited iodine detection during the
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heatup phase of this test. Only upon posttransient reflood of the
Test SFD 1-1 bundle was significant iodine release observed, which was
probably washout of reversible CsI deposits
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DETERMINATION OF IODINE 131 RELEASE FROM DEFECT IRRADIATED
FUEL RODS UNDER SIMULATED LOCA CONDITIONS
E. Groos and R. Förthmann
Kernforschungsanlage Jülich GmbH, W.-Germany
ABSTRACT
In an attempt to obtain realistic and reliable values for the I 131
release in a PWR-LOCA, nineteen test fuel rads, irradiated under power
reactor conditions, were heated with deliberately caused leaks to tem-
peratures between 800 and 1000°C.
I 131 release showed a dependence on burn up and/or specific power and
could be separated in a volatile and a non-volatile fra~6ion. For fuel
rads with normal load, the volatile fraction was 3 x 10 of the I 131
inventory at the most a~a the average total release over several hours
of heating was about 10 .
I. INTRODUCTION
Iodine 131 is to our present knowledge the radiologically most significant
radionuclide among those possibly released during a reactor incident. Theoretical
assessment however is very difficult because of the complicat,ed chemistry of the
iodine, yet the chemical form is decisive for the release behaviour. According-
ly the I 131 release values assumed in the appropriate safety regulations are
rather conservative by nature. Ta render possible a more realistic assessment
the availability of reliable realistic experimental data is essential.
When breakage of a main coolant pipe of a PWR occurs, i.e. loss of coolant
accident (LOCA), the pressure drop in the core and the superheating of the fuel
cause the claddings of some fuel rods to burst before they are reflooded by the
emergency coolant /1/. Fission products accumulated in the gap between fuel and
cladding can be released spontaneously (gap release). It was the aim of this
investigation to measure the gap release of iodine 131, being decisive for any
further iodine release in the course of the accident /2,3/.
Emphasis was placed on simulating the accident conditions as realistic as
possible in a post irradiation experiment. Temperatures, pressures and envi-
ronment conditions were adjusted similar to those in a reactor core and the
test fuel rads used had realistic burn up and specific power and still con-
tained I 131 produced by fission.
2. IODINE CHEMISTRY
Iodine belangs to the group of the halogens, which are the most reactive
chemical elements. It is however less agressive than fluorine,chlorine and bro-
mine. The elemental iodine (I,) is a crystalline substance with a boiling point
of 184,4°C though it sublimates noticeably at room temperature. This quality has
led to the fact, that in nuclear reactor accident assessment iodine is treated
like a noble gas.
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Taking its chemical reactivity into account, the behaviour of the iodine
in contact with the coolant water and the structural materials in the reactor
core must be considered. The reaction with water produces iodide (1-), hypoiodite
(HOl) and iodate (10,-)
I, + H,O ~ H+ + I + HOl
3 HOl ~ 10, + 21 + 3H+
31,
- - +
+ 3H,O .= 10, + SI + 6H .
All three reactions depend on various parameters (temperature, pH-value, ra-
diation, oxygen concentration and others). Different from I" ,he two iodine
species 1- and 10, - are not volatile and - in a loss of coolant accident - remain
dissolved in the sump-water. Only if the acidity of the water reaches pH-values
of < 6 and lower, the equilibria shift to the left side to form again I" resp.
can I be oxydized to I, by oxygen from the air /4/.
with metals I, reacts - particularly at higher temperatures resp. in the
presence of water - to form non-volatile iodides
I, + 2Me --..- 2Me+ + 2 I ,
for example with Zr the ZrI
4
(boiling point about 430°C). This compound as weIl
as non-volatile compounds wlth metallic fission products (CsI) can be formed in
the intact fuel rod, thus making only a small fraction of the iodine available in
volatile, elemental form for instant gap release when a rupture of the canning
occurs /5/.
3. TEST FACILITY
Figure 1 is a schematic presentation of the apparatus used for the experi-
ments. It had to be placed in a hot cell and consisted of four main parts:
a pressure tube (1) in a furnace to take the test fuel rod (tube length
60 mm, diameter 2,5 cm); the temperature (J200°C max.) was measured and
registerd by a thermocouple (2), the pressure (6 bar max.)by apressure
gauge (3);
a gas/water feed system (4) could feed through the inlet pipe (5) either
agas (6) or - by means of an injection pump (7) - water in small meas-
ured portions to the hot test point in the pressure tube; through the
compensation pipe (8) an adjustable gas pressure could be put on the
- cooled condensate trap (9). In this receptable steam coming from the
pressure tube through the outlet pipe (10) was condensed and the gas
pressure was necessary to compensate the resulting underpressure. When
the pressure tube was swept with an inert gas instead of steam, the
condensate trap contained sodium hydroxide solution (0, I % NaOH) to
dissolve soluble iodine. The content of the condensate trap could be
sampled for analysis through the pipe (11);
- any iodine in the'gas from the condensate trap was collected in the
filter system (12). The gas stream could be adjusted by the valve (13)
be fore it passed through a fibre filter (14) and a charcoal filter (15),
containing KJ impregnated charcoal in four separable partitions. Before
releasing it into the hot cell atmosphere, the gas passed a safety filter














FIGURE I: TEST APPARATUS (SCHEMATIC)
4. TEST PROCEDURE
The test parameters were chosen to simulate the conditions in a reactor
pressure vessel during a LOCA as close to reality as possible in an out of pile
experiment.
That comprises:
- test fuel rods with realistic burn up and specific power
- test temperatures between 800 and IIOO°C
- test pressures between 1 and 6 bar
- test fuel rod in a steam atmosphere and an environment of structural
material corresponding to the co re structure (stainless steel, zircaloy).
4.1 Test Fuel Rods
The test fuel rods were provided by KWU, who had irradiated them in the
KKW-Obrigheim to burn ups between 8 and 44 GWd/tU. The length was only a tenth
of that of the original 4 m fuel rods. They had been stored for over a year so
that the shorter lived fission products, including the I 131, had decayed. The
rods were therefore reirradiated in the HFR-Pettenl2t specific powers between 210
and 400 W/cm to an I 131 inventory of 5 to IJ x 10 Bq (140 to 300 ci) per rod.
4.2 Cladding Leak
The leak in the cladding was produced by one of three methods:
- sawing of a slit (30 mm long, 2 mm wide) be fore heating into the cladding
in the region of the temperature maximum in the pressure tube (fig. 2)
- making apreset breaking point by milling the cladding wall thin (30 mm
long) (fig. 3) and bursting the cladding during heating, detectable by a
pressure peak
- bursting of the cladding during heating without any pretreatment (fig. 4)
FIGURE 2
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FIGURE 3 FlGURE 4
DIFFERENT TYPES OF CLADDING LEAKS
Bursting of the fuel rod wall occured between 730 and 780°C with the
exeption of the two rods with the highest load, which ruptured at 640 resp.
620°C. In table I the relevant test parameters are compiled. Any influence of
the way the leak was produced on the release of I 131 could not be observed.
4.3 Heating
The temperature in the furnace was controlled by an automatie regulator
in combination with the thermoeouple. Heating up to 800°C took about 1 hour, to
IIOO°C about 1 1/2 to 2 hours. During the heating the fuel rods, in the pressure
tube were either swept with steam (16 rods) or with an inert gas (3 rods).
Sweeping with Steam
When the temperature in the pressure tube had reached 200°C, water was
injected in small portions of 0,2 to 0,5 ml into the hot tube, thus filling it
with steam. The throughput was between 200 and 300 ml of water per hour. There
were three possiblities to adjust the pressure in the system:
- amount of water injected
- out let valve
- compensation gas pressure
fig .. 1 (7)(5)
(13) and
(6)(8) .
Most of the I 131 released from the defect fuel rod that did not deposit on
the hot metals in the pressure tube was dissolved in the water condensed in the
eondensate .trap and could be withdrawn by means of the sampling pipe (11) with-
out interruption of the test. This rendered possible the measurement of the
time dependence of the I 131 release from the pressure tube.
Some negligible small amounts of I 131 were found in the filter system, mainly
in the first partition of the charcoal filter.
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Sweeping with Inert Gas
Three test rods were heated in an atmosphere of helium instead of steam to
check the iodine behaviour in the absence of water. The helium was swept through
the inlet pipe (5), the condensate trap was filled with 150 ml of 0,1 % sodium
hydroxide solution through the pipe (8). This solution was chosen to avoid
oxidation of 1- by air. It was changed reglil.uly and the I 131 meaqured. In
addition, exchangeable charcoal traps with a volume of about 20 cm3 were
placed between the condensate trap (9) and the out let valve (13) to measure the
iodine not dissolved in the sodium hydroxide solution.
4.4 Post Heating Treatment
Water Leach
In some tests (table I) the pressure tube with the ruptured fuel rod inside
was filled with water after cooling to room temperature (25 to 30°C) and left
for four hours in order to measure the non-volatile soluble I 131 (reflood
phase) .
Cleaning of the Pressure Tube
With each test some of the I 131 remained in the· pressure tube. It could
not be removed even at temperatures up to 1000°C with either steam or inert gas
and could therefore not have been I" but non-volatile iodine compounds,
presumably iodides. This iodine could be removed completely with diluted nitric
acid (0,5% HN0 3) injected into the pressure tube at about 200°C. The I 131 was
collected in the condensate trap andthe charcoal filter.
4.5 Analysis of the lodine Species
Regarding the chemical form of the I 131 released from the fuel rod, two
different forms could be distinguished: the iodine retained in the pressure tube
even at high temperatures in a non-volatile form and that found in the conden-
sate trap and the charcoal filters.
The first kind, deposited in the pressure tube, is not elemental iodine. or it
would have been evaporated out of the tube during the heat treatment. It could,
however, be converted into volatile iodine with nitric acid, proving it was
retained in the tube as non-volatile 1- formed either with the metallic walls of
the tube or with fission metals (reduction of I, to 1-). In an acidic medium, I
can easily be oxidized to I,
which was he re achieved with nitric acid but is also possible with air.
In the charcoal traps the iodine can occur in three forms:
- adsorbed as elemental iodine (I,)
- adsorbed as organic iodine compound (R-I)
- deposited on aerosoles as iodide (1-) or iodate (103 -).
Since the fraction of this iodine is negligible compared with that in pressure
tube and condensate trap - less than 1 %, except during heating in helium - it
is of no significance in connection with the results discussed later and is - to
be on the safe side - treated as "volatile" iodine.
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In the eondensate trap iodine ean appear both as non volatile land as
volat~le el;..emental I,. Liquid/liquid extraetion ,.as employed to separate I, and
and I + 10,. The distribution between an aquous phase (5 < pR < 6) and an organie
phase, not miseible with eaeh oth~r, leads to the eoneentration of I, in the
organie phase, whereas land 10, remain 'in the aquous phase. The I, is then
reextraeted from the organie phase into an aquous phase of pR ~ 12 as in
the form of 1-+ 10, -. By this method volatile I, and non volatile 1- + 10, ean
be 'distinguished.
4.6 Measurement of I 131
In all sampIes I 131 was determined by gammaspeetrometry, using the area of
the photopeak at 364 keV as a measure for the I 131 aetivity. There was no
interferenee by other radionuelides.
5. RESULTS
Two groups of results have been obcained:
- I 131 release values for different seetions of the test apparatus surnmed
up to the total release for the ruptured fuel rod (table land 11) and
- time dependent releases eurves of I 131 from the pressure tube, deseri-
bing the transport with steam into the aqueous solution in
the eondensate trap (figures 5 to 8).
In both groups volatile I, and non-volatile I
values are expressed as "Fractional Release",
released and I 131 inventory of the test fuel
were separated. All release
i.g. the quotient between I 131
rod.
Both burn up and speeifie power influenee the release of fission produets
from the fuel. The higher the burn up, the easier the fission produet transport
in the fuel due to the inereasing distortion of its strueture. Higher speeifie
pOl.er means higher fuel temperature and steeper temperature gradients aeross
the fuel pellets, both resulting in a faster fission produet transport.
Aeeording to the aetual tendeney of the release values to inerease with both
increasing burn up and specific power, an empirical "load factar" was




= B (Glvd!tU) xP (Iv/ern).
For the fuel rods eonsidered this number was between 1900 and 17600, in a nuelear
power reaetor, however, with a mean burn up of about 30 GWd/tU and an average




Table I summarizes all results obtained from 19 fuel rods. They are plaeed
in the table in the order of inereasing K . Aeeording to the experimental
teehnique it eontaines four eolumns with ~seetional" results (eolumn 7 to 10)
and one with the fraetions of 1,/1- found in the eondensate trap are shown in
table II.
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5.1 Condensate (I. Sampie)
Best representative for the "gap" release is the I 131 found in the
sampie first taken from the condensate trap. Ideally it should have been taken 2
to 3 minutes after the burst of the fuel rod, which was not possible due to the
experimental conditions. For the test rods with the saw cut applied be fore
heating, no time of burst could be defined; the first condensate sampie was
taken when the rod reached 800°C. For the rods bursting inside the pressure
tube, the first condensate sampie was taken between 2 minutes (D 66 and 457) and
about 30 minutes (D 225 and 451) after the burst. HOI,ever, time does not seem to
playa significant role, as comparison between D 225 and D 457 shows. In spite
of the different sampling t!~es no significa~5 differences in the I 131 release
could be observed (1,4 x 10 resp. 4,0 x 10 . This difference complies rather with
the general trend of the values in this column to increase with increasing load
factor) .
The most remarkable feature 0E5these figures is the altogether very low frac-
tional release of only 4 x 10 of the I 131 inventory and less - only
exceeded from the fuel rod D 338 with the unrealistically hig~4load of 400 W/cm
at a burn up of 44 GWd/tU (K
B
~ 17 600) which released 2 x 10 of its inventory.
The values in the correspondlng column in table 2 show that the fraction
of volatile iodine is even less, namely a fifth at the most. This fraction
decreases further with increasing fuel rod load_3nd heating temperature.The gap release of volatile iodine was below 10 for the test rod with the high-_
6
est load (D 338, K
B
~ 17 600), for rods with normal load (KB~6000) it was 3 x 10
at the most (D 451).
5.2 Condensate (Total)
The rods were heated between three and six hours. Every 15 to 30 minutes
the content of the condensate trap was sampled in order to establish the time
dependence of the I 131 transport out of the pressure tube by steam or gas resp.
into the condensate trap. Figure 5 presents three typical release curves for
800°C which show the burn up resp. power dependence. Aseparation of the in-
fluence of burn up and specific power was not possible due to the insufficient
small number of fuel rods. For the upper curve of figure 5 the fractions of I,
and 1- are plot ted in figure 6. Almost all of the I, was released into the first
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HEATING TIME / H
FIG. 5: RELEASE OF I 131 FROM
PRESSURE TUBE AT 800°C
FIG. 6: FRACT' \NS OF I, AND I
AT 800°C (21 GWd/tU,300 W/cm)
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The corresponding curves of the rads heated up to IIOO°C are plotted in figures
7 and 8, in fig. 7 tagether with the temperature curves. The I, fraction is



















































HEATING TIME I H
F1G. 7: RELEASE OF I 131 FROM
PRESSURE TUBE AT I 100°C
F1G. 8: FRACT10NS OF I, AND I
AT IIOO°C (SAMPLE D 225)
5.3 Total Release
Fig.9 gives a graphical summary of the release results of all 19 test fuel
rads. The 'results are split in three groups: condensate (I. sampie), condensate
(total) and total release and are plotted against the burn up. From this graph
it is apparent, that except for fuel rads with both high_zurn up and high speci-
fic power the overall I 131 release will be less than 10 of the inventory.
Bearing in mind that only a tenth at the most of this iodine is in the elemen:5tal, volatile form, I 131 release into the air in a LOCA should not exceed 10 of
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FIGURE 9: I 13 J, RELEASE FROM 19 TEST FUEL RODS HEATED UNDER LOCA CONDITIONS
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The total I 131 release from the fuel rods over several hours of heating is
presented in column 10 (table I) as the sum of the columns 7, 8 and 9. Neglec'
ting as a rough approximation both temperature and heating time - and with the
relatively small number of sampies no better evaluation was possible - the ave-
rage t~~al release of I 131 from fuel rods under normal load (K
E
<6000) was about
1 x 10 of the inventory. The heating times were up to 8 hours at 800o~5with
peak temperatures up ~g IIOO°C. The release figures vary between 3 x 10 (D 66,
K ~ 3000) and 1 x 10 (D_~08, K ~ 6000). The release fraction of volatile I, from
t~ese rods is about 3 x 10 at t~e most; only rod D 338_Uith the unrealistic high
K
B
of 17 600 exceeds this value with arelease of 2 x 10 . This total balance
includes also the rods heated in helium (table 111).
The portions of I 131 dissolved out of the pressure tube (including the
fuel rod) with water and those from the empty pressure tube with diluted nitric
acid were about equal and similar to those transported out of the tube by steam
(or helium) (table I).
6. CONCLUSIONS
The results obtained from heating experiments with defect test fuel rods
demonstrate plainly, that the release of I 131 is significantly lower than
assumed in the appropriate safety regulations. Other authors /6/ and the
evaluation of the TMI accident came to similar results, indicating that there is
at least a factor of 100, more probable 500 to 1000, between the measurable and
the assumed release of I 131 from a ruptured fuel rod under LOCA conditions.
The reason for this discrepancy is the neglection of the chemical
reactivity of the iodine, which not only reacts with other fission products in
the fuel rod and structural material in the reactor-core but also with the H,O
omnipresent in all water reactors. Iodine can therefore hot be treated like a
noble gas, which is unlimitedly volatile and chemically inert but rather like a
reactive substance, able to form compounds in the environment of a LWR, which
are not volatile and - most of them - easily soluble in water.
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D 31 7.5 250 1.9 800 25 6.8 0.2 0.8
D 81 7.5 250 1.9 800 25 7.2 0.2
1) 1.5 ))
D 90 7.5 250 1.9 800 25 8.2 0.2 )) 1.5
1)
D 66 15 200 3.0 800 750 5.8 <0. I 0.2 2.4 2.6
D 175 15 210 3.2 800 25 7.5 0.4 2.5
D 190 15 210 3.2 800 25 8.5 0.7 2.2 2.5 4.7
D 74 15 250 3.8 800 25 7.2 0.2
1) 1.5))
D 197 2 ) 15 250 3.8 1000 780 3. I <0. I 2.8
3) 6.5 9.3
D 212 2) 15 250 3.8 800 780 5.5 <0. I 1.0
3) 5.0 1.5 7.4
D 374 2) 15 250 3.8 800 780 4.5 0.1 I. 83) 4.9 1.3 8.0
D 106 15 300 4.5 800 760 5.3 2.0 6.3 8.7 15
D 112 15 300 4.5 1000 770 4.3 1.2 24 3.6 28
D 204 24 210 5.0 1100 740 3.5 0.6 7.2 6. I 9.5 23
D 167 27 210 5.7 1100 740 5.6 0.3 6. I 1.8 5.6 14
D 408 15 400 6.0 800 770 4.0 4.0 16 89 105
D 45 I 21 300 6.3 800 740 4.5 2.6 3.4 2.2 5.6
D 225 32 210 6.7 1100 730 5.2 1.4 12.6 0.7 5.9 19
D 457 19 400 7.6 800 640 4.7 4.0 50 130 180
D 338 44 400 17.6 800 620 4.0 20 320 280 600
~ Exoerimental ParaMeter ..nd 1 131 Release Results
3) Sum of NaOH 801ution
and charcoal
)) Value. corrected tor
contamination
2) He.ted in inert gu
(helium)
5) After 4 hu. heating
4) After 3 hn. heating
~ Fractions cf 12 and I in total I 131 Release
TEST WAD FRACTIaNAL RELEASE OF I 131/ 10-5
FUEL











o 66 3.0 <~.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.12 0.12 2.6
o 190 3.2 0.15 0.79 0,94 0.27 1.7 2.0 4.7
o 374 2) 3.8 0.002 0.13 0.13 0.02 0.51 0.53 8.0
D 451 6.3 0.29 2.3 2.6 0.32 3.0 3.4 5.6
o 225 6.7 0.02 1.5 1.5 0.30 10 11 19
o 338 17 .6 0.92 17 18 184 ) 2604) 2804) 6005 )
-
TEST ROD NaOH CHARCOAL WATER HNO) TOTAL I 131 - FRACTION OFSOLUTION LEACH PURGE I, I I 131 -
I, I
D 197 0.4 2.4 - (6.5) 9.3 2.4 6.9 26 % 74 %
D 212 0.3 0.6 (5.0) ( 1.5) 7.4 0.6 6.8 8 % 92 %
D 374 0.7 1.1 4.9 1.3 8.0 1.1 6.9 14 % 86 X
~!!!. 1 131 Rehaae in Helium
(aU value. 10-5 of the I 131 inventory; vdue. 1D brack.tI
uneertalo du. co llxperimentd difticultie.)
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SOLID FISSION PRODUCTS AND ACTINIDES RELEASE
AND DEPOSITION INSIDE PWR's PRIMARY CIRCUITS
P. Beslu* - C. Leuthrot* - A. Brissaud** - A. Harrer** - G. Beuken***
* CEA/IRDI/DRE
** EDF/SEPTEN
*** SEMO/Centrale de Tihange
ABSTRACT
Release of solid fission products and actinides in the primary coolant mainly
occurs in case of large cladding defects such as those induced by baffle jet-
ting. Fissile materials as well as solid fission products (Sr, Ba, Zr, Ru, Ce,
La) are released in the primary circuit where they deposit on the surfaces.
Measurements performed by CEA, EDF and SEMO on PWR reactors allowed a better
understanding of the mechanisms of deposition and to find relationships bet-
ween the release of these species, the dose rate and alpha contamination on
the primary circuit.
Modeling has been deduced from these studies and included in the PROFIP 4
~~~c~.
INTRODUCTION
The behaviour and release of volatile fission products (gas, iodines and
cesiums)'h~ve been extensively studie. both in normal and accidental conditions,
and reliable data are available for safety, health pQysics ana prQject,purpcrses.
Other fission products, produced in large quantities in the fuel as those
belonging to the alkaline - earth group (barium, strontium) to the lanthanides
group (cerium, prqseodymium) and some metallic fission products (zirconium,
ruthenium) are not volatile and have a very low diffusivity in uranium dioxide
therefore, they do not migrate easily out of the fuel and are not released in
appreciable quantity in the primary coolant if there are only very small clad-
ding defects as those generally observed during normal operating conditions.
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Nevertheless, in the case of large cladding defects (for example baffle jet-
ting induced defects) it may happen that water is in direct contact with oxide
fuel pellets, leading to a fuel erosion. The fissile material is then dispersed in
the primary coolant together with the fission products included in the fuel.
The uranium dioxide present in the primary coolant is, of course, responsible
for the release of actinides and alpha contamination, but also for solid fission
products as well by two processes :
1) - Fission products atoms included in the fissile materials which have
been dispersed in the primary coolant.
2) - Fission products created in the uranium contamination deposited on the
primary circuit area under neutron flux.
Due to their beta or gamma energies and long half lives or toxicities, some
of these fission products are of interest in several fields such as safety, health
physics or waste package.
The studies, presented in this paper, pertain mainly to
- alkaline earth group : 90sr , 140Ba and its daughter 140La
_ lanthanides group : 141Ce , 144Ce , 144pr
- metallic fission products : 95Zr , 95Nb , 103Ru , 160Ru + 106Rh
_ actinides responsibles for alpha activity : 238 pu , 239 pu , 240 pu , 241 Am , 242cm ,
244 Cm .
I - BEHAVIOUR OF ACTINIDES OUTSIDE THE FUEL CLADDING
In a PWr- fissile material is always present outside the fuel cladding ; even
if there is no cladding defect, the material uranium contained as impurities in
zircaloy and the unavoidable cladding pollution which occurs during the assembly
manufacture lead to a small but measurable quantity of fissile material in d.irect
contact with the primary coolant. In case of cladding defects where the water is
in contact with the pellets, U0 2 may be released in the coolant and deposit on
the primary circuit.
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1.1 - Estimation of the uranium contamination
The estimation of the quantity of uranium in the primary circuit has been
realized by appropriate analyses performed both on scrapping on the primary cir-
cuit and on primary water sampling. The calculation of the amount which is depo-
sited under neutron flux, can be deduced from the fission products activities in
the coolant (mainly from rare gas and iodines).
Fission products are created in the contamination deposited under neutron
flux and directly released without delay in the primary water by the recoil pro-
cess ; the release fraction of these fission products are independant of their
half-life and therefore, it is possible (see figure 1) to determine the contri-
bution of the contamination to the total fission products release and furthermore
to estimate the quantity of fissile material responsible for the contamination
typical values of the U0 2 mass deposited under neutron flux are:
- "clean" reactor (first cycle - without defect) : < 1 9
- reactor wi th sma11 defects (s i ze < 50 j.l) : 1 to 10 9
- reactor with broken rods (due to baffle jetting): 50 to 200 9 (or more)










For large values of the contamination, an estimation of the mass balance in
the primary circuit has been done ; typical values are given on Table I.
TABlE I
Contamination mass balance in the PWR primary circuits
Reactor Total mass Balance (%)
cycle (g U) in fl ux out of flux in the coolant
TIHANGE 1 60 67 33 1. 7 10-3cycle 4
TIHANGE 1 620 37 63 6.0 10-3cycle 5
TIHANGE- 1 300 47 53 3.0 10-3cycle 6
TIHANGE 1 310 48 52 6.4 10-3cycle 7
BUGEY 2 200 65 35 4.1 10-2cycl e 2
It showns :
a) that Uranium contamination is quite uniformly deposited in the primary
circuit
b) in steady state conditions and with normal water chemistry, uruniu~ is
always in an insoluble form and the quantity of particles in the primary
coolant is only 10-5 to 10-4 of the total deposited mass.
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1.2 - Actinides composition of the contamination
The initial isotopic composition of the contamination is identical to this
one of the defected assembly. ßecause there is no self-shielding. for the plutonium
production in the oxide deposited under neutron flux, the fissile isotopes increase
during irradiation more rapidly in the contamination than in the fuel itself. The-
refore the evolution with burnup of thequantities and the ratio of the main fissile
isotopes 235U and 239 pu is different in the contamination and in the fuel. The
direct experimental checking of this phenomena is not easy because the very small
quantities of nuclides and the difficulty of sampling. On the other hand the
amount of fission products created and released from the contamination is directly
related to his isotopic composition ; because 239 pu and 235U fission yields for
xenons and iodines are similar but very different for kryptons, it is possible to
verify experimentally the theoretical evolution of the contamination through the
analysis of the fission products activities in the primary coolant.
I.2a - Theoretical model
Calculations have been performed, using the cell computer code APOLLO in
which we described aPWR 17 x 17 assembly. ßecause it is not possible to strictly
solve the problem, we assigned in the calculations cross sections values without
self-shielding ; the corresponding results will be an upper limit for the 239 pu
formation; they are summarized in the table 11 where the ratios 235U;238U and
239 pu ;238U in the fuel and in the contami nation are reported for severa1 val ues
of the burnup.
TAßLE 11
Evolution of actinides ratio in the fuel and in the contamination
ßurnup 235U;238U (%) 239 pu ;238U (%)
(MWJ;t) Fuel Contamination Fuel Contamination
4400 2.23 2.24 0.223 1.42
9500 1. 79 1.80 0.374 2.39
15300 1.39 1.40 0.472 3.01
21600 1.04 1.05 0.531 3.36
28500 0.750 0.762 0.564 3.55
35800 0.516 0.529 0.582 3.63
43700 0.341 0.352 0.591 3.66
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Using these results and the PROFrp 4 computer code which allow to calculate
the fission products activities in the primary coolant due to the release from
defected rods or to the contamination, we calculated the activity evolution of
85m Kr , 133 r and 134 r in the primary water for a 900 MWe PWR. Hypothesis used for
the calculations are :
- 235U initial enrichment for the fuel and the contamination : 3.1 %
- contamination in the water / deposited contamination : 1. 10-4
- CVCS flow rate: 13.7 m3/h
- average linear power in the core : 175 W/cm.
Because the gap in our actual knowled~es about the uranium transfer in' the
primary circuit, calculations have been performed for two drastic hypothesis
A - the contamination do not transfer during irradiation and lay under
neutron flux ; this case occurs probably for the low contamination values
(manufacture contamination).
B - the transfer of the contamination leads to an homogeneous isotopic compo-
sition for the in core and out of core contamination ; this case occurs
probably with large values of contamination due to baffle jetting.
Results are summarized on the figure 2 where the increase of the water acti-
vities for 85mKr , 132 r and 134r due to a constant mass of uranium contamination,
is reported versus burnup.
FIGURE 2
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We can notice that ;
1) - the activities evolution is nearly independent of the initial contamination
burnup ;
2) - the increase is about 2 for iodines and only 30 %for kryptons.
I.2b - Experimental checking
The experimental checking of this theoretical model has been realised with
data, concerning reactors without cladding defects in which the conta~ination is
the only fission products activities source.
a) - contamination less than 1 9 U : FESSENHEIM 2 and GRAVEL1NES 1 cycle 1
b) - contamination due to small defects in a previous cycle (~ 5 g) : TR1CAST1N 1
cycle 2
c) - large contamination due to baffle jetting in a previous cycle (> 30 g)
BUGEY 2 - cycle 3 and T1HANGE 1 - cycle 8.
The comparison between the experimental results and the calculations are
presented in Table 111 for the A and B hypothesis ; Acalculation seams to be
very close the experimental data, which .means that very low transfer of uranium
in the primary circuit occurs during the irradiation cycle.
Table m
Evolutions of 85m Kr and 134 I activities in the prmary
coolant during an irradiation cycle.
Rl>O\or Esl""ted burnJp ><li>iU.. "t~(end ofeyclr/swlolqd<
(MWO/t) Mei5urements cilculitiQns AlB
~cl. brt 01 End of
c:yet. eyele 13'1 85m Kr 13'1 85mKr
FESSENHEJM2
0 1'000 2.2 1.5 2J/13 1/./13cyctt ,
GRJ>lIELINESl
0 13000 2.0 2.1/17 U/IJ
.yet. I
BUGEY 2
2.1/1~ 15/139000 20000 2.0 1.4
cyeti 3
T1HANGE I
8000 19000 1.6 1.4 2.1/17 15,113
.yet. ~
TRICASTlNl
2.0/1.711500 20000 2.0 13 lW13
,yet, 2
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1.3 ~ Alpha activities
The theoretical model of evolution has been used in order to calculate the
alpha activity of the contamination. Several calculations have been performed for
different initial burnup of the contamination. Figure 3 where are reported the
results shows that after a transitory period of about 2 to 3, GilD/t Ufollowing
the release of the contamination , the alpha activity in the contamination is 3






alpha aclivies tor the tU'31 and
II - BEHAVIOUR OF SOLID FISSION PRODUCTS
The release fractions of several fission products have been measured on PWR's
fuel at nominal power and in steady state conditions. Typical values for long lifes
fission products (T > 10 days) are shown on Table IV.
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Table lY
Fission products rele,lsed fractions for PWR '5
in steady state conditions at nominal power
1900MWe )
chemical species released fractions
rares gases 1.10- 2 to 5.10 -2 •
1.10 -2 -2·iodine to 5.10









• depending on the defected rod power
Species such as Zr, Nb, Ru, Ce, Pr, La are not directly released from the
defected rod and are always present in the primary circuit together with uranium
contamination ; they are not soluble and the fraction of activity in the primary
. -5 1 -4 d' dcoolant is as for uranlum, 10 to 0 of the total eposlte amount of these
species.
Direct release of strontium and baryum is low (10 times lower than volatiles
fission products) and these species are mainly insolubles with normal operating
conditions, but they can partly dissolve during chemical transcients such as pH
decreases, as shown on Table V,
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Table :z
TI HANGE I _ Cycle 7.
Solubililies 01 alkaline _ earth fission producls
during a pH Iranslent
Nuclide Waler aclivlty I Oe posiled aclivlty
pH = 7.2 pH = 6.6
90Sr 1. 10-3 2 10- 2
1408a 1.5 10- 3 5 10-2
II! - DOSE RATES INDUCED BV SOLID FISSION PRODUCTS
The PROFIP computer code which calculates the deposited fission products
activities around the primary circuit allow us to estimate dose rates induced by
these fission products for simple geometries as those of the primary pipes;
calculations have been checked by approrriate dose rates measurements around the
primary pipes and estimations of deposited fission products activities by gamma
spectrometry. Typical values of these measurements and calculations for the
TIHANGE 1 reactor are given on Tables VI and VII
Table 'Zr
TI HANGE 1
Dose rates Induced by fission products
cycle 4 5 6 7.
contamlnation (gU) 60 630 300 310
hot pipes 1102 201070 10 10
dose cold pipes 15 25 5 5
rates
(mRern/h) heat 0.15 5 to 20 21010 2 t05
exchanger
CVCS (83) 70 25 50
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Table m
TIHANGE 1 _ cycle 6
Dos. rat.s around the primary circuit
Dose rate '.l1Rem/h)




Hot pipes 1 16 171 170 9.4
2 20 163 240 12
Cold pipes 1 43 86 64 50
2 43 92 54 1..7
3 43 70 66 6.1
Heat exchanger
1 44 215 180 2!l
(hot sid.) 2
1.8 108 110 1.7
Heat exchanger 1 105 161 150 65
(cold side) 2 105 108 96 9.7
CVCS





Participation of fission products to the total dose rates is only important
for large uranium contamination and mainly around CVCS and RHRS.
Roughly, the dose rates due to solid fission products may be estimated from
the uranium mass deposited in the primary circuit ; with 1 9 U uniformly deposited
the dose rates close the heat insulator are about 3.10-2 mRem/h for the hot pipes,
-2 -12.10 mRem/h for the cold pipes and the heat exchangers and 10 mRem/h for CVCS
and RHRS.
CONCLUSION
Experimental data obtained on TIHANGE and French PWR reactors in the field of
fission products and uranium contamination allowed us to improve the understanding
ef·the release and behaviour of solid fission products in the primary circuit and
to propose theoretical model and correlations for the PROFIP-4 computer code which
is used at the Safety French Energy Commission (CEA/DSN) and the National Electric
Company (EDF). It is now possible to calculate deposited alpha and beta activities
as well as dose rates out of the primary pipes.
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RELEASE OF FISSION PRODUCTS BY DEFECTIVE PRESSURISED WATER REACTOR FUEL
H. Seveon (CEA) C. Leuthrot (CEA) J.P. Stora (EDF/SEPTEN)
P. Chenebault, R. Warlop
Centre d'Etudes Nucleaires de Grenoble
Departement de Metallurgie de Grenoble
85 X - 38041 GRENOBLE Cedex FRANCE
ABSTRACT
The fission products released in reactors are compared wi th the quanti-
ties available in the pellet-cladding gap, calculated from recommended
release values obtained from an experimental programme. The comparison
shows that these values can be applied to reactors.
I - EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAMME.
Wi th a view to defining the fission products (FP) in pressurised water
reactor (PWR) primary circuits, an experimental programme was implemented by
the Departement de Metallurgie de Grenoble, Service de Recherches sur les Mate-
riaux, Section d' Etudes du Comportement des Combustibles (DMG/SRM/SECC) from
1975 to 1984. This programme was financed by the Institut de Protection et de
Surete Nucleaire, Departement des Analyses de Surete (IPSN/DAS) and Electrici-
te de France, Service d' Etudes des Proj ets Thermiques et Nucleaires (EdF /-
SEPTEN) .
The experimental programme consisted of 12 experiments conducted in the
Siloe reactor. The fuel rods were of standard geometry of the PWR type : 17x17
and short in length (about 300 mm). Two types irradiation devices were used :
a) The Bouffon device is a small thermo-siphon loop in which the cladding
temperature is controlled bY1the saturation temperature for a linear fuel
power greater than 20 KW. m . Nine experiments were conducted with this
system.
b) The Jet Pump device is a water loop in which the cladding temperature con-
trol is independent of the linear power, thereby giving more representati-
ve values of the fue!lrod internal temperature for all power values, espe-
cially under 20 KW.m . Three experiments were carried out using this sys-
tem.
Two types of defect were studied :
defects located in the upper plug made before irradiation, simulating a
large construction defect (six experiments),
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defects located in the fuel column, obtained by fatigue before irradia-
tion (one expcriment) or by external mechanical stress during irradiation
(three experiments), or by pellet-cladding interaction.
The ex~~iments were conducted either with stable power levels between 10
and 40 KW.m over aperiod of several days, or at daily varying power levels
corresponding to the load fo110wing regime.
-1
The burnups reached are between 1000 and 5000 MWd.t _for the ten experi-
ments with fresh fuel, and between 20 000 and 30 000 MWd.t for the two expe-
riments run with fue1 pre-irradiated in power reactors.
11 - MAIN RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAMME.
11.1 - Release rate.
FP release by U02 is greater for defective rods than for clean rods. For
example, if the release of gaseous species, especially 133 Xe, is compared for
the same type of fuel operating at the same powers, it is found experimenta11y
that the release rate is 10 times greater for defective fuel rods than for
rods in normal condi tion. This fact is attributed to oxidation of the U0
2
by
chemical interactions with water vapour and, in particular, the influx of oxy-
gen formed by radiolysis of the water in the fuel-cladding gap.
11.2 FP emission with time.
It has been observed that FP release under steady power and temperature
condi tions is not permanent but consists of "bursts" separated by periods wi-
thout any fission products. This phenomenon can be observed only under "favou-
rable condi tions" (irradiation 100p where the water renewal time is a matter
of a few minutes, low conductance cladding defect). The simultaneous measure-
ment of the fuel rod internal pressure showed that these "bursts", which occur
at varying frequency averaging two per hour , correspond to interna1 pressure
drops and the absence of release to pressure increases. From this observation,
there is reason to believe that the radiolysis gases are the driving force for
release, thus implying necessary id1e periods for accumulation and decomposi-
tion of a sufficient quantity of water. It seems highly probable that this me-
chanism exists at all times, but is too rapid to be observed with larger size
defects. The response time (about 10 h) of the primary circuit of a reactor ma-
kes it impossible to observe this mechanism.
The experimental programme also highlighted regimes during which FP relea-
se varied more slowly (severa1 hours to dozens of hours). Figure 1 illustrates
this type of release. After the peak which accompanies the power rise, a
release level can be seen which lasts a maximum of 30 hours. This is fo11owed
by a release level three times lower that is interrupted only by a power varia-
tion. This type of release can be observed in reactors.
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FIG,1 CRUSIFON 5_ Evolution of fission produet release during itradiation
11.3 - Existence of a critical regime.
During the experimental programme, it was found that, at a certain power
level, release outside the fuel rod was higher, especially for short-lived nu-
clides. Figure 2 shows the activi ty of primary circui t water an_,\ fuel rod po-
wer in relation to time. 1t is tO_1be noted that, at 16.4 KW. m , release is
much higher than at 10 and 20 KW.m . The high activity of short-period nucli-
des can be explained only by the existence of a critical regime which corres-
ponds to the rapid vaporisation and condensation of water in the fuel-cladding
gap. Within a very tight power range, it is in fact possible to have simulta-
neously an internal cladding temperature lower that the saturation temperature
and a pellet surface temperature higher than'the saturation temperature. Such
condi tions may arise in reactors and give birth to the same release rate in
the case of a defect located in front of the fuel, and large enough to allow
the inlet and outlet of water.
1401
20 30















I ••• .!'.... "._,,' i.
~: .... , ..
~ \..... \; \...., .







III - RELEASE BY U0
2
,
The measures taken during the experimental programme concerned FP release
outside the fuel rod, which is a function of the fuel rate and transfer rate
through the rod. It has been shown in section II that this transfer is complex.
However, i~ the transients or in the critical regime periods, this transfer is
rapid and enables the release by U02 to be quantified.
Figure 3 and 4 represent the R/B release rates of gases and halogens in
relation to the linear power. R/B is defined as the ratio between the number
of atoms released per second by the fuel and the number of atoms born per se-
cond in the fuel at radioactive equilibrium. These values , obtained from the
experimental programme, represent the recommended values of release by U02 pel-
lets placed in a defective cladding. They are in good agreement with those pu-
blished elsewhere /1/.
The recommended values for halogens are derived from values obtained with
xenon of equivalent periods and were observed only in the case of liquid water
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FIG-.4 _ Release rate of halogens vs linear power
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IV - COMPARISON OF RESULTS ON POWER REACTORS.
The activity of the primary reactor circuit is measured during operation
and during normal shut-down periods, which include apressure drop stage, fol-
lowed by aperiod of temperature and pressure drop of the cooling water. Sub-
jected to these conditions, the defective fuel rods release most of the radio-
active species in the fuel-cladding gap. The ratio of activities released in
operation to those released in transients is variable. This variation is due
to the size and position of the defects, to the power of the defective fuel
rods and to the composition of the internal atmosphere.
For certain reactors , sipping tests on assemblies during unloading opera-
tions give an idea of the number of defective rods as weIl as their position
in the core and thus their operating power.
In addition, on the basis of primary cricuit activity measurements taken
during operation and during shut-down, the total activities released by the
defective rods are calculated for the various nuclides, taking into account
the purification rates and losses . It should be noted that the measurements
wi th the reactors shut-down were ·taken for a primary circuit depressurisation
range of 15.5 to 2.7 MPa only. A calculation based on simple hypotheses (water
vapour and gaseous atmosphere at 15.5 MPa inside the fuel rods in operation)
shows that only 70% of the available activi ty can be released under these
conditions. The corresponding correction has been made.
The mean value A of the ratio between the total activity measured in the
reactor and the calculated activi ty available is represented in Table 1 for









Total activity measured in the reactor
Calculated available activity
for different nuclides.
If the recommended values correctly represent the release rates from
U0
2
in defective rods of reactors, then the ratio A should be equal to 1.





The agreement between released activity in a reactor and calculated avai-
lable activi ty based on the recommended values of the experimental programme
is quite good. These recommended values correctly represent release by U0
2
in
defective pressurised water reactor fuel rods.
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THERMOCHEMICAL INTERACTIONS OF FISSION
PRODUCTS IN AN LWR ACCIDENT
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ABSTRACT
The presence of a large number of fission products in a fuel
rod results in a very complex chemical system. The chemical
states of the fission products released from the fuel during a
severe core damage accident are determined by the nature of the
immediate environment which is generally oXidizing. The oxygen
potential and the temperature of the system affect the relative
stabilities of the potential vapor species of the fission
products. Using chemical thermodynamic data, the stable vapor
species of the fission products Cs, Rb, I, Br, Te, Se, Sr, Ba,
Sb, Ru and Mo released from failed fuel rods were evaluated for
three conditions in the temperature range 1000 - 3000K: a)
water/steam/hydrogen environment (oxygen potential - -150 to -380
kJ/mol); b) water/steam/air environment (oxygen potential - - 15
to -40 kJ/mol); c) air environment (oxygen potential - - 10 to
-40 kJ/mol). The oxides, hydrides, hydroxides, molybdates,
molybdites, halides, chalcogenides and the elemental forms of
these fission elements were considered. Following release of the
volatile species from the fuel rods, their interactions with the
liquid water coolant were evaluated by means of electrochemical
stability (Eh-pH) diagrams for the individual fission products to
600 K. The results of the calculations suggest that small
amounts of selenium, tellurium, ruthenium, molybdenum, and
possibly, bromine and iodine, may be released to the environment.
INTRODUCTION
During irradiation of an LWR fuel rod over forty individual fission
products are released, resulting in a very complex chemical system within
the rod. In the eventof a severe core damage accident, release of the
volatile fission products to the environment becomes a matter of prime
concern. The behavior of the fission products can be modeled most reliably
by comparing their observed release in simulated or actual reactor
accidents with that anticipated from their chemistry.
The chemical state of a fission product is determined by the nature of
its immediate environment because the amounts of fission products released
are small in relation to the amount of host environment. In an accident
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the temperature of the fuel rods rises rapidly and they may fail by
cladding rupture. Steam will then enter the fuel rods where it reacts with
the fuel and the zircaloy cladding liberating hydrogen. If now the primary
pressure boundary is also breached, air could be present. This means that
the ruptured fuel rods could be exposed to a water-steam-hydrogen-air
atmosphere.
Within an intact fuel rod, the chemical environment is generally
reducing. However, in a reactor accident where the cladding balloons and
bursts, the environment becomes progressively more oxidizing and one needs
to consider the temperature and the oxygen potential of the environment to
predict the chemically stable fission product species released from the hot
fuel. Following their release, the fission products will interact with the
coolant water which then dominates their behavior. Most of the fission
products released will dissolve in water, while the insoluble species will
tend to plate out on the cooler surfaces. Since subsequent release of the
fission products from the aqueous solution will be by vaporization, the
equilibrium chemical states of the fission products in aqueous solution
must also be considered in detail.
Other recent treatments of the problem have considered only a limited
number of fission elements: Cs and I [lJ; Cs, I and Te [zJ; or Cs, I, Te,
Sr and Ru [3J. Also, aqueous solution chemistry is not treated at all in
these earlier models. The emphasis in this paper is on the vaporization
and aqueous solution chemistry of the high yield (Cs, Sr, Ba, Ru, Mo),
radiotoxic (I, Cs, Te, Sb, Ru, Sr, Ba) fission elements which are also
volatile or form volatile compounds (Cs, Rb, I, Br, Te, Se, Sr, Ba, Mo,
Ru). The stable volatile species have been evaluated from equilibrium
chemical thermodynamic calculations for intact fuel rods and various
accident situations. The interactions of the fission products with liquid
water are considered in terms of high temperature electrochemical stability
diagrams (Eh-pH diagrams).
FUEL ROD CHEMICAL CONDITIONS
Four principal scenarios were considered in which to assess the
vaporization behavior of the fission products from LWR fuel rods. The
general chemical conditions prevailing in each situation are described
below.
A. Intact fuel rods. The interior of an intact fuel rod is chemically
reducing since the UOZ fuel and the zircaloy cladding react with theoxygen generated during fissioning. As a result, the oxygen potential
varies during the life of a fuel rod. Based on experimental measurements
and theoretical estimates, the oxygen potential assumes a value in the
range of -400 to -500 kJ/mol [4,5J.
B. Failed fuel rods in water/steam atmosphere containing hydrogen. In
this case it is assumed that the fuel rods have failed by cladding rupture,
but the primary pressure boundary is intact. Steam and water react with
the hot fuel and the cladding liberating HZ' The oxygen potentials are set
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by the H2/H20 partial pressure ratios and are of the order of -380 kJ at1000K, -275 kJ at 2000K and -155 kJ at 3000K for p(H?)/p(H?O) = 1. In
addition to the oxidizing environment, the presence öf steam could lead to
the formation of volatile hydroxide species. This system is substantially
more oxidizing than situation A above.
C. Failed fuel rods in water/steam environment containing air. In a more
severe accident where the primary pressure boundary is breached, air can
enter the system. The oxygen potentials will then be set by the steam/air
mixture and may attain values as high as in air (0.2 atm of O2): -13 kJ at1000K, -26 kJ at 2000K, and -40 kJ at 3000K. This system has significantly
higher oxygen potentials than system B.
D. Failed fuel rods ~xposed to air. In accidents which occur in dry atmo-
spheres, the fuel rods could be exposed to air. The fuel could attain tem-
peratures as high as 3000K due to the absence of any effective cooling.
The oxygen potentials are of the order of -3 to -37 kJ/mol. Since there is
no liquid water present, there can be no dissolution of the fission
products in the liquid phase.
THERMODYNAMIC DATA AND CALCULATION PARAMETERS
A free energy minimization technique was employed to determine the
equilibrium distribution of the fission products in the present eleven com-
ponent system. The calculation technique is based on the theoretical
treatments of Brinkley [6J and White et al [7J, and incorporated into
recent computer programs [8-10J for calculation of complex chemical
equilibria. Where available experimentally measured thermodynamic
properties as a function of temperature for various condensed and vapor
species were used [8,11-20J. In all other cases, the thermodynamic data
were estimated by various methods: extrapolation of room temperature data
[3, 18, 21J; general parametrization schemes [22J; bond energy correlations
[11, 17, 23,24J.
The calculations were performed for the situations described above for
the following conditions: H2/H20 = 1; 1000 - 3000K; total pressure =170 atm.
FISSION PRODUCT VAPORIZATION CHEMISTRY
The results of the calculations are shown in Tables 1 and 2. These
tables list the partial pressures of the predominant volatile species of
the fission products considered for each of the situations A - D.
Situation A. Inspection of Table 1 suggests that of the fission products
considered, the following volatile species could be released at very high
fuel temperatures in intact rods: Cs, Rb, Cs 20, Rb20, CsI, RbI, CsBr,
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Table 1. Calculated Partial Pressures of the Major Volatile Fission Product Species
for the Scenarios A and B
Scenario A Scenario B
Fission Temp. Partial Temp. Partial
Product K Speciesa Pressure (atm) K Speciesa Pressure (atm)
Cs,Rbb
1000 10-2 _ 10-5 1000 M. MOM. M2(OH)2
W5,IO-2 _ W 3
2200 M. M20 ,1 3000 M. MOH. MO
10-1, >1, 1O~3
1000 M 10.5 _ 10-8 1000 M. MOH. M2(OH)2' M2Mo04 1O~8, 1O-~o:71O-5.
Cs,Rbc
2200 M. M20. M2Mo04 ,1 3000 M. HOH, MO, MZMo04
10-3, >1, 10-4,>1
1000 Te2
10-2 1000 HZ Te 10-
5
Te
10-1, 10-2• 1O~22200 Te ,1 3000 Te. HZTe. TeD
1000 5e2• SeS' SeS
10-3 _ W 4 1000 HZSe 10-
8
Se
W 1• 10-4• W 22200 Se >1 3000 Se I HZSe I SeO
1000 MI, MBr 10-3 1000 MX 10"3
I, Sr
) 1, 10~2 _ 10-32200 MI. MBr 3000 MX, X, HX
Mod
1000 1000 M2Mo°4 W
7
2200 ~Mo°4 ,1 3000 MZMo04 ,1
Rud
1000 1000
2200 Ru 10-6 3000 Ru, RuOH, Ru(OH)2 10-3 _ 10"5
1000 Sb 10-3 1000 Sb 10"3
Sb
2200 Sb ,1 3000 Sb '1
Srd
1000 1000
2200 3000 SrOH. Sr(OH)2 10-3 _ 10-4
1000 1000
8.
10-1 _ 10-22200 3000 B.OH. B.(OH)2
a H 15 either es or Rb, 'X 1s either I or 8r.
b CSZU04/RbZU04 1s assumed to be the stable solid phase.
c CSZtob04/RbZMo04 15 assumed to be the stable sal1d phase.
d No vapor species cf Ba and Sr are expected in scenario A.
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Table 2. Calculated Partial Pressures of the Major Volatile Fission Product Species
for the Scenarios C and 0
Scenario C Scenario 0
Fission Temp. Partial Temp. Partial
Product K Spec1es a Pressure (atm) K Species a Pressure (atm)
Cs,Rbb
1000 M, MOH, M2(OM)2
1O,S, 10,3 , 10,4 1000 10-4
3000 M, MOH, MO >1 3000 M, MO >1
1000 M, MOM, M2(OH)Z' MZMo04
10,11, 10,5 _ 10,7, 1000 M, MZ Mo04
10.6, 10.7
Cs,Rbc 10-7
3000 M, MOH, HO, MZMo04 10-5, I, 10,6, 3000 M, HO, MZMo04 >1
1000 HZTe 10.6 1000 TeD, TeOZ 10-
4 _ 10,5
Te
10,1 , 10-2 10.1 , 10-23000 TeD. Te02, TeO(OH)Z 3000 TeO, TeOZ
1000 H2Se
10,9 1000 SeO, SeOZ
1l)·4 _ 10,5
Se
10'1 _ 10'23000 SeO, SeOZ 3000 SeO, SeoZ 10,1 _ 10-2
1000 MX 10,3 1000 HX, 10,1, 10,3
I, Sr
10'Z _ 10,33000 MX, X, MX 3000 MX, >1
1000 MZMo04' Mo°3 \0"7, 10-
S 1000 MZMo04' Mo°3
10-7, lO-S
Mo
>I, 10,1 >I, 10.13000 MZMo04' Mo°3 3000 MZMo04' Mo°3
1000 RU03, Ru04
10,6 1000 Ru03' Ru04
10,6
Ru
10'Z, >1 10,2, >13000 Ru03, Ru04 3000 RU03' Ru04
1000 Sb, S406 10-3, 10,2 1000 Sb, Sb406
10-3, 10-2
Sb
3000 Sb, Sb406 >1 3000 Sb, Sb406 >1
1000 1000
Sr
10-3 _ 10-4 10'63000 SrOH, Sr(OH)Z 3000 SrO
1000 1000
S_
10,1 , lO-Z 10-43000 BaOH, Sa(OM)Z 3000 SaO
- M is either Cs or Rb; X is either I or Br.
b CS ZU04/RbZU04 1s assumad to be the st_ble solid phase.
c CSZMo04/RbZMo04 15 assumed to be the stable solid phase.
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RbBr, CS 2Mo04, Rb Mo04, Te, Se and Sb. Since the vapor pressures ofthese species are s~all at fuel ßeriphery (-900K) and cladding temperatures
( - 600K), they will tend to p1ate out at those coo 1er regi ons. On the
other hand, if the cladding now balloons and bursts, the volatile species
above will be swept out along with the fission gases Xe'and Kr, and He
(most LWR fuel rods are pre-pressurized with He).
Situation B. In the event of cladding failure the first fission products
released from the rods will prevent initial ingress of steam. When steam
enters the fuel rod it will oxidize,the fuel, further releasing fission
products. Also, the steam will react with the zircaloy cladding liberating
H? As shown in Table 1, the principal volatile species released to the
st~am/hydrogen environment will be CsOH, RbOH, CsI, RbI, CsBr, RbBr,
CS 2Mo04, Rb 2Mo04, H2Te, H2Se, Se6' although at high temperatures (>2000K)Cs, Rb, CsO, RbO, I, HI, Br, HBr, Sb, Ba(OH)?, BaOH, SrOH, Sr(OH)?, Ru,
RuOH, TeD, SeO, Te and Se will also become important. These species tend
to dissolve in the liquid water or they will plate out on the cooler
surfaces.
Situation C. In this situation, the presence of oxygen from air ingress
provides a significantly more oxidizing system than situation B. For these
conditions, Table 2 shows that the predominant species are still the same
as in situation B, but now release of Ru03, Ru04, Sb40n, Te02' SeC? andMo03 must also be considered. At lower temperatures, the contributions ofelemental iodine and bromine are relatively small, since the ratio of the
alkali halides to the halogens is estimated to be 103 to 104. However, at
temperatures above 2500K the halogen pressures are comparable to those
calculated for the halides. Again, the released fission product species
have either low enough vapor pressures to condense on the cooler surfaces,
or they wi 11 .di sso lve in the 1i qu id water. However, there may be some
release as aerosols through the primary containment rupture.
Situation O. The predominant species are essentially the same as in
situation C, except for the absence of any hydroxides. In addition, Se02,Te02 and Sb406 dominate for these elements and SrO and BaO must also beconsidered. Significant partial pressures of elemental iodine and bromine
are also calculated to develop at very high temperatures. The released
fission products should condense at the cooler regions of the fuel or of
the cladding.
FISSION PRODUCT AQUEOUS SOLUTION CHEMISTRY
In each of the two accident scenarios Band C, there is a large amount
of liquid water present in the system. The equilibrium chemical states of
the fission products in aqueous solution are most conveniently evaluated by
means of Eh-pH diagrams for the individual fission products in the temper-
ature range 300-600K and a pH range 5-11. Since the only fission product
Eh-pH diagrams currently available are those at room temperature [25J, a
technique was developed to estimate the thermodynamic data for the relevant
fission product aqueous species to 600K [26, 27J. Using these estimated
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values, Eh-pH diagrams at 323, 373, 423, 473, 523, and 600K have been con-
structed for the fission elements in aqueous solution. As an example,
figure 1 shows the ruthenium - water system at 298, 373 and 523K.
The information on the dominant chemical species released from the
failed fuel rods in accidents Band C is combined with the Eh-Ph diagrams
to describe their behavior in aqueous solutions.
Cesium and Rubidium. The only thermodynamically stable species are the
ions Cs+ and Rb+ over the entire region in which water is stable. Since
the species released from the ruptured fuel rods are all compounds of Cs+
and Rb+, they will dissolve without reaction. Elemental Cs and Rb react
with water to form M+ ions. Hence, Cs and Rb will not volatilize from
aqueous solution.
Tellurium. The stable forms in water are solid Te, TeO?, Te03' H?Te04
(HTe04-)' HTeO and TeO -- which are generally non-volatile. The species
released from th~ fuel rotls, H2Te, Te2 and Te02, interact with H20 to formone of the stable forms. Hence, any release of tellurium species will be
very small.
Selenium. Se6, SeO and SeOz are the species released from the fuel r09~,which are also the stable forms in aqueous solution together with Se03 'Se04-- and H Se03--. Hence'3there may be some release of selenium as vapor(vapor pressure of Se = 10- atm at 600K).
Iodine and Bromine. The thermodynamically stable forms of land Br in HZO
are (I,Br)- and (I,Br)03-' The alkali halide species released from !he
fuel rods and HI and HBr dissolve in the water to form stable (I,Br) and
(I,Br)01- ions and possibly, HOl and HOBr. The latter species may release
small arnounts of fission-product halogens to the environment.
Molybdenum. Mo03 has a relatively low vapor pressure at 600K and it isslightly soluble in H20. The molybdates, on the other hand, are __completely soluble. The stable forms of Mo in HZO are MoOZ and Mo04which are generally nonvolatile. Hence, any release of Mo as vapor to the
environment will be extremely small.
Antimony. For the two scenarios considered here, elemental Sb, SbZO, and
HSbOZ are the thermodynamically stable form~ZOin water. These subst~nceshave vapor pressures of the order of 10 atm at 600K, and release of
volatile forms of Sb to the environment will be negligible.
Ruthenium. The Ru - HZO system shows that Ru and RuOZ are the thermo-dynamically stable forms, both of ~hich are nonvolatile. Of the species
released from the ruptured fuel rods, Ru is nonvolatile and insoluble in
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FIGURE 1. POTENTlAl-pH DIAGRAMS FOR THE RUTHENIUM-WATER SYSTEM AT (il 298K. (ii) 373K. AND (iiil 523K. SHADED
REGION INDICATES AREA OFINTEREST. UNE a REPRESENTS THE REDUCTION EQUIUBRIUM OF WATER
AND UNE b REPRESENTS ITS OXIDATION EQUIUBRIUM. DISSOlVED SPECIES ACTIVITY IS 10-8
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Barium and Strontium. Barium and strontium hydroxides ~re highly soluble
in water, and will dissolve without reaction. Since Ba and Sr are the
only stable species in water, release of Ba and Sr vapor species to the
environment is highly unlikely.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Three fuel rod accident scenarios (exposure to steam/hydrogen/water,
exposure to steam/air/water, and exposure to air) and intact fuel rods were
used to assess the vaporization and aqueous solution chemistry of fission
product species of Cs, Rb, I, Br, Se, Te, Ba, Sr, Mo, Ru and Sb. Equilib-
rium thermodynamic calculations and Eh-pHdiagrams were used to analyze the
behavior of the chemical species. The results of this analysis showed that
small amounts of selenium, tellurium, ruthenium, molybdenum iodine and
bromine could be released to the environment.
The analysis presented here suffers from a lack of reliable thermo-
dynamic data at high temperatures, particularly on the gaseous oxides and
hydroxides. Similarly, there is very little experimental thermochemical or
solubility data on most of the fission product compounds in aqueous solu-
ti on at high temperatures. Hence, accurate qu ant itat ive pred ict ions of
fission product chemistry in accident situations must await the availa-
bility of reliable thermochemical information. Furthermore, the·formation
of nitrogen and carbon-bearing species of the fission products, such as
nitrates, nitrites, and carbqnyls must also be considered.
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DETERMINATION OF PARTITION COEFFICIENTS FOR IODINE
BETWEEN WATER AND VAPOUR PHASE WITH 1-131 AS TRACER
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ABSTRACT
The ealeulation of reJiable iodine partition eoeffieients:
P=([I]tot.aq./[I]tot.gas) is hindered by basic uncertainties in
both thermodynamie and kinetie data. Experimental determinations
of P as a funetion of various parameters (eoncentration, tempera-
ture, pH, redox potential) provide da ta for risk analysis studies
and also allows a verifieation of computing models.
A steel autoelave arrangement is deserlbed, whieh allows the de-
t.ermination of P values up to 10·6 at temperatures form ambient
up t.o 200·C. Emphasis is plaeed on experiments which show the
influenee of pH and redox pot.ential on the thermodynamies and ki-
nettes of the iodate formation. Iodate is one of the dominant.
faetors leading t.o very high part.ition eoefficlents.
Experimental result.s are compared with P values obtained from re-
eently published computing models.
INTRODUCTION
In the eurrent quest. t.o obtain reliable source term information,
t.he distribution eoeffieient (P) for iodine between the liquid
and t.he vapour phase is a most. import.ant parameter.
Calculations of P are hampered by uneertainties in the thermody-
namie and kinetie data despite extensive studies over the last
deeades. A comprehensive set of thermodynamie data is compiled
in [1]. The validity of the "elassical" equation for the hydro-
lysis of iOdine in water:
+
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<------> I- + HOl +
is questionable. 1'0 date it has not been possible to prove the
existence of HOl in the gas phase [2]. HOl will be the only vo-
latile iodine species besides elemental iodine. Extensive calcu-
lations of kinetic parameters [3) are partly based on the exi-
stence of HOl.
In view of these uncertainties, the need for experimental measu-
rement of P values is clear. Experimental determinations of P
have been carried out under varying physical and chemical condi-
tions in a number of research institutes. Recent EIR work con-
cerning are-evaluation of the merits of an external containment
spray cooling has shown that the partition coefficient for lodine
plays an important role. Associated calculations require reliab-
le P values up to 200°C. The uncertainties shown and the high
temperatures required have resulted in the present experiments
beeing carried out using a stainless steel autoclave system.
EXPERIMENTAL
One litre pf aqueous iodine/iodide solution was placed in the
glass inner con tainer ( 1) of the autoclave, shown in Fig. 1. A
few mCi of I-131 were added as tracer.
The pH value and redox potential of the solution was measured be-
fore the autoclave was closed.
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®
Fig. 1: Sketch of the EIR autoclave system for the
determination of iooine partition between water
and vapour phase up to 200 QC.
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Sampling of the gas for activity measurements was carried out at
varlous t.emperat.ures.Each gas sampie was taken aft.er about. one
hour of stirring at constant temperature in order to obtain equi-
librium conditions. The gas sampling tube (3) was held at a hig-
her temperature than the autoclave. The tube was evacuated befo-
re samp1ing. Rapid operation of valve (A) privided a 5 ml sampie
of gas. This gas in the sampling tube was transferred with the
help of an inert carrier gas into the filter capsule (4). The
filter was charged with 50 ml of activated charcoal. At the end
of each experIment., an aqueous sampie was taken as a control.
Irradiation tests proved that t.he small tracer concentration of
1ess t.han 10 mCi/l did not produce significant changes in iodine
species distribution due to radiolysis.
From the (high) partition coefficients and the smal.J. volume of
the gas samp1e It ean be seen that 1ess than 0.1% of the t.otal
iodine is removed per gas sampie. Thus a very large number of
sampies can be t.aken without significant changes in the concent-
rat ion of t.he J.i.quid and t.he gaseous phases.
A good approximation of a "clean condition" experiment was achie-
ved by heavily gold p1ating all of the internal st.ee1 surfaces in
order to avoid irreversible deposition/absorption reactions.
RESUl.TS AND DISCUSSION
The first data set shows the influence of temperature on the par-
tition coefficient p. with pH and redox potent.ial as constant.s.
In Fig.2, the resulting partition coefficients for five tempera-
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Fig. 2: Iodine part.ition as a funcUon of t.emperat.ure
[I~)t.ot..aq. = 0.001 M (added as I~)
pH (25"C) 5.1
E (25°C) = 0.67 v vs. SHE
The curve on Fig.2 represents the theoret.ical data calculated
using the thermodynamic constants out. of [4) derived from t.he
free energy data in [2J including HOl hydrolysis and volatility
values. Fig.2 shows a good fit between experiment.al and calcula-
ted data values.
Since these calculations show insignificant HOl and iodate equi-
librium values, lHtle information concerning these t.wo prohlem
areas could he deduced.
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Due to dissimilar experimental conditions and lack of sufficient-
ly detailed information (redox potential measurements), no at-
tempt was made to compare the da ta shown here with other experi-
mental P determinations.
A second da ta set compiled in Fig.3 shows the relationship be-
tween pH and partition coefficient at constant temperature and
constant redox potential. The experimental P values remai.n con-
stant up to about pH 6.5, then rapidly increase by several orders





















Fig. 3: lodine partition as a function of pH
in Csl sol utlon
[Csl]aq. = 0.0001 M
Buffer (Phosphate) = 0.1 M
Temperature: 110"C
E (25/1C) = 0.61 V vs. SHE
The bend in the experimental data at pH 6.5 does not correlate
weIl with results of calculations of kinetic parameters, based on
theoretical models in arecent report [3]. This shows that ioda-
te should be a major species and that iodate equilibrium is
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established within seconds, even at pH 5.
The curve in Fig.3 was calculated in the same way as that in
Fig.2. Again the curve in Fig.3 agrees weIl with the measured
data. This provides some information on the kinetics of iodate
formation. At temperatures and with a redox potential, (>0.6 V
vs. SHE) , relevant to a hypothetical severe accident condition,
iodate kinetics are fast with a time constant in the region of
minutes once iodate formation is thermodynamically possible.
The method shown was applied to the fuel element pool of a Swiss
BWR in order to asses the capacity for iodine retention in the
pool water. Based on the pool pH of 5.8 and redox potential of
+.5V vs. SHE a very high partition coefficient was expected.
Table I: lodine partition as a function of temperature
in a BWR fuel element pool
pH(250C)
[CsIJaq.
5.8 E(25OC) = 0.50 V vs. SHE
0.0001 M added; (the original sample was free of
active or inactive iodine)
Temperature P(experimental)
[OC] [l]tot.aq./[l]tot.gas
38 > 2 - 3 10"6
(most probably "'5.10'7)
85 2 - 2.5 10'6
120 5.5 - 6.5 10'5
The results shown in Table I are at the upper limit for P deter-
minations with the equipment described here.ln particular the va-
lues for the lowest temperature are based on such low gas phase
activities (~1 nCi/l gas) that they represent lower boundaries
for P, setting the limit of the method shown to roughly 2.10"6
for the partition coefficient. An increase of this limit is pos-
sible but difficult t.o aC.hieve in pract.ice. It would pose shlel-
ding and safety problems and may also produce significant changes
in the redox potent.ial conditions due to radiolysis products.
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CONCLusrONS
The data described here provide same contrlbution to the discus-
sion of thermodynamic and kinetic parameters in "clean condHion"
systems. A good fit with clean systems is aprerequisite for in-
vestigations of complex realistic systems.Such an advanced expe-
riment is now underway at EIR.
It must consider, for example solutions which approximate to a
"core melt" sump. This could contain a large number of dissolved
species .and suspended solids such as as fuel, silicates and
structure material. Contributory effects of a strong radiation
fjeld mllst also be considered.
A calclllation of iodine distribution is hardly achievable on
t.hermodynamic grounds. LJsing the alltoclave system shown, combi-
ned wit.h a radiat.ion field, reliable partit.ion coefficients can
be determlned at temperat.ures lIP to 200°C.
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ABSTRACT
Deposition of activity in the coolant circuit of a Commercial
Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor reduces the amount that might escape in
the event of an accident.
In a continuing programme, iron oxide particles of 0.6, 2 and 5 ~m
diameter, 17 ~m alumina particles and methyl iodide vapour have each
been injected into the C02 coolant of a reactor at Hinkley Point,
England. Subsequent changes of concentration provide information on
the rate of deposition.
Initially, rapid depoSition occurred for all the tracers. Methyl
iodide was removed with an initial half-life of 12 s. The corres-
ponding half-life was about 20 s for the particles up to 5 ~m
diameter, and 120 s for 17~m particles. After the first few minutes
the removal became slower, but concentrations fel.l by factors of
several hundred to some tens of thousands during aperiod of 3 h
following each injection. The potential escape of fission products
in an accident could be reduced several hundred times by deposition.
In one experiment, 17 ~m particles were injected with the reactor
shut down and the coolant flow rate reduced. The particles deposi-
ted more rapidly than at full flow. On increasing the flow rate to
full flow most of the particles were resuspended into the gas
stream.
The results imply that the metal-oxide particles deposit onto, but
also bounce and blow off, the internal surfaces of the coolant
circuit. Methyl iodide is converted, at least in part, into one or
more chemical forms of iodine,. which also disappear rapidly from the
gas stream. Although the mechanisms for removal are not fully
understood, the benefit of deposition in reducing the amount of
circulating activity is clearly very great.
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INTRODU<.;TION
In analysing the safety of operation of conunerci.al advanced gas-
cooled reactors (CAGR) a number of possible accidents are postulated in
which iodine and other volatile fission products escape from damaged fuel
to the coolant gas, without damage to the coolant circuit. The iodine
could be present in two forms: either as methyl iodide, or attached to
particles which are circulating in the coolant [1]. These materials
could escape from the intact coolant circuit with the two or three
percent of the gas that leaks daily from the circuit, until the reactor
could be blown down. However, experiments in the prototype Windscale
AGR, under a range of operating conditions, have shown that methyl iodide
and particles are removed from the gas stream by deposition onto the
internal surfaces of the coolant circuit, thus reducing the fraction that
might leak out by a large factor [2,3,4]. Further experiments are in
progress in a CAGR at Hinkley Point. They enable the magnitude of this
decontamination factor to be evaluated, and provide some information on
the behaviour of particulate matter and iodine compounds in the reactor
coolant.
EXPERIMENTAL
Methyl iodide and particles of iron oxide or alumina were injected
rapidly into the coolant gasstream, and the rate of deposition was
deduced from the decrease with time of the concentration in the gas. The
injection point for all the experiments entered a duct of 30 cm diameter
returning gas from the coolant treatment plant to the reactor pressure
vessel,' upstream of one of the eight circulators (see Fig 1). A sampIe
collected downstream of the injection point allowed estimation of the
quantity injected.
Methyl iodide, labe lIed with 131I, was prepared and sealed in a
small silica capsule, which, at the appropriate time, was broken in a
stream of helium. The methyl iodide evaporated rapidly and was carried
into the reactor duct within 1 minute. sequential sampIes of the coolant
were collected in several locations, both from sampling pipes installed
in the circulators, and also from selected fuel channels via the Burst
cartridge Detection Pipes, penetrating the pile cap. These pipes were
long and of narrow bore. At each sampling point coolant gas was drawn at
1 to 2 9 s-l through traps of 35 or 65 ml volume, packed with activated
charcoal impregnated with KI. A manifold arrangement was used to permit
continuous sampling. In addition a few sampIes were taken at BO 9 s-l
through a pipe of wider bore only 2 m long at sampling point 2 (see
Fig 1). At this sampling point, the gas was passed through a pack
containing six or more charcoal-impregnated glass fibre filters in
series. A fraction of the gas penetrating these filters was sampled by a
charcoal trap. The amounts of 131I collected on the sampIes were deduced
from the gamma ray spectra recorded using Germanium-Lithium detectors.
Monodisperse particles of 2, 5 and 17 #m diameter were labelIed with
59pe. In each experiment, particles of the selected size were dispersed
within a small pressure vessel connected at the injection point, and the
resulting aerosol was carried into the reactor in a stream of helium. In
an additional experiment a submieron aerosol of mass median diameter
0.6 #m, geometrie standard deviation 2.5 with the same radioaetive label
was generat~ by atomising a colloidal suspension in the pressure vessel.
The variation in eoncentration of the injeeted partieles was followed for
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about 200 minutes at sarnpling point 2 only. Glass fibre filters,
supported on both eides by stainless steel gauzes were used to collect
particulate material from the gas at a flow rate of about 115 9 s-l.
Gamma spectrometry was used to deterrnine the 59Fe content of the sarnples.
The techniques for generation, injection and sarnpling of the test
aerosols have been described elsewhere [5].
The methyl iodide and particle injection experiments were carried
out during normal operation of the reactor. One additional particle
injection experiment was performed with the reactor shut down and with
the coolant circulation rate reduced to 47 per cent of normal. Four
hours after injecting the particles the circulation rate was raised to
the normal value, to deterrnine whether the deposited particles could be
raised from the surfaces by an increase in gas velocity. Information
regarding the background 59Fe raised into the gas strearn during this
operation was obtained by collecting sarnples during a similar change in
flow the day before the particles were injected. The concentration
ratios of 59Fe to other activation products found on the filter sarnples
(particularly 58Co and 54Mn,), were used to estimate the contribution of
background 59Fe circulating in the coolant gas during the following
experiment.
EFFECT OF MIXING
The circulators drive about 4000 kg s-l of coolant around the
reactor circuit, so that the total 1.2 x 105 kg pass around the circuit
once every 30 s. There is a tendency for the gas that has passed through
a given circulator to return to that circulator on the next pass. Thus,
the tracers, injected effectively into the inlet to one circulator, do
not appear irnrnediately at sarnpling points in different parts of the
circuit. Experiments were conducted in which helium, an inert tracer,
was injected for 30 s or 1 min at the injection point and was measured in
sarnples of reactor coolant collected at the particulate sampling point
and at some selected circulators. The results (Fig 2) show the time
required for the tracer to disperse uniformly around the circuit, and the
variation in concentration due to mixing alone at selected sarnpling
points. Data from the methyl iodide and the particulate injection
experiments could be corrected for the effect of mixing, to reveal the
effects of deposition alone on the concentration of the injected tracer.
BEHAVIOUR OF IODINE INJECTED AB METHYL IODIDE
Fig. 3 shows examples of the variation in concentration following an
injection of methyl iodide. The results have been normalised by dividing
by the concentration that would have resulted, had all the injected
activity been uniformly mixed throughout the coolant.
Measurements at different locations in the reactor circuit showed
the large variations in peak concentration that would be expected for a
tracer with adeposition half-life that is much shorter than the time
required for mixing throughout the reactor circuit. Measurements at the
circulator which received the injected methyl iodide, showed that
initia1ly the 131 I disappeared from the gas strearn with a half-life of
about 12 s. Within two or three minutes the concentration had declined
several hundred times, but the rate of decline of concentration had
diminished substantially. After 3 hours the concentration was less than
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Table I. Iodinencollected on the.. components ofthe sampIers used
!9. study iodine compounds
Sample Point 1 2' 2 2 2 2
mean timea
of sample o.sb 1.0 4.7 14.3 52.9 217.7
~-~._-------------------_._----~----_._~-----.----------------_._- ----
charcoald 47 0.053 4.4XIO-3 3.8xlO-3 2.8XlO-3 3.2XlO-3
papers
Conc. c
Charcoal 187 0.15 1.3xl0-3 4.9xl0-4 3.3xl0-4 2.7xl0-4
pack
a Measured in minutes from start of injection
b During injection
c Concentrations normalised as for Fig.3
d Six charcoal-loaded filter papers in series
10-4 of the initial value, and it approached the background level,
present before injection, over aperiod of a few days.
SampIes collected using sampling trains of several elements in
series gave some evidence of the presence of more than one chemical form
of 131I. Measurements at the sampling point 1 (Fig 1), close to the
injection point, showed that charcoal-loaded filter papers each retained
only about 4 per cent of the incident methyl iodide. The remainder
penetrated to the following charcoal trap. In contrast, measurements at
sampling point 2, showed substantial fractions of iodine retained on the
filters. After a few minutes the fraction collected on a stack of six
charcoal-loaded filter papers was consistently 80 to 90 per cent of the
total retained by the sampling train. (see Table I).
In some sampIes a plain glass-fibre filter was included at the front
of the stack of filters. This retained only a few per cent of the total
iodine, showing that there was little absorption on the particulate
material suspended in the coolant.
The results imply the presence of at least two chemical forms of
iodine. The more easily absorbed was retained with an efficiency of
sixty to seventy per cent by each of the filters, so that the fraction of
this form penetrating the six filters in series would be negligible. The
more penetrating form of iodine, behaving in this respect like methyl
iodide, was absorbed inefficiently by the filters and was mostly collec-
ted by the following charcoal trap. This was confirmed by the fact that
the last of the six papers often retained only a few per cent of the
quantity held by the trap.
It would be reasonable to conjecture that the injected methyl iodide
constituted the penetrating form. However, for the sampIes collected at
sampling point 2, measurements indicated that the rear of the charcoal
pack (divided into halves by agauze) collected on average, less than
12 per cent of the iodine retained by the whole pack, while in the sampIe
exposed to methyl iodide, just downstream of the injection at sampling
point l, the corresponding fraction was 23 per cent. This comparison
suggests the presence of yet another form of iodine.
The variation of composition of the iodine suggests a complex
mechanism for the interconversion and deposition of the species present,
1427
and the results do not provide an understanding of this process. However
the results clearly indicate a large and rapid reduction in total
concentration due to loss to surfaces within the coolant circuit.
BEHAVIOUR OF TRACE AEROSOLS
Figure 4 shows examples of the results for two experiments conducted
at full flow.
The results for submicron, 2 and 5 #m diameter particles showed many
similarities. For all three the concentration of 59Fe declined rapidly
at first, with adeposition half-life of about 20 s. After a few
minutes, the decline slowed, but deposition continued, and when 3 hours
had elapsed the concentration was less than one thousandth of the
concentration that would have resulted had the injected particles become
uniformly mixed throughout the coolant. The results were generally
similar to those obtained in the prototype AGR.at Windscale [2] for 2 and
5 #m particles, but the initial deposition half-life at Windscale was
about 1 min.
The 17 #m alumina particles deposited more slowly, with an initial
half-life of 2 minutes. After 15 min the half life extended to 2 hours,
and decay was still proceeding at this rate when sampling was discon-
tinued some 3 h after injection.
In several experiments (eg see Fig 4), occasional fluctuations were
imposed on the general trend of 59Fe concentration. Sometimes these
coincided with changes in other activation products, indicating that the
fluctuations were related to the background material in the reactor. On
other occasions, 59Fe variations did not correlate with other tracers,
and preferential resuspension of the injected particles, due perhaps to
small changes in coolant flow, or movement of reactor components is a
plausible explanation.
The results appear to imply that several processes combined to
determine the variation of concentration. Initially, mixing causes an
eariy peak in concentration, but explains little of the subsequent
decline. Particles in the size region represented in these measurements
are expected to arrive at surfaces chiefly due to impaction , a mechanism
which increases in effectiveness with particle size. The fact that the
deposition half-life does not vary inversely with particle size is
strongly suggestive that bounce-off (or possibly rapid resuspension) is
occurring, its frequency increasing with particle size. The slower
variation in concentration that occurred after the tenth minute following
each injection can be explained by a progressive process of resuspension
and deposition, particles ultimately accumulating in locations from which
resuspension is very siow.
The experiment at low fiow provided further evidence of the nature
of the processes occurring (Fig 5). When the 17 #m aerosol was injected
at 47 per cent flow, the initial deposition half-life (50 s) was shorter
than the equivalent value at full flow. AB impaction is expected to
increase in frequency with flow rate, this inverse variation of deposi-
tion with flow suggests an increase of bouncing with velocity. Increases
in flow rate, both before and after the deposition experiment, gave ciear
evidence of resuspension of activated component elements of steei and of
the injected test particles. At least a half of the injected particles
must have become suspended again to explain the observed concentrations.
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CONCLUSIONS
Experi.ments on such a large, complex system as apower reactor, with
limited access for sampling, provide valuable evidence regarding the
behaviour of vapours and particles, but cannot alone give a full
understanding of the physical and chemical changes involved. However,
the results described above clearly indicate that methyl iodide (and the
products of its chemical changes in the coolant gas) and particulate
tracers are rapidly removed onto surfaces. Within three hours of
release, concentrations are reduced by factors from hundreds to tens of
thousands, and the potential for escape of fission product iodine from a
reactor in the event of an accident is reduced by a comparable degree.
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Fig. 3. Variation of the concentration of 131 1 at two
sampling points following an injeetion of eH3 1311.
The concentration has been correeted for background
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Fig. 4. Variation in concentration at sampling point 2
following injeetions of 2p.m iron oxide (-x-) and
17p.m alumina (-0-) particles. The results are
correeted for background and normalised
as in Fig.3.
-3 -2 -1. 0 1 2 3 4 5 7







[J Estimated resuspension of injected particles
o Fe - 59


























Fig.5.17 Mieron alumina experiment - injeetion and resuspension
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THE BEHAVIOUR OF IODINE IN ADVANCED GAS-COOLED REACTOR (AGR) CIRCUITS
by
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ABSTRACT
Evidence on the behaviour of iodine in the coolant circuits of
AGR is reviewed, and suggests that several iodine species are
important with respect to the overall plate-out behaviour.
Interconversion of these species by radiolysis in the core is a
key process. An approach to the modelling of iodine plate out
which takes account of the coolant radiolytic chemistry is
described.
1 . INTRODUCTION
Understanding the behaviour of fission product iodine in the coolant
circuit, and particularly the potential for retention by surface plate-out
in abnormal conditions, represents an important area in the safety assessment
of Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactors (AGR). For some time, we have been developing
a computer code (AGRIPA) for modelling the plate-out of iodine in AGR's under
a wide range of conditions. The model for iodine surface deposition originally
employed was based on the prevailing view that methyl iodide is the dominant
form of iodine in AGR coolants, and is the plating-out species [lJ. However,
this approach proved incompatible with some of available experimental
evidence, in particular the results of methyl iodide injection experiments at
Windscale AGR. We were led to propose a new model in which at least two
iodine species have important roles, the interconversion of these playing a
key part. This preliminary work included a number of arbitrary assumptions
about the nature and rate of the interconversion processes.
In this paper, we re-examine old evidence and review new results which point
to the importance of several iodine species in AGR circuits. A detailed
analysis of the radiolytic mechanism by which methyl iodide may be converted
to other iodine species confirms that this is an important process, even in
shut-down reactor conditions. The need to include a proper treatment of the
gas-phase chemistry of the coolant in iodine plate-out modelling is empha-
sized, and approaches to an improved modelling code are examined.
2. IODINE SPECIES AND THEIR INTERCONVERSION IN AGR CIRCUITS
The importance of methyl iodide in AGR circuits was demonstrated in early
reactor coolant sampling measurements. Maypack measurements from burst
cartridge detection (BCD) pipes on core channels containing defected fuel
pins at Windscale AGR (WAGR) showed more than 90% of the total radioiodine
to be organic [2]. Gas chromatographic measurements confirmed that methyl
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iodide was the major organic component. This evidence was further supported
by elemental iodine injection experiments at the French Chinon reactor [3J,
with similar coolant chemistry to an AGR. Rapid conversion of a proportion
of the elemental iodine to organic form was observed, accompanied by a fast
overall removal of iodine from the coolant by plate-out. The quantitative
extent of organic conversion was not determined, however.
Earlier laboratory studies by Collins et al [4J were in accord with
these reactor observations. Irradiated miniature fuel pins heated to clad
melting temperature in flowing CO
2
/CO carriers were found to release most of
their iodine attached to particulate, but the 10-25% gaseous component was
largely organic. Methane added to the carrier increased the organic iodine
fraction, but added air resulted in 60-80% of the released iodine being
characterised as elemental. The accumulated evidence some ten years ago
thus pointed strongly to methyl iodide as the dominant form of iodine in
AGR circuits. On this basis, methyl iodide was chosen as representative of
iodine behaviour in the first series of injection experiments to measure
plate-out at WAGR [5].
Our modelling studies [lJ of the WAGR methyl iodide injections [5,6J
suggested that this is an oversimplified picture. Our conclusions that
several iodine species play important roles are supported by new experimental
results and a re-examination of older data. BCD pipe measurements alone are
not a reliable diagnostic of chemistry in the coolant circuit, since investi-
gations have shown that up to 90% of the total iodine entering the pipes
from failed fuel core channels may become absorbed on the pipe walls [7J.
Recent measurements show that the proportion depositing can vary from near
zero up to 80%, depending on reactor operating conditions and the particular
fuel failure. It is probable that long, narrow sampling pipes act as selec-
tive filters, trapping reactive forms of iodine and transmitting the less
reactive methyl iodide. Plate-out of methyl iodide itself cannot account
for the extent and variability of the observed deposition in BCD pipes.
Recent results from a special sampling point installed at Hinkley Point B
commercial AGR confirm this view [8J. This point accesses the coolant circuit
through a short length of wide-bore pipe, so greatly reducing plate-out en route,
to the Maypack sampler. Under normal operation, the background iodine in the
circuit is found to consist of a mixture of iodine species in which the
reactive component exceedsthe methyl iodide by about a factor of 10. Samples
taken in conjunction with injections of methyl iodide into the circuit show
a rapid conversion of a proportion of this to the reactive form.
Recently revised thinking on the chemistry of iodine in oxide fuels also
points to a need to consider several iodine species which can interconvert in
the coolant circuits of AGR's. Detailed assessment of iodine chemistry in
LWR oxide fuel [9] has led to the conclusion that caesium iodide will be the
predominant iodine form. The in-pin chemistry of AGR fuel should differ very
little from that of LWR fuel, the effects of the different cladding being
slight. Releases of iodine from AGR fuel pins with minor defects where fuel
chemistry is unperturbed by coolant penetration is thus expected to be as
caesium iodide. Caesium iodide will be thermodynamically stable in AGR
coolants (CO /1% CO with a few hundred ppm of CH
4
, HZ and H 0) [10J, but
may be radiofytically converted to other iodine spec~es incfuding methyl
iodide by processes of the type discussed in Section 4 below. Direct measure-
ments of iodine release from AGR fuel are not inconsistent with CsI. Hillary
and Taylor [llJ found that most of the iodine and caesium released from
irradiated WAGR pins heated in CO2/CO deposited in the high temperature
region of their system, consistenE with CsI. The earlier experiments of
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Collins et al [4] probably involved some extraneous effects. Cs~ may have
been decomposed on the hot silica walls of the apparatus [12], and the free
iodine released reacted with trace hydrocarbon impurities to yield methyl iodide.
With air in the carrier, fuel oxidation could have led to caesium uranate
formation and corresponding decomposition of Cs~.
~t is reasonable to conclude that several iodine species, of which the
most important are caesium iodide, atomic iodine, hydrogen iodide and methyl
iodide, are important in AGR circuits, and must be considered in improved
modelling of iodine behaviour.
3. THE PLATE-OUT BEHAV~OUR OF ~OD~NE
There is abundant reactor evidence that iodine plates out strongly in AGR's.
The observations at the Chinon reactor, and the measurements on WAGR BCD
pipes, have been referred to already. Further evidence from WAGR is based on
the iodine concentration measured in coolant from core channels containing
fuel failures compared with that from clean channels [2]. A ratio of about
30 was typically found, which could only be explained on the basis of substan-
tial loss of iodine to surfaces in the circuit. Steel specimens retrieved from
WAGR boilers following a fuel failure showed positive evidence of deposited
iodine [2]. The series of methyl iodide injection experiments at WAGR [5,6],
though difficult to interpret in detail, demonstrate that overall iodine is
rapidly removed from the coolant by plate-out. They are supported by the
recent measurements at the special sampling point at Hinkley Point B
following a methyl iodide injection [8], which show that the different iodine
species present all plate-out rapidly.
Models describing iodine behaviour in AGR's must include a valid treat-
ment of the basic surface deposition processes of .the various iodine species.
In this respect, controlled laboratory measurements are a valuable source of
information. The deposition of elemental iodine onto steel and other surfaces
has been much studied [13,14], but under conditions relevant to LWR and HTGR,
rather than AGR. Data on other iodine species are very sparse. Measurements
currently in progress at Windscale Nuclear Laboratories [15] specific to AGR
conditions should do much to improve this situation. Meanwhile, results from
experiments employing inert carriers are of closest relevance. Ideally, the
rate constants for adsorption and desorption are required as functions of
temperature, the ratio of these determining the equilibrium state for condi-
tions below surface saturation. However, most measurements have been concerned
with determining the equilibrium isotherms of elemental iodine onto a range
of steels, and so are of limited value for reactor modelling. Early results
have been reviewed by Hoinkins [13], and recently Osborne et al [16] have
published new measurements for low chrome steel in conjunction with a further
review of earlier data. Osborne et al's work also includes some measurements
of the rates of adsorption and desorption. The principal conclusions which
can be drawn from this combined evidence are:
i) Two main mechanisms operate for elemental (atomic) iodine on steel.
For low iodine pressures and high temperatures where condensed FeI
2
and
CrI2 phases are unstable, reversible chemisorption operates up to surface
loading approaching monolayer coverage, when saturation effects set in.
These conditions will apply for normal AGR operation, but not necessarily
when enhanced iodine levels are present. For higher iodine concentrations,
iodides of steel components will form on the cooler circuit surfaces, and
saturation effects do not then arise.
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ii) Material type and surface condition are important. Equilibrium loadings
on heavily oxidized surfaces are much lower than on bare metals, and
are lower on stainless steel than on carbon steel. There is some
evidence that the rate of adsorption is lower on oxidized surfaces than
on bare metals. The oxygen content or oxygen potential of the carrier
gas also plays a role.
iii) The adsorption process is non-activated ~ad is generally fast. Deposition
velocities are typically in the range 10 - 10-2 ms-1• Alternatively
deposition can be represented ~~ terms of agas kinetic sticking proba-
bility, for which values of 10 and 10-4 are indicated by the work of
Osborne et al at temperatures 4000 C and 7000 C respectively.
iv) Desorption is an activated process, and the activation energy appears
to depend on surface condition. For slightly oxidized surfaces, values
are in excess of 200 kJ mol-1 [16], but for heavily oxidized surfaces
such as those in AGR's, values in the range 100 - 150 kJ mol-1 appear
likely based on plant measurements [1,7].
Hydrogen iodide is expected to exhibit very similar plate-out characteris-
tics to elemental iodine. Of the remaining species important in AGR circuits,
caesium iodide deposition rates onto steel have been measured by Nicolosi and
Baybutt [17], but only in steam atmospheres and under poor mass transport
conditions. Very recent measurements in an inert carrier by Bowsher et al [18]
suggest that unsaturated CsI vapour does not deposit significantly onto oxi-
dized steel surfaces. No data on methyl iodide deposition rates at relevant
temperatures have been published, but there is evidence that at 1150 C the rate
is orders of magnitude slower than for elemental iodine [19]. Since elemental
iodine is known to plate-out rapidly, it seems a reasonable modelling assump-
tion to attribute the dominant role in AGR circuits to this species.
4. THE ROLE OF RADIATION AND A RADIATION CHEMISTRY MODEL
A treatment of the interconversion of iodine species is needed in a fully-
developed plate-out model. Earlier, we suggested that radiolysis probably
plays the key role in this [1], and the modelling studies now described confirm
this view. In an AGR core under normal operation, neutron and Y-fields are
very high, and even under shut-down conditions substantial y-fields persist
for long periods. Both CH3I and CsI are decomposed by y irradiation [20,21],
but at the very low concentrations involved, direct radiolysis will be negli-
gible. The dominant decomposition mechanisms will involve reactions with the
primary radiolysis products of C02' analogous to the hydrocarbon radiolyses
which have been much studied in the context of graphite oxidation and carbon
deposition on fuel pins [22, 23].
AGR coolant radiolysis chemistry is extremely complex and incompletely
understood. No data on iodine species behaviour in this environment are avail-
able. Numerous mechanisms for the decomposition of CsI and CH
3
I could be
postulated. We confine attention here to the latter species, mainly because
of its importance in interpreting the results of CH3I injection experiments
at WAGR, but also because very reasonable assumptions about its behaviour can
be based on the established radiolysis mechanisms for methane.
In order to assess the extent of methyl iodide destruction on passage
through the core, it is necessary to incorporate the important coolant chemistry
reactions into a description of a fuel channel. The main difficulty lies in
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selecting representative reactions, otherwise the problem becomes too big to
solve efficiently. The reaction scheme in the model is limited to ZO chemical
species:-
a) Coolant constituents
b) 10 Radiolysis products
c) Zo Radiolysis products
d) Organic radicals
e) Iodine species
- COZ, CO, HZO, HZ' CH4 , CZH6 , CZH4
- CO;, 0(3p )
- (CO
Z
















Reactions leading to the primary and secondary radio lysis products are
shown schematically in Fig. 1. The co~ ions and the 0(3p ) atoms are the primary
products of CO
Z
radiolysis and the secondary products are formed by clustering
of the co~ ion. Fig. Z shows diagramatically the reactions involving other
species. Briefly, the scheme involves reaction of radiolysis products with
hydrocarbons to produce free radicals and with organic iodides to produce radi-
cals and I atoms; hydrogen stripping reactions between radicals and hydro-
carbons; radical recombination and recombination of I atoms with radicals to
re-form organic iodides. The rate constants for all these reactions are either
best literature values or best estimates.
The fuel channel is divided up into 50 equal volume compartments, which
are assumed to be well-mixed in all species and with a uniform temperature.
The energy deposition rate in each compartment, E(Z), is calculated from a
standard expression for a WAGR fuel channel, involving E the peak rating.
The production rates of ° atoms and CO; ions can then bemg~lculated using the
equation:-
Production rate 6.Z418 x 1016 .p.G.E(Z) moleeules -3 -1cm s
where: density of CO
Z
in g -3P cm
G G-value for production of species in (100 ev)-1
E(z) y-energy deposition rate in W g-1
Chemical reactions within each compartment and the' transport of each species
from one compartment to the next are modelled. This involves a total of 1000
variables, requiringthe use of a sophisticated differential equations solver.
The FACSIMILE code [Z4] is used since it was originally developed for the
solution of large, stiff problems such as this.
Calculations have been performed for four of the injection experiments
in WAGR [5, 6], for which details of coolant composition are available, in
order to assess the extent of conversion of methyl iodide to ethyl iodide and
iodine atoms. Energy deposition rates were estimated as a fraction of full
power rating from the length of time from shut-down to injection and the
variation of decay heat with time. The results for the appropriate conditions
can be seen in Table 1. Fig. 3 shows profiles of iodine species and radicals
up the channel for the high temperature injection. The results are obviously
very sensitive to both coolant composition and reactor conditions. The frac-
tional destruction of methyl iodide is, however, almost independent of the
channel inlet concentration over several decades, which simplifies application
of the results in a plate-out model.
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It is interesting to note that the destruction of methyl iodide is predicted
to be higher under cold shutdown conditions than at normal operation. This
could be due, in part, to the very low methane concentration (5 vpm) inthe
former experiment.
TABLE 1 : PREDICTION OF CH
3
I CONVERSIO~ IN WAGR INJECTION EXPERIMENTS
(The fractions of iodine species at the channel outlet following a single pass
are shown)
RATING FRACTION OF IODINE
(%)
































5. THE IMPACT OF RADIOLYSIS CHEMISTRY ON PLATE-OUT PREDICTIONS
The detailed reaction scheme outlined above is too complex to be included
in a plate-out model of the whole reactor circuit. In our preliminary two
species model [1], radiolysis in the core was represented by arbitrary first
order rate constants for processes destroying and reforming methyl iodide. It
is possible to cast the results of the detailed analysis in this form and
derive pseudo-first-order rate constants specific to the experimental conditions,
so eliminating the arbitrary element. Considering the scheme:
the aggregate radical concentration (effec-








can be found from the product of
t~vely constant) and the estimated
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-11 3 -1 -1
(10 cm molecule s [25]). k 1 can then be adjusted to give the correct
fraction of I atoms leaving the channel. Recombination of I atoms and radicals
outside the core is negligible. The reactor circuit model therefore allows
organic iodide!I atom interconversion only in the fuel channels and moderator
graphite channels in the main radiation field.
The present version of the plate-out model itself involves only iodine
atom deposition on the boiler steels, and is based on the conclusions of section
3 above. Adsorption is treated as non-activated, with a rate equal to a stick-
ing probability times a surface collision rate. Desorption is treated as a
simple activated process with an Arrhenius-type rate constant, although it is
clear that a more complex desorption mechanism is needed.
Initial attempts at fitting the WAGR injection experiments using the
overall model are promising. In particular, the initial removal rates for
methyl iodide are in broad agreement with experiment, and the weak temperature
dependence observed can be rationalised.
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FIGURE 1 : Schematic of COz Radiolysis
Product Reactions.
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FIGURE 3 Profiles of Radical and Iodine Species Concentrations
in a WAGR Fuel Channel for the High Temperature
Injection. (Concentration of methyl iodide at
channel inlet is 1010 moleeules cm- 3 )
1442
Recent Developments in Nuclear Aerosol Research
Related to Thermal Reactor Safety
by
F. Abbey





Laboratorium für Aerosolphysik und Filtertechnik I
7500 Karlsruhe, W.-Germany
ABSTRACT
This paper reports on the outcome of a Special ist Meeting on Nuclear
Aerosols in Reactor Safety held at KfK Karlsruhe, 4-6th September,
1984, under the joint sponsorship of the Committee on the Safety of
Nuclear Installations of the NEA, The German Nuclear Society and the
Association for Aerosol Research, and under the co-chairmanship of
the present authors. Although the Specialist Meeting covered nuclear
aerosols in all reactor systems, and some fuel cycle facilities, this
report is limited to aspects relevant tothermal reactors, and in
particular LWR's. The paper is structured on the same basis as the
meeting'and reviews the highlights, including important results
presented and recommendations for further research.
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1. Introduction
The purpose 0f this paper is to report on a specialist meeting
on nuclear aerosols in reactor safety held at KfK under the
co-chairmanship of the authors immediately prior to the present
ENS/ANS meeting (4-6th September, 1984), insofar as the topics
discussed at the meeting are relevant to thermal reactor
systems.
The prediction of fission product transport, deposition and
release associated with postulated nuclear accidents is
necessary for the assessment of radiological consequences,
and hence is an essential element in reactor safety evaluation.
And, since many of the fission products transport and deposit
as aerosols, the study of aerosol behaviour is an important
part of this problem. Nuclear aerosols can also affect the
course as weIl as the consequences of reactor accidents, for
example via their effect on the performance of engineered
safety features such as the containment and air-cleaning
systems.
Because of the high concentrations and extreme environments
in which nuclear aerosols may exi&t they exhibit very dynamic
physical and chemical behaviour and pose special analytical
and experimental problems different from those associated with
aerosols found under industrial and ambient conditions. In
1978 an expert group on nuclear aerosols in reactor safety
was established by the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear
Installations (CSNI) of the NEA. In June of 1979 this group
issued a state-of-the-art report /1/, and a specialist meeting
was held subsequently in April, 1980, at Gatlinberg in the USA.
The emphasis in these early activities was on nuclear aerosol
behaviour in LMFBR systems, and in 1981 following the TMI-2
accident, CSNI reconvened the expert group with arequest to
prepare a supplementary state-of-the-art report /2/ with
particular reference to new information which had become
available since the original document and which is relevant
to accidents involving extensive core damage in LWR's. The
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final meeting of the group, held in March 1983, recommended that
a second specialist meeting be held in mid-1984.
It is this meeting, jointly sponsored by CSNI, the German
Nuclear Society, and the Association for Aerosol Research,
to which the present paper refers. The objectives of the
meeting were to provide a forum for the exchange of information
between aerosol research specialists, reactor designers and
regulators. The paper reviews the highlights of the meeting
and notes important results presented and recommendations
made for further research related to nuclear aerosols in
LWR safety. The treatment follows· the main topic areas
adopted for the meeting.
2. Aerosol Formation (Session I)
Aerosol formation, in this context, is concerned with the
nature of the gas-borne particulate matter generated in a
nuclear accident immediately after and in the immediate vicinity
of its initial formation by vaporisation/nucleation/condensation
or fragmentation processes, i.e. it is concerned to define the
input to the· subsequent treatment of the transport and release
of the aerosol through the reactor system to the environment.
In severe LWR accidents liquid (water) aerosols may be formed in
the containment by blowdown of the coolant. Solid aerosols can
also be formed in the reactor coolant circuit (RCS) by vaporisa-
tion and condensation of volatile materials from an overheated
core, and in the containment as a result of discharging the
core materials from the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) when the
failure occurs at pressure, or by interaction between the core
materials and the concrete of the containment.
Both the chemical and physical forms of the aerosols will, in
principle, influence their subsequent transport and release.
Apart from the more obvious characteristics of particle size etc,
the solubility of the solid aerosols in water may have an
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important influences on steam condensation in the containment
in the case of the LWR.
Substantial programmes of research are currently in progress
worldwide in all these areas, and need to be continued.
The work of Albrecht et al in Germany, which provides
the principal data base for evaluating the amounts of core
materials released during the in-vessel core melt phase
of a severe LWR accident, has recently been extended /3/ to
include measurements of the chemical speciation of the aerosols
formed, using X-ray photo-electron spectroscopy. In these
experiments with simulated core mixtures, the materials
principally released as aerosol were fission product iodine,
caesium and tellurium, and cadmium, indium and silver from the
neutron absorber rods. Over most of the temperature range
(1275 - 1900o C) the neutron absorber materials were the dominant
contributors, and at the higher temperatures there was a signi-
ficant enrichment of the less volatile indium and silver. The
principal chemical forms detected were caesium and silver iodides,
caesium hydroxide, tellurium metal,cadmium hydroxide, indium oxide
and silver metal. For the principal hazardous fission products
iodine and caesium this is in accord with predictions based on
thermodynamic and kinetic studies. For the aerosols generated
at the higher temperatures the surface compositionwassigni-
ficantly different from the bulk, showing an enrichment of the
more volatile iodine, caesium, cadmium and indium.
Other experiments have placed emphasis on the physical form of the
aerosols generated from the neutron absorber materials.
Experiments in the UR /4/ in which the steel cladding of the
absorber rod was simulated showed that, at low pressure in
argon, the aerosols were composed of spherical submicron
particles which rapidly coagulate to form chain-like
structures. The primary particle size distribution is in
good agreement with the measurements of Parker /5/ on aerosol
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formed in a hydrogen-argon atmosphere by the condensation of
cadmium vapour from a plasma torch. However, the formation of
such extensive agglomerates in a steam environment is
questionable.
3. Aerosol Processes (Session 11)
The modelling of aerosol processes is of great significance for
the development of nuclear aerosol codes applicable to the
primary or containment systems of nuclear power plants. A review
of the most important aerosol processes is given in /1/.
Continued research has provided a better understanding of some
processes and generated a large amount of new information which
was not discussed in /1/ but which is included in /2/. In this
section we report only on some new developments in the research
on nuclear aerosol processes which are relevant to thermal
reactor safety.
It has long been recognized that the shape factors of nuclear
aerosols are important for most aerosol processes. Under LWR
accident conditions steam condensation leads to compaction and
spherification of agglomerates. Small spatial and temporal
inhomogeneities in the containment atmosphere are sufficient to
cause a permanent condensation and evaporation on and from
particles and, therefore, a continuous compaction. This spheri-
fication effect leads under most LWR accident conditions to a
value of unity for the dynamic coagulation and condensation shape
factor /6/. There are also new results on shape factors under dry
conditions. As reported in /7/ the coagulation shape factor of
U02 particles has been measured for the first time. It is
interesting to note that according to these experiments the
dynamic shape factor and the coagulation shape factor have
approximately the same value.
Diffusiophoresis and/or thermophoresis can be of major importance
for the wall plate-out of nuclear aerosols under LWR accident
conditions. Diffusiophoresis occurs when steam condenses on the
wall, thermophoresis may occur also without steam, if a tempe-
ratur gradient exists in the boundary layer at the wall. The
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temperature gradient causing the particle movement primarily
induces a sensible heat flux in the case of thermophoresis and a
latent heat flux in the case of diffusiophoresis. It has been
shown that the diffusiophoretic deposition rate is proportional
to the mass flux of condensing steam and the thermophoretic depo-
sition rate is proportional to the sensible heat flux. These
fluxes can be obtained with reasonable accuracy from thermodyna-
mic calculations compared to earlier deposition rate estimates by
means of the boundary layer thicknesses. Furthermore, it has been
shown that for the diffusiophoretic deposition the mass flux can
be substituted by the overall condensation rate /8/, which was
verified experimentally. A satisfactory methamatical description
of diffusiophoresis and thermophoresis is now possible, at least
under the conditions of a LWR accident scenario.
Another aerosol process still under consideration is the gravi-
tational coagulation. Here the formulation of the collision
efficiency of particles under coagulation has been discussed.
Different aerosol codes use different factors in the gravi-
tational collision kernel which leads to large discrepancies in
code predictions when gravitational coagulation is important.
Further experimental and theoretical work seems to be necessary.
A number of other aerosol processes important under the special
conditions of a nuclear aerosol system were discussed at the
meeting. Since they are relevant to LMFBR safety only or of minor
importance for the accuracy of aerosol code predictions in LWR
scenarios no detailed discussion is given. Rather, the reader
is reffered to the literature /2/, /9/.
4. Inter-relation of Thermal-hydraulics and Aerosol Behaviour
(Session III)
The sensitivity of aerosol behaviour predictions to the
estimated thermal-hydraulic conditions has always been recognized.
For example, uncertainty regarding the thermal-hydraulic conditions
in the upper plenum is one of the major uncertainties is pre-
dicting aerosol transport and retention in the primary system of
a LWR. Additional or improved data are required in a number of
areas.
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However, current computer codes generally make two further
basic assumptions 1) each control volume within the code
is treated as well mixed up to any surface boundary layers,
so that a single node treatment will suffice, 2) thermal-
hydraulics and aerosol behaviour are regarded as separable
in the sense that there is no back coupling from aerosol
behaviour to thermal-hydraulics; hence the thermal-hydraulic
conditions can be evaluated separately and are then used as
input data for the aerosol equations. The validity of both
of these assumptions may now be open to question.
Recent thermal-hydraulic measurements taken on the DEMONA
model containment facility (see Section 7) show that convective
mixing is often not strong enough to overcome stratification
effects /10/. Fu'rtherDEMONA evaluation will show what degree of
accuracy can be achieved in this situation using single node
aerosol codes, and which simplifications appear permissible.
It ha~ also been suggested ~1/ that aerosol behaviour may affect
the thermal-hydraulics in a number of ways and that it may not
always be possible to neglect the back coupling, e.g. as a
determinant of the spatial distribution of the associated
decay heat, (the question of possible revaporisation of
fission products initially deposited in the primary system
mentioned in Section 6 may be a case in point here), or, as
suggested in Section 2, by solubility effects on steam condensation
in the containment. This is an area which needs further attention.
A detailed theoretical investigation has been made/12/ of
aerosol nucleation and growth by condensation in the formation
and cooling of vapour-gas mixtures, applicable for example
to the condensation of fission product vapours in the primary
system or steam condensation in the environment. It is shown
that experimental and computer modelling must accurately
represent heat as well as mass transfer processes.
There is room for improvement in this respect in the current
modelling of the condensation of fission product vapours
in the primary system, which may significantly overestimate
the amount of aerosol formed.
1449
5. Aerosol Measurement and Generation Techniques for Large Scale
Experiments (Session IV)
Nuclear aerosol measurement techniques comprise most other
aerosol measurement techniques if they comply with the conditions
which usually occur for nuclear aerosols, namely high concentra-
tions, high temperature and pressure and eventually high humidity.
Of particular significance is the application of nuclear aerosol
instrumentation in experiments where aerosol formation, behaviour
and retention is investigated, since then the accuracy of
aerosol measurement is in competition with the accuracy of code
calculations.
In this context intercomparison tests of various aerosol measure-
ment techniques for sodium fire aerosols/13/ have been carried
out. Groups of five countries participated with six cascade
impactors of different type, one spiral centrifuge, one
sedimentation battery and one inertial spectrometer. Two groups
also performed image analysis of particles. The aerosol investi-




particles with Na-mass concentrations
between 60 and 1,200 mg/m3 , All instruments used produced
aerosol data that were in reasonable agreement. The individual
aerodynamic mass median diameters were within approximately
~ 20% and the d 's were generally within ~ 50% of the sample
mean values. This indicates that sodium aerosol measurement
techniques of sufficient accuracy are available and major problems
could be judged to be solved.
Particle size distribution measurements for high mass concen-
trations of test aerosols and for high temperatures have been
carried out by means of a cascade cyclone aerosol sampler.
It was found that the cyclone performance depends not only
upon the gas viscosity but also on the gas density /14/. The
cascade cyclone seems to be a new method of nuclear aerosol
classification, where high particle loads in high temperature
streams are involved.
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Another example of the successful applicationofnuclear aerosol
measurement techniques is the aerosol measurement system used
in the DEMONA Experiments/15/. The system is designed to
perform under extreme conditions (high pressure, high temperature,
high aerosol concentration and steam saturated atmospherel in
the 640 m3 vessel. This almost excludes the use of conventional
aerosol measurement techniques which are commercially available.
Additionally, the aerodisperse system to be measured consists of
solid particles, liquid particles (droplets) , and an air-steam
mixture carrier gas, and the mass concentration, particle size
distribution, density and form of particles and the mass of
condensed water are to be determined as function of time and
location. The solution of this complex aerosol measurement
taskconsists of different techniques, namely
filtration devices of special design to prevent steam entrainment
cascade impactors protected against steam
inertial spectrometers protected against steam
photometers for integral aerosol concentration measurement
protected against temperature and steam
optical spectrometer for droplet measurement protected against
steam and temperature
calorimeter for measurement of airborne water content
It could be judged as a major accomplishment that all these
new nuclear aerosol measurement techniques have been developed
and pretested successfully. The use of these techniques in
the dry DEMONA tests has so far demonstrated reasonable
performance. Application to the wet tests of DEMONA is
scheduled later this year.
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Nuclear aerosol behaviour simulation experiments require the
production of high aerosol mass concentrations in large volumes.
For the DEMONA tests an aerosol generator system has been
developed with an aerosol production rate of about 100 g/min
metal oxide particles. Based on an aerosol generator design
developed at ORNL three 80 kW plasma guns blowing the metal
powder into a ~urning chamber resulting in wall temperatures
of up to 15000 C have been developed. The heating in the plasma
provides melting of the powder and subsequent oxidation and
evaporation of the particles, which finally recondense. The
performance of the generator has been demonstratsd up to 3
bars system pressure. This aerosol generation method for
producing high mass concentrations and high production rates
has been tested and shown to produce adequate aerosols of
reasonable size and shape. There are, however, still improve-
ments necessary in order to avoid aerosol materiallosses due
to insufficient material transport through the feedline of the
system.
6. Aerosol Behaviour in the Primary System, Experimental
Investigations (Session V)
Studies of aerosol transport and deposition in the primary system
have not progressed to the same degree as the equivalent
containment studies.
One of the important recommendations of the Supplementary Report
of the OECD-CSNI expert group on nuclear aerosols in reactor
safety was to perform realistic, large scale experiments on
aerosol transport in the primary system of an LWR. An inter-
nationalseries of experiments of this kind has recently been
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initiated and is in progress using the Marviken reactor in
Sweden. The objectives of the experiments are to provide
a demonstration of aerosol retention, and to establish ~ data
base for code validation purposes. An attempt is being made
to provide as realistic conditions as possible, particularly
thermal-hydraulic conditions, though high pressures
are excluded by the limitations of the facility. The behaviour
of the volatile fission products (iodine and caesium - "fissium")
and the more refractory constit)lentl3 pf the coxe ("corium") are
being studied separately and in combination, the aerosols being
generated respectively by means of a furnace and a plasma torch.
A programme of supporting separate effects test is associated
with the Marviken experiments.
A primary circuit code validation test programme is also being
carried out at ORNL in the USA /16/ incorporating both
aerosol transport tests to simulate upper-plenum transport
and deposition, and aerosol T8S\lSpension tests. The major
results to date of the aero"ol transport tests show that the
fraction of aerosol transported out of the vertical pipe which
is used to simulate the upper plenum is influenced by the
flow residence time, and, via thermophoresis, by the thermal
gradients produced at the walls. So far code comparisons with
measured aerosol plate-out have been better than comparisons
with aerosol settling. By contrast with earlier experiments
the resuspension test have been performed with a range of
particle sizes and with dense deposits of the kind which may
be produced in reactor accidents. The results show that
smaller particles « 1~m diameter) are more difficult to
resuspend. Both transport and resuspension tests will be
continued.
The research programmes described provide for most of the questions
related to aerosol behaviour in the primary system. However,
one question not addressed,by definition since the simulant
aerosols used are inactive, is the effect of the decay heat
associated with the deposited materials on the thermal-hydraulic
conditions prevailing in the primary system. If the temperature
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of the deposited material increases sufficiently there may be
the possibility of re-vaporisation, particularly in the later
stages of an accident. The potential importance of this
problem needs to be established.
7. Aerosol Behaviour in the Containment - Large Scale Experiments,
Comparison to Aerosol Codes (Session VI & VII)
The OECD-CSNI expert group on nuclear aerosols in reactor safety
/1/ also recornrnended large scale experiments on aerosol behaviour,
in LWR containments under accident conditions. This has been
implemented recently by several laboratories. In addition,
research has been done on aerosol behaviour under LMFBR accident
conditions. Although in both cases different types of nuclear
aerosols have been used the main aerosol processes involved
(see section 3) are the same except the steam condensation proce~s
for LWR accident conditions. For LWR conditions the large scale
experiments which have been carried out or are underway, incluqe
the ORNL-program in the Nuclear Safety Pilot Plant (NSPP), the
HEDL-program (LACE) in the Containment Systems Test Facility (CSTF)
and the KfK-program in the Model Containment of Battelle-Frankfurt
(DEMONA) • In addition, the FAUNA-program at KfK and the ABCOVE-
program at HEDL should be mentioned although not directly related
to LWR safety.
Preliminary results of the NSPP, LACE and DEMONA programs show
typical decay curves of aerosol mass concentration as predicted
by aerosol codes. A strong influence of steam condensation was
observed. Questions to be answered by these experimental programs
are:-
Is the aerosol mass concentration time function influenced by
the chemical properties of the aerosol (as suggested by NSPP
data)?
What are the resuspension mechanism and are they sufficient
to resuspend significant quentities of radioactive aerosols?
What are the physical nature and the aerosol characteristics
of resuspended material (as investigated in the LACE and the
NAUA program)?
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Are there significant aerosol depletion processes in the primary
system piping and/or in the auxiliary building path ways to
reduce the aerosol source term into the containment (as
investigated in the LACE program)?
Is the homogenous mixing hypothesis - as applied in all
aerosol codes so far - valid for all significant accident
scenarios (as investigated in the DEMONA program)?
What is the influence of accident scenario dependent thermal
hydraulics on aerosol behaviour (as investigated in the
DEMONA, NSPP and LACE programs)?
The intercomparison of aerosol codes has been done for the case
of sodium oxide aerosol behaviour by an expert group in coopera-
tion with the CEC /17/ Except for the code AEROSOLS/A2, which
uses the assumption of a lognormal particle size distribution,
all codes predict the leaked aerosol mass within a range of 10%
(reference case). The sensitivity analysis showed that the
aerosol code results depend strongly on the collision efficien~y,
the coagulation shape factor, the turbulent energy density
disipation rate and the dynamic shape factor. In order to reduce
uncertainties further analysis should be devoted to these
parameters.
Similar intercomparisons of aerosol codes related to core melt
scenarios in LWR accidents in underway in cooperation with
OECD-CSNI and CEC. For the first dry experiments in the DEMONA
program pre-test calculations of the aerosol mass concentration
time function were made /18/. Here the uncertainty was about a
factor 2 reflecting the lack of knowledge in the initial particle
size distribution, aerosol production rate etc. The post-test
calculation of aerosol mass concentration time function, however,
lies within the error band width due to uncertainties in the
measurement techniques. Whether this favourable result will hold
also for the forthcoming wet tests in the DEMONA program cannot
be decided at this time, since additional uncertainties could




Very substantial progress has been made in the understanding
of nuclear aerosol behaviour in LWRs, since the previous
CSNI Specialist Meeting held in Gatlinburg, USA, in 1980.
However, further research is required in a number of
specific areas.
The conclusion and recommendations of the CSNI supplementary
SOAR /2/ regarding areas where further research is required
were generally endorsed by papers at the meeting.
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ABSTRACT
The development of the NAUA code has been finalized with the completion of
version ModS. The code calculates aerosol behaviour in the containment system
of an LWR during core melt accidents. As a final demonstration of the ability
of the code to calculate the overall aerosol behaviour correctly, the large
scale experimental project DEMONA is underway. The experiments are conducted in
the model containment facility at Batteile Frankfurt. Accident conditions
during the aerosol depletion phase in the contaiment are reproduced as closely
a possible, because also the thermodynamics code COCMEL is being validated.
DEMONA is supported and conducted as an international project with
participations from Switzerland and Germany.
A thermodynamic test of the facility and the instrumentation was conducted
and the leak rate of the (unlined) containment was measured to be 70 %/d. Two
dry aerosol behaviour test are reported using tin oxide and iron oxide aerosol.
In both cases the agreement of measured mas concentration with post test calcu-
lations was excellent. For the tin oxide aerosol test pre test predictions with
the NAUA code were in good agreement with measured data, too.
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INTRODUCTION
In the years following the publication of the Reactor Safety Study /1/ and
the German Risk Study Phase A /2/ extensive analytical and experimental work
has been carried out in the field of fission product retention capability of
the reactor containment system. These worldwide efforts have been stimulated
further by the TMI 2 accident which demonstrated possible low consequences of
severe accidents. The efforts were first concentrated on particulate fission
products which had not been treated very detailed in the risk studies. A much
larger retention of aerosols in the containment than expected earlier was found
in model calculations and partly confirmed by experiments. As a consequence the
highly volatile fi;sion products, mainly iodine, then domina ted the risk asso-
ciated to nuclear accidents. This in turn triggered more work in the field of
iodine chemistry in particular, or fission product chemistry in general. The
today's picture is that the volatile forms of iodine are much less likely to
occur and persist than assumed previously and that non-volatile iodides will be
formed by reactions with airborne particulates or in the sump provided they
have not already been released to the containment in particulate form.
So, except for the noble gases, all fission products are in the form of or
may react with particulate airborne matter, aerosols, in the containment. The
prediction of aerosol behaviour in the containment, therefore, is a central
part in all calculations of fission product transport and depletion in nuclear
accidents.
DEMONA, OBJECTIVES AND METHODS
At present three large scale ( >100 w) experimental aerosol projects in
the field of LWR safety are being conducted: MARVIKEN V, LACE and DEMONA. The
necessity of coordinating these efforts has been recognized from the beginning
to avoid duplications and to provide the links between them. The interest of
the DEMONA project is only in aerosol behaviour in the containment, to demon-
strate the effectiveness of natural aerosol depletion processes as calculated
with the NAUA code. The NAUA code development is considered to be completed
with version Mod5 which, in addition to Mod4 /3/, contains a module for diffu-
siophoretic deposition /4/. An additional aim of the DEMONA project is to
validate a suitable thermodynamics code which generates the required input data
for NAUA. In DEMONA the single volume code COCMEL /5/ and the multi zone code
FIPLOC /6/ are being applied. The DEMONA project is jointly conducted by KfK
Karlsruhe, Battelle Frankfurt, The Swiss Federal Institute for Reactor Research
Würenlingen, and KWU Erlangen /7/.
The experiments are conducted in the model containment test facility at
Batteile Frankfurt which is a 1 : 4 scale model of the Biblis containment
(Fig. 1). The model containment is constructed of concrete (without liner)
which gives thermodynamic characteristics very similar to a real power plant.
Table I contains the test matrix for DEMONA. The tests are variations of
the base case which is a simulation of a low pressure core melt accident with
late overpressure failure of the containment. This is simultaneously the
scenario with the highest probability of occurrence and the situation in which
the aerosol behavior has to be calculated over the longest period of time and
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Thermodynamic test of the model containment
Dry aerosol test
Base experiment
Variation: weak aero~ol source
Variation: transienr thermodynamics
Variation: complex geometry
Spare tests, if needed
Final demonstration experiment
Table I: DEMONA test matrix
The aerosols for the experiments are non-radioactive metal oxides. Three
plasma torch aerosol generator units of 80 kW each have been installed to vapo-
rize and oxidize metal powders /8/. The oxide vapor condenses when cooled and
forms an aerosol of aggregates of very fine primary particles which is fed into
the containment. The mass concentration of the aerosol is up to approximately
10 g/w. The containment atmosphere is a condensing saturated steam air mixture
at 115°c temperature and 3 Bar total pressure.
Considerable efforts have been made in the development of the instrumen-
tation of the test facility. The thermodynamic instrumentation /9/ measures
temperatures of gas, walls and sump at many locations, pressure and composition
of the atmosphere, mass and heat input rates, leak rates, heat transfer coeffi-
cients and the concentration of liquid airborne droplets. The aerosol instrum-
entation /10/ measures mass concentration, particle size distribution, spatial
distribution and deposits on walls and floors. Chemical composition and morpho-
logy can be evaluated from samples taken at different locations in the contain-
ment. Besides the mass concentration of airborne droplets also their size
distribution will be measured.
In Fig. 2 the locations of some of the instruments are shown. In the
containment filter sampling stations, inertial devices, an optical size spec-
trometer and wall and floor samplers are distributed. An extraction line with
an auxiliary dilution tank feeds additional instruments such as mass monitor,
impactor, samplers etc. Not shown in Fig. 2 are ten identical photometers which
measure the spatial distribution of the aerosol.
Pre test calculations of the thermodynamics and of the aerosol behaviour
are being conducted for each experiment. After the experiment post test calcu-
lations are done using the actual experimental parameters. Both calculations
are compared to the measured data. For each individual experiment of the test
matrix aseparate report is published.
RESULTS OF THE THERMODYNAMICS TEST
The thermodynamics test /11/ was performed to check the function of the
facility and of the instrumentation under the conditions of the planned expe-
riments. The behaviour of the contaimment was tested and its thermodynamic
behaviour was measured and compared with calculatuons with the codes COCMEL and
FIPLOC. Further the aerosol instrumentation was tested under layout conditions.
The course of the experiment, which is representative for most of the
experiments of the test matrix, can be subdivided into four phases:
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1. Heat up phase: The model containment is heated by steam injection until a
steady state is reached. At the beginning of this phase the air is expelled
and the heating of the structures and walls is performed with pure steam
which gives a very uniform temperature increase. At the end of this phase,
after approximately two days, the temperature is 115°C and the interna1
structures are almost saturated.
2. Air injection phase: Air is injected to establish the desired atmospheric
composition. This phase corresponds to the aerosol generation period in the
later experiments. Air, steam and aerosol is injected until the total
pressure is 3 Bars after about 2 hours.
3. Measurement phase: This is, in the later experiments, the period of interest
in which the aerosol depletion will be measured. In this phase the total
pressure is kept eonstant at 3 Bars by steam injection to make up for
pressure losses due to condensation and leakages. During the thermodynamics
test the leak rate of the containment was measured in this phase.
4. Cooling phase: Cooling and venting of the model containment after the end Gf
the measurement phase will last approximately 3 days until the temperatures
are low enough to enter the facility and recover the instruments and in situ
sampies.
The main aim of the thermodynamics test, besides testing the performance
of the equipment, was to measure the leak rate of the model containment. The
leak rate has to be known for the NAUA calculations and was postulated not to
exceed 200 %/d. It has to be recalled that the model containment has eoncrete
walls without liner. The leak rate was determined by measuring the change in
the composition of the atmosphere with four independent methods. Since only
steam is added during the measurement phase the steam air ratio will increase
slowly as air leaks out' of the containment. From the deerease of the air
partial pressure the leak rate ean be calculated.
During the phases 2 and 3, however, a significant gradient in the atmos-
pheric composition developed in a few hours. In the lower dead volumes steam
was depleted by condensation, in the upper part steam was enriched and could
not be transported to the depleted zones. Since the total pressure was kept
constant this also lead to a temperature gradient, the temperature increasing
from bottom to top. In the given geometric configuration of the test this
effect was stronger than the counteracting mixing effects of natural
convec tion.
As a result of all this the atmospheric composition varied ~ot only with
time but also with space. However, since it was measured at 14 different
locations a weighted mean could be determined and avalue is 70 %/d was obtained
for the leak rate which is weIl below the postulated limit.
The comparison of measured thermodynamic data with model calculations was
of course complicated by the inhomogeneous conditions in the containment. The
single volume model COCMEL could only calculate average values which, never-
theless,.were in good agreement with,measured data, especially for temperature
and pressure build up during the heat up phase and for' steam condensation
rates. For further experiments with stronger natural convection COCMEL is ex-
pected to give representative results. On the other hand a FIPLOC calculation
with 22 zones modelied showed the observed inhomogeneities very weIl. There-
fore, the thermodynamic behaviour of the model containment can be considered as
completely understood.
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RESULTS OF DRY TESTS
The dry test of the test matrix, without the influence of condensation and
diffusiophoresis on aerosol behaviour, is intended to serve as a comparison
case for the wet tests. The dry test is conducted at ambient temperatures but
with 3 Bars pressure which are built up during the aerosol generation. Two
different dry tests will be reported here:
- V 23
V 20
with tin oxide aerosol with a peak concentration of 5 g/m'
with iron oxide aerosol with a peak concentration of 1.6 g/m'
Fig. 3 shows measured and calculated mass concentrations of the aerosol
during test V 23. The aerosol generation was essentially in two periods the
first producing 5 g/m' of aerosol the second adding 1 g/m' after 4 hrs. The
dashed line is apre test calculation with constant source and leak rate. The
solid curve represents a NAUA post test calculation taking into account the
measured time functions for aerosol source and leak rate. The other data are
measured concentrations at five different locations in the model containment.
First of all and most important it can be seen that pre test calculation
as weIl as post test calculation and measured data all agree within a factor of
2 (shaded area), which is a very encouraging result. The differences between
pre test calculation on the one side and post test calculation and measured
data on the other can be fully explained by unexpected deviations in the
experiment which could not have been taken into account for the pre test
calculation. These are:
- In the first four hours of technical problems lead to an intermittent
operation of the aerosol generators. Consequences to the aerosol system were
enhanced convection and input of sensible heat both resulting in an increased
overall depletion rate. This explains the steeper slope of the mass concen-
tration curve during the first four hours as compared to the pre test
calcula tion.
- The leak rate of the containment decreased from initial 110 %/d to 50 %/d
after 20 hours due to pressure drop and clogging of the leak paths. This
explains the slower decrease of the long term mass concentration as compared
to the pre test calculation for which a constant leak rate of 100 %/d had
been assumed.
These two corrections in the input data for NAUA proved to be sufficient
to give the good agreement between measured data and post test calculations.
Another experimental result which was different from the pre test assumptions
but had very little influence on the calculated mass concentration concerns the
particle shape. For a "dry" test no condensation was assumed and particle shape
factors of 2 were used in the pre test calculation. However, the compressed air
which was used to cool the aerosol generators and to transport the aerosol con-
tained enough excess humidity to condense temporarily on the particle. No indi-
cation of a condensational growth of the particles was obtained but all partic-
les showed the weIl known spherification process during the early phases of the
experiment. Aggregates formed later were not spherified again. Thus in the post
test calculation shape factors of 1 were used with an effective density of 50 %
of the aerosol material density.
Another case of deviations from pre test assumptions was observed in test
V 20. Fig. 4 shows pre test calculation, measured data at eight locations and
post test calculation of the mass concentration during V 20. Here a very rapid
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Fig. 4: Pre test calculation (dasheded line), post test calculation
(solid line) and measured data for DEMONA test V20
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was measured although there was no further energy input as in V23. The
explanation is that in contrast to test V 23 the aerosol contained an unwanten
coarse fraction of powder residues which had not been completely vaporized.
This fraction is removed from the airborne state much faster than a finely
dispersed aerosol. The post test calculation using the measured bimodal source
particle size distribution then gives a complete agreement with the measured
data.
These results indicate that NAUA calculations agree weIl with the observed
aerosol bheaviour when the parameters of the aerosol source are known, which
seems to be difficult to forecast in experiments.
CONCLUSIONS
When judging the quality of the results of code calculations we have to
answer two different questions: How good is the physical modelling in the code
and how good are the predictions to be used in risk assessments of reactor
accidents?
The physical modelling of the code can be judged only by comparing experi-
mental results with calculations that use identical boundary conditions. For an
aerosol behaviour code this means that the input data for aerosol sourees,
thermodynamics and containment properties should be known in detail. As was
shown above these complex data can sometimes not be predeter~ined with the
neccessary precision before the experiment. So a rigid check of the correct
performance of the code is only possible by post test calculations. For the
examples discussed above the agreement was excellent then.
On the other hand the more important question pertains to the quality of
predictions in case conditions are only roughly known as will be the most
likely case in severe accident analysis. Pre-test calculations offer an unique
possibility to answer this question because actual large scale tests deviate
frequently from planned conditions. This has been observed during the DEMONA
tests but also in other large scale experimental programs.
Certainly the confidence band width of computed results which depend on
uncertain input parameters could be evaluated by parameter variations alone,
but experimental evidence is sometimes more convincing. Concerning the DEMONA
experiments two statements have been verified which had been based on analy-
tical work before.
Firstly, the initial source particle size distribution influences the long
time aerosol behaviour only when the particles are relatively coarse. This was
analytically predicted by calculations with the NAUA code /12/. In an accident
aerosole are generated by vaporization of the core and no such coarse fragments
can exist in the aerosol as have been observed in test v20. With that respect
experiment V20 is not representing real accident conditions, and the
discrepancy between pre test calculation and measurement has no significance
for the code's predicting capabilities. In test V23, when the aerosol was
generated by complete vaporization of the material, the pre test calculation
predicted the measured aerosol behaviour very weIl.
Secondly, the relative insensitivity of the long time aerosol concentra-
tion on the aerosol source function which can be seen in the pre and post test
calculations for test V23 is due to the dry test conditions. In dry atmosphere
the aerosol behaviour is domina ted by dry interaction and dry deposition pro-
cesses which tend to level out initial differences and lead to almost identical
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states of the aerosol system after some time. This interesting confirmation of
the 'enveloppe concept' /13/ developped for LMFBRs, however, haa no bearing on
LWR aerosol behaviour because in ateam atmoapheres condensation and diffuaio-
phoreais will establish a component depending on thermodynamica. Long time
aerosol behaviour then depends mainly on thermodynamica.
For accident analysis, finally, long time aerosol behaviour ia of leaaer
importance in many casea. The total accumulated leakage from the containment
mainly originates from the early period of the accident when the aerosol
concentration ia high. Therefore, the maaa released into the containment'ia one
of the most important factors influencing the leakage and the consequencea.
Once the release function ia known, the subsequent aerosol behaviour waa found
to be calculated correctly with NAUA.
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ABSTRACT
Ana1yses were performed to obtain more rea1istic estimates of
the release of radionuc1ides to the environment in severe accidents.
Resu1ts are presented for a variety of accident sequences in five
different LWR plant designs. The predicted environenta1 release
fractions obtained in these ana1yses are in most cases significant1y
lower than those in the WASH-1400 study. The methodo1ogy deve10ped
for this study is expected to form the technica1 basis for upgrading
the methods used to ana1yze source terms in regu1atory practice.
INTRODUCTION
The potential for the release of radionuc1ides to the environment in
severe accidents has long been a source of pub1ic concern about the safety of
nuc1ear power p1ants and the focus of regu1atory research. For most operating
reactors, research report TID-14844 /1/ formed the technica1 basis for
1icensing ana1yses invo1ving radionuc1ide release in severe accidents.
Pub1ished in 1962, TID-14844 makes certain assumptions about the release of
fission products during a hypothetica1 severe accident which were representative
of the state of know1edge at the time. From 1972-1975 the Nuc1ear Regu1atory
Commission conducted the Reactor Safety'Study to assess the accident risks in
U.S. commercia1 nuc1ear power p1ants. The report of that study, designated
WASH-1400, /2/ was pub1ished in 1975 and provided a more comprehensive and
physica11y accurate description of fission product behavior. The amount of
fission product release to the environment (the "source term") estimated in
WASH-1400 has since been used extensive1y in p1anning and eva1uating reactor
operations.
The WASH-1400 source term for accident sequences has had broad imp1i-
cations for operating LWRs~-in 1icensing, emergency p1anning, safety goals, and
indemnification po1icy. However, additional research continued to provide.
improved methods for estimating fission product release and transport. In 1981,
the Nuc1ear Regu1atory Commission issued the report "Technica1 Bases for
Estimating Fission Product Behavior During LWR Acddents" /3/ which reviewed
the state of know1edge at the time. As part of the Technica1 Bases report, the
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assumptions, analytical procedures, and available data were evaluated, and new
estima'tes were made. One improvement of the new estimates over previous ones
was that they took into account the retention of radioactive material within
the reactor coolant system. But, because of the limitations of the computer
codes available at that time, these new estimates could not follow the transport
of fission products along their flow path from the core to the environment by
applying the various codes sequentially. This resulted in piecemeal, parametric
estimates of release.
The research effort described in this paper was undertaken to provide such
a systematic, sequential application of the codes as well as to present analyses
performed with computational procedures improved since the "Technical Bases"
report. It is to be recognized that in this study, an analytical approach was
developed for estimating radionuclide transport and deposition which incor-
porates individual physical and chemical processes or mechanisms. When veri-
fied, these methods are expected to replace the generalized source term of
TID-14844 and the tabular release fractions in WASH-1400 which were used for
broad classes of accidents. The results presented in this paper are reported
in greater detail in the first six volumes of the report BMI-2l04 /4/.
METHODS OF ANALYSIS
In the approach developed for this study, the calculations provide a
consistent analysis of radionuclide behavior by following fission product
transport along flow paths, starting with release into the core region and
ending with final release to the environment. The general approach consists of
aseries of steps performed in sequence such that in the combined analysis, the
results are specific to an individual set of accident conditions, and each step
is based on results from analyses of the previous step.
Overall time-dependent thermal-hydraulic conditions were estimated with
the MARCH 2 code, /5/ and detailed thermal-hydraulic conditions for the primary
system were estimated with the MERGE /6/ code developed specifically for this
program.
The time-dependent core temperatures were used as input to another code
developed for this program, CORSOR, which predicts time- and temperature-dependent
mass releases or vaporization of radionuclides from the fuel and control rod
and structural materials within the pressure vessel. Releases during core-
concrete interactions of radionuclides and other materials remaining with the
melt were estimated by Sandia National Laboratories using the VANESA code.
Using the MARCH/MERGE-predicted thermal-hydraulic conditions and the CORSOR-
predicted radionuclide release rates as input, the TRAP-MELT 2 /7/ code was
used to predict vapor and particulate transport in the primary coolant circuit.
Transport and deposition of radionuclides in the containment were calcu-
lated using the NAUA-4 /8/ code. The NAUA code was modified for this study by
including mechanisms for spray wash-out of aerosols, Stefan-flow deposition of
aerosols with condensing steam, and homogeneous nucleation of fog droplets when
the water vapor saturation ratio exceeded a value of approximately three.
The basic stepwise procedure described above is illustrated in Figure 1,

























FIGURE 1. SEQUENCE OF COMPUTER ANALYSES
were of a ''best estimate" type using input derived from experimental
measurements whenever possible. Types of data employed in the analyses include
vapor deposition velocities, aerosol deposition rates, aerosol agglomeration
rates, fission product release rates from fuel, particle sizes formed from
vaporizing/condensing fuel materials, engineering correlations for heat and
mass transfer, and physical properties of various fuel, fission product, and
structural materials.
SEQUENCES ANALYZED
A variety of accident sequences were examined in this study for a number
of different plant designs. Five different plant designs were investigated:
two large, dry PWR designs, Surry and Zion; an ice condenser PWR design,
Sequoyah; a Mark I BWR design, Peach Bottom; and a Mark 111 BWR design, Grand
Gulf. Accident sequences were selected for analysis based upon risk signifi-
cance and the intent to cover a broad spectrum of accident conditions.
RESULTS OF ANALYSES
The quantities of important chemical species predicted to be released to
the environment for the accident sequences analyzed in this study are tabulated
in Tables I through V. For the two plants analyzed in WASH-l400 the corres-
ponding source terms are also indicated.
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TAßLE I. RELEASE FRACTIONS FOR PWR - LARGE, DRY CONTAINMENT (SURRY)
Containment(a)
Safeguards
Sequence Spec1 es RCS Bul1ding Envi ronment WASH 1400
CsI 0.027 0.59 0.29 0.OB7 0.7
AB-ß' CsOH 0.038 0.59 0.29 0.085 0.5
Te 0.26 0.19 0.12 0.070 0.3
CsI 0.027 0.92 0.050 0.7
AB-S (b) CsOH 0.038 O. 92 (c) 0.049 0.5m
Te 0.26 0.34 0.042 0.3
CsI 0.027 0.92 0.057 0.7
AB-y CsOH 0.038 0.90 (c) 0.059 0.5
Te 0.26 0.31 0.14 0.3
CsI 0.027 0.97 4.8 x 10-5 8 x 10-4
A8-. CsOH 0.038 0.96 (c) 4.7 x 10-5 B x 10-4
Te 0.26 0.45 4.0 x 10-5 1 x 10-3
CsI 0.85 0.11 0.046 0.7
TMLB'-ö CsOH 0.86 0.10 (c) 0.039 0.5
Te 0.30 0.16 0.11 0.3
CsI 0.85 0.15 2.8 x 10-3 8 x 10-4
TMLB' -. CsOH 0.86 0.14 (c) 1.7 x 10-4 8 x 10-4
Te 0.30 0.19 8.1 x 10- 2 1 x 10-3
CsI 0.48 0.52 4.2 x 10-5 3 x 10-2
S20-y CsOH 0.57 0.43 (c) 6.4 x 10-
5 9 x 10-3
Te 0.91 0.058 3.3 x 10-2 5 x 10-3
CsI 0.74 0.26 1.5 x 10-
8 2 x 10-5
S20-. CsOH 0.76 0.24 (c) 1.4 x 10-
8 1 x 10-5
Te 0.69 0.15 7.7 x 10-8 2 x 10-5
CsI 0.50 0.018 0.40 0.079 0.7
V wii~ CsOH 0.51 0.017 0.40 0.073 0.5water )
Te 0.13 0.71 0.14 0.025 0.3
CsI 0.50 0.018 0.069 0.41 0.7
V CsOH 0.51 0.017 0.071 0.40 0.5no water
Te 0.13 0.71 0.044 0.12 0.3
(a) Balance of Te to add total to 1.0 is predicted to remain in the melt.
(b) Containment vo1 ume di vi ded i nto four compartments.
(c) Safeguards bul1di ng not considered for this sequence.
(d) Release point in safeguards building assumed to be under 3 feet of saturated water.
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TABLE 11. RELEASE FRACTIONS FOR PWR - LARGE, DRY CONTAI~IENT (ZION)
Sequence Specles RCS Contel rrnent (al Envi ronment WASH 1400
Cs! . 0.98 2.5 x 10-2 1.9 x 10-6 8 x 10-
4
TML8'-< CsOH 0.98 2.5 x 10-2 1.9 x 10-
6 8 x 10-4
Te 0.28 0.64 7.8 x 10-
5 1 x 10- 3
Cs! 0.34 0.66 2.5 x 10-
8 2 x 10-5
S20-< CsOH 0.42 0.58 2.3 x 10-
8 1 x 10-5
Te 0.93 1.7 x 10-2 3.6 x 10-8 2 x 10-
5
(al Ba lence of Te to add total to 1.0 15 predlcted to remaln 1n the
melt.
TABLE Ur. RELEASE FRACTIONS FOR PWR - ICE CONDENSER CONTAINMENT (SEQUOYAH)
Lower(a) lee Upper
Sequence Spec1.s RCS Contal nment Bed Containment Envi roment
Cs! 0.82 6.1 x 10-2 0.10 1.5 x 10-3 1.7 x 10- 2
TMl.B'-y CsOH 0.83 3.9 x 10-2 0.12 2.9 x 10-3 2.3 x 10- 2
Te 0.25 2.4 x 10-2 3.7 x 10-2 6.2 x 10-4 1.4 x 10-2
Cs! 0.82 8.6 x 10-3 0.17 5.5xlO-3 3.9 x 10-4
THLB o_~ CsOH 0.83 5.4 x 10-2 0.13 5.0 x 10-3 4.5 x 10-4
Te 0.25 4.0 x 10-2 3.1 x 10-2 3.8 x 10-3 2.0 x 10-3
Cs! 0.82 4.2 x 10-2 9.4 x 10-2 4.6 x 10-2 1.3 x 10-3
THL-y CsOH 0.83 3.1 x 10-2 0.11 3.4 x 10-2 7.0 x 10-3
Te 0.25 3.1 x 10-4 1.2 x 10-2 8.6 x 10-3 5.5 x 10-4
Cs! 0.82 5.7 x 10-2 8.5 x 10-2 3.4 x 10.2 6.9 x 10-9
TML-~ CsOH 0.83 5.8 x 10-2 9.4 x 10-2 3.5 x 10-2 7.4 x 10-9
Te 0.25 8.1 x 10-3 1.0 x 10-2 9.5 x 10-3 1.6 x 10-8
Cs! 0.73 4.5 x 10-2 8.3 x 10-2 0.11 3.3 x 10-2
S2HF CsOH 0.75 4.2 x 10-
2 7.6 x 10-2 0.10 3.2 x 10-2
Te 0.69 6.4 x 10-2 6.5 x 10-2 4.5 x 10-2 5.5 x 10-2
(al Balance of Te to add total to 1.0 15 predicted to remaln In the melt.
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TABLE IV. RELEASE FRACTIONS FOR BHR - HARK I (PEACH BOTTOH)
Sequence Spedas RCS Pool OrY>i'11 (a)
Reactor
Wetwell Bulldtn9 SGTS Environment WASH 1400
Csl 0.19 0.35 0.12 0.34 0.9
AE,y' CsOH 0.19 0.34 0.14 0.33 0.5
Te 2.9 x 10'2 3.2 x 10,3 0.32 0.65 0,3
esl 0.06 0.69 1.5 x 10,2 0 0.24 0,9
TC·v' esOll 0.22 0.56 1.4 x 10'2 0 0.21 0.5
Te 0.34 7.9 x 10,3 0.16 0 0.37 0.3
esl 0.06 0.69 1.5 x 10,2 6.9 x 10,2 6.B x 10,2 0.10 0.1
TC,y CsOll 0.22 0.56 1.4 x 10,2 6.1 x 10,2 5.B x \0,2 9.1 x 10'2 0.1
Te 0.34 7.9 x 10'3 0.16 0.11 1.3 x 10,2 0.25 0.3
Csl 0.14 0.80 5.4 x 10'3 0 4.B x 10,2 0.9
lW-l' esOll 0.15 0.79 5.0 x 10'3 0 4.5 x '10,2 0.5
Te 0.40 B.6 x 10'3 0.2 0 0.19 0.3
(a) Balance of Te to add total to 1.0 15 pred1cted to rema1n in the melt.
TABLE V. RELEASE FRACTIONS FOR BHR - HARK III (GRAND GULF)
Sequence Species RCS Orywell (a) Pool Conta i nment Envi ronment
CsI 0.19 3.6 X 10'2 0.77
1.9 X 10,4 6.8 X 10'3
TC CsOH 0.51 1.4 X 10'3 0.49 9.2 X 10,6
3.5 X 10'4
Te 0.22 6.0 X 10,2 0.45 4.3 X 10,4 8.8 X 10'3
CsI 8.4 X 10'2 3.9 X 10,3 0.91 7.5 X 10,7 2.4 X 10'4
TPI CsOH 0.24 3.7 x 10,3 0.76 9.0 x 10,7
3.1 x 10,4
Te 0.45 6.0 x 10,2 0.14 1.4 X 10,5
1. 3 x 10.3
CsI 6.3 X 10.
2 3.8 x 10,6 0.94 6.8 x 10,4 8.4 x 10'4
TQUV CsOH 0.54 2.8 x 10,6 0.46
3.5 x 10,4 4.4 x 10,4
Te 0.40 8.0 x 10'2 0.21 1.6 x 10,3
2.1 x 10,3
S2E
CsI 9.1 x 10'2 1.4 x 10'2 0.89 9.6 x 10'4
7.0 x 10,3
(nominal CsOH 0.16 1.3 x 10'2 0.82
8.6 x 10,4 6.3 x 10'3
pool bypass) Te 0.26 3.5 x 10,2 0.32 6.5 x 10,3
2.4 x 10'2
CsI 9.1 x 10,2 1.1 x 10'2 0.86 5.9 x 10'3
4.2 x 10'2
S~E CsOH 0.16 9.8 x 10'3 0.79 5.4 x 10'3
3.8 x 10,2
(h 9h 3.5 x 10,2pool bypass) Te 0.26 0.11 0.10 0.14
(a) Balance of Te to add total to 1.0 15 predicted to remain in the melt.
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The release of fission products from fuel during the period of fuel heatup
and melting in-vessel and during ex-vessel attack of the concrete predicted in
this study is not markedly different from the results in WASH-1400.
Essentially all of the volatile fission products are predicted to be released
from the fuel in all cases.
Retention of fission products during transport through the reactor coolant
system was not credited in the WASH-1400 study. in the current study the
amount of retention in the reactor coolant system is in many cases substantial
(e.g., 85 percent of the iodine in TMLB') depending on the thermal-hydraulic
conditions in the system. The uncertainty regarding the ultimate fate of
fission products deposited within the reactor coolant system is very great,
however. Follow-on analyses of decay heating of reactor coolant system
surfaces and the reevolution of fission products are in progress.
The release of fission products from the fuel and transport in the reactor
coolant system vary with accident sequence and plant type (BWR versus PWR) but
are relatively insensitive to the containment design. Containment design was,
however, found to have a dramatic effect on the magnitude of the predicted
environmental source terms.
Surry Plant
The results of the containment transport analyses performed for this study
indicate that the potential for retention in the containment building and
secondary buildings is somewhat greater than predicted in WASH-1400. This is
partially because of an underestimation of removal processes in the WASH-1400
CORRAL code and partially because of an increased time to containment failure
in the current analyses.
In general, the results of the current study indicate that for many impor-
tant accident sequences the source term in WASH-1400 is overestimated by
approximately an order of magnitude. The effect of a reduction of this magni-
tude on estimated risk would be essentially proportional for the risk of latent
fatalities (i.e., an order of magnitude) but would be even more dramatic for
the risk of early fatalities because of the threshold behavior of this measure.
Of the important sequences analyzed, the one in which a major reduction in
consequences was not observed is the interfacing LOCA sequence, V, for the
assumption of no overlying pool of water at the entry point into the safeguards
building. If there is an overlying water layer, the source term is
considerably reduced. Although this is no longer considered a risk-dominant
sequence because of steps taken to suppress its likelihood, the existence of
credible sequences with potentially large consequences can have public
perception and regulatory implications regardless of the risk significance of
the sequence.
zion Plant
The issue of whether or not early containment failure can occur in some
accident sequences in large, dry PWR containment designs largely overshadows
most of the other uncertain aspects of source term analysis. If the
containment remains intact for an extended period of time following core
meltdown, the potential human health consequences will be minor and the
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character of off-site emergency response will differ substantially from the
high-consequence, early containment failure sequences of WASH-1400. It has not
been the purpose of this paper to determine the likelihood of early containment
failure in the Zion or Surry plants. This topic is being investigated in other
work being performed for the NRC. The potential benefits of a high failure
pressure and a large containment volume are, however, evident.
By comparing the predicted releases of aerosols from the containment in
the two sequences analyzed, the effects of spray scrubbing and reduced contain-
ment pressure on release can be observed in the lower releases for S2D.
Although the release of fission products in aerosol form appears to domina te
the consequences' of large-release accidents with early containment failure, the
release of more volatile forms of iodine {e.g., 12 or methyl iodide} formed by
interactions withinpools and on surfaces in ~he containment building along
with the release of noble gases tend to domina'te the predicted releases in the
accidents with delayed failure and smaller releases.
Sequoyah Plant
The results of the containment transport analyses in the present study
indicate significant potential for fission product attenuation. As would be
expected, the environmental source terms are seen to depend on the timing of
containment failure, with earlier failure leading to larger releases. The ice
condenser was found to typically remove about half of the airborne radio-
activity passing through it. The operation of containment sprays and air
return fans was found to lead to substantial reduction in the potential release
to the environment.
The ice condenser containment was found to be potentially vulnerable to
large hydrogen burns. For the accident conditions and modeling assumptions
considered, significant pressure loads were predicted even considering
operation of the hydrogen igniters; large pressure loads resulted when the
burning was predicted to propagate into the upper compartment of the contain-
ment. The prediction of containment failure mode likelihood was not an ob-
jective of this study, however. The potential for early containment failure is
being investigated in other tasks being performed for the NRC.
Peach Bottom Plant
The retention of fission product aerosols during their transport through
the reactor coolant system in the present study was found to be on the order of
10-20 percent of that released from the fuel. Primary system retention of
tellurium was found to be quite high, but since only a fraction of the total
tellurium release occurred during the in-vessel phase of the accidents, the
effect on the overall tellurium release from the plant was not great. In
general, the predicted retention for Peach Bottom is not as high as for some of
the PWR sequences considered in this study; the differences in the predicted
primary system retention are associated with differences in accident thermal-
hydraulics for the two types of designs.
Fission product aerosol removal by the BWR pressure suppression pool has
been found to be sensitive to the aerosol particle size distribution, the
nature of the flows through the pool, and the thermodynamic state of the pool.
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For accident sequences such as AE, in which the suppression pool remains sub-
cooled, quite<high pool decontamination factors are predicted. Due to the
timing and location of the predicted containment failure in this sequence,
however, not all of the released fission products pass through the pool, thus
limiting overall decontamination and resulting in substantial releases to the
environment. In sequences such as TC and TW, all of the melt releases are
discharged in the suppression pool, but here the pool is boiling or saturated
at the time of core melting, greatly reducing its effectiveness for fission
product retention. Overall approximately one-half of the aerosol releases were
predicted to have been retained in the suppression pool for these accident
sequences.
In the accident sequences evaluated in this study, the failure of the
primary containment was 'assumed to lead to the failure or bypass of the
secondary containment (reactor building). The potential effectiveness of the
secondary containment and the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) were
explicitly considered for one of the accident sequences. The potential for
retention in the reactor building and removal by the SGTS was found to be
limited by outleakage from the reactor building, as the gas and vapor inputs
carrying the fission products exceeded the flow capacity of the SGTS. The
inclusion of the secondary containment was found to result in only a fractional
reduction in the predicted fission product source term to the environment. The
effectiveness of the secondary containment could vary greatly, however,
depending on the accident sequence and assumptions made about the flow path
following primary containment failure.
Grand Gulf
Transient accident sequences were emphasized for the Mark 111 containment
design because they are expected to be major contributors to risk. !wo
variations of a pipe break sequence were included, however, to investigate the
effects of suppression pool bypass.
Because the suppression pool was not bypassed in the transient sequences,
major fractions of the fission products are collected there. Nearly all of the
fission products not deposited in the reactor coolant system or dryweIl are
deposited in the suppression pool. The subcooled pool in the pipe break
sequence is also an effective attenuating factor for flow through the pool but
the pool bypass flow has a major influence on release from the plant. The two
bypass flow case" considered were a nominal leakage flow and an assumed stuck-
open vacuum breaker. The nominal leakage and vacuum breaker cases gave source
terms about a factor of 10 higher than the source terms predicted for the
transient cases with no bypass flow.
SUMMARY AND COMMENTS
The magnitudes of the environmental fission product source terms predicted
in this study are significantly lower than those of earlier assessments, such
as WASH-1400. It is important, however, to recognize that the uncertainties
associated with these results could be quite large. The prediction of fission
product release has been shown to be sensitive to accident thermal-hydraulics
as weIl as to the mechanisms of fission product release and transport. It
should also be recognized that the prediction of the course and consequences of
the low probability hypothetical situations considered here is inherently
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uncertain; at best, the smaller number of accident scenarios considered here
can only be representative of a wide spectrum of possible outcomes in the event
of an accident.
Some potentially important' aspectp. of fission product release and trans-
port have been treated superficially in this study which require further
consideration. The potential for the reevolution of fission products from
surfaces in the reactor coolant system as the result of decay heating could
lead to larger environmental source terms than predicted. Similarly, fission
products deposited in the containment could be reevolved and released from the
containment over the long term, perhaps in a different chemical form such as
methyl iodide or elemental. iodine.
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Parametric Study of Factors Affecting Retention
of Fission Products In Severe Reactor Accidents
E. A. Harman
Stone & Hebster Engineering Corporation
Boston, Massachusetts, 02107, U.S.A.
ABSTRACT
During the past year and a half, a parametric study of factors affecting
retention of fission products in containments and contiguous structures
has been conducted by Stone & Hebster Engineering Corporation (SHEC) in
support of the American Nuclear Society's (ANS) Special Committee on
Source Terms. l This paper summarizes the results of that study and dis-
cusses the application of the results in the formulation of source terms
for severe core damage accidents. The study reported here is for a large
pressurized water reactor (PHR). The Surry station ~as selected for the
study because it was the PHR plant analyzed in the Reactor Safety Study
(HASH-1400).2 A similar parametric study of the Peach Bottom Mark I
plant, the boiling water reactor plant analyzed in HASH-1400, is in
progress.
This study represents a careful appraisal of a number of parameters and
phenomena which have been neglected to oversimplified in some analyses.
Inclusion of the effects analyzed results in a large overall reduction
in releases of fission products to the environment, when the effects are
considered together, although the reduction from any single effect is not
large when considered alone.
liben these relatively large reductions in releases are combined with the
reductions from studies of fission product retention in the reactor coolant
system (RCS) , such as those reported in the recent U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (USNRC) sponsored work at BatteIle Columbus Laboratories
(BMI-2l04),3 substantial overall reductions in releases to the environment
result.
Based on the results of this study and studies by others, a downward re-
vision is proposed to the interim source term first proposed by the author
at the Second International Conference on Nuclear Technology Transfer
ICONTT-II. 4 The revised interim source term includes the release to the
environment of the following fractions of the core inventory of specific
fission product groups: noble gases-l.OO, volatiles-(iodine (I), cesium-
rubidium (Cs-Rb), and tellurium-antimony (Te-Sb)-O.Ol, and nonvolatiles
barium-strontium (Ba-Sr)-0.004, ruthenium (Ru)-0.003, and lanthanum (La)-
0.0002. The release fractions of the nonvolatile groups have been reduced
based on analyses of aerosol retention within the power plant.
STONE Sc WEB6TER &.
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INTRODUCTION
The study reported here included analyses of releases of fission products
with: (1) postulated pre-existing openings in the containment (e.g., re-
sulting from failure to isolate the containment completely, (2) hypothet-
ical early breach of the containment pressure boundary (i.e., during or
shortly after core degradation), and (3) postulated late breach of the
containment because of the slow pressure buildup resulting from the gen-
eration of noncondensible gases associated with the core/concrete inter-
action processes. The results indicate that the releases for hypothetical
early breaches of the containment are comparable to those for pre-existing
openings. Without a pre-existing opening or early breach, containment breach
is not expected to occur in less than one day, if at all. The releases
associated with late containment openings are observed to be small in
comparison with those of pre-existing openings. Thus, the focus or the
study is on the potential releases associated with pre-existing openings.
The following phenomena and parameters were included in the study:
o Containment Dpening Size





o Release of Non Volatiles
o Aerosol Particle Size
o Aerosol Concentration
o Timing of Te Release from Core
o Core Degradation Without
Vessel Meltthrough
o Fission Product Decay Heating
o Timing of Injection into
Containment
Because of the length limitat ions for this paper, results are presented only
for the parameters and phenomena listed in the left column. Results of
analyses of the parameters listed in the right column are presented in
Chapter 6 and Appendix B of the ANS Committee Report. 1
Analyses were performed for three accident sequences described in WASH-1400: 2
AB (large break LOCA in containment with loss of all AC power), TMLB (a
transient with loss of all AC power fo1lowed by the failure of the power
conversion system and the 10ss of the capabi1ity of the secondary system
to remove heat from the RCS), and V (an interfacing system LOCA in the 10w-
pressure emergency core .cooling system at a location outside the containment).
The results presented in this paper are limited to the AB and TMLB sequences.
APPROACH AND ANALYTICAL METHODS
This study concentrated on the retention of fission products in the con-
tainment and contiguous structures. Ana1yses were performed first by
neglecting retention of fission products in the RCS. Subsequently, some
analyses were repeated with the RCS retention factors reported in Volume V
of BMI-2l04. 3 Fina1ly, some ana1yses were performed assuming retention in
the RCS with subsequent delayed iniection into the containment.
STONE 8< WEBBTER A
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The release rates from the core and their timing were taken from the in-
itial draft report of the BMI study of the Surry plant, Volume I of BMI-
2104. 5 Some subsequent analyses were performed with the later data re-
ported by BMI.3 Complete release of the volatile species from the core
was assumed. The release fractions from the core of the non-volatile





















The approach used was to first perform analyses of the thermal hydraulic
conditions as a function of time for each phase of the accident sequence
being analyzed and then perform aerosol behavior analyses. The thermal
hydraulic calculations were performed with a combination of mass and
energy calculations using the RELAP-4 ModS computer program,6 core/con-
crete interaction data obtained from Sandia,7 and thermal hydraulics
analyses with the THREED computer program. 8 The THREED program incor-
porates the thermal hydraulic formulations of RELAP-4 and the treatment
of passive heat sinks from CONTEMPT-LT.9 Portions of the analyses, such
as the' boiloff phase for the AB sequence, were calculated manually. The
aerosol transport and behavior were then analyzed llsing the NAUA-4
computer program,lO as modified by SWEC to include diffusiophoretic re-
moval based on the volumetrie removal rate of steam due to condensation
on passive heat sinks as computed by THREED.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
A. Size of Opening In Containment
Figure 1 presents the results of analyses of the relative cumulative
leakage of iodine and cesium for various size postulated pre-existing
openings in the containment. Data are presented for both the AB and
TMLB sequences. The data are normalized to a relative leakage of 1.0
for a 1.0 ft 2 (0.093m2) pre-existing opening. Leakage is seen to in-
crease rapidly with increasing opening sizes in the range from near
zero to ~ 1.0 ft 2 (0.093m2) and to decrease for larger openings for the
AB sequence and increase only slightly for larger openings for the TMLB
sequence. The unexpected behavior observed for larger opening sizes
results from the effects of in-leakage which was observed for these
opening .sizes.
Figure 2 depicts the volumetrie leakage rate as a function of time for
the TMLB sequence with two different p~e-existing containment openings -
1.0 ft Z (0.093m Z) and 0.1 ft Z (0.0093m). In-leakage is seen to oecur
because of the expulsion of air and noncondensible gases, and the con-
tinuing steam condensation in the containment. For aperiod of one hour
STONE & WEBSTER &.
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to one and one-half hours following the postulated vessel meltthrough, the
containment acts as a condenser with air being taken in from outside of the
containment. For the smaller size opening, in-leakage is not observed over
the time Period presented in this figure. The volumetrie leak rates are
combined with the NAUA analysis of aerosol transport and behavior to result
in the cumulative leakage of ,fission products for each opening size studied.
The cumulative leakages were observed to be asymptotic within approximately
three hours after the start of core melting. The data presented in Figure
1 represent the cumulative (or total) leakage for each containment opening
size studied.
B. Timing of Opening in Containment
Figure 3 presents the relative cumulative leakage of iodine and cesium as
a function of the time at which a 1.0 ft 2 (0.093m2) opening in the containment
is postulated to occur. The t=O data represents a pre-existing opening,
i.e., an opening resulting from failure to isolate the containment completelt
or created coincident with the onset of the accident. The data are .
normalized to a relative cumulative leakage of 1.0 for a pre-existing
opening. Data are presented for aerosol loadings corresponding to the
amount reported in BMI-2104 Volume I or one-fifth (i.e., multiplier of
0.2) and one-tenth (i.e., multiplier of 0.1) times the nominal loading
reported by BMI, tö investigate the effect of the large uncertainties
associated with those quantities at the present time. The total mass of
"other" aerosols, i.e., other than the 168kg represented by the iodine.
cesium, and tellurium species, is summarized below:
Mass of Other Aerosols (kg)
AB Sequence TMLB Sequence
Nominal 5,500 6,130
(BMI-2l04 Volume I)
0.2 x Nominal 1,100 1,230
0.1 x Nominal 550 513
An unexpected finding in the parametrie study is that the relative cum-
ulative releases of iodine and cesium for postulated early breaches of
containment are not much different than for pre-existing openings. Figure
3 shows that the releases are only approximately 30% higher for a 1.0 ft 2
(0.093m2) opening at the start of core melt (0.5 hr) for the AB sequence
compared with the releases with a pre-existing opening. For the TMLB
sequence, no appreciable difference in releases was calculated for pre-
existing openings and openings coincident with the start of core melting
(~ 3 hr) or at vessel meltthrough (4.6 hr). The cumulative releases are
observed to decrease exponentially with the timing of postulated contain-
ment breach following the injection of fission products into containment.
The injection periods during which severe core degradation is calculated
to occur are ~ 0.5 to 1.0 hr for the AB sequence and ~ 3 to 4 hr for the
TMLB sequence. The slopes of the curves in Figure 3 are related primarily
with aerosol settling rates. It should also be noted that the core/con-
crete aerosol loading does not affect the volatile fission product releases
for containment openings up to ~ 1 1/2 hr after the start of severe fuel
damage.
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Figure 4 illustrates the results of an analysis of the release of volatile
fission products due to a postulated late overpressurc breach of thc con-
tainment for a TMLB sequence. The curves to the left of the figure depict
the fraction of the cesium (as a representative fission product) which is
airborne in the containment as a function of time. Three curves are
presented, representing, the airborne cesium fraction with the nominal
loading of "other" aerosols and with 0.2 and 0.1 times the nominal loadings.
These curves are seen to decrease when the postulated openings occur at 27
hr. The cumulative cesium leakage fraction (i.e., mass leaked divided by
mass injected into the containment) is shown in the curves at the right of
the figure. In this analysis the containment is assumed to develop either
a 0.1 ft 2 (0.0093m2) or 1.0 ft 2 (0.093m2) opening 24 hr after the start of
core damage, i.e., 27 hr into the accident sequence. The cumulative cesium
leakage fractions for the three loadings of "other" aerosols are summarized
below:
Loading of Cumulative Cesium Leakage Fraction
"0t her ll Aerosols 0.1 ft 2 (0.0093m2) 1:0 ft L (0.093m2)
Nominal 3.0 x 10-5 4.5 -5*x 10
0.2 x Nominal 2.6 x 10-4 3.6 x 10-
4
0.1 x Nominal 5.7 x 10-
4 7.6 x 10-4
* Not shown in Figure 4.
Note: These data assume no retention in the RCS.
The effect of timing of openings in the containment is illustrated by the
following data for the TMLB sequence including retention in the RCS:
Timing of Containment Breach
Pre-existing
(Prior to core degradation)
Early




degradation - 27 hr)
Fraction of Inventory









* Includes retention in RCS from BMI-2104 Volume V.
** Based on 0.2 x nominal aerosol loading, which is close to the BMI-2104,
Volume V aerosol loading.
C. Diffusiophoresis
Enormous quantities of steam are condensed on passive heat sinks in light
water reactor containments during accidents. A total of 54,600 Ib(24,800kg)
of steam is calculated to be condensed on the containment heat sinks during
the period of injection of fission products in the TMLB sequence, i.e.,
from 3 to 4;6 hr. The average condensation rate is ~ 9.6 Ibis (4.4 kg/s).
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Analyses were performed to quantify the amount of aerosol removal from the
atmosphere because of this steam condensation, a process which has come to
be described as diffusiophoresis. ll The removal of aerosols from the con-
tainment atmosphere was calculated within NAUA by adding a volumetrie re-
moval rate term based on the steam condensation rate calculated with THREED.
Diffusiophoresis was found to have a different effect on the fission product
mass distribution depending on the containment opening size as illustrated
below: .





























Severe accidents at light water reactor nuclear power plants include the
ejection of a two phase mixture of steam and liquidwater at the location
of the break in the RCS.12 For example. during the AB (large break LOCA)
sequence approximately 247,000 lb (112,000 kg) of liquid water was 'calculated
to be injected into the containment during the blowdown and refill/reflood
portions of the sequence. A significant fraction of this water is aerosol-
ized. 13 For purposes of analysis it was assumed that fractions of the in-
jected liquid were airborne in the containment atmosphere as suspended
liquid water droplets. These water droplets were modeled in the NAUA-4
analyses with a log-normal source distribution with a number median diameter
(NMD) of 1.0~m and a standard deviation a of 2.0. The water droplets were
observed to settle rather quickly. However, due to the large number of
particles involved, a significant number density remains airborne at the
time of injection of fission product aerosols, @1,680 sec in the AB sequence
analysis.
A parametrie study was eondueted in which the initial mass of suspended
liquid droplets was varied from a few to 25% of the inj eeted' liquid mass.
The resulting release of volatile fission produets with a 1.0 ft 2 (0.093m2)
pre-existing opening was observed. Figure 5 presents the results of the
analysis for the AB sequenee, with and without diffusiophoresis in the
NAUA-4 analyses. Similar sensitivity analyses were conducted for the TMLB
sequence. Analyses indieate, that water droplets with larger diameters
(e.g., NMD-lO~m) did not effeet the fission produet behavior appreeiablY.
The eonelusions reaehed from these studies was that initial airborne eon-
centration of suspended liquid on the order of 10% or more of the injected
amount result in reduction in iodine and cesium leakage by about a
faetor of 2.
Figure 6 presents a eomparison of the effeets on airborne coneentration of
eesium due to "other" aerosols (i. e., other than the volatile speeies),
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diffusiophoresis, and suspended liquid. These data are for the AB sequence
with no opening in containment. Case (1) in this figure is based on only
the volatile fission products being injected into the containment. Case
(2) includes the addition of the 434 kg of "other" aerosols reported to be
released from the RCS prior to vessel meltthrough in BMl-2l04 Volume 1. 5
Case (3) is a repeat of case. (1) with diffusiophoresis and suspended
liquid water droplets, as discussed above. Case (4) is the baseline
nominal set of conditions for the AB sequence in the parametric study,
with masses obtained from the BMl study but with no diffusiophoresisand
no suspended liquid. Case (5) shows the effect of adding diffusiophoresis
and suspended liquid to Case (4). The effect of diffusiophoresis and
suspended liquid, as shown in Cases (3) and (5) is to substantially re-
duce the amount of time required for a given reduction in the airborne
fraction. The figure also illus trates (by' comparing Cases (4) and (5))
that the "other" aerosols do not influence the airborne fraction of cesium
during the first few hours of the sequence. As no ted earlier, the cumula-
tive leakage for pre-existing openings is asymptotic in less than 3 hr.
Thus, the leakage for pre-existing openings is essentially unaffected by
the core/concrete aerosol loading.
E. Contiguous Structures
Penetrations in PWR containments, with the exception of the equipment hatch
and purge system, lead into contiguous structures outside containment.
Retention of fission products due to aerosol behavior in contiguous structures
was investigated using the quench spray pump house and main steam valve house
configurations at the Surry plant. Analyses were performed in which a single
node (single control voll1me) model of the containment was coupled serially
with a four node model of the lower and upper levels of the structures
mentioned above. The ratio of the cumulative leakage fractions from the
contiguous structures to the leakage fractions from the containment in-
dicate the amount of retention in these structures as summarized below:




0.1 ft 2 (0.0093m2)







F. Multicompartmentation within Containment
The analyses discussed previously in this paper are based on a single
control volume representation of the containment. Thermal hydraulics
analyses for the AB sequence were also performed with a multi-
node model of the containment, which includes 14 nodes and 28 internodal
junctions, using the THREED program. The results of these analyses were
used to reduce the representation of the multicompartmentation within the
containment to.6 nodes, based on taking advantage of symmetry and combining
flows across several junctions. The 6 node model was employed in aseries
of serial calculations using NAUA. The resultant cumulative leakage of
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iodine and cesium, as calculated with the ~ultinode model, was 0.6 times
the leakage calculated with the single-node model.
The multinode thermal hydraulics analyses indicate that the containment is
weIl mixed at the time of injection of fission products in the present
analysis. The analyses also' indicate that, as time progresses, the residence
time in each node increases. Thus, if the injection of fission products
into the containment is delayed, the effect of multicompartmentation would
be much greater than it appears to be in the present analysis.
This analysis of the effect of multicompartmentation should be viewed as a
first estimate. Detailed quantification of this effect should be obtained
with a multinode program which couples the thermal hydraulics and aerosol
behavior analyses. Recent calculations with the CONTAIN program represent
the first such undertaking. 14 Additional analyses are required to develop
a more refined estimate of the effects of multicompartmentation.
G. Combined Effects of Several Parameters
Figure 7 depicts the cumulative leakage fraction of cesium and iodine as
a function of time for a TMLB sequence with no retention in the core or RCS.
The results of six separate analyses are presented as shown in this
figure.
Each succeeding curve represents a separate NAUA run with a change in or
addition of a parameter to the previous case, with Curve 5 inc1uding all
of the changes and additions considered. Curve 6 represents a multi-
plication of the results from Curve 5 by a factor of 0.6 to account for
the effects of multicompartmentation, as previously described. These
multicompartmentation analyses were performed for an AB sequence and are
applied here to the TMLB case as a first order approximation.
It is observed that the leakage fraction (0.72) depicted in Curve 1 is
essentially the same as the 0.7 leakage fraction reported in WASH-1400 for
iodine. However, by including the other effects depicted in this figure
the 1eakage fraction is reduced to 0.015 with no retention in the core
or RCS.
Another way of ana1yzing these effects is to consider the effect on leakage
with a 1.0 ft 2 (O.093m2) pre-existing opening and reduce the containment
opening size at the end of the analysis. Both approaches were used in
studying the effects for the AB and TMLB sequences, as summarized in
Figure 8. Cases 1 through 5 represent analyses with THREED and NAUA in
which each effect was introduced into the analysis sequentia11y, with no
retention in the RCS. Case 6 inc1udes retention in the RCS as reported
in BMI-2l04 Vol. V, pending cOIrpletion of SWEC analyses of RCS retention. 15
H. Retention of Non Volati1e Fission Products
In WASH-1400, the release fractions for the non volatile fission product
groups for the highest release category (PWR-2) were based on an analysis
of the TMLB' sequence with early overpressure breach of the containment.
These release fractions resulted from a combination of release fractions
from the core and the containment, neglecting retention in the RCS.
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The effects of retention of nonvolatile fission products can be determined
approximately by assuming that they would be released in direct proportion
to the "other" aerosols as ilJustrated below for a 0.1 ft 2 pre-ex:)'1;lting 0l'ening:
Fraction of
Nonvolatile Inventory Fraction Cont. Fraction
Fission Product Released Retained Leakage Released
.Q!_().'ly________ __ From Core* In RCS** Fraction*** To Environ.
Barium-Strontium 0.27 0.90 0.035 3.7xlO-3
Ruthenium 0.27 0.90 0.035 3.0xlO-4
Lanthanum 0.017 0.90 0.035 2.3xlO-4
* Taken from BMI-2l04, Volume V.
** Taken from BMI-2l04, Volume V. Applies only to portion released prior
to vessel meltthrough.
*** From present study, including retention in contiguous structures.
APPLICATIONS OF RESULTS TO SOURCE TERMS
In view of the analysis results discussed above, Stone & Webster Engineering
Corporation proposes that the Interim Source Term, first proposed at the
ICONTT-II Conference,4 be revised as follows to ac count for a more realistic
assessment of the release fractions of the nonvolatile fission product
groups. The noble gases and volatile fission product groups are unaffected
by this revision.






































Proposed at ICONTT-II, November 1982. 4
Revision based on conservative interpretation of analyse1;l of aerosol
retention.
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ABSTRACT
Co re melt accidents in nuclear power plants are analysed
to occur with an extremely low probability. In spite of
this fact the public interest concentrates on the radio-
active material which may be released during these highly
improbable hypothetical events. Therefore, the objective
of the R+D-work sponsored by the Federal Ministry of
Research and Technology focus on the development of the
analytical basis for radioa6tive source term predictions.
It is the purpose of this paper - on the basis of 1300 MWe
KWU type PWR's - to summarize and to compare the results
of current analyses performed in the Federal Republic
of Germany.
INTRODUCTION
The investigations into core meltdowns conducted for more
than ten years in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) currently
have been concentrated on the source term for risk dominant
accident sequences. To determine the radioactive fission product
releases to the environment, thermohydraulics and thermodynamics
are needed as well as comprehensive computations to evaluate the
aerosol and iodine fractions and their physical and chemical
behavior. Additionally, single problems - such as the pressure
level beyond that the steel shell fails during pressuriza-
tion as well as the flow pathes of the gases within the reactor
building before and after containment failure - influence the
results and therefore have to be identified. Recent analyses
performed currently demonstrate that the consequences of
melt downs had been conserably overestimated in previous
basic studies such as the German Risk Study / 1 /. The above
statement is based not the least on the particular features
of the containment and the entire building with respect to
the retention of radioactivity. A typical German containment
is shown in Fig. 1.
Primary Circuit
<D Reactor Pressure Vessel
® Sieam Generator





@ Boraled Water Storage
® Safety Injeclion Pump
@ Residual Heal Exchanger
Fig. 1: Reactor Building Biblis
ACCIDENT SEQUENCES
With a view of the considerations to be made later in this
paper,it is appropriate to present first a review of the melt-
down sequence. In general, two cases can be distinguished as
typical examples: the low pressure and the high pressure paths,
which with respect to the radioactive source term are expected
to be the enveloping bounds for all other melt-down scenarios.
Low Pressure Path
After a large leak as initiating event this sequence pro-
ceeds at low pressure in the primary system. Representative of
this category, the sequence will be described following a
double-ended break of the hot main coolant line and complete
failure oF the low pressure emergency core cooling systems if
the operation changes from the feed to the sump recirculation
mode. As a consequence of this hypothesis the evaporation from
the reactor pressure vessel flooded up to the main coolant
line level starts 20 minutes after blow-down. Subsequently,
the water level after 0.6 h has dropped down to the upper edge
of the core followed by failure of the core support structure
after another 1.2 h.
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The interaction of core meltwith the foundation concrete
starts immediately after failure of the reactor pressure vessel
about 1.9 h after blow-down. Evaporation of the sump-water
starts after about eight hours, immediately after the concrete
shielding in the reactor cavity is penetrated which, initially,
keeps the sump separate from the melt. The long-term build-up
of pressure in the containment is determined by the evaporation
of the sump-water. With the containment isolated - which
exhibits only the design leakage of 0.25 Vol%/d - this gives
rise to apressure build-up in the long run.
High Press ure Path
Contrary to the low press ure path, this sequence is
characterized by events taking place at high pressure in the
primary system. If, after an emergency power case additionally
the whole set of redundant Diesel generators fails, no
electricity supply is available. In that case, the decay heat
is initially removed from the core to the steam generators
which, on the secondary side, evaporate their water inventory
until after about 1.5 hall steam generators are getting dry.
This results in apressure and temperature rise in the primary
circuit onto the set point of the pressurizer pressure relief
valves.
Closing and opening cycles of the pressure relief valves
are repeated until the dropping water level has rendered bare
parts of the core in the reactor pressure vessel. The core is
further heated and later there will be indications of melting.
If the reactor pressure vessel fails due to contact of molten
material with the RPV,substantial energy and mass transport
takes place from the primary system into the containment.
Depressurization upon failure of the reactor pressure vessel
is followed by flooding of the molten material and of the still
unmolten core parts slumped on the concrete foundation through
accumulator water. Depending on whether the liquid and solid
core parts are coolable or not coolable in water, the water
evaporates at a slightly faster or slower rate. For both, the
low and the high pressure cases Table 1 compares the most
important results of the sequence analyses. The lowest three
lines contain important information which is needed to value
the fission product release rates presented in the following
sections.
In conformity with the results reported in the German Risk
Study on Nuclear Power Plants it can be assumed that in much
more than 90 % of all conceivable cases the containment is tight
at the onset of an accident (except for the design leakage to
be considered) and that it remains tight until overpressure
failure. Therefore, the calculations presented in the paper
concentrate on this scenario.
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Law Pressure Case High Pressure Case
lnitiating event, h 0.3 0
Core heat up, failure of co re
support strueture after, h 1.3 5.0
RPV-heat up, un til h 1.9 5.0
Sump 'ltater ingression, h 8 5.0
Integral aerosol release inta
contairvnent, kg 3460 22.4
Hell cooiabie
yes no
FaHure 01 ,teei ,hell, d 5 4.3 5
Sump evaporated. d 1218.5' 6/7'
, dependlng upon fallure mode 01 the ,tee! ,hell (20/300 ,m2)
Tabl. 1: RESI1.TS OF tfLT 00\0loi S(QlEIUS
THERMODYNAMICS IN THE CONTAINMENT
AND IN ADJACENT VOLUMES
The calculations have been performed with the computer
code WAVCO / 2 / which has been developed in order to predict
the thermodynamics and the distribution of gases and other
constituents within a subdivided building. Based upon the main
features illustrated in Fig. 2, an equation system consisting
of separate mass- and energy-balances for the state of the
atmosphere and sump of each zone is set-up. Furtheron,
additional balances for the mass of each component must be
solved to determine the actual gas distribution. All possible
thermodynamic states of the atmospheric steam are commonly
covered by the same equation-system. Since the conditions in-
side different zones are strongly dependent from each other
all the zone-specific equations have to be combined to form
a coupled non-linear differential equation system.
Fig. 3 illustrates the overall reactor building as weIl as
the flow paths which have to be considered in core melt situa-
tions of release category 6 sequences (containment intact with-
in the first couple of days until overpressurization of the
steel shell). Fission products approaching the annulus can be
released to the environment through the air' extraction
system via the stack - or - at slight overpress~re condi-
tions - via leakages through penetrations in the outermost
concrete structure. After containment failure the pressure
in the annulus increases beyond the 0.1 bar limit. Then, a
large leak with an area of 12 m3 which has been identified to
be the weakest point fails resulting in apressure equalisation
between the annulus and the auxiliary building. During this
blow-down procedure the pressure in the auxiliary building
increases up to the 0.05 bar level initiating failure of a
connection to the environment and to the turbine hall.
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From that point on,containment atmosphere enters the environ-
ment through several connections. The time dependent flow
rates via the different flow paths has been calculated and
have been used as the basis for aerosol and iodine calculations.
The containment failure mode, in particular,the cross
section, influences the flow rate out of the containment into
adjacent areas and therefore determines the released radio-
active source term. As a matter of fact, experts in the FRG
agree today that failure of the undisturbed steel shell of a
German 1300 MWe Standard PWR will occur at about 14 bars and
that in the realistic case at a lower press ure level leakages
be fore failure are expected. Therefore, investigations of the
load carrying capability were performed at different locations
of the containment,the goal being to quantify the type of
failure for a steadily rising internal press ure and to indicate
the associated cross sections of the openings.
At apressure of 11 bar and a temperature of 170°C radial
expansions of as much as approx. 40 cm and vertical tangential
dis placements at the equator of about 30 cm occur in the un-
disturbed shell zone. Deformations of this size are not tolerat-
ed by the surrounding structurej even before attaining the
loading condition indicated before, substantial constrained
deformations take place at the disturbed points and hence
leakages'develop. The results show that failure of the steel
shell must be expected to occur first at the material lock
which is bol ted to the steel shell of the reactor containment.
For verification a cheap experiment will be performed / 3 /, the
results of which could be transferred directly to real condi-
tions without requiring to develop and run an expensive
computer program.
According to the present state of knowledge a leak of
limited size is expected. The leak size ranges between 300 cm 2
and a value which is sufficiently high to prevent a further
continous pressure rise in the reactor containment. This value
depends exclusively on thermodynamic parameters because just
the energy and mass flows genera ted in the containment at the
time of overpressure failure must be removed through the leak.
The leak is also strongly influenced by the layout of the
containment. For containments of German standard PWR's a 20 cm~
cross section is sufficient to preven~a further pressure increase
in the containment.
On the basis of the energy and mass release into the
containment and the two limit cases encountered for over-
pressure failure (20 cm 2 leak and 300 cm 2 leak) Fig. 4 shows
the pressure plot for the low (LPC) and the high pressure case
(HPC). For the LPC apressure increase up to the 9 bar load
limit of the steel shell must be expected after about five
days only. Because of the fact the core material has been
assumed to be coolable, a slightly shorter time interval of
4.3 days has been calculated for the HPC.
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Fig. 4: CONTAI,*NT HISTORIES FOR RELEASE CATEGORY 6 SEQLENCES
For the HPC the maximum pressure occuring during pressurization
of the primary circuit is well below the design pressure of
the containment. As already mentioned, the pressure can be
stabilized with a 20 cm 2 leak whilst a leak cross section of
300 cm 2 leads to complete depres$urization. The pressure in the
annulus and the auxiliary building stays at the atmospheric
level. Only immediately after failure of the steel shell the
pressure within the annulus exceed to the 0.1 bar level causing
failure of the connection between annulus and auxiliary building.
This fact has been predicted to occur for both the small and
the large leak size.
FISSION PRODUCT BEHAVIOR
Until overpressurization of the steel shell only the
design leakage from the containment into the annulus is
effective (about 7 m3 /h). In the low pressure case fission
gases, iodine and particles are transported to the stack
passing the filter system via the annulus suction system
(about 600 m3 /h). Because of the loss of power this system
doesn't operate in the high pressure sequence. For all cases
the filter itself has been assumed to be ineffective at the
time of overpressurization failure. This is a very conservative
assumption because the situation within the annulus during and
after this time per iod will probably only cause adegradation
of the filter's behavior to retain iodine and aerosols.
1499
Aerosols
Data derived from the SASCHA experiments / 4 / have been
used in order to compute the release of aerosols particles from
the core and the primary circuit into the containment. The
behavior of the aerosol system within the containment and in
the adjacent volumes have been analysed by the NAUA-code / 5 /.
The code is based on physical aerosol processes summarized in
Tab. 2 which also includes the sensitivity of each individual
process on the basis of the conditions typical for LWR-
scenarios.
Aerosol Process Integrated In NAUA Sensltivlly
sedlmentallon yes very important
diffusion yes minor effect i ve
thermophores i s no insignificanl for UiR-szenarios
diffuslophoresls yes Important
turbul.nce no not imporlant for UlR-szenarios
agglooerallon yes very important
steam condensalion yes important, If th.rmodynamics
avallabl.
Tabl. 2: SEHSITIVITY Of DIFFERENT AEROSOL DEI'lfTION 1t:CIl\NISHS
For the high and the low press ure case Fig. 5 shows
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It should be pointed out that, obviously, by far the highest
amount of airborne particle mass are non-radioactive elements
and isotops. For the low pressure case (LPC) as a result of the
large aerosol source the airborne mass decreases by more than
five orders of magnitude within five days through aerosol-
physical removal mechanisms. At the time of containment failure
only those substances can still be released at the maximum
which continue to be airborne. Starting with a less dense
aerosol atmosphere the removal in the high pressure sequence
(HPC) is slower and i~ the long term period equals the situa-
tion in the LPC. At the time of overpressurization of the
containmentwhich is not shown in Fig. 5 even higher aerosol
concentrations are calculated for the HPC.
Fig. 6 shows the integral particle mass transported to
the environment via all open connections as calculated on the



















Fig. 6: ACCltllLATED AEROSOL ~\\SSES LEAKEO TO TIt: ENVIROMNT
Compared with the small leak cases the results indicate
about a factor of 2 higher releases for the 300 cm 2 leak. As a
consequence of the shorter time interval until containment
failure and of the higher amount of aerosol still airborne a
slightly larger mass will be released to the environment in
the HPC. It also can be concluded that failure of the filters
as pessimistically assumed is more sensitive in the HPC.
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Iodine
The iodine behavior within the containment and adjacent
volumes has been calculated using tte iodine model IMPAIR.
The main features of the model / 6 / are summarized in Tab. 3.
During Release out of the Fuel and \lithin the Primary System
- eanstant release rates and homogenious mixing
- 99 %of 12 instantaneously reacls In CsIHilIH2 atmosphere \0form Csl
- no Agl reaetion
- no retention
- in the ~igh pressure case max. concentration of aerosols
200 g/m con\aining 2 %1
In the containment
- 12-partition coefficient 200
- secondary reactions neglecled lIhlch result in higher pi-
values as f. i. impuri ties, I03-formalion, Redox-potenlial,
radiolysis
_ 12 reacls in sumpwater to form Agl, equilibriUIII after
3:5 h .lth 10 %of lhe 12 avaHable
- airborne 12 reacls wl th organic material to fora organic I,
al lhe maxlmum 90 % 12 and 10 %organlc I
Table 3: IHPAIR (l0011l: fIllEL) , IHI'ORTANT ASSlH'TIONS
In Adjacent Volumes
- carry over of l-species corr. to leak ~ates and
campost Hon \011 thin the "soufce-volume"
- no 1- release to adjacent volumes via 'Italer droplets
in the steam flow generated by sump-'ltaler evaporation
- partition coefficient of 5000 (ar the overall I
- organic I released to adjacent volumes doesn 't reaet
any more. Additional organic I 1s (ormed by airborne
12 (after 10 h 50 %of each)
- I-release continues until all the sump-'ltater 1s
evaporated.
Tab. 3 cont.: IHPAIR (I(JOIIl: 11JOEL), IHPORTANT ASSll'l'TIONS
These assumptions are based on the actual knowledge in
this extremely complex science and represent the commonly
agreed opinion of experts in the FRG and abroad. Nevertheless,
important assumptions which usually include some conservatism
need final experimental verification. The numbers which are
reported in this paper will change in the future and there-
fore should be taken as a preliminary orientation.
Analogous to Fig. 6 representing the aerosol release rates
Fig. 7 shows the total iodine releases to the environment for
the low and the high pressure case (HPC). Because of the un-
certainties as weIl as the only small differences in the
calculated results the influence of the different containment
failure modes on the iodine'behavior is not presented. Similar
to the results of the NAUA calculations, larger iodine
releases - at the end in the one/two orders of magnitude range -
have been analysed for the HPC.
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Flg. 7: ClWARISON Of TI[ TOTAl. IOOIIt RElIASE TO Tlf ENVIROttfNT
On the basis of the HPC the fraction of the different
iodine species is given in Fig. 8.
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Flg. 8: IOOIIt RElIASE TO Hf ENVIROttfNT
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This tendency demonstrating the importance of organic iodine
and 1 2 has been identified for all scenarios.
CONCLUSION
Finally, Table 4 summarizes the integral release of Cs 137
and I 131 as the isotopes dominating the melt-down consequences,
I 131 determining the early fatalities, Cs 137 the late cancers
and the ground contamination. Although care should be taken as
a consequence of important assumptions which may change in
the future, it can be concluded that - compared with the results
of the German Risk study - the consequences of core melt-downs
will be much lower than previously estimated.
Cs 137 1 integral 1131
Q Ci 9 9 ci
O'lt Pressure Case
-case 1 3. W 4 3 . 10-2
1 0.04 5 . 103
- case 2 7 . 10-4 7. W 2
~igh Pressure Case
3. W 3- case 1 0.3
6 . 104- case 2 5 . 10-3 0.5 10 0.5
case 1 =20 cm~ leak
case 2 =300 cm leak
Table 4: CAESILI1 mJ 100111: RELEASE TO Tlf: ENVIROMNT (WIT~lII DECAI)
To confirm the expected tendency ongoing research work on
specific aspects related to severe accidents has to be complet-
ed. In particular, this includes: sensitivity studies,
consequence analyses for other dominant sequences, improvements
of fission products behavior and demonstration of aerosol plate-
out (DEMONA-experiments). In addition, work is being performed
to clarify hydrogen distribution and explosion phenomena as
well as the long term melt/concrete behavior (BETA-experiments).
All the R & D work mentioned above has been initiated and is
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RETENTION OF GASEOUS RAOIOIODlNE WITH SORBENTS
UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS
H. Deuber, H.-G. Dillmann, K. Gerlach
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe GmbH
D-7500 Karlsruhe I, Postfach 3640
Federal Republic of Germany
ABSTRACT
Under moderate filtration conditions ( <150 °C) impregnated activated
carbons can be used to efficiently retain radioiodine. With a resi-
dence time of about 1 s in the carbon, for elemental radioiodine a
retention of > 99.99 % can be anticipated because the desorbing iodine
is in a nonel~ental form. For methyl iodide a retention of >99 %
can be assumed under the same conditions. An extremely low retention
has to be expected for certain unidentified iodine species which
according to recent measurements may occur in high proportions in the
exhaust air of light water reactors in rare cases. Under extreme fil-
tration conditions (temperature ~150 °C) silver zeolites are eligible
for efficiently trapping radioiodine.
INTRODUCTION
In light water reactors (LWRs) the release of gaseaus radioiodine has in
general to be mitigated by filtration in both normal operation and accidents /1/.
This paper deals with work which in recent years has been performed in our la-
boratory on the retention of gaseaus radioiodine with sorbents under accident
conditions. Both eligible sorbents and achievable retention are covered. Only
same important results are given. Details can be found in the papers cited
below. Work which is being initiated in our laboratory, e.g. on the influence
of fire , is not dealt with.
GENERAL
This chapter contains same general remarks on gaseaus radioiodine species,
filtration conditons in LlvR accidents and iodine sorbents.
The iodine species which in general have to be taken into account are ele-
mental iodine (12), methyl iodide (CH3
I) and similarly behaving organic iodine
compounds. Moreover, unidentified penetrating iodine species have to be reckoned
with (see below). The occurrence of gaseaus hypoiodaus acid (HOl) is question-
able /2/. The formation of gaseaus hydriodic acid (HI) can not be excluded in
accidents when hydrogen is present.
1 2 exhibits a much higher sorption tendency than CH3I. Therefore, in gene-ral 1 2 can be much better retained by sorbents than CH I. Radiologically, 1 2
is much more important than CH
3
1 with respect to inges€ion. As for inhalation,
these species are of similar importance.
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The retention of iodine volatilized from aqueous solutions ("HOl") by sor-
bents has been treat'ed in some publications /3,4,5,6/. There are virtually no
data on the retention of HI by sorbents. Corresponding investigations are being
initiated in our laboratory.
As for the retention to be achieved with accident filters, it is mentioned
here that German guidelines for pressurized water reactors (PlvRs) require a
minimum retention of 99.99 % for elemental radioiodine and of 99 % for organic
radioiodine in a design basis accident /7/.
The challenges of accident filters in various LWR accident scenarios have
been described /2/. In the present paper two filtration conditions are distin-
guished: moderate conditions (e.g. filtration of PWR annulus exhaust air) and
extreme conditions (e.g. exventing of PWR containment). In the first case, the
temperature is below ISO °c. The relative humidity is low as long as the temge-
rature is high. In the second case, the temperature is in the region of 150 C
or higher. The relative humidity may be both low and high.
As for iodine sorbents, both activated carbons and inorganic sorbents are
eligible for efficiently trapping radioiodine /1,8/.
RETENTION WITR ACTIVATED CARBONS
The activated carbons employed to capture radioiodine are usually impreg-
nated with KI, TEDA, derivatives of TEDA or similar compounds. Mixtures of
these impregnants are also used.
In this chapter some results are presented from laboratory tests on the
activated carbons 207B (KI) and 207B (TEDA) (base material: coal; grain size:
8-12 mesh) with 12-131 and CH 31-131 as the test agents. Moreover, some resultspertaining to penetrating 1-131 in the exhaust air of LWRs are given.
The conditions in the laboratory tests which are dealt with in some detail
are indicated in Table I.
Table I: Parr~Tters in the laboratory tests on the retention of 131 12 and


































a) 2 % at 130 oe, < I % at 180 °c (dew point: 30 °C)b)
c) absolute (also in the following tables)
section depth: 1.25 or,2.5 cm (diameter: 2.5 crn)
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Figs. 1 and 2 show the penetration as a function of the bed depth in the
tests with I -131. Two parts of the penetrati"n curves can be distinguished.
The s teep pirt (bed depth: S 5 cm) can be ascnbed to I , the flat part (bed
depth: ? 5 cm) at least largely to more penetrating ioaine speeies present as
impurities or formed in the test bed.
Figs. 1 and 2 illustrate that under the test conditions chosen there was
practically no influence of both the impregnant and the temperature on the
extent of the penetration. At a residence time of about 0.1 s the penetration
was weIl below 10-2 %with fresh carbons.
With aged carbons qualitatively_~imilarresults were obtained (not shown).
However, the penetration exceeded 10 % in some cases, even at a residence
time of 0.5 s (purging time: 1 week in the tests at 130 °c). It has to men-
tioned that in one test with aged 207B (TEDA) at 180 °c ignition occurred.
The most important finding of the tests with I -131 is that at 130 °c the
iodine passing through deep carbon beds (residence time: 0.5 s) was in a non-
elemental form in all cases, even with aged carbon. At 180 °c, however,
also element al iodine passed through equivalent beds of aged carbon.
With activated carbons other than 207B (Kl) and 207B (TEDA) similar
results ,,,ere obtained. It is therefore concluded that at moderate filtration
conditions ( <150 °C) a minimum retention of 99.99 % for elemental radioiodine
can be equally weIl achieved with various commercial impregnated activated
carbons.
Details of the tests with 1
2
-131 can be found elsewhere /9,10,11,12/.
Figs. 3 and 4 display the penetration as a function of the bed depth in
the tests with CH
3
1-131. As with 17-131, steep and flat parts of the penetra-
tion curves can be distinguished. Again, there was practically no influence
of both the impregnant and the temperature On the extent of the penetration.
At a residence time of about 0.1 s the penetration was several orders of mag-
nitude lower than 1 %. It can be concluded that at moderate filtration condi-
tions « 150 °C) a minimum retention of 99 % for methyl radioiodide can be
equally weIl achieved with various commercial impregnated activated carbons.
As for penetrating iodine species, the above mentioned experiments illus-
trate that in laboratory tests theit proportions are generally extremely low.
It has been found that in the exhaust air of LWRs the proportions of penetra-
ting iodine species are usually low too ( order of magnitude: 1 %) /5/.
However,as discussed below, recent measurements in a boiling water reactor
(BWR5) have shown that much higher proportions can not be entirely excluded.
The measurements in BWRS were made after an unusually high release of
radioiodine into the reactor water due to fuel element damages. Table 11
contains the retention of gaseous 1-131 from the reactor by a purge air filter.
(The purge air originates in particular from the containment and other rooms
containing reactor water.) The filter, which had been filled with fresh carbon
shortly prior to the beginning of the investigations, exhibited a very low
retention of total and organic 1-131, in spite of the favorable filtration
conditions. In two sampling periods theretention was numerically even nega-
tive.
The relatively high retention of elemental 1,-131 proves that the poor
performance of the putge air filter was not caused by leakage. The results of
a laboratory test on the carbon of the filter with CH
3
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Sampling period b) Retention [%]
Total 131 1 Elemental 131 1 Organic 1311
1 76 > 99.9 71
2 55 > 99.9 c) 41
3 < 0 > 99.9 c) < 0
4 < 0 > 99.8 c) < 0
a) activated carbon: 207B (Kl) , 8-12 mesh
b) duration: 1 week each
c) detection limit for elemental 131 1 in outlet air not exceeded
Hence, only the occurrence of penetrating 1-131 species has to be consi-
dered. Indeed, high proportions of penetrating 1-131 (order of magnitude: 50 %)
result from the distribution of the 1-131 from the reactor on (sectioned) acti-
vated carbon beds run in parallel to the purge air filter in the sampling
periods 2 and 3. The distribution obtained with 207B (Kl) and 207B (TEDA) is
presented in Figs. 5 and 6. No significant difference is discernible. With
another Kl impregnated activated carbon (RKJ1) a better retention was observed.
With mass spectrometric measurements the nature of the penetrating 1-131
could not be elucidated. However, from the distribution of the 1-]31 on the
carbon beds it can be concluded that "HOr' and compounds such as C6H5
I
(iodine benzene) played no significant part /5/. The source of the penetrating
1-131 is unknown.
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RETENTION WITH INORGANIC SOF~ENTS
Under extreme filtration conditions (temperature ~150 °c), silver contai-
ning inorganic sorbents can be used instead of impregnated activated carbons
to retain radioiodine. Zeolites in the silver form and materials impregnated
with silver compounds are eligible.
Apart from inflammability, the inorganic sorbents exhibit a very low
desorption of iodine under extreme conditions because the iodine is bound in
stable silver compounds (e.g. AgI). However, the structure and/or the impreg-
nant of the inorganic sorbents may be adversely affected under extreme conditions.
With a particular silver zeolite, however, only a very low deterioration was
found. TableIII contains the retention of eH 1-131 with this sorbent under
conditions which are much more serious than t~ose to be expected e.g. during
exventing of a PWR containment. At a bed depth of 5 cm (residence time: 0.2 s)
a retention of <99 %was found only at the most adverse conditions. It has to
be mentioned that a hydrogen purge of the silver zeolite after exhaustive
loading with 1-131 had no deleterious influence at high temperatures.
Inorganic materials impregnated with AgNO (e.g. AC6120) should not be
used at temperatures above 200 °c because of t~e possible decomposition of the
impregnant.
Details of the investigations on inorganic sorbents can be found else-
where /14/.














Temperature Exposure time Retention [%]
fC] [h] 2.5 cm a) 5.0 cm a)
160 5 96.0 99.896 95.4 99.7
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CONFINEMENT OF AIRBORNE PARTICULATE RADIOACTIVITY
IN THE CASE OF AN ACCIDENT
V. Rüdinger, J.G. Wilhelm
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Postfaoh 3640, D-7500 Karlsruhe 1
Federal Republio of Germany
ABSTRACT
In the oase of an aooident, the filter elements in the inlets and
exhausts of the air-oleaning systems of a nuolear faoility may beoome apart
of the remaining fission produot barrier. Among others, the Projeot Nuolear
Safety is pursuing the information neoessary to insure safe operation of
air-oleaning systems under aooident oonditions.
Experimental investigations into the response of HEPA filters to dif-
ferential pressures involving both dry and moist air have demonstrated the
ooourrenoe of struotural failure with subsequent loss of effioienoy at low
values of differential pressures. Contributions are being made to the deve-
lopment and verifioation of oomputer .oodes used to oaloulate those
fluid-dynamio and thermodynamio oonditions expeoted to prevail in an
air-oleaning system as a result of potential aooident situations.
With regard to further investigations, a new test faoility was put
into operation for the realization of superimposed ohallenges and a new
method for testing partioulate removal effioienoy under high temperature or
high humidity was developed.
Further work will oonoentrate on experimental investigations of aged
filters under oombined ohallenges, development of improved filter elements,
and the development of oodes to model air-oleaning systems.
INTRODUCTION
The High Effioienoy Partioulate Air (HEPA) filters within the
air-oleaning systems of nuolear installations play an important role in the
oonfinement of airborne partioulate radioaotivity. The performanoe of these
filter elements must be guaranteed not only during normal servioe but also
under aooident oonditions.
In order to be able to evaluate the risk of an inoreased release of
radioaotivity to the environment, a thorough understanding of HEPA-filter
behavior under possible aooident oonditions is needed. The neoessary data,
however, are in general very limited. Within this oontext it should be noted
that relatively frequent failures of HEPA filters during normal servioe have
been reported /1, 2/. For the more stringent possible ohallenges posed du-
ring aooidents, more failures oan be expeoted. Therefore, two aims of our
investigations are in the field of HEPA-filter performanoe and inolude the
establishment of filter performanoe under possible aooident oonditions as
weIl as the development of improved filter designs, where found to be neoes-
sary. A requirement in this regard is that present filter dimensions and
air-flow speoifioations should in general be maintained.
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As of this time, comprehensive requirements regarding filter service
under accident conditions cannot be specified because the possible condi-
tions challenging the filter units within the Air-Cleaning Systems (ACS) are
largely unknown. This is due to the lack of computer codes able to reliably
estimate the conditions inside the ACS. Two additional aims fall within the
context of modelling such systems. These include obtaining the required
input data on ACS components, in particular the filter units, as well as
contributing to the development and experimental verification of ACS codes.
In the following, abrief overview of the current status of these in-
vestigations, that are performed within the scope of the Project Nuclear
Safety, are given.
HEPA-FILTER STRUCTURAL LIMITS
If a HEPA filter fails structurally the removal efficiency is usually
reduced to values below 90 %, even to zero. Therefore in the case of an ac-
cident, above all the filters structural integrity must be maintained. Me-
chanical loads endangering the filter units can result, among others, from
increased differential pres~ures that are induced by a tornado depressuriza-
tion or a LOCA, or that develop due to filter loading with moisture from a
LOCA or soot from a fire.
Response to High Air Flow Velocities: The response to high air veloci-
ties was investigated with a blowdown facility /3/. Altogether more than 250
individual tests with approximately 30 types of filters from 10 different
manufacturers were performed at ambient temperature and low relative
humidity; in order to establish structural limits and to measure flow re-
sistance characteristics. Both new, commercially-available filters and
improved prototypical units were tested. Some of the filters were preloaded
with polystyrene latex of 0.3~m aerodynamic diameter; up to apressure drop
of 1 kPa at rated flow /4-6/.
The results obtained allow the actual structural limits of the major
designs of commercial filters at high air velocity to be defined. They are
summarized in Table I with the range of the average differential pressure at
failure for the different designs.
Table I: Structural Limits of Commercial HEPA Filters of
Standard Size With Glass-Fiber Media
Filter Design Temp. of Range of Average
Operation Failure Differential
Pressure
Pack Frame (oC) (kPa)
Deep Pleat Wood < 130 11 - 23
Deep Pleat Metal < 220 4 - 11
Mini Pleat Wood, Metal < 130 6 - 19
or Plastic
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The test results demonstrate that thestruetural strength of HEPA fil-
ters eurrently available is rather low even under the relatively benign eon-
ditions of ambient temperature and low relative humidity. It can be further
stated that the filter units with deeply pleated medium and separators, sus-
tain the highest differential pressure before failure oceurs. It was found
that preloading the new filters with polystyrene latex particulate led to a
slight reduction in failure pressure, on the average, with two exeeption of -
27 %and - 40 %.
Response to Moist Air: The response of standard-size HEPA filters to
moist air was investigated using the test faeility TAIFUN /7/. It is a closed
loop facility that allows aeeurate control of the relativehumidity up to
151 oe. With a spray system, fog eonditions ean also be simulated.
To establish the meehanical loads that result from exposure to flows of
moist air, the measurements were oriented to determine how filter differenti-
al pressure inereases as a funetion of the relative humidity of the air to be
filtered as weIl as the liquid moisture eontent for air at > 100 %rel. humi-
dity. In Figure 1 the results obtained from HEPA filters 'preloaded with
room-air dust duöing service operation, are summari~e~1/8/. The tests were
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Fig. 1: Pressure drop of preloaded
HEPA filters as a function of air-
stream rel. humidity and liquid
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In the first phase of all the tests with loaded filters, an unexpected
irreversible decrease in flow resistance was observed when the relative hu-
midity exceeded approx. 70 %for the first time. This effect, which is not
relevant with regard to the structural limits, is attributed to compaction
of the particles deposited within the fiber matrix of the filter medium due
to eondensing water vapor. The filter medium loaded with the eompacted dust
only begins at about 70 %rel. humidity to incorporate water to such an
amount that the flow resistance starts to rise measurably.
drop attained at 100 %rel. humidity fall within a range of 1 to approx. 7
kPa, in part dependent upon the quantity of aeeumulated dust. From these re-
sults it ean be eoneluded that below 90 %rel. humidity, loaded filters are
not seriously affeeted by extended exposure to moist air. At 100 %rel. hu-
midity however, high differential pressures oeeur, and thus impose elevated
meehanieal loads on the filter medium. Due to the resulting stresses, the
filter units usually failed at differential pressures between 1.7 and 6.3
kPa, after extended exposure to saturated air flow. Sinee mist eliminators,
usually installed upstream of HEPA filters, ean in the ideal ease only re-
duee the moisture eontent only to that of saturation, they will not be able
to fully proteet loaded filters from failure. This eonelusion was experimen-
tally proven.
High air humidity does not only ereate elevated meehanieal loads in
the filter units, it additionally weakens the filter pack and reduees the
tensile strength of the medium. Both faetors eause the HEPA filters made
with glass fiber media to fail strueturally at the relatively low differen-
tial pressures already noted above.
Response to High Temperature: Pratt and Green /9/ reported on dynamie
tests of HEPA filters during whieh the temperature was inereased stepwise
from ambient up to 500 oe over aperiod of approx. 30 min. Whereas the fil-
ter units of one type remained intaet, the filters of two other designs
failed strueturally at differential pressures on the order of only 1 kPa.
Failure Modes and Filter Improvement: Different modes of failures were
observed for the experiments reported on here. One mode of failure whieh
seems to limit the struetural strength cf the deep-pleat design that showed
the highest struetural strength, is the rupture of downstream ends of the
folds of the filter paper, whieh is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3.
Figs. 2 and 3: Failed folds of deep pleat HEPA filters
This mode of failure was observed during tests with high air veloei-
ties with high air humidities as weIl as under hot dynamie eonditions. These
failures are due to the eombined effeets of elevated tensile stresses within
the filter medium at the ends af the falds and a reduetion in the tensile
strength of the medium during the expasure to the extreme operating eonditions.
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Based on the information gained about the modes and mechanisms of fail-
ures, first successfull improvements were achieved with HEPA filters made
with glass-fiber media /4-6/. The potential for further improvement in this
concept of filter design is judged to be considerable. For special purposes,
where the requirements for fire resistance are not very high, HEPA filters
with high structural strength and high resistance to the effects of humidity
and acid can be manufactured using a polycarbonate microfiber medium /10/.
Particulate filters with high removal efficiency and potentially high tempe-
rature resistance, that also function as flame arrestors, can be made with
stainless-steel fiber pads as the filter medium /11/. With the aid of a
strong construction supporting the fiber mats, high structural strength can
be achieved in spite of the very low tensile strength of the fiber pads.
NEW FAOILITIES AND METHODS
The investigations into the behavior of HEPA filters under possible ac-
cident conditions also require the construction of new test facilities and
the development of new test methods. In France /12/ and in the United
Kingdom /9/ two new facilites were built in order to test the behavior of
HEPA filters operated under high temperature.
Nearly all existing facilities only allowed HEPA filters to be tested
under individual challenges, i.e., combinations of challenges were not possi-
ble. Therefore, the fluid-dynamic test facility BORA was specially designed
and built at the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Oenter to fill this need. With
this facility, that has recently been put into operation, HEPA filters and
other components of air-cleaning systems can be exposed to the combined chal-
lenges of high differential pressure and flow rate, together with high rela-
tive humidity, in atemgerature range from 30 0 0 up to approx. 110 0 0• For
temperatures up to 350 0, challenges by high temperature can be combined
with high air-flow velocities. The schematic of the closed-loop facility BORA
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Fig. 4.: Schematic of the test facility BORA.
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The facil~ty has a m~ximum electrical powe~ re~uirement ?f 900 kW and
uses up to 50 m /h of coollng water. The photos ln FlgS. 5-7 glve an
impression of the size and the character of the test facility BORA.
Figs. 5-7: Views of the test facility
BORA before mounting of the thermal
insulation: (5) Blowers and connec-
ting ductwork. (6) Low temperature
cooler, main duct and by-pass duct.
(7) End wall of the component test
section with the high-speed cinemato-
graphic equipment.
The test facility BORA was designed to analyze the behavior of air cleaning
system components, namely particulate filters under extreme test-air condi-
tions at steady and unsteady flows, as well as to help develop and to verify
numerical computer codes that can model the response of air-cleaning systems
to design-basis and hypothetical accident conditions. The results of the
successful first test program are reported on in Ref. 13.
Another development need involves filtration efficiency, that is,
verifying fission-product confinement once the structural integrity of the
filter elements is assured. Whereas the NaCl method seems to be satisfactory
for the measurement of filter removal efficiency at temperatures up to
350 °c /9 including discussion of Dorman, 12, 14/ no test method has been
available, until now, to test full-scale HEPA filters under challenges that
include high air humidity.
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The newly developed procedure to test HEPA-filter efficiency under si-
mulated conditions of high temperature and high humidity /14/ uses a conden-
sation aerosol which is generated with the aid of an argon plasma using
Ti02 or Mo03 powders. These aerosol substances are insoluble in water, arethermally stable, and have a high melting point. Efficiency measurements are
accomplished by the collection of test-aerosol sampIes onto Nuclepore fil-
ters and by subsequent atomic absorption analysis. The schematic of the test









Fig. 8: Schematic of the plasma-aerosol efficiency test method for HEPA fil-
ters.
The new test method has been successfully evaluated and checked
against two standard procedures at room-air conditions.
4
The sensitivity of
the method allows decontamination factors as high as 10 to be determined.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO AIR-CLEANING-SYSTEM CODE DEVELOPMENT
To evaluate whether the confinement of fission products is also
assured during an accident, reliable data on the behavior of particulate
filters are needed, in addition to knowledge of the challenges that the fil-
ter units would be exposed to, at the places within the air-cleaning system
where they are mounted. There are only a few relatively simple codes availa-
ble to model air-cleaning systems' response to, e.g., gas-dynamic tran-
sients'. These codes include TVENT /15/ for tornado simulation, or EVENT /16/
for explosion simulation. In different institutions, fire codes are under
development /17/.
In preparation for further code development, both above-mentioned
gas-dynamic codes were modified so that active components with time- depen-
dent flow-resistance characteristics can be modelIed. Additionally, a more
accurate description of HEPA-filter flow resistance was introduced. In order
to verify the accuracy of the calculations, the gas-dynamic characteristics
of the test facility BORA were modelIed with both codes. Subsequently, the
predictions of different gas-dynamic transients simulated with this facility
were compared with the corresponding experimental measurements /18/.
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As a typical result of these investigations, Fig. 9 shows the varia-
tion in the static.pressure upstream of the component test section as well
as across the test section, where a HEPA filter was mounted. The predictions
of both codes are almost identical for the range in static pressure of this
test. Apart from the time delay of approx. 0.25 s the calculations are in
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Fig. 9: Some results of modelling the gas-dynamic behavior of the test fa-
cility BORA with the codes TVENT and EVENT. Comparison of calculated and me-
asured gage static pressures.
Given the effectiveness of TVENT and EVENT in predicting gas-dynamic
transients, neither was originally developed to take into account the pro-
cess of water condensation or the transport of liquid-water aerosols that
may occur during a LOCA in a water-cooled nuclear power facility. In order
to obtain realistic data regarding the challenges to the filters within
air-cleaning systems, additional code-development work is necessary.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the results obtained so far, it can be concluded that safe
HEPA-filter operation seems to be limited to conditions close to normal. No
information is available yet on the behavior of aged filter units or the
response of new and aged filters, to combined challenges, both of which in-
dicate the need for further investigations. Additionally, the ongoing work
for filter improvement is considered necessary, where the conventional fil-
ter concept with glass-fiber media seems to offer good possibilities. Fur-
thermore, the challenges to the filter units inside the air-cleaning systems
need to be estimated before credit for the particulate removal efficiency of
the filters can be taken into account in source-term calculations. This
implies additional work in the field of code development.
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EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS SIMULATING IODINE RELEASE
AT DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT IN PWR
W. Moreli, W. Kastner, R. Rippel, F. Richter
KRAFTWERK UNION




After failure of an effective pressure line in th~ trans-
ducer compartment of the annulus of a PWR fission pro-
ducts, especially 1131 contained in the primary coolant,
are released in the compartment atmosphere.
Depressuration experiments in a I : I scale test facility
were performed using cesium-tracer simulating the ionic
dissolved fission product behaviour.
During the test-phase of about 50 minutes corresponding
to the initial accident phase, the humidity-born tracer
release is less than I % of the discharged amount.
INTRODUCTION
The calulation of the radiological consequences of design
basis accidents with primary-coolant release presumes reliable
data on the behaviour of important radionuclides (iodine, cesium)
under the accident conditions.
The guidelines by the Federal Ministry of the Interior
On evaluating the design of nuclear pow~r stations with pres-
surized-water reactors against accident~ within the scope of
§ 28, ßection 3 of the radiation protection regulations dated
18th October, 1983 prescribe which accidents are decisive for
technical safety design and which forms of proof are to be fur-
nished.
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One of these accidents to be analysed radiologically in
accordance with the accident guidelines is a "leak in an instru-
ment line bearing primary coolant (effective pressure line)" in
the annulus of the reactor building. In such an accident, part
of the hot primary coolant discharged from the si te of the leak
·evaporates very rapidly, and it is necessary to clarify which
proportion of the radionuclides is released under these condi-
tions. The parameters to be used for this accident are given in
the "Fundamentals on accident calculation for the guidelines ... "
published as supplement to the accident guidelines. An essential
assumption is based on the fact that the activity concentration
with relation to mass in the steam arising on discharge comprises
10 %of the discharged, un-vaporised coolant with respect to
iodine and other impurities.
The research project jointly financed by the Federal Min-
istry for Research and Technology and KWU and conducted by KWU
furnished proof that this model is sufficiently conservative.
PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES
Experimental findings on the release of droplets after a
break in an effective pressure line in the annuls are determined
in depressurisation experiments.
The broken effective pressure line, the transducer room and
the cross-section of the vent chimney are hereby simulated in the
geometrical scale 1 : 1 (Fig. 1). The discharge time in the ex-
periments is selected so that more than the initial phase of the
accident (30 minutes) is covered.
The radionuclide 1131 plays the radiologically dominant role
in the initial phase of the accident. As the experimental facility
is not situated inside a controlled area, it was not possible to
employ radionuclides in their reactor-equivalent concentration as
tracers, but nonradioactive substances must be employed in a com-
paratively high concentration.
It has been determined in parallel examinations that iodine
is dominantly (90 %) present in the chemical form of the water-
soluble, non-volatile iodide (1-) in the real primary-coolant of
PWR. It is thus possible to employ the ionogeneous alcaline salt
CsN0
3
as tracer which is also easily soluble in water.
The most important objective of the experiments is to deter-
mine which proportion of the tracer is released from the leakage
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space surrounding the leak within the first accident phase of 30
min. Two pilot tests were performed to test the measurement and







Break 01 an Effective Pressure Line:








The experiments were performed on a high pressure vessel
(DBA) with following 50 m' container (low pressure tank; NDB).
Figs. 2 and 3 show the test arrangement.
The system consists essentially of four components:
- high pressure vessel (DBA),
- inlet line,
- low pressure tank (NDB),
- vent line.
The high pressure vessel DBA simulates the primary circuit.
This is heated by rod heaters placed vertically in the lower ves-
sel part. The water mass usable for discharge is approx. 3500 _













Test Arrangement and Instrumentation
The discharge of the saturated water takes place from the
lower part of the DBA via a pipe ND 150, followed by an electri-
cally operated sliding valve to which the actual inlet line ND
15 is connected.
The in let line ND 15 represents the broken effective pres-
sure line leading to the transducer compartment, the contraction
ND 5 corresponds to the cross-section of the welded connection to
the main coolant line which limits the flow.
The nozzle of the in let line is situated in the lower part
of the low pressure tank, which represents the transducer compart-
ment.
The water separated in the NDB is led through a pipe from
the lowest point of the vessel into the sump tank and collected
there.
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In the upper part, the vent line ND 414 is connected to the
NDB. The cross-section area corresponds to that of the grills
areas of feed exhaust air openings in the transducer compartment
of a power station.
The vent line, consists of an approx. 5.1 m long vertical
and a 5.4 m long horizontal tubing and forms the connection bet-
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Fig. 3
Measurement Positions in the Vent Line ND 414
In order to determine the transport of the tracer through
the vent line, the system of isokinetic sampling of a represen-
tative partial mass flow was selected as sampling technique
(Fig. 4).
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For this purpose, tnree elbow probes (inner diameter 20 mm)
arranged in counter flow direction were fitted to different posi-
tions in the cross-section. In order to configurate the sampling
of the steam-droplet mixture isokinetically, knowledge of the flow
speed is necessary which was determined with a turbine flow meter.
In two experiments, one elbow probe was adjusted close to the wall
















lsokinetic Sampling 01 SteamIDropiet-Sampies
During sampling of the steam-droplet mixture through the el-
bow probes, the two-phase mixture from the appropriate probe is
condensed completely with an intensive cooler.
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A carry-over of humidity into the Woulff's bottles was not
observed. In order to make certain, the tube connections and the
Woulff's bottles were rinsed with deionised water after comple-
ting the experiments and the Cs content was measured. The Cs mass
rinsed from the surfaces was approx. 2,5 ~. The error on account
of carry over is thus only 2.5 0/00 of the determined value.
No statement can however be made from the isokinetic sam-
pling on the water separated in the vent line which consists of
steam condensate and droplets. In order to determine the quantity
and to make a chemical analysis of this water (wall-condensate)
collection vessels were fitted (Fig. 3) at the entry to the verti-
cal and horizontal line section.
For aseparate examination of the phases, a steam separator
and a droplet separator (cyclone) were additionally installed.
The steam separator consists of a hollow body open on one
side which is partly filled with wire wool. The water droplets
are here separated from the fluid sucked up (water jet pump).
The remaining steam flows to a condenser. Samples are taken from
the condensed steam.As the tracer is non-volatile, the concentra-
tion in the steam sample should be zero.
THE PROCEDURE
Two pilot tests were carried out to check and improve the
measuring and sampling procedure. As these experiments were sa-
tisfactory, they were also fully evaluated.
In this way, four experiments are available under almost
equal initial conditions.
To perform the experiments, the high pressure vessel (DBA)
was filled with approx. 6 m' deionised water and a CsN03 solution
of a known composition added in order to obtain the required Cs-
concentration in the DBA.
Homogenous distribution \'BS checked by analysing water samples
taken at three points of different geodetic heights (CM, CD, CU).
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The partly filled DBA was then heated to saturation point at
approx. 310 deg C, 100 bar.
After opening the sliding valve the saturated water expanded
into the low pressure tank NDB from the DBA via the inlet line ND 15
fitted with a contraction to ND 5.
The discharging process was stopped after appr. 50 min in
order to keep the rod heaters in the DBA covered. The DBA heating
was controlled during the discharge phase so that pressure and
temperature were was constant as possible during the total period.
RESULTS
The essential results of the experimental phase at steady-
state conditions which begins after 12 minutes and which is only
to be observed here, are shown for the experiment V 1 in Fig. 5.






















w .. U2 ±O.14 m11 (11'i,,0,94)
m.. 29.30 ± 1.24 (kg!lnlnl H10 (turbine)
m.. 25.36 ± 1.24 (kgllllln) HlO (mUli velocittl
Separaledwaler: ~
m=J6,10:t::1.10(\glmin)H20
C =56.22"1: 1.35 ppmCs
~:r~::~I~ile t
m "O,012::::0.oo6~nH20






Essential Results of Test V1
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The trend for the measured results of Cs-concentration for
this experiment is represented in Fig. 6: the 8mall increase of
the tracer concentration in the DBA is caused by evaporation of
the fluid inside DBA during the flashing.
6 $eparated water in NOB
A DBA
o Condensate vertical
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Cesium Concentralion
The cesium concentration of the water separated in the NDB
reaches approximately twice .the concentration of the DBAj the
reasons are the enthalpy values during evaporation and the non-
volatility of the cesium tracer. The increase in cesium concen-
tration in the wall condensate of the vertical part of the vent
line is caused by the decreasing condensation (reason: warming
up of the line) and an assumed constant amount of droplets.
As can be further seen the ce~ium concentration in the iso-
kinetic sampies - compared with the given concentration originally
in the DBA - is very small.
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The most important parameter rOF the problem posed in this
project is nevertheless represented by the release of cesium. In
order to be independent of the gi yen tracer-concentration, the out-
flowing Cs mass flow rate m
A
. CISO was related to the inflowing
mass flow rate mE . CDBA . This Parameter is characterized asrelease 0 and gl yen 1n percent .
Thus the following measured values are necessary to calcu-
late the release.
- concentration in the DBA:
- inflowing mass in the NDB:
- concentration in the isokinetic sampIes:
- mass flow in the vent line:
Purely the mass flow rate mA could not be directly measured
but can be determined trom the following values:
- specific enthalpy on saturation
h'. = f(PDBA)
~: ,_= :/;U ;; 11::;/
- U
- saturation density of water
9' - f(p )
Q"= f(pU)) - U
- velocity in the vent line w
A
or alternatively by employing the sump water mass separated per
time unit (mass balance).
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Summarizing the results including the error propagation in
the calculation, the following values are received for the cesium
release (Fig. 7):
Fig. 7
IV 1 IV 2 VI V2
Mass f(wr) 26.93 ± 118 28.64 ± 1.25 29.30 ± 1.14 29.58 ± 1.36
lIow rate mA=f(w) kg/min 13.31 ± 118 24.61 ± 1.15 25.36 ± 114 25.59 ± 1.36
vent line I(ba!.) 29.21 ± 376 30.61 ± 3.31 29.93 ± 1.43 29.69 ± 166
Concen-
Iration eIsa ppm 0.06 ± 0.04 0.06 ± 0.05 0.10±0.04 0.11±004
ventline
Massflow




COBA ppm 10.44±0.13 15.74 ± 0.11 34.80 ± 0.53 33.30 ± 0.44Iralion
D6A
Release <P % 0.22 : ~i~ 0.15:m 0.13±006 0.14 ± 0.06
Calculalion of the Cesium-Release <P
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R~SUM~
Experimental results were determined in four depressuriza-
tion experiments on a technical scale for the droplet release in
the primary coolant dissolved non-volatile suhstances after a
failure in an effective pressure line in the annulus.
The broken effective pressure line, the transducer cQmpart-
ment and the cross-section of the vent chimney were simulated on
the geometric scale 1 : 1. The primary coolant was simulated by
deionized water in saturated state at approx. 100 bar/310°C, the
behaviour of the non-volatile, dissolved radionuclides (iodide)
simulated by employing cesium ions (CsN0
3
).
The experimental period of at least 50 minutes covers more
than the necessary first phase to be observed for the accident
of approx. 30 minutes. After a non-steady state starting phase
of about 12 minutes, which is of subordinate importance for the
tracer release, steady-state conditions take place in the system.
If the release 0, i. e. the quotient of the rate of outflo-
wing and inflowing cesium mass in percent, is examined, the re-
sults for all experiments performed ly within the range
0,02 %~ 0 ~ 0,43 %
If the pilot tests are not regarded (larger error range,
measuring techniques employed were tested), then the release 0 for
the two main experiments V 1 and V 2 is at
0.07 %~ 0 < 0.20 %
CONCLUSION
If these values are compared with the basis for accident cal-
culation, it can be seen that the release of such radionuclides as
iodine and cesium is considerably overestimated for the accident
examined.
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FISSION PRODUCT AND MATERIAL VAPOR TRANSPORT
,DURING MOLTEN CORIU}!-CONCRETE INTERACTIONS
D. Cubicciotti and B.R. Sehgal
Electric Power Research Institute
Palo Alto, California 94303 USA
ABSTRACT
The ex-vessel progression of a postulated core melt-down accident
leads to molten corium concrete interactions '(MCCI) , during which
the gases gener~ted from concrete decomposition and the concrete
solids react with the corium melt. Fission product and reactant-
material sparging and aerosol formation occurs due to vaporization-
condensation processes. The timing, the magnitude and the chemical
and physical form of the products of MCCI are extremely important in
determining the overall source term resulting from postulated severe
accidents. This paper presents a methodology based on equilibrium
thermodynamics, in which a free energy minimization treatment was
used to estimate partial pressures of gases in a many component,
multi-phase system. The amounts of the fission products and conden-
sable materials vaporized and their chemical form were calculated for
an example case of basalt-aggregate concrete. The MCCI reaction rate
model embodied in the CORCON-1 code was used to provide the thermal-
hydraulic conditions.
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Postulated risk-dominant accidents [1], by current definition, lead to a
core melt down. An accident starts with postulated faults, which result in
undercooling of the core, which in turn leads to core heat up, degradation and
eventual melting. This in-vessel progression of the accident ends with the
failure of the vessel by the attack of the molten core on the lower head. The
molten material consisting of U02 fuel, Zircaloy clad and stainless steel from
the vessel internals is ejected out of the lower head penetrations into the
containment cavity and the ex-vessel phase of the accident ensues.
Fission products contained in the U0 2 fuel are subject to release while the
core heats up during the in-vessel progression of the accident. Indeed, it is
very likely that most of the volatile fission products, i.e., iodine (I), cesium
(Cs), and tellurium (Te) which pose the most biohazard would be released [2],
during the core heat up. However, recent tests [3] at Oak Ridge National Lab-
oratory have indicated that some fraction of the tellurium inventory may be
retained in the melt, if some of the zirconium escapes oxidation during the core
heat up and melt-down periods. This retained Te, then, may become available for
release during the ex-vessel progression of the accident.
The debris formed in containment cavity melts due to decay heat generation
and attacks the concrete base-mat. The molten corium concrete interaction (MCCI)
results in decomposition and melting of the concrete with production of very
large quantities of carbon dioxide and steam. A cavity forms, advancing both
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axially downwards and radially outwards in time, through and alongsides which
gas bubbles and gas streams will pass and emerge at the top of the corium melt.
The carbon dioxide and steam react with the contents of the corium melt to
produce a variety of chemical reactions and the resulting products. For
example, they partially oxidize the metals in the melt to produce heat, which
adds to the decay heat being generated. The gases, the fission products and
other materials in the melt form various chemical compounds, which may vaporize
and be carried away with the flowing gases. These vaporized materials after
emerging from the corium melt will form an aerosol source as they condense in
the containment atmosphere.
The magnitude, the content and the physical and chemical character of the
MCCI aerosol source are extremely important in estimating the source term due to
postulated accidents. In addition to these parameters, the timing of the MCCI
aerosol release, relative to that of the fission product aerosol release from
the primary system, and to that of the containment failure, is of great impor-
tance. If the timing is opportune, the relatively copious and large-particle
MCCI aerosol will help scrub the relatively dilute and small-particle aerosol
that may be discharged from the vessel on revolatilization of the fission pro-
ducts deposited on the primary system surfaces. Similarly, if containment fail-
ure does not follow soon after the start of the MCCI, there is little danger of
having a large airborne source in the containment, since natural processes of
aerosol removal from the containment atmosphere would have been active for a
sufficiently long time.
Corium concrete interactions are modeled by several codes developed some-
what independently. The German codes WECHSEL [4) and KAVERN [5) and the U.S.
code CORCON [6] are similar in concept, but have differences in submodels. The
code MAAP [7) developed under Industry Degraded Core (IDCOR) Program employs
similar physical concepts about the Mccr albeit both in a somewhat simplified
manner. Predictions from these codes for the thermal-hydraulic parameters in some
typical MCCr events during postulated accidents have been different from each other.
The CORCON code models the MCCI chemistry and thermal-hydraulics in a
coupled fashion. However, the chemical treatment is limited in its scope and
extent and a model named VANESA [8) has been developed at Sandia National Lab-
oratories in which a chemical-kinetic treatment involving many chemical reac-
tions has been employed. The VANESA code has been used [9) for prediction of
the MCCI aerosol source for some postulated accident scenarios.
In this paper, the vaporization of the fission products and the corium com-
ponents is considered on the basis of equilibrium chemical thermodynamics com-
bined with the thermal-hydraulic treatment embodied in the CORCON code. The
CORCON models are briefly described in Section 11 with the results of their
application to the example case of corium interactions with concrete containing
basalt aggregate. Section 111 gives a description of the chemical model
employed and gives results for the releases in the example case chosen and cal-
culated in Section 11; and Section IV summarizes the results and presents some
conclusions.
11. CORIUM-CONCRETE INTERACTION: THERMAL-HYDRAULIC MODEL
The CORCON code treats the Mccr as occuring in a concrete cavity containing
an axisymmetric pool of molten corium surrounded by agas atmosphere. The cor-
ium pool is treated as a set of layers (each with spatially-homogeneous proper-
ties) consisting of metallic and oxidic components of the molten corium. The
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relative axial positions of these layers are determined by their bulk densities.
In most cases, three layers are assumed: a heavy oxide layer, a metallic layer
and a light oxidic .layer. The calculations are performed in two dimensional
axisymmetric geometry.
The interaction of the molten corium with the concrete cavity proceeds on
the bot tom and on the sides of the concrete cavity. CORCON assumes that the
gases generated at the bottom are transported through the corium pool, while the
gases generated on the sides are allowed to bypass the pool. The initial con-
figuration of the pool is assumed as a two layered system with the heavy oxide
layer at the bottom and a metallic layer on the top. The solids of the concrete
melted on the sides of the cavity are presumed by the CORCON model to float on
the metal and form a third layer in the pool, which is termed as the light-oxide
layer. The solids of concrete melted on the bottom mix with the heavy oxide
layer and reduce its density. At some point in time the heavy oxide layer
becomes light enough and is assumed to 'float-through' the metallic layer and
join the light oxide layor. Thus, the thickness, content and the material prop-
erties of these layers change with time as the MCCI proceeds.
The CORCON code employs empirical models for heat transfer in the downward,
sideways and upward directions. The proper partitioning of the heat generated
is of importance, since that determines the rate of the progression of the melt
in the cavity, the rate of gas bubbling through the corium pool and thus the
rate of vapor transport out of the pool. It is suspected, presently, that
empirical heat transfer models employed in the code may not be correct, since
the predicted downward progression of the corium melt has not agreed [10] with
the measurements from the first BETA test [11].
The chemical interactions, the decay heat generation, and the heat transfer
between layers determine the temperature histories of the layers. The three
layers have significantly different histories of heat generation (decay heat in
heavy oxide layer, chemical energy in metallic layer) as the interaction pro-
ceeds. The temperatures'of the molten layers are very important relative to the
vaporization processes.
The example treated in our paper for MCCI considers reactor core melt
falling on to a concrete base-mat containing basaltic aggregate whose composi-
tion was obtained from Reference 6. The core was presumed to melt through the
reactor vessel at 13,000 seconds after initiation of the accident and onto the
concrete base-mat. We have not considered the initial interactions of the melt
with concrete, in which significant dispersal may or may not occur. The period
of time considered is after when the core debris has settled down and reheated
again.
The core material initially consists of U02 fuel (3.63 ES g moles or 98T),
the Zircaloy cladding (2.48 ES g mols or 3lT), of which about 20% was assumed to
be metallic and the rest oxidized to Zr02 for this calculation, stainless steel
structural material (2E6 g at. or 112 T Fe; 3.35 ES g at. or l7T Cr, 1.8 ES g
at. or 10T Ni, and 4E4 g at. or 2.2T Mn), and fission products, this is similar
to the values used in BMI-2104 [9J which is the reference for this simyle case.
(The terminology XEY is used in this paper to represent the number x10 ). To
limit the extent of the calculations, only certain fission product8 were con-
sidered; based on their amounts, radioactivity, and availability of chemical
information. Those included and their amounts were: La (826 g at. or 114 Kg),
Mo (3870 g at. or 372 Kg), Nb (719 g at. or 67 Kg), Sb (16 g at. or 2 Kg),
Sr (860 g at. or 76 Kg), Ru(2270 g at. or 231 Kg), Te (213 g at. or 27 Kg).
Also'included were Ag (10,000 g at. or 1080 Kg) and Sn (2155 g at. or 254 Kg).
The bulk of the Ag was from control blade alloy, but there i8 some fission
product Ag. The Sn came from the Zircaloy cladding but also included some
fission-generated material.
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The molten core separates into two layers: an oxide, which is the denser,
and contains UO Z' ZrO Z' La Z0 3, SrO, Sb Z03, SnO Z' NbO Z' MoO Z' and the metal,
which floats, and contains Fe, Cr, Ni, Mn, Zr, Ag, Ru, Te. (The Te is presumed
to have been associated with the Zircaloy cladding as a telluride, and is there-
fore carried to the metal layerj this is also based on the assumption in BMI-
2104 [9]). Some Cs (360 g at.) and I (40 g at.) were included in the MCCI phase
of the accident. Also, the Sb, which is quite volatile, was included because
it had not been in the earlier treatment. All three of these substances were
found to be very volatile and vaporized from the melt soon after melt through.
Figure 1 shows the CORCON estimate of the temperatures from 13,000 seconds
into the accident, when the vessel melt-through occurred to ZO,OOO seconds,
where a significant amount of freezing of corium pool has occurred and the
CORCON model is not applicable. The figure shows that the dense oxide joins the
light oxide layer (termed the 'oxide-flip') above the metallic layer, slightly
after 15,000 seconds i.e., approximately Z,OOO seconds after the start of the
MCCI. The large and growing difference in temperatures between the oxide and
the metallic layers is apparent from Figure 1. Concrete constituents including
the gases CO Z and HZO released in the CORCON calculation are shown in Figure Z.
The amounts of other metal oxides introduced during concrete melting were
assumed to be proportional to the SiOZ'
111. VAPORIZATION THERMODYNAMICS CALCULATIONS
111.1 METHOD
The procedure used for the early stages after melt-through, while there
were two oxide layers and one metal layer, i.e. before the 'oxide-flip', was as
foliows. The gas entering the bottom was equilibrated with the dense oxide.
Then, the gas from that calculation was equilibrated with the metal layer. Dur-
ing the first time step (500 seconds), it was assumed that there was no light
oxide layer present. During the subsequent time steps (1,000 seconds each),
that gas was equilibrated with the light oxide layer above the metallic layer.
The side gas was equilibrated only with the concrete entering the sides to rep-
resent their interaction before the concrete mixed with the melt. After the
'oxide-flip', which occurred sometimes after 15,000 seconds in this case, the
following steps were used. The gas entering the bottom was equilibrated with
the metal; then the gas from the metal plus the side gas was equilibrated with
the oxide layer, which was less dense than the metal at that time.
The amounts of material vaporized from the system, were considered to be
the moles of gas in equilibrium with the light oxide melt during each time step
for the bulk materials; but for the fission products, the amounts vaporized were
taken as the moles in any gas phase. This was done partly to reduce the number
of elements involved in the calculations and partly with the concept that the
small amounts of vaporized fission products might be aerosolized and pass into
the final gas leaving the system. The additional simplifications made were that
the sodium would behave chemically like potassium and magnesium like calcium.
Thus, the gram atoms of sodium were added to those of potassium and magnesium to
calcium. The free energy minimization computer code SOLGASMIX-PV was used to
calculate these equilibria. Aversion [lZ] that treats as many as ZO elements
was employed.
The species considered can affect the calculated equilibria. The calcula-
tion must include all of the important species. Those employed in the calcula-
tions reported here are listed in Table I. The thermochemical values used for
these calculations were taken from References 13 to Zl. In general, they are
1539
measured values; however, values for the hydroxides taken from Jackson [15] are
mostly estimated. No values were available for trihydroxides, which may playa
role with trivalent. elements.
111.2 FREE ENERGY MINIMIZATI0NS
A sampie flowsheet for a calculation before the 'oxide-flip' is shown in
Figure 3. The amounts of gas (H20 and CO2) and concrete (Si0 2, K2Si03, CaSiO )
added to the dense oxide from the bottom, were taken from the CORCON calculat!on
at the current time step. The earlier dense oxides were obtained from the ear-
lier time step calculation (or initial inputs for the first time step calcula-
tion). These amounts of material were input into the SOLGASMIX-PV program,
along with the temperature of the dense oxide layer obtained from the CORCON
calculation. The output from the calculation gave the numbers of moles of gas
and the moles of condensed phase dense oxide used for the next time step calcu-
lation.
The moles of gas phase generated in the dense oxide layer were used as part
of the input to the metal layer calculation. Interaction of the gases with the
metal constituents from the earlier time step calculation was evaluated by the
free energy minimization program with formation of the three phasesindicated:
a gas phase, which went to the light oxide layer, an oxide phase which was added
to the light oxide layer and a metal phase which went to the next time step
calculation.
Calculation of the equilibrium in the light oxide layer included the gas
and oxide from the metal layer, as weIl as the oxides from the light oxide (ear-
lier time step) calculation and the oxide from earlier time step side calcula-
tion. Gas resulting from this calculation was included in the final gas issuing
from the core-concrete interaction and the oxides produced went to the next time
step light oxide calculation.
The side calculation represented interaction of the concrete with its own
gas as it was added to the light oxide layer. The amounts of gas and concrete
were taken from the CORCON calculation. The gas resulting from the calculation
was added to the final gas and the oxide to the light oxide for the next time
step calculation.
The flow paths considered for the conditions after the 'oxide-flip' are
similar to those in Figure 3. Only two layers were considered, the molten metal
which was at the bottom of the cavity, and the molten oxide which floated on
it. The concrete and gases added from the bot tom were input into the calcula-
tion for the meta1 layer. The gas and oxide from that calculation was added to
the light oxide layer. The gas and concrete added from the side were mixed with
the other constituents of the light oxide calculation.
In brief, the amounts of bulk materials vaporized from the system were
taken tope the moles of gas in equilibrium with the light oxide melt during
each time period; but for the fission products, the amounts vaporized were taken
as the moles in any gas phase. .
111.3 COMPOSITI0N OF LAYERS
111.3.1 Oxide Layers. The compositions calculated for the oxide layers
are shown in Figure 4. It was assumed that there was no significant amount of
light oxide during the first 500 seconds. The composition of the oxide melt
after the 'flip' is also shown in the figure. During the time period from
15,000 to 16,000 seconds, the two oxide phases weremixing, and compositions
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were not calculated. After the 'oxide-flip', the main constituents continue to
be UO Z and ZrO Z' although significant amounts of concrete are added. Most of
the oxides of the concrete remain in the melt, but the alkali metal oxides are
vaporized out.
111.3.Z Molten Melt Layer. The composition of the molten metal is shown
in Figure 5. The major constituents are the stainless steel metals (Fe, Cr,
Ni). It was assumed that the steel contained about Z% Mn. It was also assumed
that about ZO% of the zirconium of the cladding entered the melt as metal when
the core melted through the reactor vessel. Half of the original inventory of
fission product tellurium was assumed to go to the molten metal layer with zir-
conium. Also, about half of the original inventory of control rod silver was
assumed to be carried by the cladding to the metal layer. The Sn originally in
the Zircaloy cladding was assumed to be in the dense oxide and collected in the
metal. Fission product Ru was assumed to be in the metal layer initially, and
it remained there throughout the scenario. Fission product Mo was initially
added to the dense oxide and it was slowly vapor-transported to the molten
metal. The HZO and CO Z added to the system from the bottom of the cavity, after
passing through the dense oxide, interacted with the molten metal. They oxi-
dized the metal and passed onto the light oxide phase. The fraction of Zr in
the metal decreased rapidly after'about 15,000 seconds. Then the next most
reactive metal, Mn, began to be oxidized.
111.3.3 Gases Released. Figure 6 shows the amounts of HZO, HZ' CO, and
CO Z released from the system during the course of the core-concrete interaction.
The HZO arises mainly from the gas added by the side concrete. The HZ comes
from the HZO added at the bottom which is reduced when it interacts with the
metal (and is partly reoxidized in the light oxide). The CO Z and CO come from
the side gas and the bottom gas, respectively. Some 0z (about 3000 moles) is
released as part of the thermal decomposition of the concrete added from the
side. The amount is approximately equivalent to the amount of K released from
the side concrete before the 'oxide-flip'. No significant amounts of 0z were
released from any other layer in the calculation.
In addition to the semipermanent gases mentioned above, quite large amounts
of certain condensable gases were released. Figure 6 shows these species,
mainly K, KOH, and Fe(OH)Z' and their amounts. Most of the alkali metal oxides
and the FeZ03 from the siae; and part of the alkali metal oxides from the con-
crete added to the bot tom became vaporized.
111.3.4 Fission Product Vaporization. Fission products were introduced
into the system either in the dense oxide or in the molten metal layers. The
amounts used in the calculations are shown in the second column of Table 11.
Some of them were essentially completely vaporized in the first time step con-
sidered, namely Cs, I and Sb. These were assumed to enter the gas phase from
the dense oxide and to be vapor-transported out of the system with no further
significant interactions with the melt.
Two of the elements involving fission products in the dense oxide (Mo, Sn)
were found to vaporize partially. Before the 'oxide-flip', some of them were
found to be vapor transported into the metal. After the 'oxide-flip', that pro-
cess did not occur. The remaining fission products in the dense oxide (La, Nb,
Sr) were so slightly volatile that they were not included in other calculations
for a given time step. It was assumed that the amount vaporized from the dense
oxide was carried with the final gas transported out of the cavity. The ele-
ments added to the metal (Ag, Te, Ru), and those transported in (Mo, Sn), were
included in the calculation for the molten metal-gas phases. The amounts of
those elements, in the gas phase, in equilibrium with the metal were presumed to
be vapor transported out of the cavity before the 'oxide-flip'.
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The total amounts vapor transported are given in Tables 11 and 111 and the
releases of some of the fission products with time are shown in Figure 7. The
dominant vapor species for each element is indicated in the last column of
Table 11. Table 111 shows the amounts of materials vaporized from the melt-
concrete system and corresponds to Figure 6. The first five entries are
permanent, or semipermanent gases, which are released as the concrete is
decomposed. The quantities of alkali metals released are noteworthy because
their removal from the concrete melt is expected to impact the model for the
thermal-hydraulics. A rather large amount of iron was vapor-released. These
condensable materials (alkali metals and Fe) would probably influence aerosol
formation and transport in regions outside the cavity.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A methodology to predict the source of vaporized fission products and com-
ponentmaterials during the interaction of molten corium and concrete was devel-
oped. Su~h an interaction might occur in the containment cavity of a light
water reactor, if a postulated core-melt accident is allowed to proceed to
breach the reactor vessel. The time frame of the interactions is after the cor-
ium debris has settled down in the containment cavity, remelted and started to
attack the concrete base-mat.
The methodology developed is based on the assumption of the interaction
proceeding under thermodynamic equilibrium conditions. The thermal-hydraulic
conditions for evaluation of the rates of the chemical reactions were derived
from the model embodied in the CORCON-l code. The methodology considered spa-
tial layers of corium containing materials of different density (e.g., oxides,
metals), which underwent chemical reactions with the gases and other materials
generated from melting concrete. The dynamics of the interactions was modeled
as batch processes in each time step with coupling between the chemistry and
thermal-hydraulics taken into account. The source of the fission products and
component materials emerging at the top of the corium melt into the containment
atmosphere was calculated.
An example of the application of the methodology considered almost a whole
core melt (along with molten structure from the bot tom of the reactor vessel)
interacting with the concrete base-mat containing basalt aggregate. The results
of the calculations for this example are shown in Tables 11 and 111 and in Fig-
ures 6 and 7, in terms of the amounts of gases and vapors released at the top
surface of the corium melt as a function of time. The vapors released are pre-
cursors to the aerosol source in the containment, as they reach the cooler parts
of the containment. For the example considered large amounts of gases: HZO,
HZ' COZ and CO were released. Some fission products and quite large amounts of
condensable concrete materials accompanied these gases.
Among the fission products considered it was found that Cs, I and Sb were
very volatile and if present in the melt would volatalize completely in the
chemical forms of CsOH, CsI and Sb Z respectively. Most of the fission product
tellurium, if present in the corium melt due to the reaction with zirconium,
would be vaporized during the MCCI. Other fission products e.g. La, Sr, Mo, Nb
and Ru were not vaporized out of the MCCI system to any appreciable degree.
The vaporization of the alkali metals constitutes a heat removal process,
which could influence the progression of the MCCI. A rough estimate of the heat
removal is shown in Table IV, which shows the vaporization reaction, the
reaction enthalpy change, the total heat absorbed and the megawatts of heat
removed. The heat removal by alkali metaI and iron vaporization is greater than
that by vaporization of HZO and CO Z from the concrete.
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The results presented here are specific to the example chosen. The amounts
and compositions of the gases generated are strong functions of the composition
of concrete aggregates. The results shown here for the gas and vapor source
from MCCI apply only to the compositions employed here for the corium melt and
the concrete. It has not been possible to make direct comparisons of the
present results to those presented in Reference 9; although the major features
of both analyses are similar to each other.
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Species considered in calculations (before oxide-f1ipa)
DenB8 Oxideb Metale: Light Oddeb,d 5ide Conerete
Ga. phase: Gas phase: I Gas phue; Cu phase:
COZ'" IbOB 5nO* Ag K' SnO CO, B,' Sn AIZO CO HgOalr
CO' ""(OB), SnOB CO, KOB Te' CO' RZO* SnO· AlO leOH Mg(OB),
ce Ho°4"Z 80(08)2 CO' Mn' UZTe Ca' K' SnOR Al Ye(OR)2 1t Na'
C&(08)2" Nb Sr Cr' DnO U Ca(08)2 KOR· 50(08)2 AlO(OR)2'" R, NaOH*
R,' NbO StO· CrO No' UO' Cr' Mn' 003• ce "20* 0, '
82°· NbOR 5e(OH)2" Pe' ""0 UO) CrO MnO 0°48 2 eaon K' S10
K' Nb(OR), UO, PeO Ni Zr Pe' 0, zrO' C&(08)2'" KORIlI 510B
1011'" 0, U03* R,' Ru ZrO· PeO SiO Zr(OB)2 CO2' Mg 51(08)2
La Sb U(OR), R,O Sn'
LaO' Sb, U0 4"Z* OXide phase:
LaOH ShO* Zr Hatal phase: GaSlO] 51°2 Oxide phase:
La(OH)2* Shoa ZrO· Ag Dn Ru Gr203 50°2 AlZO, HgSi03
"" Sb(OB)2 ZreOH) "" Sn PeO UO, GaSl03 Ha2UD)""0 510· Zr(OH)2 Cr Ni [251°3 UO) Ye ZS104 SiO
HoO]" So Pe NiTe Zr DnO ZrOZ KZSi0 3
OXide phaael
eaSlO) NbO Sn02 Oxide phase:
K2StO) NbO, SrSl03 Gr 203 ibO, UO)
La 2(Si03)3 SbZ0 3 UO, PeO SuO ZrO Z
""0, SiOZ UO) BnO UO,
""0) SnO ZrGZ
SAfter the oxide flip there vu on11 ooe OXide, wich va& a coilbination of the dense oxide snd light oxide befon thl!:
flip. The gall IIpeciea wen those considered for the denSl!: oxide and light oxide befote the flip. The aide concrete vaa
also incorporate.d into this oxide.
bCIl re.presentll both Ca lind Hg, lind K represents both K lind Ha in the ealeulatioDlS indieated.
Cr-II, Nb. Sb, and Sr that had been vapodzC!d fro. the denae oxide vere a8lllJllled still to be in thia gas, poaa1bly 4i!II
aerosole.
dAs, Pe, Mn, Ho, Sn, Te, and U vaporhed froll. the setal, and La, Nb, Sb, and Sr vaporized frolA the denae o:r.ide vera
a8slAed to be in thh gu wich vaa the final gas leavlng the syatelll.
*Gauoua apeciea vith higheat pressures for each eleaent.
aAmount released during the scenario considered (i.e., 13,000 to 20,000 sec.)
bFission product Ag and Sn constitute only a small fraction of the amount of
these elements used in the calculation.
cThese were released in the first time period considered.
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aK represents the alkali metals (K + Na).
bpercent of element (i.e., H, C, K, Mn) introduced into entire system that
was vaporized.
Table IV. Heat Removal Effects of Vaporization Reactions
l!. H, Power
(kj /mole) Total Heat (j) ..illID
K2Si03 + H20(g) = 2 KOH(g) + Si02 414 4.8 x 10
9 0.7
K2Si03 + H2(g) = 2K(g) + Si02 + H20(g) 575 1.6 x 10
10 2.2
FeO + H20(g) = Fe(OH)2(g) 188 2.6 x 10
9 0.4
H20(1) = H20(g) 44 7 x 10
9 1.0






























Figure 1. Temperatures of molten layers for Basalt concrete
estimated from the CORCON Model. The light and
dense oxides mix to form a single oxide that














































Figure 2. Concrete Constituents introduced during Molten Core-
Concrete Interaction Period from CORCON Model (in thousands
of moles). Top box represents H20, the middle box CO, and
the bottom the 3i02 part of the concrete. In each case
the dashed curve is material released from the bot tom of
the molten pool and the dotted curve from the sides.
The full curve in the 3i02 box represents the



























Figure 3. Schematic flow sheet before 'oxide-flip'. Boxes
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Figure 4. Compositions of molten oxide layers. The formulas on the








:0> '- ... c' 0 .,,LL U Z 1:: 0 I-<Q)









































K---- ~OH ~.:~:~.~~(~~);~ ~ ~~
:.:.::.:::-:::::::.~~.:':::':;:'::''':'''':'.-' _. -' I
--------
A.9_ -- - - - - - -----
14000
,~--------U03 ""1








































Mo _---",,-Sb ""..........................:.:.-._~ ..






















Figure 7. Release of fission products from the total system
as a function of time. Upper box - moderately volatile
fission products. Lower box - relatively
involatile fission products.
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AN APPLICATION OF THE MONITORING AND DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEM
TO PLANT DIAGNOSIS ON FP TRANSPORT AND RELEASE IN NPPS
H. Kodaira, S. Kondo and Y. Togo
University of Tokyo
7-3-1, Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, Japan
ABSTRACT
A monitoringanddiagnostic system (MADS) of FP transport and release
in NPPs is applied to plant diagnosis in combination with the compu-
tational code "SACHET", which evaluates the dynamic FP inventories in
the multiple compartment system of PWR plants. MADS introduces an
algorithm of the stochastic approximation for the adaptive pattern
classification of the dynamic disturbed parameter system, using a non-
linear functional of the set of monitored data and the system parameters.
By the use of MADS, it becomes possible to understand PWR plant states
precisely in the view of FP transport and release during normal operation,
to identify the occurrenses of the unusual events clearly, and to
foreca~te the potential hazards reasonably and updatedly.
INTRODUCTION
High power levels and fuel exposures of modern nuclear reactor power plants
have resulted in co re inventories that may exceed 10 billion curries (Ci) of
radioactive material, and the potentially severe consequences of the release of a
major part of them are serious problems that must be addressed if nuclear reactors
are to be used successfully as a large-scale source of power for the near future.
During normal operation of NPPs, a major part of the FP inventories is
retained in the core and the very small fractions of them escape to the primary
system. The radioactive materials in the primary system then escape to the
secondary system and/or to the reactor containment and the major part of them 1s
removed by the purification systems. The radioactive materials cannot, however,
disappear in the plants except for radioactive decay, and when an unusual event
will happen, all of them may become the source terms of the environment. As the
occurrence of an unusual event may be hardly forecasted, we must be prepared for
it.
Various kinds of man/machine systems in NPPs have been proposed and developed
after Three Miles Island Accident. These systems can be described as computer-
based information processing systems which take in plant data, analyze the plant
dynamics, estimate the resulting damage to fission product barriers, and display
the results to the NPP's operating crew to help their control of the plant.
A monitoring and diagnostic system (MADS) of FP transport and release in NPPs
has been proposed, and our primary objective of MADS is to monitor the distribution
of the radioactive FP and to diagnose the plant state in the view of FP transport
during the NPP's lifetime. MADS can provide the NPP's operating crew with the
information of the dynamic distribution of the whole radioactive FPs at all times,
and in case of an unusual event, these informations may become the accurate
initial conditions for the evaluation of the radiological consequences.1•2)
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FP TRANSPORT IN NPP
PWR plants are chosen to simulate FP transport and release in our study and
the computerized simulation code "SACHET" have been developed, in which PWR plants
are devided into fifty compartments. The multiple compartment system as shown in
Table I, cannot describe the phenomena in PWR plants completely, but it is enough
for the simulation of the major phenomena. The radioactive FPs in MADS and SACHET
are shown in Table 11. The radioactive FPs which are removed from one compartment,
are always transported into another compartment. Therefore compartments such as
purification system, filtration system, and reactor containment wall are considered.
Table I Multiple Compartment System in MADS and SACHET
1 Reaetor Core
2 Primary Coolant System
3 Purification Demineralizer
4 Boron Recovery Demineralizer
5 Holdup Tank
6 Boron Recovery System
7 Boron Condensate Demineralizer
B Sampie Tank
9 CVC Tank (liquid)
10 CVC Tank (gas)
11 Hydrogen Reeombiner System (gas)
12 Hydrogen Reeombiner System (liquid)
13 Continuous Off-gas Tank
14 Gas Oeeay Tank
15 Pressurlzer Relief Tank
16 Reaetor Coolant Drain Tank
17 Auxiliary Coolant Drain Tank
18 Auxiliary Building Equipment Drain
19 Equipment Drain Holdup Tank
20 Equipment Drain Evaporation System
21 Equipment Drain Condensate Oemineralizer
22 Equipment Drain Sampie Tank
23 Reaetor Containment Sump
24 Reaetor Building
25 Auxiliary 8uilding Sump
26 Auxiliary Building
27 Flbor Drain Holdup Tank
28 Floor Drain Evaporation System
29 Floor Drain Condensate Oeminerali,er
3D Floor Drain Sampie Tank
31 Reaetor Containment Annulus
32 Turbine Building Sump
33 Turbine Building
34 Seeondary Coolant System (liquid)
35 Seeondary Coolant System (gas)
36 Main Steam Condenser
37 Codensate Oemineralizer
38 Seeondary Coolant Blowdown System
39 Seeondary Coolant Blowdown Condenser
40 PCA Filter
41 Containment Air Cleanup System
42 Filter Unit
43 lodine Filter
44 Annulus Air Cleanup System
45 Reaetor Containment Wall
46 Oemineralizer Was te Tank
47 Boron Condensed Tank
4B Waste Evaporation Condensed Tank
49 Environment (liquid)
50 Environment (gas)
Table 11 Radioactive Nuclides in MADS and SACHET
Br 83 84m 84 85
Kr 83m 85m 85 87 88 89
Rb 86m 86 87 89
Sr 89 90
Y 90m 90 91m 91
Te 129m 129 132
I 129 131 132 133 134 135
Xe 131m 133m 133 135m 135 137 138
es 134m 134 135 136 137 138
Ba 140
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Equations of The Multiple Compartment Model
As the flow terms assurne uniform mixing within each cornpartment, the changes
of FP inventories are described by a set of equations of the form:
dC,/dt=~H, ,C,+A'C:+P*U (1)
1 J 1J J 1
where C, =inventories of nuclide C in compartment
H~ ,=transport coefficient of nuclide C from compartment to compartment
1J
Hii=-l:Hii-A
A =decay constant of nuclide C
C! =inventories of mather nuclide CI in compartrnent i
A} =decay constant of mother nuclide C'
P =constant according to the thermal power and fission yield
U =1 if compartment i is the core fuel
o in other cases







H t,(;H t +", )CO,(t'-2Ht +(;H t + ... )"(A 'CÜ+P"U) (2)
As the estimation of the whole FP core inventories needs a relatively large
computer code such as ORIGEN, and a lang computational time, FP co re inventory
matrix is used in SACHET, which is previously calculated by ORIGEN code.
In normal operation, operating fower equilibrium FP source term and FP escape
rate coefficient are used in SACHET. )
Iodi,ne spiking phenomena after the reactor shutdmm are considered in SAGHET,
in which original empirical model obtained by the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell method,
using the data of the experiments in OWL-1 in-pile loop of JMTR, is used. The
model i5 a nonlinear funetian with such variables as reactor power, fuel burnup,
FP inventories, and changes of linear heat rate,coolant temperature, and coolant
pressure ,4)
In case of further fuel defect, from gap release to core explosion, the
release fractions of the core inventories are referred to the data from Refs.5&6.
Transport Coefficient
Transport coefficients of the matrix H are defined by the several system
parameters of NPP, such as decontamination faetor, filter efficiency, partition
factor, etc., which are summarized as foliows.
Purification system i (decontamination factor DF) FI(j-i),FO(i-l)
H, ,=(FI-FO/DF)/V" Hl,=O, and Hl,=FO/DF/V, (3)
1J J 1 J J
Filtration system i (filter efficiency EF) G(j-i,i-l)
Hij=EF*G/V
j










Schematic flow diagrams of MADS and SACHET, and the interrelation of them
are given in Fig. 1. The software of HADS consists of codes as fallows,
Data Input
In the proeess of data input, three kinds of data set are took in, plant
process data, contra 1 data, and radio1ogical data. Proeess data such as tempera-
tures, pressures, flow rates, etc. are used to determine the transport coefficients.
Contra 1 data such as valve open/close, pump on/off, etc. are used to recognize

























Diagnosis of The Plant Condition
I










Evaluation of The Potential
t=t+dt: Release, Off-Site Consequence
1-,-_____ -~~--- Display of The Results
NADS
Fig. Schematic Flow Diagrams and Interrelation of NADS and SACHET
Radiological data are monitored after evaluating them, and those values are
compared at the next diagnosis phase.
The equations to be solved are the ones described in the previous chapter, and
the solution of them is also given previously. Numerical approximation is adopted
in NADS by the truncation of the third order matrix, and this approximation is
valid for the product of t by the norm of the matrix H is small.
Diagnosis of The Plant State
Example plant conditions of FP transport in NADS are shown in Table 111,
where the damages to the FP barriers are summarized.
Table 111 Example Conditions of FP Transport in NADS
Class I Normal Unusual Alert
I o eration Event
Fuel Damage I -0.25% 0.17,(30 min) min)
I




Steam Line I I"ith SG Leak
Break I 25kg/min
SG Leak lvi th I








The monitored radiological data, in some cases the activities of the mixture
of the radiological nuclides are measured, such as inventory vector of the
reference radioactive nuclide, and the estimated value of it are used to diagnose
the plant condition and to identify the occurrenCe by the pattern recognition
method. The threshold of each condition is given by the results of SACHET.
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Adjustment of The System Parameters
At the estimation phase of MADS and SACHET, there are a lot of system parame-
ters which are defined approximately, and according to the experiences of the
plant operation, such values as decontamination factors have varied widely with the
plant operation. These parameters can be adapted properly at the adjustment phase
of MADS using the following asymptotic equations.
A functional of the system parameter x and measured data C is defined as
follows.
(6)
where C is the estimated data using the system parameter x, and gi~is the factor
of the values and errata of C and C. At the time step n, the data C is measured,
and system parameter is adjusted according to the equations.
x[n,m]=x[n,m_l]+r[m]Eg.{c.[n]_c.[n,x[n,m_1]]lac[n~x[n,m-1]](7)




The system parameters adjusted at this step are:
(1) common parameters: failed fuel rate, leak rate from the primary coolant to the
containment, leak rate from the primary to the sacondary coolant,
(2) elementary parameters: leak rate with cladding failure, removal rate by sprays
or natural deposition, transportcoefficient with evaporation, and
(3) parameters of every nuclide: decontamination factor of demineralizer, stripping
factor of CVC tank, etc.
These parameters are drawn up from the fuel to the environment, from the
common to the individual, and from the inert gas to the particle, for the
adjustment in sequence.
Estimation of The Unmonitored FP Distribution and The Potential Releases
At this step unmonitored FP distributions are evaluated using the adjusted
transport coefficient matrixes.
In an unusual event, the FP distribution after long period can be evaluated
and especially in case of a rare occurrence, the potential release in addition to
a loss of one of three FP barriers is also evaluated.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Normal Operation
The estimated radioactive FP inventories during normal oper.tion are shown in
Table IV. These evaluations are based on the fuel burnup 19800 ~n,D/UMt, 0.25%
failed fuel, and other operating parameters. During normal opration, as the FP
leakage from the fuel to the primary coolant is very small, the quasi-steady
condition is considered in the multiple compartment system, and the inventories are
evaluated on the ratio of the sour ce terms to the rates of removal by radioactive
decay, purification, and leakage. These values have been used as the initial
conditions of the following calculations.
The results show that the consideration of the fission decay chain and the
source terms of the mother nuclide decay is not negligible. In case of alkali
metals such as Cs and Rb, the greater parts of their inventories are derived from
the decay of their mother nuclides. There are a lot of NPPs, whose radioactivity
monitoring systems adopt Cs-137 as the reference radioactive nuclide;) and the
analysis of the transport of it to the monitoring system in consideration of the
fission decay chain is necessary.
Change of System Parameters
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2.72 5.79 1.66 1.25 9.32 3.00 3.48 6.22 1.71 7.80 1.88 2.919.67 5.75
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9.11 1.57 2.95 7.97 1.04 1.05 6.06 9.77 7.92 7.98 1.57 1.049.90 1.10















Gas deeay tank 5.76 1.40 1.60 1.769.28 1.65 2.40 3.80 6.33 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
















Waste holdup 7.55 3.58 7.61 1.19 1.02 1.81 2.394.156.974.14 1.00 1.87 3.56 7.59


















2.203.77 7.03 2.54 7.23 5.48 1.97 3.73 1.40 5.71 1.72 1.037.07 2.66



















6.21 1.07 2.02 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.86 3.29 1.62 3.54 7.51 0.0














19800 MWO/UMT, 0.25% failed fuel
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As MADS is not installed in an actual NPP yet, the validity of the software
of MADS is tested in combination with SAGHET code.
Some results are shown in Table V (GASE I - VIII), where several parameters
are changed at the first step of calculation (t~O.O), and in GASE V - VIII,
reactor has been stopped at the third step of calculation (t~20.0). The adjustment
of the system parameters are not shown in Table V explicitly, however, in the use
of theequations (7), (8), and (9), the numbers of iteration mare only three or
four in most cases as shown in Fig. 2 (a).
In GASE land 11, where fuel cladding failures are increased by the rate of
0.l%/30min as shown in Table 111 (unusual event), the increases of the fuel
failure are identified at the first step of the adjustment, and only the
inventory of each element in the primary coolant is necessary for the adjustment.
In GASE 111 and V, where the primary coolant leaks to the reactor containment,
at the rates of 2.5kg/min and l25kg/min respectively, as shown in Table 111, the
leak rates are adjusted by the monitored data of the inventories of inert gas in
the reactor containment. The partition factor of iodine in GASE V is adjusted
after the adjustment of the leak rate, by the monitored data of the inventories
of iodine in the reactor containment.
In GASE IV and VI, where the primary coolant leaks through SC to the
secondary coolant, at the rates of l250kg/day and l250kg/min respectively, as
shown in Table 111, the SC leak rates are adjusted by the monitored data of inert
gas in the primary coolant and the secondary coolant(gas).
In GASE VII and VIII, where both the primary and secondary coolant leak at
the nearly same time, the two leak rates are adjusted by the monitored data of
the inventories in the primary and secondary coolant and the turbine bUilding.
The convergency of the parameter estimations are not so good as compared with the
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Fig. 2 Adjustment of the system parameters by MADS
Bypass Factor
In case of steam line break, transport coefficient from the second compartment
to the third compartment (R
2
) is larger than that from the first compartment to
the second compartment (R
l
), where those compartments have become in astate of
transient equilibrium, in a short time. As ,FP increase in the third compartment
(turbine bUilding) has been propotional to the inventori~s of the first compartment
(primary coolant), the transport coefficient from the first compartment to the
third compartment (H
3l
) has been significant, and the value of it is as foliows.
1
H3l~:zRl*(R2-Rl)*t (10)
In similar cases of the purification system and the filtration system, bypass





Table V FP Inventories after The Change of The System Parameters
CASE I (CIadding Failure)
t~O. 0; 5. 56*E-07 / sec
Halogen t~o.O t~IOO.O t~200.0 t~300. 0 sec
Primary Coolant 2. 96*E +02 8. 98*E+02 1.49*E+03 2.07*E+03 Ci
CVC Tank 1.03*E+00 1.12*E+00 1.40*E+00 1. 84*E+00
Reactor Building 2.45*E-05 2.60*E-05 3.05*E-05 3.76*E-05
Inert Gas
Primary Coolant 7.74*E+03 8.85*E+03 g. B7*E+03 1. 08*E+04 Ci
CVC Tank 2.67*E+02 2.67*E+02 2.70*E+02 2.75*E+02
Reactor Building 8.78*E-02 B.81*E-02 8. B8*E-02 9.00*E-02
Particle
Primary Coolant 5.76*E+OI 6.63*E+02 1.26*E+03 I. B3*E+03 Ci
CVC Tank 3.41*E-OI 5.58*E-OI 1.17*E+00 2.39*E+00
Reactor Building 4.54*E-05 4.66*E-05 5.44*E-05 7.26*E-05
CASE !I (Cladding Failure - No Decay Chain)
t~D.O; 5. 56*E-07 / sec
Halogen t~O. 0 t-IOO.O t-200.0 t-300.0 sec
Primary Coolant 2. 96*E+02 8. 98*E+02 1.49*E+03 2.07*E+03 Ci
CVC Tank 1.03*E+00 1.12*E+00 1. 40*E +00 1.84*E+00
Reactor Building 2.45*E-05 2.60*E-05 3.05*E-05 3.76*E-05
Inert Gas
Primary Coolant 7.63*E+03 8.75*E+03 9.76*E+03 1. 07*E+04 Ci
CVC Tank 2.63*E+02 2.64*E+02 2.67*E+D2 2. 72*E +02
Reactor Building 8.65*E-02 8.68*E-D2 8.76*E-02 B. B7*E-02
Particle
Primary Coolant 2.77*E+OI 6.24*E+02 1.19*E+03 1.74*E+03 Ci
CVC Tank 1.62*E-OI 3.70*E-OI 9.60*E-OI 1. 85*E+00
Reactor 8uilding 1.91*E-08 3.44*E-08 7.73*E-08 1.44*E-07
CASE !II ( Primary Coolant Leak)
t-O.O; 4.167*E-05 ton/ sec
Halogen t~O. 0 t-IOO.O t~200.0 t-300.0 sec
Reactor Building 2.45*E-05 5.67*E-04 1.08*E-03 1.55*E-03 Ci
Inert Gas
Reactor Building 8.78*E-02 2.31*E-OI 3.68*E-OI 4.98*E-OI Ci
Particle
Reactor Building 4.54*E-05 5.61*E-05 8.45*E-05 1. 26*E-04 Ci
CASE IV (SG Leak)
t-O.O ; 1.447*E-05 ton/sec
Halogen t-O .0 t~IOO.O t-200.D t-30D.0 sec
Secondary Coolant(l ) 7.11*E-04 2.30*E-03 3.76*E-03 5.10*E-03 Ci
Secondary Coolant(g) 1. D7*E-05 2.54*E-04 4.76*E-04 6.78*E-04
Inert Gas
Secondary Coolant(l ) 4.37*E-07 7.88*E-07 1. 52*E-06 2.53*E-06 Ci
Secondary Coolant(g) 2.82*E-03 3.76*E-02 5.45*E-D2 6.26*E-02
Particle
Secondary Coolant(l) 2.43*E-03 2.78*E-03 3.13*E-03 3.47*E-03 Ci
Secondary Coolant(g) 1.46*E-06 5.16*E-D6 9.58*E-06 1. 29*E~05
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Table V (continued)
CASE V (Primary Coolant Leak)
t"O. 0; 2.08*E-03 ton/ sec
0.2 (Iodine Partition Factor in Reaetor 8uilding)
t"20.0; shutdown
Halogen t"O.O t"100.0 t~200.0 t~300. 0 sec
Reaetor 8uilding 2.45*E-05 5.40*E-02 1.04*E-Ol 1.51*E-Ol Ci
Inert Gas
Reaetor 8uilding 8.78*E-02 7.23*E+00 1. 40*E +01 2.05*E+Ol Ci
Particle
Reactor 8uilding 4.54*E-05 5.63*E-04 1.87*E-03 3.66*E-03 Ci
CASE VI (SG Leak)
t~o. 0; 2.08*E-02 ton/sec
t~20.0; shutdown
Halogen t~O. 0 t~100.0 t~200. 0 t"300.0 sec
Seeondary Coolant(l) 7.11*E-04 2.39*E+00 4.55*E+00 6.52*E+00 Ci
Secondary Coolant(g} 1.07*E-05 2.91*E-Ol 5.81*E-Ol 8.50*E-Ol
Turbine 8uilding 9.75*E-07 3.11*E-05 1. 22*E-04 2.72*E-04
Inert Gas
Secondary Coolant( I) 4.37*E-07 4.99*E-04 1. 58*E-03 2.84*E-03 Ci
Seeondary Coolant( g) 2. 82*E -03 5.21*E+Ol 7.72*E+Ol 8.94*E+Ol
Turbine 8uilding 4.31*E-04 6.54*E-03 2.04*E-02 3.79*E-02
Particle
Seeondary Coolant(l) 2.43*E-03 5.36*E-Ol 1.04*E+00 1. 53*E+00 Ci
Seeondary Coolant(g) 1.46*E-06 3.67*E-03 8.81*E-03 1. 23*E-02
Turbine 8uilding 3.33*E-08 3.32*E-07 2.00*E-06 5.38*E-06
CASE VII (Steam Line 8reak with SG Leak)
t~O.O ; 3.62*E-02 ton/sec (Steam Release)
4.17*E-04 ton/sec (SG Leak)
t"20.0; shutdol~n
Halogen t~o. 0 t~100.0 t"200.0 t=300.0 sec
Seeondary Coolant(l ) 7.11*E-04 4.84*E-02 9.15*E-02 1.31*E-Ol Ci
Seeondary Coolant(g) 1.07*E-05 5.82*E-03 1. 15*E-02 1. 69*E-02
Turbine 8uilding 9.75*E-07 4.20*E-05 1. 67*E-04 3.73*E-04
Inert Gas
Seeondary Coolant(l) 4.37*E-07 1.04*E-05 3.18*E-05 5.63*E-05 Ci
Seeondary Coolant(g) 2.82*E-03 1. 03*E+00 1.51*E+00 1.72*E+OO
Turbine 8uilding 4.31*E-04 8.67*E-03 2.73*E-02 5.10*E-02
Particle
Seeondary Coolant(l) 2.43*E-08 1.31*E-02 2.32*E-02 3.30*E-02 Ci
Seeondary Coolant(g) 1.46*E-06 7.51*E-05 1.74*E-04 2.38*E-04
Turbine 8uilding 3.33*E-08 4.40*E-07 2.70*E-06 7.24*E-06
CASE VIII (SG Leak with Off-Site Power Down)
t~O.O; 2.08*E-03 ton/sec (SG Leak)
2.91*E-02 ton/sec (Steam Oump)
t=20.0; shutdown
Halogen t~O .0 t~100.0 t~200.0 t=300.0 sec
Seeondary Coolant( l) 7.11*E-04 2.40*E-Ol -4.55*E-Ol 6.51*E-Ol Ci
Seeondary Coolant(g) 1.07*E-05 2.90*E-02 5.77*E-02 8./t4*E~02
Turbine 8uilding 9.75*E-07 1. 65*E-04 6.63*E-04 1.49*E-03
Inert Gas
Seeondary Coolant(l) 4.37*E-07 5.02*E-05 1. 58*E-04 2.80*E-04 Ci
Seeondary Coolant(g) 2.82*E-03 5.17*E+00 7.59*E+00 8.68*E+00
Turbine 8uilding 4.31*E-04 3.34*E-02 1.09*E-Ol 2.34*E-Ol
Particle
Seeondary Coolant( l) 2.43*E-08 5.57*E-02 1.07*E-Ol 1. 55*E-Ol Ci
Seeondary Coolant( g) 1. 46*E-06 3.66*E-04 8.64*E-04 1. 19*E-03








In such cases as steam line break and large LOCA, monitoring the second
compartment has not become essential.
Computational Time
The software of MADS is not so simple as to perform the real time operation
by a process (mini) computer, even though computational time is shorter than
real time in the Use of M-280H. To shorten it, the software of MADS have been
tuned for the vector calculation, and the ratio of it becomes less than 0.3 as
compared with the scalar calculation. Process computer with an array processer
can realize the real time operation of MADS.
CONCLUSION
Computerized code "SACHET" which simulates the dynamical FP transport and
release in PWR plant has been developed, and the software of MADS has been
studied, and the effectiveness of MADS is shown in this study.
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ABSTRACT
The modular core melt system KESS-2 is being developed to analyze
the course of severe accidents. The major volatile fission pro-
ducts are released during the early phase of the meltdown accident
and transported through the primary system into the containment.
The fission product decay and release is modeled by the module
FIPREM-2 of KESS-2.
The code is coupled to the transient thermalhydraulic and
core models. The results are then fed into the transport code
TRAP-MELT.
The model FIPREM-2, its validation and the results of the
KESS-2 analysis will be described with respect to the fission
product release and transport for different accident scenarios.
INTRODUCTION
The core meltdown system KESS-2 is being developed in order to analyze
the course of severe accidents in light water reactors 11/. The main objec-
tives of the KESS-2 modeling are the following:
• Provide activity and aerosol source terms during severe
accidents for the risk assessment.
• In depth analYsis of the course of severe accident pheno-
me na and the physical processes involved.
• Analysis of experiments in the severe fuel/core damage area
and extrapolation to reactor conditions.
• Identification of key phenomena and operator actions to
terminate accidents.
Since one of the major objectives of severe accident analysis with KESS-2 is
to determine the space and time dependent release of fission products to
the environment, the physical processes which significantly influence the
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fission product release will be modeled and coupled adequately in KESS-2.
The current concept of KESS-2 and the modular programs are shown in Fig. 1.
Investigations based on a 2F-LOCA indicate, that almost all fission products
were retained in the containment, if the containment failed due to overpres-
surization a few days after the initiation of the accident /2/. Assuming a
prior leak in the safety building (FK2-FK4 in the German Risk Study /3/)
and/or a small break in the primary system, the major fission products may
be released continuously from the containment. The major volatile fission
products are released during the early phases of the meltdown accident
(Phases 1 - 3, in-vessel phenomena). Thus, the transport and deposition of
fission products in the primary system are strongly coupled to the thermal-
hydraulics and the core heatup and slumping phenomena until failure of the
pressure vessel.
FISSION PRODUCT RELEASE MODELING IN KESS-2
Fig. 2 shows the modeling approach of the fission product and aerosol
release within KESS-2 and the connection to other KESS-2 models the dashed
lines indicate, that only a weak coupling exists.
The inventory of the nuclides considered is required as input at the
beginning of the accident. Such an information may be contributed by the
ORIGEN code.
The space and time dependent temperatures in the fuel rods and structu-
re are provided by the MELSIM3 and LUECKE3 code systems of KESS-2. In MELSIM
and LUECKE the geometry is represented in a two-dimensional geometry.
The module FIPREM-2 models the fission product decay and release from
the fuel rods and structural materials within the reactor pressure vessel.
In spite of the uncertainties in the experimental results, a rate type
equation is assumed. The model considers the space dependency of the tempe-
ratures, the reduction of local heat sources and the redistribution of fuel
rod material due to the slumping fuel rods within the two dimensional geo-
metry.
However, the complex chemical behavior of the released fission products
is not weIl understood, but under investigation elsewhere /4/.
It is assumed that the released fission products are not retained in
the core region. The transport through the steam line of the primary system
(e.g. pipes and components) is modeled by the TRAP-MELT code. The code re-
quires the mass flow rates and temperatures of the flowing steam and the
temperatures on the piping walls. These data are provided by the primary
system module PRIMOD of KESS-2.
The releases from the primary system into the containment are input for
the aerosol behavior codes, like the NAUA code /5/. The thermodynamic state
in the containment is modeled by the codes COCMEL or ASTRO of KESS-2.
The main features of the fission product release and transport modeling
in KESS-2 can be summarized as foliows:
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• Time and space dependent concentration and activities for
an arbitrary nurnber of nuclides, its decay and build-up.
• Release of fission products from the core and structural
material based on measured release rates (coupling to the
core behavior codes in KESS-2).
• Transport through and deposition of aerosols in the primary
system (coupling to thermalhydraulics).
• Aerosol behavior in the containment (coupling to contain-
ment codes).
• Easy updating in the view of physical and experimental
insights.
• Validation of the code by parts.
• Easily adaptable to experimental conditions.
APPLICATIONS
In order to demonstrate the sensitivity of temperature uncertainties
on the release fractions of J, the module FIPREM-2 has been applied to an
experiment perforrned by Albrecht /6/. The release rates were derived from
experimental da ta taken from Fig. 3 /7/ (dashed lines). Based on the tempe-
rature history shown in Fig. 4, the accumulated release fractions with re-
lease rates basing on SASCHA experiments and the proposed NUREG-0772 were
applied. It should be mentioned that the release rates are based on diffe-
rent experimental conditions and have not been corrected to achieve the same
results. The results shown in Fig. 4 demonstrate that it is not sufficient
to model the temperature dependency of the relea~e rates only. One should
additionally at least consider burn-up and geometric conditions. The sensi-
tivity of a +/- 100 K deviation in the temperatures is shown to be less
important compared to the influence of the fuel burn-up, for instance.
with respect to the fission product release and transport models in
KESS-2 various accident scenarios have been investigated. A disadvantage to
date is the lack in modeling the chemical behavior of significant radioac-
tive isotopes. This part will be incorporated in the future /4/. The advan-
tages of the analysis are,
• Determination of the fission product and structural material
release on a best estimate basis.
• Information about the reduction of heat sources in the core cal-
culations.
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• Coupling to sophisticated codes with respect to thermalhy-
draulics, containment and care behavior.
• Continuous analysis starting at the initiation of the accident.
• Capability of validating the codes on a stand-alone basis.
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ABSTRACT
As part of a study aimed at the evaluation and improvement of the
performance of HEPA filters under possible accident conditions, the struc-
tural limits and flow resistances of commercial and prototypical filter
units, during exposure to high air velocities, were investigated.
Full-size, clean and preloaded, unused filters were exposed to air
flows with differential pressures up to 28 kPa and filter-entrance veloci-
ties up to 35 m/s, at ambient temperatures and relative humidities.
Test results include the range of average differential pressures at
which present-day commercial HEPA filters can be expected to fail, 4 - 23
kPa, as weIl as the flow-resistance data required for input to computer
codes Ilsed in safety analysis. Test results are applicable to the design,
safety analysis, and licensing of nuclear facilities.
INTRODUCTION
The High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters within the
air-cleaning systems of nuclear facili tie's form part of the barrier bet-
ween contaminated zones and the ambient environment. Protection of human
health frOln the effects of airborne radioactive material relies upon an
effective air-cleaning process, not only during normal operation but par-
ticularly dllring accident situations. A loss of coolant, a fire, or a tor-
nado depressurization could challenge HEPA filters at their service loca-
tions with high differential pressure, high flow rate, high telnperature,
or high relative humidity. Nechanical stresses within the filter medium
can be expected to occur, followed by possible loss of effective filtra-
tion or release of previously captured particulate. Contingent upon acci-
dent type and scenario, these challenges could be imposed individually or
in combination, i.e., superimposed. A Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA), for
example, could superimpose all of the above challenges on filters in ser-
vice.
The amount of radioactive material released to the environment via
an air-cleaning system during an accident situation is in part determined
by the resultant behavior of the filters. To investigate this behavior,
other authors have exposed HEPA filters to conditions that simulate the
effects of a number cf accident types /1-9/.
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These studies provide general, though sometimes restricted orientation
toward the evaluation of HEPA-filter behavior during individual challenges
to filter performance. Often, the number~, the manufacturers, and the
designs of the filters tested have been limited. In addition, tests have
been performed almost exclusively with new filter units. Limits in
filter-performance characteristics have not always been discussed within the
context of possible improvements to such characteristics, e.g., maximum dif-
ferential pressure, flow resistance, filtration efficiency, dust holding ca-
pacity, and resistance to the effects of exposure to moisture, high tempera-
ture, or shock waves.
Reported on here are the results of a first step toward goals of
evaluating the performance of commercial HEPA filters under individual and
superimposed challenges, and improving filter performance where considered
necessary. A third objective is to obtain the experimental data required for
numerical simulations of transient flows in air-cleaning systems. In addi-
tion to the structural limits, the failure mechanisms, and the flow resist-
ance characteristics of HEPA filters at room temperatures and humidities,
some relevant improvements in structural limit and flow resistance are dis-
cussed.
STRUCTURAL TESTS
Effective HEPA filtration depends first of all upon preservation of
the structural integrity of the filter medium. Hence, the differential pres-
sure (bP) at rupture of the medium in a HEPA filter is an important
criterion of filter performance. Filter structural failure can be defined to
occur with the first visible rupture in the glass-fiber medium that normally
has a thickness of 0.5 mm. The differential pressure associated with this
initial failure is then designated as the structural limit of the filter.
Structural limits were determined by subjecting each test filter to a
differential pressure pulse, of up to 28 kPa in magnitude and for as long as
5 s in duration, by the use of compressed air and a blowdown test facility
/3, 10/. During these structural tests, the differential pressure and struc-
tural failure were recorded by an oscillograph chart recorder and a high
speed camera, respectively. All tests including the flow-resistance tests
described below were conducted at air temperatures of < 40 °c and relative
humidities of < 60 %.
FLOW-RESISTANCE TESTS
The flow-resistance curve of a filter describes filter differential
pressure as a function of flow rate or average air velocity at the filter
entrance. HEPA-filter flow resistances are relevant for two reasons. Compu-
ter codes /11-12/ that numerically simulate transient flows in air-cleaning
systems require these functions in order to model filter differential pres-
sures and flow rates under accident conditions. Secondly, the mechanical
stresses in a filter pack are proportional to the differential pressure and
hence related to the flow rate by the flow-resistance function. Desirable,
low mechanical stresses at high flow rates depend upon low differential
pressure and thus are to be obtained with filters which have flow
resistances characterized by flat, rather than steep curves.
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Flow-resistance tests of HEPA filters were performed at conditions of
quasi-steady flow and at differential pressures of up to 20 kPa with the sa-
me 'test facility employed for the structural tests. From each filter type to
be structurally tested, one filter was exposed to a sequence of about 10
different flow rat~s, while the flow and pressure data needed to generate a
flow-resistance curve were registered with achart recorder. The duration of
a test was usually less than 30 s.
TEST FILTERS
The majority of filters tested were 610x610x292-mm commercial units
that represent 3 current designs from the major European and American manu-
facturers. A closely related group included similar units that had been
factory modified by reinforcement of the glass-fiber medium. In a third test
category were 2 types of prototypical filters with filter medium of metal
fiber and polycarbonate microfiber, respectively. A few commercial units in
standard sizes smaller than 610x610x292-mm were also evaluated. All test
filters were new and some had been preloaded with particulates during expo-
sure to air flows containing a polystyrene-latex (PSL) aerosol with a count
median geometrie diameter of some 0.3 ~m.
STRUCTURAL-TEST RESULTS
Relevant to filter structural performance under high differential
pressure are measures of performance as weIl as parameters that influence
this performance. Additionally of interest are methods by which performance
can be improved. Structural limit as weIl as the progressive structural
damage that follows initial structural failure are two measures of perfor-
mance. Parameters with potential influence include the design, the
manufacturer, and the size of the filter, and also the presence of
particulate loading. Filter structural performance can be improved by
modifications to current designs or development of new, less conventional
designs.
In Table I are listed the location and the ßp range of structural
failure for clean HEPA filters of 3 current commercial designs. A total of
72 test filters from 8 manufacturers are represented here. The ßP range of
average failures in the fourth column,is a quantitative measure of the dif-
ferential pressures, on the average, which will cause structural failure for
a given filter design. The parameter responsible for the width in the ranges
is filter manufacturer, since the averages were calculated for groups of
filters based upon manufacturer. For example, from the first design listed,
the value of 11 kPa is the average differential pressure at structural fail-
ure for five filters from one manufacturer and correspondingly, 23 kPa is
the value of the same parameter for 4 filters from another manufacturer.
Average values by manufacturer, for other tested filters of this design,
fall within these two bounds. In addition to an average structural limit,
each group of filters also has an associated standard deviation. The average
standard deviation for each of the designs listed, from 'first to third,
respectiverly, is 12, 7; and 12 %. Because the values of Table I are ave-
rages, some failures at both somewhat lower and somewhat higher ßp's than
those listed, can be expected.
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Table I: Structural limits for 3 Designs of Commercial
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An additional, yet qualitative measure which can be used to compare
the performance of the 3 filter designs, is how quickly and to what extent
structural damage progresses after the initial structural failure. The abil-
ity to qualify filter performance on this basis is made possible by further
analysis of the same high-speed films which were taken of the downstream
side of the test filters and used to establish the initial structural fail-
ures. Study of the films shows that each of the 3 commercial filter designs
typically exhibits a different mode of progression in structural damage.
These modes relate in part to the respective locations of'structural failure
in the filter, listed in the third column of Table I. \
For deep-pleat filters with a wooden frame, initial failure typically
occurs as the result of a 2-4 cm rupture in one of several swollen folds of
medium on the downstream side of the filter /13/. Damage usually progresses
relatively slowly byan increase in length of the original rupture, up to as
much as 40 cm, and/or by additional rupture in a second or third swollen
fold. Even after exposure to maximum 6P's approx. 5 kPa greater than those
at initial failure, generally > 99 %of the filter medium remained intact,
as shown typically in Fig. 1. The tensile strength of the glass-fiber medium
has been implicated as the point of weakness for this design /3,10,14/.
The relatively low structural limit as weIl as the early occurrence of
catastroghic failure in deep-pleat filters with a metal frame, for service
at >120 C, is mostly attributed to the lack of adhesive between pack and
frame /10/. Visible failure begins with horizontal lines of small ruptures
in the downstream folds of the medium. This is followed suddenly by ejection
of the entire filter pack from the frame at 6P's less than about 1 kPa grea-
ter than those of initial failure. Essentially no medium remains in the
frame as illustrated in Fig. 2.
The structural limits as weIl as the extent of progressive damage for
the mini-pleat filters with multiple panels mounted in 'V' configurations,
lie between those of the two designs described above. Initial failure
typically begins when the downstream edge of a swollen medium panel shears
at the vertical sheet-metal rib to which it is glued /10/. Progressive
damage spreads relatively quickly with failure of other panels, as the 6P
increases. The lack of structural support for the medium panels is
responsible for this failure type. Mini-pleat filters exposed to maximum
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ßP's of approx. 5 kPa greater than those at initial failure generally re-
tained about 50 %of the filter medium intact as indicated typically in Fig.
3. Such damage reduces the removal efficiency to essentially zero.
Fig. 1: Damage' to a Deep-Plea t Wooden-
Frame Filter After ISP of 18 kPa.
Fig. 2: Damage to a Deep-Pleat Metal-
Frame Filter After ßP of 6 kPa.
Fig. 3: Damage to a Mini-Pleat Wooden-
Frame Filter After ßP of 20 kPa.
Other parameters which showed some influence on the structural limits
for the filter design with deep pleats, aluminium separators, and wooden
frame, were filter cross section, filter depth, and particulate loading. As
shown in Table 11 for filters of the same depth with two different cross
sections, and from both of two manufacturers, structural limits increased
with decreases in filter cross section. Increases are also seen for filters
with the 305x305-mm cross section for a decrease in filter depth. But with
the same decrease in depth for filters with the 610x610-mm cross section, a
decrease in stTuctural limit is evident.
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Tahle 11: Variation of the Structural Limits with Filter
Cross Section and Depth; for New Conunercial Deep-
Pieat Wooden-Frame Clean HEPA Filters.
Filter Size Average Break Pressure 6P J
Standard Deviation a,
and Number of Tests n.
Fil ter Type A Filter Type C
Cross Section Depth 6P a n 6P a n
(mm x mm) (mm) (kPa) (%) (Ea. ) (kPa) (%) (Ea.)
610x610 150 10 14 3 13 27 3
610x610 292 13 5 4 23 17 4
305x305 150 26 2 7 25 6 5
305x305 292 17 11 8 24 7 8
The 610x610x150-mm size is characterized not only by the lowest struc-
tural limit but also by a catastrophic initial failure of the pack /13/,
rather than the localized initial failure of folds in the medium, as is the
case for the other three sizes. Both the early catastrophic failure and the
relatively low llpts that cause it, may be attributed to higher structural
stresses in the pack due to geometry. If the pack is modeled as an average
thickness plate under a distributed load, a geometric ratio proportional to
the maximum stresses in the pack is pack cross-sectional area divided by the
square of pack depth /15/. For the 610x610x150-mm size this ratio is greater
than those of the other three sizes, by factors of between 4 and 20. The
suceptibility to failure of the pack as a whole is, for any givenllP,
greatest for this size.
Not yet clear is why the highest structural limits appear for filters
with a 150-mm depth, i.e., those with the 305x305-mm cross section. This may
be attributed to changes, with pack depth, in the not-yet-defined
distributions of air flow and pressure within the pack at high air veloci-
ties. Or, another possibility is that of a more stable pack in this size,
due to geometry or manufacturing processes. These possibilities would be
applicable for the localized initial failure in medium folds, not the
catastrophic failure of the 610x610x150-mm size.
The effect of apreload of PSL, to a llP of 1 kPa at rated flow, on the
structural limits of filters with deep pleats and wooden frame was to incre-
ase structural limits by an average of < 10 %. This compares with average
decreases of 14 %and 40 %, respectively, for deep-pleat filters with metal
frame and one type of mini-pleat filter. Taken altogether the results indi-
cate a slight trend toward lower structural limits due to apreload with
PSL.
The structural limits of the filters listed in Table 111 illustrate
the results of several approaches taken to improve filter design. First
noted are the results of several respective reinforcements of the filter me-
dium that show an increase in the structural limits for one filter type of
one manufacturer; from 11 to 23 kPa in one case and from 11 to 24 kPa for
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another case. Two types of filters with deep-pleat medium that had been
reinforced by a fiber-glass scrim exhibited the highest structural limit of
any 610x610x292-mm modified filter with a glass-fiber medium. Three filters
from each of these two types supplied by another manufacturer were tested
and all six remained undamaged after exposure to differential pressures
> 27 kPa.
Additional modified commercial designs tested but not shown in
Table III included a deep-pleat, separatorless and several mini-pleat types,
both with wooden frames. The separatorless type was reinforced by a fiber
-glass scrim for which test outcomes showed an increase in average ßp at
failure, from 11 kPa /4/ up to 18 kPa. Perforated steel sheets on the down-
stream side of the medium panels, of one type of modified mini-pleat filter,
also resulted in an increase in structural limit: to 22 kPa from the 11 kPa
/10/ of the standard type.
Resu1ts from 2 categories of prototypica1 HEPA filters which were tes-
ted are also shown in Tab1e III. The one deep-bed meta1-fiber filter /16/
eva1uated, withstood undamaged, the maximum differential pressure of the
test faci1ity, 27-28 kPa, as did 24 filters with several types of deep-p1eat
polycarbonate microfiber media /17/. One additional filter in the 1atter
category sustained without structura1 damage a differential pressure of
30 kPa in another test faci1ity /18/. The widespread app1ication of the fil-
ters with the meta1-fiber and polycarbonate medium, respective1y, remains
yet limited by f1ow-rate and temperature performance characteristics.
Table 111: Structural Limits cf Hodified Deep-Pleat, and Prototypical,
New Clean 61 Ox61 Ox292 nun HEPA Fi Hers.
Hodification to Design Average hP
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The comparison of structural-test results with similar tests by
Gregory and coworkers /3,4/ shows that the structural limits for approx.
100, of 120, other similary tested commercial filters lie within the ranges
given in Table I • The exceptions, results for approx. 20 test filters of
the first design in Table land from one manufacturer, showed an average
9-kPa differential pressure at failure and a different characteristic fail-
ure mode, both attributed to a medium with an unusually low tensile strength
/3/.
Over 200 filters of 30 types from 10 manufactureres were tested to ob-
tain the results presented for structural tests. A summary of these results
indicates that structural limits varied significantly with both design and
manufacturer for representive samples of new commercial 610x610x292-mm
nuclear-grade HEPA filters procured in Europe and in the U.S.A. The degree
of progressive structural damage at several kPa above that required to cause
initial structural failure, was observed to depend primarily upon filter de-
sign. The filter design typified by the highest structural limits and least
progressive damage is that with deep pleats, separators, and wooden frame.
The vers ions of this design with metal frames for applications above 120 °c,
were found to exhibit not only the lowest struetural limits but also the
most progressive damage after initial failure. Most of the factory-modified
commercial-type filters of the deep-pleat and mini-pleat designs tested,
demonstrated structural limits higher than their commercial counterparts.
Comparable structural limits of > 27 kPa were also observed for two types of
prototypieal filters tested.
RESISTANCE-TEST RESULTS
The flow-resistanee characteristies of a filter are usually illustra-
ted graphieally by differential pressure aeross the filter plot ted against
the average air velocity at the filter entrance. This format is also em-
ployed for the flow-resistance curves of Figs. 4-7, where the results from
flow-resistanee tests of commercial and modified 610x610x292-mm filters are
presented.
The curves in Fig. 4 illustrate flow resistanees for a number of clean
filters with deep pleats and separators. The "S" filters are modified units,
the group "AM-VM" refers to metal-frame filters, and the other types are
eommereial filter units. Differences among the eurves are primarily due to
slight variations in eonstruction of the filter pack. The flow resistances
of a number of identiea1
3
filters, which had been preloaded with PSL to 1 kPa
at a flow rate of 1700 m /h, are shown in Fig. 5. Steeper and more linear
flow-resistanee curves are seen to be charaeteristic of the preloaded fil-
ters, in eomparison to the clean filters.
The influence of the n~mber of folds in the medium can be recognized
by eomparison of the two resistanee eurves drawn with solid lines in Fig. 6
for filters of 64 and 95 folds, respectively. Flow resistance was found to
increase with the number of folds, for air velocities sbove approx. 15 m/s
and for the range in the number of folds, 50-95, investigated. The dotted
lines of Fig. 6 show the contribution of the flow resistance in the pack,
i.e., in the channels formed between the pleats of medium and the adjaeent
separators, to the total flow resistance of the filter. The test data for
these curves was obtained by testing each filter a second time after the
























Fig. 4: Flow-Resistance Curves for
Clean Deep-Pleat HEPA Filters.
Fig. 5: Flow-Resistance Curves for
Preloaded Deep-Pleat HEPA Filters.
In Fig. 7 are shown the flow resistance curves for several types of
clean mini-pleat filters, and one separatorless filter, "FS", all of which
are characterized by steep increases in resistance for air velocities bet-
ween 10 and 20 m/s. This is undesirable from the standpoint of low mechani-
cal stresses in the filter medium at high air velocities. An improvement in
flow resistance for the structurally reinforced "DSV" filter, compared to
the standard "DV" filter, is also evident. Ruedinger has shown curves for
mini-pleat filters with higher resistances due to apreload of PSL /10/.
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Fig. 6: Curves Showing Influence of
Folds and Pack on Flow Resistance.
Fig. 7: Flow-Resistance Curves for
Mini-Pleat Clean HEPA Filters.
~P = 0.079Y + 0.012y2
The test results for the flow-resistance curves illustrated here can
also be used to determine differential pressure as a function of the average
air velocity at the filter entrance. It is these functions that are required
by computer codes used to numerically simulate fluid-dynamic accident-in-
duced transients within air-cleaning systems. The flow resistance of deep-
pleat 610x610x292-mm commercial HEPA filters with separators can be modeled
by
for clean filters and
for filters loaded to 1 kPa at a flow rate of 1700 m3/h, where:~P is in
kPa, Y is < 35 m/s, and .p is < 70 %relative humidity.
1581
A summary, of the over 80 flow-resistance tests performed, shows that
based on the criterion of minimum mechanical stresses at high flow rates,
the filter design with the least desirable flow-resistance characteristics
is that with mini pleats. From the same standpoint, the most desirable de-
sign is that with deep pleats and separators. The flow resistances for fil-
ters of the latter design vary with both manufacturer and number of folds in
the medium. At average filter-entrance tlir velocities of 20-35 m/s, the op-
timum number of folds for minimum flow resistance for clean filters is bet-
ween 50 and 60.
CONCLUSIONS
Test results indicate that new commercial HEPA filters of current
designs are probably not structurally suitable for all possible conditions
of operation during accident situations. The structural limits of HEPA fil-
ters during superimposed challenges of high differential pressure, high flow
rate, high relative humidity, and high temperature remain untested. Also
unknown are the effects of filter aging as a factor in filter response to
these challenges. Additional investigations into the behavior of both new
and used filter units, during exposure to some individual and particularly
to combined challenges, are needed.
Further improvements in filter structural strength, in addition to
those already demonstrated, are considered necessary and possible. Some im-
provement in the flow-resistance characteristics of deep-pleat filters at
air velocities above 20 m/s is considered feasible.
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TELLURIUM BEHAVIOR DURING AND AFTER THE TMI-2 ACCIDENT
K. Vinjamuri, D. J. Osetek, R. R. Hobbins
EG&G Idaho, Inc.
P.G. Box 1625
Idaho Falls, ID 83415
ABSTRACT
The estimated behavior of tellurium during and after the accident at
the Three Mile Island Unit-Z is presented. The behavior is based on
all available measurement data for 129rnre , l32Te , Stable tel-
lurium (126Te , lZ8Te and l30Te ), and best estimate calculations
of tellurium release and transport. The predicted release was cal-
culated using current techniques that relate release rate to fuel tem-
perature and holdup of tellurium in zircaloy until significant oxida-
tion occurs. The calculated release fraction was low, approximately
7%, but the total measured release for sampies analyzed to date is
about 4.0%. Of the measured tellurium about Z.4, 0.88, 0.4Z, 0.17
and 0.086% of Core inventory were in the containment sump water, con-
tainment solids in water, makeup and purification demineralizer,
containment inside surface, and the reactor primary coo1ant, respec-
tive1y. A significant fraction (54%) of the ca1cu1ated tellurium
retained on the upper plenum surfaces (4.61% of the core inventory)
was deposited during the high pressure injection of coo1ant at about
ZOO minutes after the reactor scram. Comparison of tellurium behav-
ior with inpi1e and out-of-pile tests strongly suggests that zirca10y
holds tellurium unti1 significant c1adding oxidation occurs. Ana1y-
ses of samp1es from the core region of TMI-2 may provide an assess-
ment of the 1arge fraction of tellurium retained there, thus va1i-
dating the zirca10y-oxidation-dependent tellurium release models.
INTRODUCTION
Until recently, studies of tellurium release from the core were based on
temperature, and its vo1ati1ity in comparison with other potentia11y important
radionuc1ides (I, and Cs)[l]. However, tests at the coreme1t faci1ity at Oak
Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), the severe fue1 damage tests at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), and the SASCHA tests at Kar1sruhe, sug-
gest that tellurium may be held up by zirca10y c1adding which r~su1ts in sig-
nificant1y 10wer releases from the core. These tests also demonstrated that
tellurium releases increase significant1y when the zirca10y c1adding is oxi-
dized and the previous1y held up tellurium is re1eased. Lorenz et a1.,[2]
emphasized that a 10wer-than-expected tellurium release does not necessari1y
mean a 10wer ca1cu1ated release to the environment, but rather that the tel-
lurium transport pathway is different from previous1y envisioned and higher or
10wer releases to the environment may resu1t, depending on zircaloy oxidation
during an accident progression. The study of tellurium behavior during and
after the Three Mi1e Is1and-Unit 2 accident may shed further light on tellurium
transport during a severe accident.
The objectives of this paper are to: present the resu1ts of tellurium
ana1yses performed to date on TMI-Z samp1es; estimate the tellurium distribu-
tion, release and retention factors; and compare the data with current best
estima,te behavior models and data from out-of-reactor and in-reactor tests.
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MEASUREMENT OF TELLURIUM RELEASED FROM TMI-2 CORE
A summary of tellurium measured in all sampies taken from the TMI-2 plant
systems and compon~nts is listed in Table I. The systems and components
included in the tellurium investigation were: (a) reactor primary cool-
ant,[3,4] (b) reactor coolant bleed tank water[5] (c) containment inside
surface, [4,6] (d) containment sump water and solid debris, [7-10] (e) con-
tainment atmosphere, [11] (f) auxiliary building sump water[12] (g) makeup and
purification filter, [13,14] (h) upper plenum surfaces[15] (sampies from the H8
and B8 leadscrews), and (i) core debris (grab sampies). The largest tellurium
releases measured in the above plant systems and components were summed to give
a total fractional release of about 4% of the core inventory.
TABLE I. SUMMARY OF TELLURIUM RELEASE FRACTIONS IN TMI-2 SYSTEMS
System or Component
1. Reactor primary coolant
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a. Core inventory calculated by ORIGEN-2 code [16].
b. Not analyzed.
c. Analysis is underway and will be discussed in the EG&G report
[Reference 15].
d. Analysis is underway and will be reported in 1985.
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Control rod mecbanism leadscrew sampIes from the H8 and B8 positions are
being analyzed by induction coupled plasma technique for elemental tellurium,
at INEL. [15] The radioactive tellurium nuclides except 125mTe, are expected
to have been decayed to negligibly small amounts and the measured tellurium
would be the stable tellurium nuclides (126Te , l28Te and l30Te ) from
fission products and the doped tellurium added to stainless steels as a
free-machining agent. The precise quantity of doped tellurium is generally
proprietary information, however, tellurium weight percentages of 0.0005- 0.1 %
are typical. Analyses of grab sampIes from the core are underway, but these
data are not available for this paper.
CALCULATION OF TELLURIUM RELEASE FROM TMI-2 CORE
The details of the TMI-2 accident sequence have been discussed in several
reports.[17-2l] Some of the key events[9] in the accident sequence for the
time per iod 100 to 213 minutes are shown in Table 11. The critical per iod of
the accident sequence from the point of view of core damage and fission product
release is believed to be between 113 and 208 minutes after the reactor
trip. [9] The l13-minute time corresponds to the beginning of Core uncovery
following phase separation in the reactor coolant when the reactor coolant
pumps were turned off at about 100 minutes. The 208-minute time corresponds to
the core refill following the resumption of sustained high pressure injection
at about 200-minutes.
For the purpose of estimating the tellurium release fraction from the
core, the TMIBOIL temperature data[9] were used in the fractional release rate
calculations using the Lorenz model[2].
The SCDAP computer code[22] was used to calculate the extent of zircaloy
cladding oxidation. The core was divided into seven axial and three radial
nodes. The radial nodes are denoted by cold (C), Average (A)
TABLE 11. SUMMARY OF PERTINENT EVENTS IN THE TMI-2 ACCIDENT SEQUENCE
Time,
Minutes Event
100 Last Reactor Coolant (RC) pumps turned off in Loop A.
113 Beginning of core uncovering.
139 pilot Opera ted Release Valve (PORV) closed.
145 Iodine in the reactor building air sampIe (HP-P-227) began to
increase rapidly.
150 A radiation detector (in core instrument panel area monitor)
showed response indicating release of activity to the primary
system.
174 RC pump 2B was started and run until 193 minutes.
192 The PORV block valve was opened and cycled several times in the
next period.
200 Sustained High Pressure Injection (HPI) and core reflooded.
208 Core refill.
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and Hot (H) regions, and the axial nodes "ere numbered from 1 through 7. As
sho"n in Figure 1 the cladding in nodes H6 and A6 "ere oxidized tu >90%. The
rest of the cladding in the core "as oxidized to <90%. The estimated frac-
tional releases from nodes H6 and A6, and from the rest of the core "ere 4.36,
1.14 and 1.46%, respectively. These estimates "ere made based on Lorenz's
model, and "eighting the core inventory according to the axial flux distri-
bution. The total release fraction is therefore approximately 7%.
This 10" estimated tellurium release fraction is in reasonable agreement
"ith the 10" measured tellurium release fraction and suggests that most of the
tellurium "as retained "ithin the core, probably in the zircaloy cladding.
TRAP-MELT Calculations
Preliminary calculations of tellurium transport and deposition during the
TMI-2 accident "ere made using the TRAP-MELT computer code[23]. Input para-
meters "ere obtained from various TMI-2 reports published[9, 19, 21, 24] during
the last five years. The primary coolant system "as divided into eight
control volumes as sho"n in Figure 2. The control volurne geometries "ere
obtained either from the final safety analysis report (FSAR) [25] or esti-
mated. These parameters include length, hydraulic diameter, flo" area, set-
tling area and height. Thirteen 5 minute time intervals starting from
153 minutes and ending "ith 213 minutes "ere used. Steam temperatures and
steam flo" rates reported in [Reference 21] "ere used and system pressures "ere
obtained from the measurements charts reported in [Reference 24]. The tel-
lurium source term (0.07) estimated in the previous section was used.
The fraction of the core inventory deposited on lo"er plenum, core, upper
plenum upper head, hotleg, pressurizer, steam generator and cold leg surfaces
are, 1.60 x 10-4 , 0.0, 4.61, 1.46, 0.69, 0.087, 0.084, and 0.0026%, respec-
tively. The fraction of the Core inventory of tellurium deposited on upper
plenum surfaces versus time is shown in Figure 3. Out of a total deposition of
4.6% on upper plenum surfaces, about 2.5% was deposited after the event at
200 minutes, when the core was reflooded (see Table 11 for accident sequence).
A large steam flo" rate[2l] at reflood transported much tellurium from the core
and deposited on the upper plenum surfaces.
COMPARISON OF TMI-2 TELLURIUM BEHAVIOR WITR
INPILE AND OUT-OF-PILE TESTS
In this section, the fractional release rates and release fractions esti-
mated and measured during the TMI-2 accident are compared "ith measurements
from the two PBF Severe Fuel Damage Tests[26, 27], and the ORNL[2] and
SASCHA[29-3l] out-of-pile tests. The modified tellurium release model of
Lorenz et al[2]., was used to estimate the fractional release rates for TMI-2
in the temperature range of 1300 to 2550 K for t"o regions in the core: 3.05
to 3.66m (10 to 12 feet) and 2.44m to 3.05m (8 to 10 feet) from the bot tom of
the core, where the cladding oxidation "as >90 and <90%, respectively. The
fractional release rates versus temperature-are shown in Figure 4 and compared
with the data from the PBF Tests (SFD-ST and SFD 1-1), ORNL Tests (HI-l, HI-2,
and HI-3) and the SASCHA Tests. The PBF SFD-ST result at· 2400 K, the ORNL Test
HI-2 and the SASCHA Tests lie above the lower line. The SFD-ST results at
2000 K, the SFD 1-1 and the ORNL Tests HI-l and HI-3 show low tellurium release
because of low cladding oxidation.
The release fractions measured and estimated from TMI-2 are compared with
the inpile and out-of-pile tests in Table 111. The calculated and measured
tellurium release fractions for TMI-2 are low. The measured tellurium fraction
in the TMI-2 accident simulation test (SFD 1-1) in the PBF is lower. The PBF
1587
~ ---- -------- ----------C7 A7 H7 A7 C7
C6 ~A6~ ~H6~~A6~ C6
C5 A5 H5 A5 C5
C4 A4 H4 A4 C4
C3 A3 H3 A3 C3
C2 A2 H2 A2 C2
Cl A1 H1 A1 C1
~ Cladding oxidized to >90%
CJ Cladding oxidized to <90%
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Figure 4. Comparison of fractional release rates.
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Event (K) (%) Fraetion Referenee
TMI-2 Aeeident 2600 Low 4.0 x 10-2 Present Study
(measured)
7.0 x 10- 2
(estimated)
PBF Tests
SFD-ST 2400 100 4.0 x 10-1
SFD 1-1 2400 30 1.1 x 10-2
ORNL Tests
HI-l 1673 40 3.0 x 10-3 [2]
HI-2 1973 100 0.5 to 1. 0
HI-3 2273 35 6.0 x 10-3
SASCHA Tests
Low Steam Flow Z573 Low 3.3 x 10-1 [Z]
(1.5 L/m)
High Steam Flow Z733 High 6.5 x 10-1
(30 L/m)
10-ZAr + 5% HZ Z173 0 3.6 x
Ar + 5% Steam Z200 Low Z.O x 10-1
SFD 1-1 test elosely approximated the thermal hydraulie eonditions of the TMI-Z
aeeident, and the results of this test indieate very small tellurium release
(~l.l%), whieh is attributed to the holdup of tellurium by unoxidized zir-
ealoy in the test bundle. Also the low tellurium release is eonsistent with
ORNL tests, where the eladding oxidation was low and tellurium was tied up with
the zirealoy eladding. The tellurium release in SASCHA test (Ar + 5% H2) is
in good agreement with TMI-Z. Also in SASCHA tests, the tellurium release was
higher in a test where the steam flow is high. Analyses of sampIes from the
eore region may provide an assessment of the large fraetion of tellurium
retained in the eore, thus validating the zirealoy-oxidation dependent tel-
lurium release models.
CONCLUSIONS
A number of available TMI-2 sampIes were analyzed, best estimate ealeula-
tions were performed, and the data were eompared with results from inpile and
out-of-pile tests. The following eonelusions are drawn from the analysis:
1. Very little (~4.0%) tellurium was released and transported from the
TMI-Z eore, probably as a result of holdup by zirealoy eladding and
struetural materials. Analyses of sampIes from the eore region may
provide an assessment of the large fraetion of tellurium retained
there.
Z. Best estimate ealeulations suggest that a signifieant fraetion of the
total tellurium deposited on the upper plenum surfaees was due to
high pressure injeetion at about ZOO minutes after the reaetor seram,
resulting in high ,steam flow.
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3. Comparison of tellurium release fractions and fractional release
rates from the TMI-2 accident with in-pile and out-of-pile test
results suggests that zircaloy holds tellurium until the cladding is
oxidized significantly.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors thank Mrs. Pushpa Bhatiya for running the TRAP-MELT computer
code and G. S. Reilly for plotting the figures. The authors acknowledge
D. O. Campbell and R. A. Lorenz of ORNL for providing TMI-2 data.
REFERENCES
1. Technical Bases for Estimating Fission Product Behavior During LWR Acci-
dents, NUREG--0772, June 1981.
2. R. A. Lorenz et al., "Review of Tellurium Release Rates from LWR Fuel Ele-
ments Under Accident Conditions, " rroceedings of the International Meeting
on Light Water Reactor Severe Accident Evaluation, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, August 18 to September 1, 1983.
3. C. A. Pelletier et al., Iodine 131 Behavior During the TMI-2
Accident, NSAC-30, September 1981.
4. R. A. Lorenz et al., "Review of Tellurium Release Rates from LWR Fuel Ele-
ments and Aerosol Formation from silver Control Rod Materials," An
informal letter to M. Jankowski, ORNL, Chemical Technology Division, Oak
Ridge, Tennessee, 37830, February 28, 1983.
5. Letter from J. E. Emery to J. A. Carter, Interoffice Correspondence, Oak
Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 37830, March 28, 1980.
6. R. J. Davis, Information on Reactor Building Surface Contamination,
NUS-TM-352, September 1983.
7. M. P. Morrell, "The Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) containment assess-
ment task force program," ANS thermal reactor safety meeting, Knoxville,
Tennessee, April 1980, conference No. 800403/volume 11, P. 1140.
8. Letter from W. D. Shults to J. A. Daniel, Analytical Chemistry Division,
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830, September 4,
1979.
9. J. C. Cunnane and S. L. Nicolosi, Characterization of the Contamination in
the TMI-2 Reactor Coolant System, EPRI NP-2722 November 1982.
10. Letter from J. A. Carter to D. O. Campbell, interlaboratory correspondence,
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830, October 27,
1982.
11. J. K. Hartweil et al., Characterization of the Three Mile Island Unit-2
Reactor building Atmosphere Prior to the Reactor Building Purge, GEND-005,
May 1981.
12. Letter from J. E. Emery to J. A. Carter, interoffice correspondence, Oak
Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830, March 3, 1980.
13.
1591
E. J. Renkey and IV. IV. Jenkins , Plan:,-;n:,-~;::'n",g"---cS~tu:;:.::dLY.;,:-..,.::R:;:e::os",i"n,---"a~n,-=d~D,",e:.:b:.:r~~;;:·s-;-.:R"e",m:;:.o,,-v=a.:::.l
System-Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 2 Makeup and Purification
Demineralizers, Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory, HEDL-7377,
June 1983.
14. J. D. Thomson and T. R. Osterhoudt, TMI-2 Purification Demineralizer Resin
Study, GEND-INF-013, May 1984.
15. K. Vinjamuri, D. IV. Akers and R. R. Hobbins, Examination of H8 and B8
Leadscrews from TMI-2, EG&G informal report, September 1984.
16. M. J. Bell, ORIGEN, ORNL Isotope Generation and Depletion Code, ORNL-4628,
1973.
17. M. Rogovin. Three Mile Island-A Report to the Commissioners and to the
Public, NUREG/CR-1250.
18. G.P.U. Technical Data Report 044, Annotated Sequence of Events, March 28,
1979.
19. J. R. Ireland, et al., "Thermal-Hydraulic and Core-Damage Analysis of the
TMI-2 Accident", Nuclear Safety, Vol. 22, 5, September-October, 1981.
20. J. Rest and C. R. Johnson. A Prediction of TMI-2 Core Temperatures from
the Fission Product Release History, NASC-12, November, 1980.
21. K. H. Ardron and D. G. Cain. TMI-2 Accident: Core Heatup Analysis,
EPRI-NSAC-24, January, 1981.
22. C. M. Allison et al., SCDAP/MODI Analysis of the progression of core
damage during the TMI-2 Accident, EG&G report No. SE-CMD-009, June 19,
1984.
23. H. Jordan et al., TRAP-MELT Users Manual, NUREG/CR-0632, February 1979.
24. Analysis of .Three Mile Island-Unit 2 Accident, NSAC-80-1, March 1980.
25. Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 License Application, FSAR,
Metropolitan Co., 1974.
26. P. E. MacDonald, B. J. Busher, R. R. Hobbins, R. K. McCardell, and G. E.
Gruen, "PBF Severe Fuel Damage Program: Results and Comparison to
Analysis," International Meeting on Light-lVater Reactor Severe
Accident Evaluation, Cambridge, MA, August 28-September 1, 1983.
27. P. E. MacDonald, C. L. Nalezny, R. K. McCardell, "Severe Fuel Damage
Test 1-1 Results," American Nuclear Society Annual Meeting Vol. 46,
P478, New Orleans, Louisiana, June 3-8, 1984.
28. K. Vinjamuri, D. J. Osetek and R. R. Hobbins" "Fission Produc t Release
Rates Measured During the in-pile Fuel Damage Tests," American Nuclear
Society Annual meeting, New Orleans, Louisiana, June 3-8, 1984, Vol. 46,
P. 480.
29. H. Albrecht and H. lVild, "Investigation of fission Product Release by
Annealing and Melting of LIVR Fuel pins in Air and Steam," ANS Topical
Meeting, Sun Valley, Idaho, August 2-6, 1981.
1592
30. H. Albrecht and H. Wild, "Behavior of I, Cs, Te, Ba, Ag, In and Cd During
Release from overheated PWR Cores," International Meeting on Light Water
Reactor Severe Accident Evaluation, Cambridge, MA, August 28-September 1,
1983.
31. H. Albrecht and H. Wild, "Review of the main Results of the SASCHA Program
on Fission Product Release under Core Melting Conditions," ANS topical
Meeting on Fission Product Behavior and source Term Research, Snowbird,
UT, July 15-19, 1984.
NOTICE
This paper was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of
the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any
agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or
implied, or assumes any legalliability or responsibility for any third party's
use, or the results of such use, of any information, apparatus, product or
process disclosed in this report, or represents that it use by such third party
would not infringe privately owned rights. The views expressed in this paper
are not necessarily state or reflect those of the Uni ted States government or
any agency thereof.
1593
A CONTAINMENT-VENTING FILTER CONCEPT AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
AT STAINLESS-STEEL FIBER FILTERS
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Postfach 3640, D-7500 Karlsruhe 1
Federal Repuhlic of Germany
ABSTRACT
Bursting of the containment of pressurized water reactors as a result
of severe reactor accidents can he avoided hy installation of accident fil-
ter systems which fulfill the function of a safety valve. This greatly re-
duces contamination of the environment hy fission product release. The fil-
ter concept and its implementation using stainless-steel fiher filters and
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CONCEPT OF AN ACCIDENT FILTER SYSTEM FOR
CONTAiNMENT VENTING AGAINST BURSTING
Following severe reactor accidents areaction hetween concrete and the




AN ACCIDENT FILTER CONCEPT
tainment of LWRs which, depending on the development of the
the types of concrete used, could lead after some days to
reactor containment /1/. This implies a near-ground release
ty from the containment which, at the
time of hurst, would he an airhorne
radioactivity. The process might even
he aggravated hy a fraction of acti-
vity released from the hoiling sump
as a result of resuspension.
German PWR power plants are de-
signed for a maximum containment
pressure of 6 har. The hurst pressure
is assumed to he 8-9 har. The opera-
ting point of an accident filter sys-
tem should lie in the pressure range
of 6-8 har. The volumetrie flow rate
of the gas resulting from the reac-
tion of melted core and concrete is
known from computations made in /1/
and 3amounts to ahout 3000-
5000 m /h. The demister (Fig. 1) of
the venting system is installed with-
in the reactor containment. In this
way it is ensured that the outflowing
gas stream leaves the
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reactor containment with a maximum
gas relative humidity of 100 % and
without the presence of water drop-
















DRY-EFFECT DF THE SAFETY VALVE SY
ISENTHALPIC PRESSURE DECREASE
The second essential component
is apressure control valve actuated
via the internal pressure; it allows
only the same volume of gas to escape
as is newly genera ted. In this way,
the pressure in the reactor contain-
ment is kept at a constant value and
the activity oonfined in the reactor
containment for as long as possihle.
Moreover, hy aerosol physical
processes the fraction of airhorne
activity is reduced through agglome-
ration. Another important function of
the valve is to produce an
isenthalpic expansion of the contain-
ment atmosphere and thus effect a
strong drying of the gas, from
160 oe and 100 %relative humidity
to 145 oe with a 45 oe distance from
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SOI-----+---,'----f----f-j---+---j-----l/-.r-;--The first filter stage is a pre-
filter consisting of stainless-steel
fihers and made up of several layers
of different fiher diameters for re-
moval of the majority of the coarse
aerosols. The measured values will he
indieated helow. The seeond stage
eonsists of 2 ~m stainless-steel
Except for the short start-up
phase of ahout 10 s duration when on-
ly ahout 8 1 of condensate are produ-
ced in the HEPA filter section, until
the 100 oe limit (dew point 1 har)
is attained, the filter components
are exposed exclusively to superhea-
ted steam. As a haekup for the valve
a hurst diaphragm connected in pa-
rallel which does not open until a
pressure of ahout 8 har is attained.
After the onset of an accident ahout
4 to 5 days will pass until the fil-
ter system is put into operation. Du-
ring this time interval the filter
system can he inertized with N?, if
required, in order to prevent H2
deflagration.
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fihers comparahle with HEPA glass-fiher
media. At this stage, the very fine
aerosols of less than 1 ~m diameter are
removed. The temperature and radiation
hurden of the HEPA filter are given in




It is possihle to connect another /"__<,-
HEPA filter downstream of the iodine / -;/-
filter in order to remove any contamina- ,.Il"I----I---+-+.--b-""''''-+..-'----+---
ted ahrasion material from the iodine /--- ./ -...................-:-1/"-_-k~:-+---I---«ofilter stage. The offgas is suhse~uently __~
carried via a fan and a flame arrester
(on account of the H2 fraction) to thestack.
Fig.6
/ \",~",., .''?J'''t'd....1'lr·.........•
A hypass of the filter system will
he provided to he used during the period
after the pressure huildup has come to
an end, the pressure in the containment
has dropped to values < 6 har, and the
exventing filter system is no longer re-
quired for the reactor containment. This
hypass allows the removal,of the decay
heat of the plated-out fission products
without releasing any more vent air to
the outside. And in fact, failure of
this hypass cooling would not pose proh-
lems since no organic adhesives and
sealants are used for the filter gompo-
nents and temperatures up to 500 C can
he accommodated. At these temperatures,
cooling hy heat radiation alone should
he sufficient.
--- ,
In addition, a device will he / // .--- ~~~
provided which allows fil tra tion of the S.Il' 1----+-++--..j,LI--1----+---j
air in the annulus, in the case that the I I
latter is contaminated hy ·air leaking I;
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Another solution oonsists of a mohile filter system as represented in
Fig. 5 hecause ahout 4 days will pass until the filter systems would he
put into operation. Only installation of the demister, control valve, in-
ternal pipework, and appropriate connections will he required. The largest
weight to he handled in a mohile system will undouhtedly he the required
radiation shield, hut that could he huilt up hy using hricks of concrete
at the site.
FIBER MATERIALS
Both the prefilters and the HEPA filter stages use stainless steel
fihers, which are temperature resistant up to 550 0 0 and resistant to
some acids. Their radiation resistance is practically unlimited. The metal
fihers come in the following diameters: 22, 12, 8, 4, and 2 ~m. For fil-
ters with removal efficiencies corresponding to those of HEPA filters, on-
ly fihers of 2 ~m, respectively, can he employed to ensure a minimum depth
of the fiher pack. The usual fiher material used is No. 1.4404 stainless
steel (AISI TP 316L), hut also such materials as inconel 601, titanium and
nickel are heing applied although they have not yet heen made availahle in
all diameters. The fihers can he supplied in flats, coils, unsintered and
sintered or as yarns and fahrics. At present, only unsintered fleeces pro-
duced in coils are heing used. Sintering reduces the porosity. Although
the product is easier to process, it has a lower storage capacity hecause
of the lower porosity.
Stainless steel fihers can he used up to some 550 0 0 ; they addition-
ally offer flame protection, e. g. in fires, and are resistant to moisture
and acid according to specifications. Fig. 6 shows a scanning electron mi-
crograph of the fiher structure.
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TEST EQUIPMENT AND TEST METHODS
Two test rigs are availahle for stu-
dies of aerosol filters. Test rig No. 1,
which is called "TAIFUN", has heen presen-
ted at the 12th USAEO Air Oleaning Oonfe-
rence. /2/ It allows all main accident pa-
rameters to he set. The second test duct
is designed for normal conditions, and
loading tests.
The removal efficiencies of metal fi-
her filters were determined hy the uranine
method, with which readers are assumed to
he familiar /3/. Fig. 7 shows an aerosol
spectrum typical of the tests conducted.
According to Dorman /4/, the uranine meth-
od results in a penetration which is
approx. a fador of 5 higher than that for
DOP, which means that the measured values




~ Areal weight lS kgJm2
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THE HEPA FILTER STAGE
Six layers of 750 g/m2 with 2 )l ~
fihers allowed DF values up to > 10
to he measured at face velocities of 40
cm/s (Fig. 8, curve 1). Since the data
measured with clean air were only
slightly ahove the limit of detection
within the period of exposure, the fil-
ter pack was cut in half for some fur-
ther studies. This filter, which wa~
covered with three layers of 750 g/m
each, produced the hottom curve in Fig.
(8). This can he explained hy a
selective change in the aerosol spec-









In two test series the influence
of temperature on the DF was studied.
In the range up to 200 °C, the DF was
found to increase with rising tempera-
ture. The face velocity was set at 30
and 40 cm/s. The results are shown in
Fig. 9. The higher DF can he explained
hy increased diffusion-controlled remo-
val. Moreover, the pressure dependence
of the DF was studied.
Fig. 10 indicates the results. The
DF decreases with rising pressure. 10'
At 5 har, a factor of approx. 0.5 is 8
attained. For this t 2st series, a
fiher layer of 1500 g/m wi th 2 ).l m
fihers was used. This drop can he
explained hy diffusion-controlled
removal heing impeded hy the higher












DECDNTAMINATION FACTOR AS AFUNCTlDN OF THE
OPERATIIIG TEIIPERATURE OF ASTAIlILESS STEEL











Areal weight 2.25 kg Im'





STUDIES WITH STEAM IN THE HEPA
FILTER SECTION
Previous investigations into
the HEPA filter section dealt mainly
with filters exposed to air /5/.
However, since in a severe accident
the major fraction of the contain-
ment atmosphere consists of steam,
measurements of the removal effici-
ency under conditions of steam expo-
sure were performed. oSuperheated
steam, 1 har and 140 C, was as-
sumed and the steam temperature was
reduced in steps in order to incre-
ase the steam moisture until conden-
sation occurred. The values have
heen entered in Tahle 1. No signifi-
cant difference was ohserved in com-
parison to tests performed with air.
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This demonstrates that, at least over several weeks, filtration effieieney
ean be maintained with the use of stainless- steel fiber filters.
Table 1
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THE PRESSURE BURST RESISTANCE
In a test series eondueted at the LANL in Las Cruees, USA, two filter
eartridges of the eell design (610 ~ x 610 mm x 290 mm), equipped with 30
layers of 4 ~m fibers cf 300 g/m eaeh, were subjeeted to apressure
burst test. The test faeility allows a maximum differential pressure .of
0.28 bar to he applied aeross the test filter. This pressure was not suf-
fieient to destroy the filter. If the rupture resistanee of the fihers is
suffieiently high and the design to support the fihers and the easing are









Areal weight 1.5 kglm' -Air velocity 40 cm/s
,
bar
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SOME REMARKS ABOUT METAL FIBER
FILTER DESIGNS
A filter to oe used in aooident
situations oan oe expeoted to oe ex-
po~ed to dose rates of a few
10 rad/h1Önd to integral doses ofa few 10 rad. For this reason,
suoh filters should not inoorporate
organio sealing oompounds and seals
oetween the upstream and the down-
stream sides. A design simular to
the deep oed adsorption filters has
oeen developed and the oell struo-
ture aoandoned for suoh uses. A
housing design has oeen made in
whioh the fioer paoks are pressed
only meohanioally. Several elements
have oeen ouilt whioh are meant to
optimize the design. Fig. 11 is a
sketoh of the housing and one filter
inser~. The faoe area is 2 to
2.5 m, depending on the element
used. As a funotion of the design,
volume flo~s oetween approx. 1500
and 3000 m /h oan oe filtered. The
only gasket is installed oetween the
filter element and the upstream side
of the housing, whioh means that any
leakage air penetrating would also
oe filtered.
A speoial advantage of fioer
paok filters is due to the possioil-
ity to oomoine in one housing the
HEPA filter seotion and a roughing
separator. The vertioal position of
the fioer paoks and the design of
the fioer olamping system ensures
that oondensate and preoipitated
droplets will oe oollected on the
upstream side, where they oan oe re-
moved, e. g., oy means of a drain
pipe.
============~~
THE IODINE FILTER STAGE
For the iodine filter, the max-
imum temperature inoreases to aoout
160 oe whioh is aoove the 100 oe
temperature of the influent gas.
This oan oe controlled with iodine
sorption materials (molecular sieves
in the silverform) over aperiod of







days after accident- (d)
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lodine release: 10 %
Dose and Dose rate of the iodine filter after an Qccldent
os a function of time
Fig.12
100 % of the ß-radiation, and
10 % of the y-radiation were taken
into account in the calculations.
The dose hurdens of the iodine sorp-
tion material and of the particulate
air filter are indicated.
The calculated dose and dose
rate values vary over a wide range
hecause only relative arhitrary
assumptions can he made on the geo-
metries and activity distrihutions.
However, the magnitudes can he indi-
cated (Fig. 12).
For the iodine sorption unit a
material had to he found which has a
high removal efficiency for iodine
over the whole range of possihle
conditions and is not characterized
hy significant desorption also at
elevated temperatures and high radi-
ation hurden. The activated carhon
used in normal exhaust air iodine
filters is not eligihle hecause of
its easy inflammahility and high de-
sorption
Two 'materials were tested;
firstly, inorganic sorption materi-
als hased on catalyzer carriers with
a silver nitrate impregnation and,
secondly, silver molecular sieves.
With hoth materials the reaction
hetween iodine, iodine compounds and
silver gives rise to temperature re-
sistant iodine silver compounds
having practically the same desorp-
tion hehavior. One of the most im-
portant parameters influencing remo-
val is the relative humidity.
The AC 6120 sorption material contains less silver than the molecular
sieves. Already with 7 g Ag/100 g of hasic material the removal efficien-
eies are sufficient at humidities of the air< 80 %RH. Silver zeolites do
not attain this value until a silver content of aoout 30 g/100 g of mate-
rial has heen attained.
In a lahoratory scale apparatus tests were performed at different hu-
midities, temperatures and pressures with molecular sieves in the silver
form from different supplies and with impregnated catalyzer carriers
(designation AC 6120). The materials must attain minimum removal efficien-
eies hoth at high and low temperatures and humidities. This means that de-
sign measures have to he taken against droplet storage and reduction in
the humidity of the air.
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The sorption materials behave differently with respect to changes in
the param5ters of pressure and temperature. Up to a limit temperature of
about 250 C the AC 6120 removal efficiency increases with increasing tem-
perature because the reaction rate rises. Above this temperature the im-
pregnation material undergoes thermal decomposition at a relatively high
rate, whilst molecular sieves are more temperature resistant because of
the different bonding of the silver in the sorption material. The removal
efficiency decreases with increasing pressure. But this effect is much
smaller than the influence exerted by the temperature. Since the tempera-
ture and the pressure are coupled via the vapor pressure curve in a first
approximation and since the (positive) influence by the temperature domi-
nates over the influence exerted by pressure, rising pressure will normal-
ly not cause a reduction in the removal efficiency of an exventing air
filter.
For the reasons stated above exhaust air filters will be operated at
normal pressure outside the safety containment since throttling will lower
the pressure and in addition diminish the relative humidity of the air.
The service life is an essential parameter with respect to accident
filter operation. From the plots showing the development versus time of
the airborne activity in the safety containment about 100 h of safe opera-
tion can be expected under conditions of elevated pressure and tempera-
ture.
Table 2 shows the removal efficiencies as a function of the tempera-
ture and time of vapor loading. Results of radiation and desorption tests
are given in /6/.
TABlE 2
REMOVAL EFFICIENCY OF AN AG MOLECULAR SIEVE FOR C1I3
131 1 UNDER EXTREME CONDlTlONS
FACE vEloe ITY
LOAOING TIME




TEt1PERATURE DEli POINT PRESSURE EXpüSURE REMOVAL EFflCIEtlCY (%)
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Ahove all two houndary conditions are decisive for the use of a drop-
let separator.
1. Great quantities of water must he expected since in an accident up
to ahout 300 tons of water get released and when escaping a large volume
of it is in the vapor phase and reeondenses suhsequently.
2. Over a rather long period during the condensation phase very small
droplets must he expected whieh might lead to an inadmissihle storage of
water in the partieulate air filters and in the iodine filter.
Moreover, a droplet separator must have the lowest possihle resist-
anee to air and must he radiation resistant.
These conditions can he fullfilled hy using demisters made of stain-
less steel fiher separators. After optimization a eonfiguration .of droplet
separators of 22 and 8 ~m fihers hy four layers each has proved to he sui-
tahle for use in coarse and fine droplet separators. The results have heen
indicated in Tahle 3.
TABLE 3
REMOVAL EFFICIEIICY OF A DROPLET SEPARATOR CONTAINING STAINLESS STEEL FIBER PACKS
DIAHETER OF DROPLETS : 2-5 IUH






AIR FLOW FACE TOTAL REHOVAL EFFICIE"CV (X)
RATE VELOC!TY PRESSURE DROP
(H3/H) (HIs) (PA) PACK 1 PACK 2 PACKS 1 + 2
200 0,23 250 99,6 98,9 99,996
300 0,3q 320 99.q 97.3 99.98
qOO 0,Q6 Q80 99.5 89,3 99.9Q
THE PROBLEM OF eORROSION
The stainless-steel fihers have heen exposed to steam and steam-air
mixtures at temperatures hetween 100 and 180 oe in endurance tests which
lasted for several months. No corrosion whatsoever appeared on the fihers.
Therefore, it can he assumed that no critieal corrosion phenomena will oc-
cur during an estimated service life of 2 - 4 weeks, not even when the
filters are exposed to the offgas of a reaotor containment. Repeated use
of such a filter system is certainly not to he anticipated.
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investigated with a respect to
The tracer aerosol was a




Given the long waiting time until the filter is put into operation
the fraotion of fine aerosols < 1 ]lm should not make a substantial contri-
bution to filter loading beoause agglomeration takes place. The values are
given in Table 4.
TABLE LJ




200 H3/H, -f. LJOO H3/H
0.ll,1
1 - 10 /UM
FIBER FIBER INITIAL FINAL EFFICIEHCV lOA01HG lOAOING
DIAMETER LOADIHG V.A.LUE OF VALUE OF
(/UH ) (G/H2) flP (t.\ßAR) llP (119M) <Xl (G) (1(0/1'12)
lO 1500 0.1 6 78 ml 10.5
11 1500 0;15 7 85 1148 7.6
11 1500 0.15 8.8 96 1188 7.l
8 1500 0.5 B.5 > 99 1080 l.5
4 1500 1.3 17.1 > 99 488 1.56
'8 1500 1.7 14.9 90 jljJO 4.6
'4 1500 5.1 II > 99 790 1.5
Since an exventing filter with an exposure area of about 5 m2.will
be necessary for a volumetric flow rate of 3000-5000 m3/h in order to rea-
lize a HEPA filter section with 2 ]lm fibers, a theoretical loading of
about 50 kg can he expected. However, aocording to results previously ob-
tained from other investigations such a high aerosol loading is not to be
expected so that in this respect also there exists no limit in the appli-
cation of the filter.
The investigations will be continued at different·flow rates in order
to cover possihle changes in volumetrio flow rates as weIl.
SUMMARY
By this demonstration of performance of an accident filter system it
can reasonahly he supposed that hypothetical acoidents in LWRs can also he
controlled and the environmental hurden reduced hy a faotor of > 1000.
Using this filter ooncept, hoth aerosol- and iodine activities can he con-
tained. Only the nohle gases with low radiological impact would he relea-
sed. The cost of such a filter system should amount to 0.5 to 1 million
dollars. This means that, compared with condensation systems, a
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REWET-II EXPERIMENTS TO DETERMINE THE EFFECTS OF
SPACER GRIDS ON THE REFLOODING PROCESS
Timo Kervinen, Heikki Purhonen ,
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P.O. Box 169, SF-00181 Helsinki 18, Finland
Heikki Kalli,
Lappeenranta University of Technology,
Department of Energy Technology,
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ABSTRACT
25 reflooding experiments have been carried out in the REWET-II
test facility for studying the influence of spacer grids on the
reflooding process during a postulated LOCA. The test section of
the REWET-II facility contains 19 indirectly electrically heated
fUll-length fuel rod simulators in a triangular array equipped with
ten honeycomb type spacer grids. The first 15 experiments have been
carried out in the standard test section i.e. with all the 10 spacer
grids. In the last 10 experiments two spacer grids (the 6th and the
8th) have been removed from the upper half of the rod bundle.
Experimental results indicate that spacer grids improve the cooling
of the fuel rod simulators. The main reason for the improved cooling
is the entrained droplets adhering to the spacer grids and forming
new downstream and upstream moving quenching fronts.
INTRODUCTION
The REWET-II facility has been· designed to investigate the reflooding
phenomena during a postulated LOCA in an LWR. The reference plant is the
Loviisa VVER-440 plant in Finland. The VVER-reactors have certain unique
features differing from other PWRs. Fuel rods are in hexagonal geometry, fuel
rod bundles of 127 rods are in BWR-like channels. The fuel rod bundle has 10
honeycomb type spacer grids. The emergency core cooling (ECC) system consists
of two separate systems having two LPCI-pumps each. The ECC water is injected
directly into both the upper plenum and the downcomer of the reactor vessel.
During recent years several authors have published papers dealing with
the effect of spacer griqs on reflooding phenomena during a LOCA 1=1,2,3=1.
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Also the earlier REWET-experiments indicated that the spacer grids may have an
important effect on the reflooding phenomenon /-4-/. In this paper two new
series of reflooding experiments are presented.-The REWET-II facility and
experiments are described in the second and third sections. In the two last
sections the results of experiments are presented and the effects of spacer
grids are discussed.
REWET-II TEST FACILITY AND TEST CONDITIONS
The layout of the REWET-II test facility is presented in Fig. 1. The
scaling ratio between REWET-II facility and the reference reactor is
1 :2333. In the facility all the elevations of different components are the
same as in the reference reactor. The reactor core is simulated with a bundle
of 19 electrically heated fuel rod simulators in the actual hexagonal fuel rod
geometry (Fig. 2). Hence, the heated length (2420 mm), the outer diameter
(9.1 mm) and the lattice pitch (12.2 mm) of the simulators are also the same
as in the reference reactor. The power distribution of the fuel rod simulators
is a chopped cosine with a peaking factor of 1.5. The number and the
construction of the honeycomb type spacer grids are the same as in the actual
fuel bundles. The heating coil of the fuel rod simulator is inside a stainless
steel cladding tube filled with magnesium oxide. The facility contains also a
pipe simulating the broken loop and a connection line between the upper plenum
and downcorner simulating the 5 intact loops. The REWET-II facility has been
described in detail in Ref. /-5-/.
The parameters of interest in the experiments were the rod surface
temperatures measured with thermocouples. Areas around the 6th ( at the
elevation of 1341 mm ) and the 8th ( at the elevation of 1821 mm ) spacer
grids were especially well-instrumented (Fig. 3.). Other parameters to be
measured were system pressure, differential pressures, coolant flow rates,
coolant temperature and heating power.
Before the experiment the facility was preheated by steam and the lower
plenum was filled with water. A specified electrical power was then switched
on and when the maximum cladding temperature had reached a specified value the
test was initiated by starting the injectioh of the ECC water into the
downcorner and/or to the upper plenum.
EXPERIMENTS
The two test series reported here included 25 reflooding experiments. In
the first test series SGI (Spacer Grid Test I) 15 experiments were carried out
using the standard rod bundle equipped with 10 honeycomb type spacer grids. In
the second test series SGII (Spacer Grid Test 11) 10 experiments were repeated
using the same rod bundle with only 8 spacer grids, i.e., the 6th and 8th
spacer grids were removed from the upper half of the test section.
The parameters in the experiments have been chosen in accordance with the
reference plant. Hence, e.g. the coolant injection rates have been scaled
down from the ECC system of the Loviisa plant. The heating power used in the
experiments corresponds to about 5 %of the thermal power of the reference
plant. Coolant temperature ( 50°C) is the same as in the reference plant. The
ranges of the parameters are shown in Table I.
1611
Table I. Ranges of test parameters in REWET-II spaoer grid experiments.
System pressure
Heating power of rod bundle
Average linear heating power
Total flow rate (oold level rise)
Initial maximum oladding temperature









100/0 %- 50150 %
Effeot of Spaoer Orids on Cladding Temperature and Quenohing Times
In the reflooding prooess the most signifioant parameter is the oladding
temperature of fuel rods. Temperature rise and quenohing time are typioal
oharaoteristios used to desoribe the oladding temperature behavior and the
oooling of the rod bundle during the reflooding prooess.
The oladding temperatures measured in the experiments indioated that in
the lower half of the test seotion the differenoes between the oorresponding
temperatures in the two test series SOl and SOlI were insignifioant (Fig. 4).
In the upper part of the test seotion (where two spaoer grids were removed in
test series SOlI) looal temperature rise was lower and quenohing earlier in
test series SOl than in the oorresponding experiments in test series SOlI. The
largest differenoes in quenohing time and looal temperature rise between
oorresponding experiments at the elevations of the 6th spaoer grid were 50 s
and 105°C and at the elevation of the 8th spaoer grid 150 s ,and 150°C,
respeotively.
Maximum initial temperature, looal temperature rise, turnaround time
and quenching time for selected experiments are summarized in Table 11. Figs.
5 - 6 show quenching times at different elevations and maximum local
temperatures for two compared experiments.
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Table 11. Summary of reflooding characteristics in four pairs of REWET-II
spacer grid experiments.
SGI SGn
Total flow rate: 4 cm/s ,Eee injection to downcorner,
Average heating power: 6.5 W/cm ,Pressure: 0.1 MPa
Timax 630
0 e 600 0 e
Ti 580 0 e 570 0 e
/,;T 30 0 e 105°e
tt 15 s 153 s
tq 325 s 365 s
Total flow rate: 8 cm/s ,Eee injection to downcorner and upper plenum,
Average heating power: 6.5 W/cm ,Pressure: 0.1 MPa
Timax 595°e 610 0 e
Ti 480 0 e 550 0 e
/,;T oOe 105°e
tt 0 s 242 s
tq 305 s 361 s
Total flow rate: 20 cm/s ,Eee injection to downcorner,
Average heating power: 6.5 W/cm ,Pressure: 0.1 MPa
Timax 600 0 e 610 0 e
Ti 540 0 e 575°e
/';T oOe oOe
tt 0 sOs
tq 78 s 83 s
Total flow rate: 4 cm/s ,Eee injection to downcorner,
Average heating power: 8.7 W/cm ,Pressure: 0.3 MPa
Timax 640 0 e 630 0 e
Ti 590 0 e 560 0 e
/';T 35°e 133°e
tt 12 s 78 s






maximum initial temperature at elevation 1195 mm (midplane)
initial temperature at elevation 1341 mm
maximum temperature rise at elevation 1341 mm
turnaround time at elevation 1341 mm
time for quenching at elevation 1341 mm
Effect of Spacer Grids on Reflooding Mechanism
The temperature histories measured in the experiments indicated irregular
quenching near the spacer grids; a distinct positive temperature difference
was found between the upstream and downstream side of the spacers (Fig. 7a).
The largest temperature difference measured was 250 oe, and in all the
experiments with the standard rod bundle the difference rose to more than
100 oe. The effect of spacer grid on the axial temperature profile of the
cladding was clearest just above the spacer (curve 1356 mm in Fig. 7a); the
temperature began to recover as the distance from the spacer increased (cf.
curve 1376 mm ). In the experiment with the corresponding spacer grid removed
the quenching occured in the natural order from upstream to downstream and the
temperature profile was smooth (Fig. 7b).
There are two reasons for the better cooling on the downstream side of
the spacer grids. By restricting the flow area and acting as heat transfer
fins in the rod bundle the spacer grids increase turbulence and flow velocity
of the coolant and enlarge the heat transfer area of the rods. Further, the
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droplets entrained by the steam may adhere to the spacer grids or break into
smaller droplets thus altering the steam-to-liquid heat transfer. The droplets
attached to the spacer grids increase local heat transfer and form new
upstream falling and downstream rising quenching fronts, finally improving the
total rewet of the fuel rod simulators.
CONCLUSION
The two test series have been carried out in the REWET-II test facility
to study the effect of spacer grids on the reflooding phenomena. The first
test series was performed with a hexagonal bundle of 19 fuel rod simulators
equipped with ten honeycomb type spacer grids. In the second test series the
same rod bundle was used but with only eight spacer grids i.e. the 6th and 8th
spacer grid were removed from the upper half of the test section. From the
results obtained in these test series the following conclusions can be drawn.
The spacer grids improve the cooling of the fuel rod simulators during
the reflooding process in two ways. First, the spacer grids reduce the flow
area and, hence, increase turbulence and coolant flow velocity. Second,
entrained droplets adhere to the spacer grids and form new downstream rising
and upstream falling quenching fronts. The combined effect is that spacer
grids alter the local axial temperature profile of the cladding. Near the
spacer grids film boiling, transition boiling and nucleate boiling take place
earlier than elsewhere. There are several downstream and upstream moving
quenching fronts in the rod bundle improving the cooling and rewetting of the
rods. The'phenomenon described above can actually be seen in the REWET-III
facility, which consists of three 1500 mm long fuel rod simulators inside a
glass tube.
In the REWET-II reflooding experiments both pure downcomer ECC-injection
and combined downcomer and upper plenum ECC-injection were used to determine
the effect of spacer grids on reflooding phenomena. However, significant
differences near the spacer grids were not found between these two injection
modes. The effect of the spacer grids on the cooling of the test rod bundle
was clearest with low pressure, low flow rate and high heating power.
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Figure 1. REWET-II facility.
1615
Figure 2. Reactor core simulation in the REWET-II facility.
Figure 3. Example of thermocouple locations near spacer grids















































Figure 4. Comparisons of eladding temperature histories in REWET-II experiments.
( Note: the elevation of the 4th thermoeouple in the experiment with












TOTAL FLOW RATE -4 cmlsoO.069 kg/s
. AVERAGE HEATING POWER 6.5 WJcm
COOLANT TEMPERATURE 50'C
PRESSURE 0.1 MP,



























Figure 5. Comparisons of quenehing
times in a pair of
REWET-II experiments.
Figure 6. Comparisons of maximum
loeal temperatures in
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Figure 7. Comparisons of cladding temperature histories near the spacer grids
in REWET-!! experiments, A with all the spacer grids and B with two
spacer grids removed.
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ABSTRACT
Several authors have proposed improving the fuel utilization of the
PWRs by reducing the moderator-to-fuel volume ratio (VH20/VU02)' The
low water volume fraction is achieved with a triangular fuel rod
array. In this paper a calculational study on the reflooding
phenomena in a tight-pitch rod lattice is presented. Two reflood
computer codes, FLOOD4 and NORCOOL-I, are first verified against
results obtained in experiments with the REWET-II facility which
has a triangular array of fuel rod simulators. Using these computer
codes, the reflooding is then investigated in a tight-pitch rod
bundle. The results seem to indicate that the emergency core cooling
in the tight-pitch lattice is no more difficult than the emergency
cooling of the core lattice in the VVER-440 reactor simulated by
the REWET-II facility.
1. INTRODUCTION
During recent years several authors (e.g./-1 ... 5 I) have proposed to
improve the fuel utilization of the pressurized water-reactors by reducing
the moderator-to-fuel volume ratio (VH20 /VUO ) from about 1.5-Z.0 to about
0.5. The low moderator volume fraction is a~hieved with a triangular fuel
rod arrangement. By using PU02/UOZ fuel, high conversion ratios (>0.9) are
possible in this kind of advanced pressurized water reactor (APWR) core, cf.
expecially reference L-5_1. In Table 1 typical characteristics of APWR
fuel assemblies are given.



















Thermal-hydraulics of the AP~R ~uring ~ l~ss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) have
been studied in references / 3 / and i 6 /. In this paper the same problemacy
is approached from a differ~nt-directIon~ Our starting point will be the
experiments in the REWET-II reflood facility on the emergency core cooling (ECC) .
The REWET-II test section resembles in certain aspects the APWR core configu-
ration. The experiments will serve to verify two reflood codes, FLOOD4 and
NORCOOL-1. Using these codes, the reflooding will then be investigated in a
tight-pitch rod bundle.
2. REWET-II REFLOOD EXPERIllENT FACILITY
The REWET-II reflood facility /-7 7, jointly built by the Technical Re-
search Centre of Finland and Lappee~ra~ta University of Technology, has been
0Eer~tional_si~ce fall 1981. First results have been published in references
/ 8 / and i 9 /. In Table 2 the main characteristics of the facility are given.
The-refere~ce-powerplant is the Loviisa VVER-440 plant, Figure 1.











Number of rods in bundle
ECC injection locations
Heating power of fuel rod
simulators
Average linear heating power
Flow rate (cold level rise)
System pressure
Maximum surface temperature



















As seen in Tables 1 and 2, the REHET-II test section, Figure 2a, is quite
similar to the APHR configuration. The fuel rod simulators are in the triangu-
lar array, their length and outer diameter are close to the dimensions of the
APHR fuel rods. The REHET-II spacer grids are different and, of course,the
lattice pitch is larger than in the APHR fuel assembly.
3. REFLOOD CALCULATIONS
Two computer codes, FLOOD4 and NORCOOL-I, have been used to analyze the
REHET-II reflood experiments /-9 7. The FLOOD4 code has been developed at the
INEL, U.S.A., in the Semiscal~ p~ogram /-10 7; the NORCOOL-I code is a product
of the Nordic reactor safety project L-l1_7~
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3.1 Verification of the Computer Codes
Two standard experiments have been chosen to represent typical REWET-II
experiments. The results and main parameters of these experiments are given
in Figures 3a and 4a. In the beginning of the experiments the lower plenum is
full of cooling water. In the first experiment, Figure 3a, the ECC water is
injected into the downcomer only. In the second experiments, Figure 4a, the
same total flow of ECC water is divided between the downcomer and the upper
plenum (comhined injection).
These standard experiments have heen calculated using the codes FLOOD4
and NORCOOL-I. The results are given in Figures 3h and 3c for the first ex-
periment, and in Figures 4b and 4c for the second experiment.
The two codes can reproduce relatively weIl the first standard experiment,
especially the quenching times in the hottest region of the test section (cf.
curves 3 and 4 in Figures 3) are close to the measured values. In the second
experiment, Figures 4, the agreement between the measured and calculated re-
sults is more qualitative. In both cases, FLOOD4 seems to give more reliable
results than NORCOOL-I.
3.2 Calculations with a Tight-Pitch Test Section
In what follows the REWET-II test section in Figure 2a is replaced by a
fictitious "APWR test section" shown in Figure 2b. The rods remain exactly the
same, but the lattice pitch is reduced from 12.2 mrn to 10.1 mm. Consequently,
the water-to-rod volume ratio of the test section is reduced from about 1.2
to 0.47. Helical wires are used instead of the honeycomb spacers.
With this APWR test section in the REWET-II facility, the two standard ex-
periments have been calculated for two values (600 °c and 700 °C) of the maxi-
mum initial cladding temperature. The case of the higher initial temperature
(700 °C) is illustrated in Figures 5.
In the first standard experiment both codes agree in the quenching behav-
ior of the hottest region (Figures 5a and 5b). As earlier in Figures 3b and 3c,
the top quenching (cf. curve 5) predicted by FLOOD4 is not seen in the NORCOOL-I
results. Hence, the maximum cladding temperatures differ in the upper part of
the test section. In the second standard experiment NORCOOL-I did not manage
to give reasonable results; only FLOOD4 results are shown here in Figure 5c.
Compared with the experiments in Figures 3 and 4, the results in Figures 5
seem to indicate that under similar conditions the quenching times are slightly
shorter in the APWR test section than in the normal REWET-II test section,
especially in the hottest region near and above the test section mid-plane.
FLOOD4 calculations of the two standard experiments have been performed
also with reduced linear heating power and ECC flow rate in the APlvR test sec-
tion. This reduction corresponds to the fact that in a given core volume there
would be more fuel rods in the APWR case. Sampie results of these calculations
are ShO'Vll in Figures 6a and 6b. Compared with Figures 5a and 5c, the quenching
rate of the hottes region is even still higher in this case.
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4. CONCLUSIONS
An investigation on reflooding in a tight-pitch rod lattice has been per-
formed using two codes, FLOOD4 and NORCOOL-I. The codes have been verified
against the results obtained in two "standard" experiments with the REIfET-lI
facility. This reflood facility is designed to simulate the LOCA conditions
in a VVER-440 reactor. The REWET-II test section resembles in certain aspects
the APWR configurations proposed.
The results obtained in chapter 3.2 seem to indicate that the emergency
core cooling in the tight-pitch lattice is no more difficult than in the
VVER-440 core lattice, the rod dimensions being the same in the two cases.
Under similar conditions even slightly higher reflooding rates are obtained
in the tight-lattice case. Although parallel to results in /-3 7 these re-
sults are not directly comparable with the earlier studies Z-3=7 and L-6_7.
Finally, the need for experiments should be pointed out. In addition to
the eventual verification of the results obtained, these experiments would
off er a severe test problem to the reflood computer codes.
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Figure 1. Simulation of the VVER-440 reactor vessel













Figure 2. a) Cross section of the REIVET-II test section.












































































Figure 3-, Results and parameters of the first standard experiment
(downcomer ECC injection)
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Figure 4. Results and parameters of the seeond standard experiment
(eombined ECC injeetion)

































































E C C INJECTION
LOCATION
0.0345·0.0345 kg/t; ElEVAllONs:
6.5 W/em 1. 430 mm
700'0 2. 687 mm
3.11&5 mm
DOWNCOMEA + 4. 1786 mm












Figure S. Results of the APWR test section
a) FLOOD4 calculation of the first standard experiment
b) NORCOOL-I calculation of the first standard experiment
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Figure 6. Results of the APliR test section; average linear power and
total flow rate have been reduced by a factor 0.685
a) FLOOD4 calculation of the first standard experiment
b) FLOOD4 calculation of the second standard experiment.
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PREDICTION OF REFLOODING IN SINGLE CHANNELS
AND PARTIALLY-BLOCKED ROD BUNDLES
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ABSTRACT
A mathematlcal model to Investlgate the Influence of system parameters on the
f10w and heat transfer durlng refloodlng Is described. The model employs
equatlons for momentum and enthalpy of vapour and liquid phases; correlatlons
are used to determlne fluid frletlon and heat transfer as funellons of f10w
regime and loeal eondltions. Caleulallons whleh predlet a seleetlon of the
UKAEA REFLEX single-ehannel experiments are reported. These show the
effeets of pressure . heat generation. Inlet subeoollng and f10w rate.
Reasonably good agreement w/lh experiment has been obtalned. The
three-dimenslonal f10w In a partially-bloeked rod bundle Is also examined.
Caleulations for a geometry typlcal of eurrent designs w/lh flow and boundary
values based on the PWR-FLECHT tests are reported.
INTRODUCTION
The refloodlng of a reactor eore is an Important stage In the recovery from a
Loss-of-Coolant-Aeeldent. It beg Ins when emergeney eore eooling water first
reaches the fuel rods and contlnues until the eore Is quenched. Prior to reflood.
eladdlng temperatures may rlse to values at whleh water eannot wet the wall. The
heat-transfer processes oecurrlng durlng reflood are therefore very eomplex and
conslderatlon of several f10w regimes Is required.
Much experimental work has bean earrled out to galn a deeper understandlng
of the f1uld-f1ow and heat-transfer meehanlsms wh Ich oeeur during reflood. Thls
work usually Involves tests on single heated rods or ehannels. llJ and [21. and In
some eases rod bundles [31. although the lalter are usually aimed at providlng
overall Information for safety analysis rather than detalled Inslghts Into the f10w
behavlour. Analytical models of reflood also fall broadly Into two eategorles. those
whleh rely heavlly on large-scale experimental data. and those whieh employ
detalled mathemallcal deserlptlons of the loeal physleal processes. using emplrleal
eorrelations to model local heat. mass and momentum transfer.
The reflood model used In the present study Is of the lalter kind. and was
developed uslng a general. multi-dimensional. two-phase f10w program PHOENICS
[4]. The model was first used to Investigate the effeet on predleted refloodlng
behavlour of different heat-transfer assumptions. In partieular. the f10w regimes
and correspondlng correlallons for wall-to-f1uld heat-transfer used In codes such as
RELAP and TRAC were examlned. A prevlous study [5] showed that the quench rate
predieted for CSNI standard problem number 7 [6] varied between one-half and four
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limes the expeTlmental value, depending on the correlatlons employed. Of the
correlalions which were studied, those used In the TRAG code appeared to give
closest agreement with this experimental case.
The present paper describes further applicalions of the model to slngle-channel
reflood experiments, and an extension to a three-dlmenslonal case In whlch a rod
bundle is partlally blocked. The resulls of the UKAEA REFLEX experiments [21
show the influence of pressure, heat generalion, subcoollng and Inlet f10w rate on
refloodlng. The purpose of the one-dimensional calculatlons was to assess whether
the assumplions used for f10w regimes and empirlcal correlallons remalned valid
over a range of condltlons.
The three-dlmensional study was almed at determinlng the two-phase f10w
behavlour in a parlially blocked rod bundle. Results are reported for a typical
bundle geometry, the Inlet f10w rates and boundary condillons belng based on the
PWR-FLEGHT tests. Attention Is focussed on the stage of reflood before the
quench front reaches the ballooned region, the f10w condllions at thls time belng
the most crucial In terms of maximum cladding temperatures obtained.
ANALYSIS AND SOLUTION METHOD
Governlng Differential Equatlons
The general two-phase, three-dimenslonal transient conservalion equalions
solved In PHOENIGS may be wrltlen in the form:
8 -8t (PlRl~) + dlv(PlRlul~ + r~grad~) = S~
where 4> Is the dependent variable, P the denslly, u the vector velocily, R the
volume fractlon, r~ the dlffusive exchange coefficient for ~, S~ the source of ~ per
unlt volume, and the subscrlpt i denotes the phase concerned.
In the three-dlmenslonal cases consldered, equalions of the above form are
solved for slx velocity components (one for each phase In each coordinate
directlon) and for the enthalpy of each phase. The pressure, whlch Is presumed
common to both phases, and the volume fractlons, are determlned from the
conlinulty equatlons, whlch are of the same form as above wlth ~=1. In the
one-dimensional model of the single-channel experiments, only two velocity
equalIons are requlred. However, a wall temperature equalion of the form:
~t (PwTw) - dlv(kwgradTw) = ST
Is also solved so that the effect ofaxial conduclion, whlch is slgnlflcant In the
region of the quench front. can be Included.
The effects of pressure and gravlty are Included as source terms. Additional
source terms represent the effects of interphase and wall-to-fluld momentum, heat
and mass transfer; these contain coefficients whlch are obtained in most Instances
from emplrlcal correlations, which in turn depend on the f10w regime. The f10w
regimes considered In the model are shown in Table 1. It can be seen that the
local wall temperature and the vold fraclion are the most important parameters In
determlnlng the regime. The wall temperatures at wh Ich regime changes occur
are the liqUid-saturation temperature, Tsat, the crilical-heat-f1ux temperature, Tchf
and the minlmum-fllm-bolling temperature, Tmin'
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The wall-to-fluld heat-transfer coefflclents for the varlous regimes are taken
from the TRAC code [81. and are outlined in Table 2. The mathematlcal forms of
the exchange coefflclents and souree terms. together wlth the correlatlons for
Interphase frlctlon and heat transfer. and for wall-fluid frlctlon. are descrlbed in
detail by Glynn. Rhodes and Tatchell [5],
Solution Method
The calculatlon domaln Is dlvlded Into a number of grid cells. The differential
equations are approxlmated by flnlte-domaln equatlons whlch are solved uslng the
IPSA algorlthm of Spaldlng 1981 [9], The solution is obtalned by a tlme-marchlng
method whlch Is fully Impllcit. Thls means that at each time step durlng the
solution. all quantltles (except of course the prevlous-tlme value in the transient
term) are evaluated at the new time level. This necessltates Iteration at each
time step. but ensures that stable solutIons can be obtained even when large time
steps are used. Flow regimes are. however. flxed according to prevlous-tlme-step
values.
Computer Program
The solution scheme outllned above Is embodied In a general-purpose f1uld-flow
computer code called PHOENICS [4], The use of a general code has allowed
much of the reflood problem to be set up through standard 'swltch-on' options.
The emplrlcal Information bullt into the model is provlded In special user
subroutlnes.
PRESENTATION OF RESULTS
Predlctlons of the UKAEA-REFLEX Experiments
(a) Definition of the test cases
The test section In the REFLEX rlg comprlses a vertlcal heated tube made of
Inconel 600, whlch Is 3. 59m long, 12.56mm Inside diameter and 15.87mm outside
diameter. A range of tests has been performed wlth varylng pressure. inlet water
subcooling. flow rate and tube wall heatlng. Three tests have been chosen for
analysis. these being Runs 92. 107 and 129. The test condltlons are given In
Table 3.
(b) Computational details
In order to resolve the steep gradlents of temperature and heat flux In the
quench front region. and hence account accurately for heat conductlon In the tube
wall. a fine grld Is requlred. A movlng grid treatment Is used which employs a
flne-grld region of unlformly-spaced cells. centred on the quench front and movlng
with It. The remalnder of the tube Is dlvlded into larger cells. whlch are
redistributed as necessary so as to preserve an approxlmately uniform distribution.
The grids and time steps used for the three runs are set out in Table 4. These
values were cho$en after some initial calculatlons had shown that they were
adequate for the predictlons to be substantlally independent of grid and time step.
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(cl Comparlson of predlctions wlth experiments
The f10w regime whlch Is establlshed at the beglnnlng of reflood depends on
the rate of Injectlon of liquid. the wall temperature. liquid subcoollng. and system
pressure. For example. wlth large subcoollng and high flow rate. a column of
liquid would develop. thus formlng an Inverse-annular f10w regime. If the wall
temperature Is above the minimum fllm-bolling temperature. as Is usually the case.
then water cannot wet the wall. and coollng Is obtalned by convectlon of the steam
generated from bolling of the liquid column and dlspersed droplets. The
heat-transfer ooefflolents assoolated wlth thls f10w regime are relatively low. and It
Is not untll the wall temperature reaohes Tmln that alternative flow regimes bring
Into play meohanlsms whloh permit greater heat-transfer. When thls oocurs. the
wall temperature falls rapldly to near the liquid saturation temperature. thus formlng
a quenoh front wh loh moves gradually up the ohannel. Ahead of the quenoh
front. the wall temperature may rlse If there Is suffflolent heat generation.
Eventually. however. It beg Ins to fall as the quenoh front approaohes.
The predloted variations of quenoh front position. pressure-drop and wall
temperature at 1.25m are oompared wlth experimental data. for the three cases
oonsldered. In Figures 1 to 3.
The predlcted quenoh front positions. Figure 1. all show a rate of quenchlng
whloh Is slower than experiment at the beglnning of reflood. but whlch Inoreases
later on. The overall heat-transfer Is evldently too low In the early stages. An
extreme example Is Run 129. where the onset of quenohlng is delayed beoause the
heat-transfer ooefflcient predlcted by the film-bolllng correlatlon appears to be too
low for the looal condltlons. and some time was taken for the tube to 0001 to Tmln'
The rapid quenohlng In the later stages of reflood. partloularly for Runs 92 and 129
may be a result of too high a value predicted for Tmln as mentloned below.
The overall pressure drop data are glven In Figure 2. It can be seen that the
predloted values are lower than those measured. partlcularly for Run 92, The
pressure-drop Is approxlmately equal to the hydrostatlo head In the tube. The
under-predlctlon may. therefore. Indioate that interphase frlotlon Is too high. and
that water passes through the tUbe too qulckly. It should be noted. however. that
the measured value at the beglnning of the translent has. for eaoh case. a value
of about 104 N/m2 . It may be that this offset is a feature of the Instrumentation
and should be subtraoted from the data before oomparison wlth the predlotions. If
thls Is the oase. then the two sets of data are In qulte good agreement.
It Is Interestlng to note the predloted fluotuatlon In pressure drop in Run 129 at
about 30s. Thls Is oaused by a change in f10w regime from inverse-annular to
annular. A slmilar change was predlcted at about the same time for Run 107.
Run 92. however. was predloted to have an annular f10w regime from the
beginnlng. probably due to the low f100ding rate and zero subcoollng.
The wall temperature variations at 1.25m height are shown in Figure 3.
These compare reasonably weil with experimental data. The most noteable feature
Is the wall temperature at whloh quenohing oocurs. The predictions indlcate a
value of Tmln of about 4000C or sllghlly above. The experiment shows a
somewhat lower value. In the region of 3500C. Thls dlfferenoe in Tmln may
explain the more rapid rate of quenohing predicted. the tube wall not havlng to 0001
to such a low temperature before the correlatlons whlch predlot a hlgher
heat-transfer ooefflcient are brought into use by the regime selection crlterla.
Overall. the predlctions are in reasonable agreement with the experimental
data. particularly If the discrepancy In pressure drop oan be explalned by a
oonstant offset in the experimental data, More Importantly. the heat-transfer and
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frietlon eorrelations used in the model appear to have responded eorreetly to the
varying reflood eonditions.
Bloeked Rod-Bundle Analysis
(a) Definition of the test ease
The system eonsidered Is a regular square matrix of elosely-spaeed fuel pins in
an 11x11 array. A bloeked region has been assumed to form In the eentral
region of the bundle. due to elad ballooning. A 360mm length of the bundle Is
eonsldered. the bloekage belng loeated In the mlddle. and havlng a length of
120mm. The diameter of the underformed rods Is 9.5mm and the piteh 12.6mm.
It is assumed that the deformed rods swell until they just touch. Thls results In a
bloekage of about 600/0. Figure 4 gives the geometry eonsldered. other
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One quarter of the rod bundle was eonsidered. as shown In Figure 4. One
grld eell per sub-ehannel was used in the eross-stream plane. wlth 18 divisions In
the axial dlreetlon. Thus. the grld used was 6x6x18. Steady-state and translent
ealeulations were performed. the former wlth flxed amounts of IIquld-droplet mass
Inflow. and the laller wlth a varylng liquid inflow.
(c) Typleal results
Typieal results from the model are shown In Figures 5 and 6 in the form of gas
and liquid velocity veetor plots. and graphs showlng the axial variations of rod
temperature,
The gas phase veloeitles. Figure 5. show that the gas Is defleeted around the
bloekage. eauslng an Inerease In velocity at the outside of the bundle, Wlthln the
bloekage. the gas velocity Is simJlar to that at inlet. although the mass flow Is
redueed by the defleetlon of gas Into the outer region. Dlreetly above the
bloekage. where the flow area onee again expands to the normal value. the gas
veloeites are mueh redueed. The liquid droplet veloeitles are not unduly Influeneed
by the gas defleetlon. therefore the inertla of the droplets at Inlet earry them
through the bloeked region at the same rate, Withln and direetly above the
bloeked region. the liquid veloeitles gradually reduee due to the influenee of gravity
and the low gas veloeitles providlng relatlvely Jlllle interphase frlctlon.
Axial distributions of rod temperature are shown In Figure 6 for the seven rods
Indieated In Figure 4. Outside the bloekage. rods 6 and 7. the temperatures do
not vary greatly. Areduction to about 42000 Is evident In the eentre of the
bundle. where the gas velocity Is higher. The rods assoelated wlth the bloeked
region all show a similar behaviour. Thelr temperature inereases up to the
bloekage. fall wlthln the bloekage where a greater heat-transfer area Is avaJlable.
and rlse outside the bloekage where gas vEiloelties are low and areas are redueed.
The hlghest temperature. about 68000. oeeurs In the rod nearest the eentre of the
bloekage. Towards the exlt of the bundle the rod temperatures faJl due to the
erossflow of cooler gas expandlng Into the region above the bloekage.
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The predicted behaviour of the three-dimensional f10w in a blocked rod bundle
appears to be qualltativeiy simllar to that observed experimentaily. in particular;
the blocked region iso perhaps contrary to expectation. reasonably weil cooled.
The presence of water droplets ensure that the steam does not become superheated
In the blockage. and hence good coollng is maintalned despile the reduced steam
f1ow. Thls general behaviour has been conflrmed experlmentally [3J.
Concluding Remarks
Thls paper has presented reflood predlctions for slngle-channel and
partially-blocked rod-bundle cases. Single channel modelling studles have shown
that reasonable agreement between predlction and experiment for quench front
position and wall temperature Is obtalned. but that pressure-drop Is somewhat
underpredlcted. Further work Is requlred to provide some fine tuning of the
heat-transfer and friction correlations employed. However. the basic set appear
to respond reasonably weil to changes in reflood condltions.
The three-dlmenslonal predictions of a partially blocked rod bundle show
encouraglng qualitative agreement wlth experimental data. Predlctlon of particular
experimental cases and more detailed comparlsons would provlde greater Inslght
Into the f10w behavlour and heat transfer. A three-dlmensional model. thus
valldated. could then be used to predlct behavlour In reactor condltlons.
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COMPARISON OF CALCULAjIONS USING TRE BEST ESTI}~TE REFLOOD REAT
TRANSFER CODE BART-Al WITR DATA FROM TRE FEBA AND REBEKA FACILITIES




BART-Al is a Westinghouse computer code which provides a mechanistic
evaluation of heat transfer during the reflood stage of a large Loss
of Coolant Accident (LOCA) in a Pressurised Water Reactor. The
code has been used by NNC in support of the reactor safety"case with
respect to the consequences of fuel clad swelling or ballooning during
a LOCA. In support of this application of the code to the safety
case, an extensive programme of validation of all aspects of the
modelling is in progress. In this paper, the results of comparisons
of the code with experimental data from two FEBA tests (0% and 90%
sub-channel flow area blockage) and with the REBEKA6 experiment are presented.
Reasonable agreement with the data is obtained and the results
confirm that the code provides a generally adequate description
of the heat transfer process during core reflood.
INTRODUCTION
The safety case for LOCA in the UK is based on the use of an Evaluation
Model, which complies with the requirements of Appendix K to 10CFRSO. In
the development of the safety case, all aspects of the modelling in the
Evaluation Model have been investigated in detail to assess the conservatism
embodied in calculations using this methodology. An aspect that has
received considerable attention in the UK is the phenomenon of fuel clad
ballooning during a LOCA. A considerable programme of model development,
experimental work and calculations have been undertaken to confirm that this
phenomenon will not resul t in calculated clad temperatures in excess of the
appropriate limit. The Evaluation Model calculates the consequences of
ballooning via astrain and blockage definition using the NUREG-0630
prescription coupled with a blockage steam cooling assumption prescribed
by Appendix K. To determine the adequacy of this modelling technique, an
alternative calculational method was developed which evaluated clad burst
strain and rupture via a more mechanistic approach and which resulted in
a conservative estimate of the flow blockage which was greater in axial and
radial extent than via NUREG-0630. To determine the coolability of such a
blockage the Westinghouse mechanistic reflood heat transfer code BART [1]
was used which models explicitly the effect of entrained drops in the steam
flow in reflood heat transfer. In support of this application an extensive
programme of further validation of the BART code has been undertaken,
particularly related to ballooning and flow blockage experiments. This paper
discusses the results of comparisons of the code with data from two FEBA
tests and from the REBEKA 6 experiment.
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TRE BART CODE
The BART code is a non-equilibrium, non-homogeneous two phase fluid
model. Details of the code have been described elsewhere [2] and thus only
abrief outline will be provided below.
Moving up the channel the code models a variety of flow regimes from
subcooled liquid at the bottom of the test section or fuel bundle to a
saturated boiling region, a quench front, an inverted annular film boiling
region, a transition flow region, and in the upper part of the bundle, a
dispersed flow region. Early in the transient, if conditions are such that
entrainment of drops is not possible, then a single phase vapour region is
modelIed.
The dispersed flow region is a very important regime for reflood blockage
heat transfer process. The dispersed region consists of a highly superheated
steam phase with entrained liquid drops. The mechanis~s for heat transfer from
the rod surface to the fluid that are modelIed in the code, are forced
convection to vapour and direct radiation to the fluid. The forced convection
coefficient accounts for the presence of drops in the steam flow. Desuper-
heating of the vapour is accounted for by droplet to vapour heat transfer.
Specific models are incorporated in the code to account for the effects
of spacer grids, both in terms of their effects on the clad axial strain
profile and on the reflood heat transfer process. The grid heat transfer
effects include improved heat transfer due to the reduced sub-channel
flow area and due to flow disturbances,and grid rewetting which improves heat
transfer by desuperheating the steam.
Astrain and blockage model is also incorporated in BART. The code
calculates clad temperatures circumferentially around the clad as weIl as
axially along the rod and clad rupture is calculated via a local clad strain
limit. This limit will be exceeded locally due to calculated variations in
temperature around the clad due to assumed eccentricity of the fuel pellet or
heate~ rod. The strain is calculated to translate into a subchannel flow
blockage via several optional idealised flow blockage models. A two channel
model is employed to calculate flow diversion around the blockage.
TRE FEBA TESTS
The FEBA facility (Ref. 2)at Kernforschungzentrum Karlsruhe has been
designed to provide data on the effects of grids and subchannel flow blockage
on the reflood heat transfer process. The bundle consists of a SxS array of
full length rads and the test section is forced flooded from the bot tom at a
constant flood rate. ~,o tests are examined in this paper, Test 229 "hich
modelIed six grids and no flow blockage, and Test 239 which had identical
fluid boundary conditions to Test 229, and modelIed a short 90% flow blockage
across a 3x3 array in one corner of the bundle at the midplane.
Several parameters from Test 229 are shO'lll in Figure 1. The quench
front advance up the bundle is weIl predicted by the code as are the steam
temperatures. This is an indication that BART is modelling the details of
the two phase heat transfer process reasonably weIl. The clad temperature
comparisons indicate that the code accurately calculates lower and mid bundle
temperatures while overpredicting temperatures near the top of the bundle by
~lOOoC. It is noted that no model of the FEBA shroud is incorporated in the
code which can be expected to have same influence on temperatures in the small
1639
FEBA bundle.
Figure 2 sho",s comparisons of key parameters from Test 239. THo BART
calculations are presented. In one all the entrained drops in the steam flo",
",ere assumed to carry on through the blockage. In the other some drops are
diverted from the blockage in a manner nominally analogous to that assumed
in safety case modelling. The drops are assumed to remain in the bypass
channel once diverted.
The clad axial profile comparison sho",s that BART reasonably accurately
predicts the temperature variation along the rod for the case ",ith all drops
assumed to carry through the blockage. The effect of the grids in the
calculation can be seen as dips in the calculated clad temperature transient
at the appropriate elevations. The blockage is seen to have a small effect on
the clad temperature in both the calculation and data ",ith the temperature
just do",nstream of the blockage overpredicted by ~60oc and further dOIYnstream
by ~IOOoC, as in Test 229. It is noted that the shroud introduces strong
radial temperature gradients across the FEBA blockage and thus care must be
taken in comparing calculated clad temperatures ",ith data from different
blocked rods. The indications from interpolations of available data are
that BART ",ould overpredict the data by less than 600 C just dOIYnstream of the
blockage if the appropriate thermocouple measurements ",ere available.
The case ",ith some drops diverted from the blocked channel substantially
overpredicts the clad temperatures ",ithin and dOHnstream of the blockage. The
overprediction can be seen in Figure 2 to be of order 200-250oC. This latter
result sholvs the importance of the presence of drops in the steam flo", in
limiting steam superheat and thus reducing clad temperatures.
TRE REBEKA 6 EXPERIHENT
The REBEKA 6 experiment [3] is an out-of-pile test at Kernforschungzenturn
Karlsruhe designed to investigate fuel rod straining, rupture and flo", blockage
heat transfer in rod bundle during a simulated large LOCA reflood transient.
REBEKA models a large 7x7 full length fuel bundle and all but three of the rods
",ere pressurised. The bundle ",as force reflooded at a constant rate and at
a constant system pressure. All the pressurised rods strained and ruptured.
The test ",as designated a blind standard problem (German Standard Problem
No.7 and International Standard Problem No.14) and BART predictions of the test
Ivere made ",ithout access to any of the thermohydraulic or mechanical data. The
BART model assumes an eccentricity of the heater element ",ithin the clad ",hich
results in a temperature difference around the clad and thus non-uniform strain
and rupture based on a local burst strain criterion. An appropriate
eccentricity for input to BART ",as derived by separate BART and TAPSWEL analysis
of the REBEKA 5 test. The latter code is a t",o-dimensional thermal conduction
code ",hich uses input heat transfer parameters from BART and a range of
eccentricities to calculate a range of burst strains. BART requires a single
value of eccentricity to represent an average rod in the bundle.
The BART blind analysis provided predictions of a number of parameters
including clad temperatures, rupture strains, rupture times and flo", blockage.
Burst of all the rods occurred as ",as predicted. Key parameters from the
test are sho",n in Figure 3. Reasonable predictions of clad rupture strain
and clad to coolant heat transfer ",ere made. Ho",ever the clad burst
temperatures, pressures and times",ere less ",eIl predicted and BART over-
estimated the time to initiation of entrainment of ",ater drops early in the
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reflood. The latter is a characteristic of many BART forced reflood test
predictions. The quench front progression was also significantly underestimated
by the code.
Temperatures dOIVllstream of the blockage I,ere significantly overpredicted.
This was partly due to the quench front underprediction but was mainly
influenced by the premature wetting of the burst sites which occurred in the
test. No codes are available which can calculate appropriately this powerful
beneficial feature of this dynamic ballooning experiment.
Further calculations have been undertaken post-test after results of the
data were released. These further calculations were based on a better definition
of the test boundary conditions, included some changes to the BART modelling,
and incorporated some further developments to the code, particularly related
to the modelling of the initiation of droplet entrainment. These calculations
have resulted in a significant improvement in the quench front modelling and
reduced clad temperatures somewhat at upper elevations, though the code still
overpredicts the data. More importantly, the post-test analysis has provided
an accurate simultaneous calculation of burst strain, rupture time, burst
temperature and burst pressure.
Flow blockage was overpredicted somewhat in both sets of analysis.
This is to be expected since the calculational model assurnes coplanar strain
and rupture. There is some evidence that the external thermocouples may have
influenced to a small extent the amount of non-coplanarity in the test. The
premature quenching of burst sites is an obviously important feature of the
REBEKA experiment that can significantly affect clad temperature results.
The reproducibility of such effects for other fluid conditions is an area
worth further investigation.
CONCLUSIONS
1. BART calculations of flow blockage tests in the FEBA and REBEKA
facilities have been presented. These results indicate that the code
can produce reasonably accurate or conservative predictions of the key
data for the fluid conditions in these tests.
2. The comparison with test data had led to improvements in the
code modelling. These improvements will, of course, also be tested
against other experimental data.
3. The calculations and detailed examination of the data has led to
increased understanding of a number of characteristics of the tests
not modelled by the code including the influence of the shroud in
FEBA, premature quenching of burst sites and possible effects of
external thermocouples in REBEKA.
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IN-PILE INVESTIGATIONS AT THE PHEBUS FACILITY OF THE BEHAVIOR
OF PWR-TYPE FUEL BUNDLES IN TYPICAL L.B. LOCA TRANSIENTS
EXTENDED TO AND BEYOND THE LIMITS OF ECCS CRITERIA
J. DUCO, M. REOCREUX, A. TATTEGRAIN
Ph. BERNA, B. LEGRAND, M. TROTABAS
Commissariat ä 1 'Energie Atomique, France
ABSTRACT
An in-pile investigation is currently carried out at the PHEBUS facility
of the behavior of .8m active height, 25-rod PWR-type fuel bundles during
simulated large-break LOCA (L.B. LOCA) reactor transients. A first series
of six tests using pressurized rods is to be completed by the end of 1984,
relative to a conservatively calculated 2-peak cladding temperature
transient at the hot point, as considered in the French 900 MW{e) PWR
standard safety report. The severity of such a transient has been
increased in the tests so as to check the bundle behavior at the limits of
the first two NRC ECCS criteria, which were, in fact, locally exceeded in
one test. Three of the tests are reportec1 on hereunder. Short coplanar
cladding balloonings were ohserved at the hot point level, which resulted
in maximum flow blockage ratios of about 50%. Severe cladding
embri ttl ement agai nst thermal shock and subsequent handl i ng was observed
in the test where the cri teri a were exceeded. Predi cti on of the overall
thermal-hydraulic behavior in the bundle was good, using the RELAP 4 MOD 6
code. Cladding strains are generally overevaluated by codes such as
FRAPT 4 or CUPIDON, which currently do not take into account azimuthal
cladding temperature gradients. Other L.B. LOCA test series are envisaged
from 1986 on, based on transients calculated with "physical" models.
OBJECTIVES
The general objective of stage 2 part 1 of the PHEBUS programme to be
comp1eted by the end of 1984 i s to i nvest i gate the actua1 i n-pil e behavi our of
.8m active height, 25-rod PWR-type pressurized fuel bundles, during the course
of conservatively calculated L.B. LOCA 2-peaktransients, such as those
considered in the French 900 MW{e) PWR standard safety reports. The severity of
the 2nd peak of such transients has been intentionally increased, by an
adequate control of the driver core power and delaying bundle reflooding, so as
to reach the NRC ECCS criteria limits, as regards maximum cladding temperature
and maximum cladding oxidation (Fig.l); this is expected to provide insight
into the adequacy and the possible margins of conservatism of such limits for
zircaloy embrittlement against thermal shock on reflooding, once the cladding
has endured the full 2-peak-type transient.
The particular objectives can be identified as follows :
a) the qualification in a bundle-type geometry of the cladding deformation
and rupture models as derived from the single-rod EDGAR tests, and the
supplying of adequate data sets for the qualification of any further
development of these models which could be required ; a possible residual
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effect on deformati on of the brief cl adding temperature foray beyond theO< /~
metallurgical phase transus at the first peak is particularly to be
investigated ;
b) The assessment of the maximum flow blockage ratios that could be
reached during the transient, their iwpact on possible cladding failure
propagation modes, and the obtention of data whichcould be used to evaluate
the cool ability of damaged reactor assemblies ;
c) The supplying of data as regards cladding oxidation behavior
verification of the predictions given by current zircaloy oxidation model s,
axial extent of internal oxidation in failed rods, structure of oxidized
cladding (extent of Zr 02, 0\ - Zr (0) brittle layers, etc .•. ) ;
d) The assessment of the actual capability of deformed claddings, oxidized
up to 17% wall thickness according to a given temperature history, to withstand
thermal shock during PWR prototypical refloodings ; the capability at ambient
temperature for the bundle to resist other loads which might arise from
post-test handling, storage and transport is also to be assessed.
The above objectives appeal' as the best compromise between some current
safety analysis issues and the existing capabilities of the PHEBUS facility.
PHEBUS will be stopped for one year at the end of 1984 and upgraded. The test
campaign will be resumed in early 1986, involving L.B. LOCA (stage 2 part 2)
and SFD experiments (stages 3 and 4 of the program) . Among the new LOCA test
series considered for implementation at that time, two serious candidates could
be the following :
a) tests for assessing the impact of a significant burn-up on bundle
behavior,
b) tests liable to give major long-ballooning channel blockages during
blowdown. The latter case refers to milder transients than those considered in
the current series, such as those which could be calculated with "physical"
models. Flattening the present "peaky" axial power profile in the test bundle
is aprerequisite, for which some technical solutions are being examined.
TEST MATRIX
The basic cladding temperature history to be simulated in this test series
is a two-peak curve vs time after the onset of depressurization (Fi~. 1). At
the hot point, the temperature rockets within 10 sec to about 920 C at the
first peak (which is 100°C higher than theo<. /13 metallurgical transus of
zircaloy), then drops rapidly below 800°C, before rising briskly to a maximum
value which is attained in about 40-50 sec ; this maximum value is 1100°C 01'
1200°C as a goal, depending on the test. A temperature plateau is maintained at
that level during such a calculated time interval as to attain a given oxidized
fraction of the deformed cladding wall near the balloon ; in view of particular
objective c , the chosen oxidized fractions cover a domain up to the 17% limit
of NRC ECCS cri teri a as a goal. Then, dependi ng on the test, the bundl eis
cooled slowly to preserve the deformed bundle geometry, 01' more rapidly aiming
at the same reflooding velocity as in the PWR case (objective d). Cladding
burst temperature is a test parameter which. i schosen either at 810°C 01' 890°C
as a goal. 890°C refers to the burst temperature as calculated for the reactor
reference transient at the hot point and corresponds to theo( +13 phase of
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zircaloy, whereas 810·C is a tentative to get a larger strain at burst, which
derives from the fact that in the high cf.... -phase, around 810·C, deformations at
burst are larger (objectives a and b). The choice for these temperatures is
based on characteristic values of metallurgical equilibrium states. Actually
there wi 11 be in fact probab1e effects of phase change dyn ami c whi eh will
result from the quick temperature excursion beyond theo(~transus at the first
peak during blowdown. (I
Six tests with pressurized bundles (test numbers 215 P and 215 R, 216,
217, 218 and 219) have been scheduled until the end of 1984- stoppage of
PHEBUS.
Up to now, tests 215 P to 218 have been completed, but the last two too
recently (test 217 carried out on 21 June and test 218 on 19 July) to provide
more than general information. Test results presented hereinafter will
therefore refer to tests 215 P, 215 Rand 216, for which significant analysis
work has been accomplished.
TEST PERFORMANCE
In order to apply to the fuel rods the desired transients as regards the
cladding temperatures and the differential pressures across the clads, the test
train is put in a loop (Fig.2) where the initial conditions reproduce steady
state conditions of the power plant for pressure and temperatures. The
transient conditions are obtained by insulating the test section of the loop
containing the fuel bundle, then by opening two breaks, one on the cold leg and
the other on the hot leg. The total area of the breaks is adjusted in order to
get the desired system pressure history. The break area ratio is set up to
simulate the flows on apower reactor which move to the break through the cold
and hot 1egs, and therefore the fl ow through the core. The 1atter adj ustment
allows the control of the position of the stagnation point and thus the control
of the heat transfer from the rods to the coolant, which means the obtention of
the desired cladding temperature transient. At the end of the blowdown, the
refill of the lower part of the loop is initiated, and is followed by the
bundle reflooding at a controlled inlet flow-rate.
The adjustment of this operational procedure has been obtained during
stage 1 of the PHEBUS program by an iterative approach between
thermal-hydraulic code predictions and experimental results. 15 hydraulic tests
with unpressurized rods have been performed to reach a satisfactory control of
the transients applied to the bundle.
TESTS RESULTS
TEST 215 P
This test, which was the first to use 22 pressurized rods in a bundle, was
carried out on 8 July 1982, with the 2-peak reference transient of Fig.l as a
goal, and relevant experimental results were reported on at the
OECD-NEA-CSNI/fAEA Specialists Meeting at Riso, Denmark in May 1983. The fresh
fue1 was jus t precondi ti onned by previ ous adequate power cycl i ng to fragment
U02 pellets. The anticipated thermal evolution of the cladding was disturbed
firstly by an early, unexpected, non-homogeneous rewet of the bundle during the
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blowdown, which prevented the goal temperature of 920°C from being reached at
the first peak, and secondly by three minor entrainments of water onto the
bundle during the heat-up phase of the transient (Fig. 3), causing the
downwards flow through the bundle to reverse at about 60 sec. The first event
resulted in the enhanced development of 1arge heterogeneities on cl adding
temperature histories which led to unsynchronized, anisotronic cladding
deformati ons, and eventua11 y to flow b1ockage rati os of 83% (si x center rods
with coplanar short ballons), 65% (nine center rods), and 48% for the whole
bundle (apart from the unpressurized rods). The latter low value, which is of
no concern for bundle cooling, is partly due to the flow reversal at about 60
sec, whi eh caused the hot part of the bundl e temperature profil e - a rather
peaky axi al shape i ndeed - to move upwards and subsequentl y to provoke the
ballooning and burst of outer rods at a level higher than the elevation where
the centra1 rods burst.
PIE results proved that maximum cl addi ng oxi dati on i 5 5% close to the
bundle power peak; the extent of internal axial oxidation on both sides of the
burst exceeds 50 mm· for the center rods and i 5 about 30 mm for the outer rods.
U02 pellets are divided into 3 or 4 large fragments, which materially hinders
any significant fuel relocation as the cladding balloons.
Fi ve extra hydraul i c tests wi th nucl ear power, usi ng unpressuri zed test
trains, were conducted between October 1982 and April 1983, to adjust test
parameters so as to avoid unwanted early rewet and insure all the phases of the
reference transient. These led to the successful test 213 G on 14 April 1983,
the parameters of whi eh were used for the specifi cati on of test 215 R wi th a
pressurized bundle.
TEST 215 R
This test was performed on 5 May 1983 with 22 pressurized rods. On Fig. 3
a typi ca1 cl adddi ng temperature hi story i 5 represented for tes t 215 R. The
cladding temperatures at the first peak of the reference transient attained the
maximum value of 1030° C on central rod n° 18, but their average values were
estimated at 850°C and 730°C for the central and external rods, respectively.
After the expected temperature drop of 150 to 250°C at about 15 sec, due to the
fu11 openi ng of the hot 1eg break, the heat-up ramp, starti ng at a rate of
10°C!sec, caused a maximum temperature plateau of 1050°C to be reached without
refill disturbanees, which was maintained about 35 sec, before a progressive
reflooding.
All rods actually pressurized burst at about 25 sec at a mean temperature
of 850°C. Unexpectedly rods nOlO, 15 and 18 did not burst, revealing an initial
lack of tightness. PIE showed a better coplanarity in the bundle of the short
ba1100ns of the rods, just below core mid-plane, than in test 215 P. Unlike
test 215 P, where the burst poi nts of rods were turned towards the bundl e
center, ruptured parts of the cl addings in test 215 R faced undeformed rods
nOlO or 18 (Fig. 4) ; this is due to the fact that these last two rods are
presumably the hottest in test 215 R. Due to large azimuthal cladding
temperature differences, strains at burst and relevant sub-channel blockage
ratios are similar to those obtained in test 215 P (Fig. 5). Total cladding
oxidation reached a maximum of 15% of initial cladding thickness on rods n08
and 13 at core mid-plane. Internal oxidation extended to 113 mm of the burst
point on rod n013, but a standard penetration is rather 70 to 80mm.
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TEST 216
Thi s test was i ntended to be a repeti ti on of test 215 R on a new test
train with 23 pressurized rods, more reactor specific as regards some fuel
assembly features, like the metallurgical cladding variety or the use of mixing
grids. As it so happened, on 1st December 1983, the first cladding peak
temperature was attained as expected, but the temperature failed then to drop
significantly, due to some misoperation of the break valves, so that cladding
bursts were detected at the first peak. The subsequent heat-up phase procured
unexpected plateau temperatures of 1350°C on the hottest rods, at the limit of
the capacity of cladding thermocouples. Test control at the end of the 120 sec
duration plateau was achieved by small repeated water injections, but the
induced di sturbances caused for some cl addi ngs rewets foll owed by dry-outs
before final quenching (Fig.6). It has to be noted that throughout the test no
temperature rise occurred which could not be finally controlled.
PIE revealed smaller cladding strains at burst than in the two previous
tests, resulting in a maximum channel blockage ratio of about 40% for the
external rods just below core mid-plane. Fractured claddings and free pellet
fragments in the bundle (Fig.7) give evidence of severe embrittlement, but it
is presently difficult to attribute such a damage to thermal shock or
subsequent handling of the bundle.
Micrographic examinations of the claddings show that the maximum zirconia
thickness reaches 75 r. m and 62 Mm on the external and internal sides of rod 9
cladding, respectively. Theo(-Zr (0) layer attains a maximum thickness of 140 f'lm
on rod 9 and appears in general more severely cracked than the adj acent
zirconia. Some indication of pellet-cladding reaction is visible on rod 17.
Although test 216 did not reach its original goals, it proeures valuable
information as regards the amplitude of cladding deformation at the first
temperature peak where bursti ng occured. ßesi des, cl addi ng oxi dati on on some
rods went beyond the relevant ECCS criteria limits, which resulted in
si gni fi cant embri ttl ement : further analys i s shoul d gi ve additi onna1 i nsi ght
into the actual margins of such criteria.
TEST INTERPRETATION
Due to the global character of the PHEßUS experiments, the interpretation
has been focused on physical phenomenology and on global code verification.
Physical phenomenology is derived directly from the detailed analysis of the
measurements and of the post irradiation examinations (PIE). After trying to
understand qualitatively what happened, it was seen physically very clearly
that the phenomena governing most of the fuel behavior are the thermalhydraulic
events, including those occurring at the sub-channel scale.
Coplanarity of bursts depends upon each displacement of the hot spot. In
test 215 P, flow reversa1 occurs between the burst of inner rods with a
downwards flow and the burst of outer rods (upwards flow), which explains the
location of bursts in two distinct regions (Fig. 5). In 215 R, flow remains
upwards and leads logically to a better coplanarity at a higher level compared
to 215 P.
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Times of bursts depend upon times at which rupture temperatures are
reached. In 215 P, a large scatter in times is observed due to early rewet
which gives very heterogeneous initial conditions at the onset of the heat-up
phase. In 215 R, tem~eratures are closer to each other, resulting in burst time
differences as low as 2 sec for some categories of rods. Azimuthal cladding
temperature differences are the cause of burst orientation and of large
oxidation differences around a rod. Oxidation is more advanced on the parts of
the rods which are expected to be the hottest as indicated by the burst
orientation.
Tests 215 P and 215 R also show mechanical bundle effects, i .e.
mechanical interactions between rods \~hich depend on times of ballooning and
burst.
Code verification is the second objective of test interpretation. The codes
concerned are those which can currently be used for power plant safety
evaluation in the LOCA case. The codes used are RELAP 4 MOD 6 for
thermalhydraulics and fuel behavior, FRAPT 4 and CUPIDON - which constitutes
the basis of the CATHARE fuel module - for fuel behavior, once the
thermal hydrauli c input i s defi ned. Some CATHARE verifi cati on i s envi saged in
the future.
Successful prediction by RELAP 4 MOD 6 has been confirmed by the correct
assessment of the overall thermalhydraulic behavior in PHEBUS tests (pressures,
break flow, densities ... ) insofar as PHEBUS features could be adequately
modelled.
When measured temperatures are used as an input data to the fuel codes or
are calculated by RELAP 4 MOD 6 by some artifice, thermal behavior of the rods
is predicted accurately (Fig. 8) provided all the details are correctly
modelled (e.g. the thermocouple holes, power profile, ... ). qxidation is also
correctly predicted using the usual correlations of these codes. However, the
mechanical behavior is not as well predicted.
Tabl e I shows that for test 215 P times and temperatures at burst are
under-evaluated by FRAPT 4, slightly over-estimated by CUPIDON, quite correctly
predicted by RELAP 4 MOD 6. The strains are in most cases significantly
over-evaluated.
For 215 R test, times at rupture (Fig.9) seem to be better predicted :
this could be due to a more rapid crossing of the rupture conditions resulting
in less sensitivity to the models. Deficiencies in strain prediction are
obviously due to azimuthal temperature differences which are not taken into
account in these codes. Some calculations with RODSWELL show that introducing
azimuthal heterogeneities on heat transfer and power generation improves
strain predictions.
It is clear that the description of azimuthal effects must be introduced
in codes if one wants to obtain realistic predictions. As the PHEBUS facility
allows for global experiments only, where many effects are combined, aseparate
effect test program has been defined on the EDGAR rig. The following items are
to be studied : impact of the actual material properties and geometry of the
cladding, effect of azimuthal temperature gradient, axial stress and internal
pressure feedback.
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This separate-effect program as well as the next PHEBUS tests are due to give a
better phys i ca1 understand ing of i ndi vi dua1 phenomena and provi de cha11 engi ng
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EXPERIMENT ~ 46<t<66 ~ 1\)840
INNER RODS ie ~
FRAP T 4 86 770 ~ 4.9
CUPIDON 170 847 ~ 3.5
I EXPERIMENT ~ ~
i OUTER RODS ~ ~ 830°C I
(1) at the limit of the ballooned part of the cladding
(2) on the ballooned part of the cladding
TABLE I : PHEBUS TEST 215 P
CmJCLUSION
A detailed control of the PHEBUS facility has been obtained, which
eventually affords a substantial in-pile experiment potential for reproducing
complex LOCA-type, thermal-hydraulic transients.
Although a full prototypicality of PHEBUS tests cannot be obtained, due to
some peculiarities of the facility, such as its atypical bundle power profiles,
L.B. LOCA experiments yield three kinds of valuable results :
a) they provide additional elements of proof as regards the global core
cool ability in the LOCA case ;
b) they constitute a research tool for identifying governing physical phenomena
in complex real-life transients ; such an understanding is aprerequisite for
insuring a comprehensive safety analysis;
c) they procure data sets for code verification and for improvement.
As regards item a) the mai n results of the PHEBUS tests reported on are
the following : no runaway of Zr oxidation and no bundle cool ability impairment
were observed - no cladding embrittlement occurred provided the criteria were
respected, but cl addi ng fractured duri ng reflood i f they were not sati sfi ed
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(central part in test 216) - early cladding burst resulted in aborted
deformation - there was no fuel relocation in deformed eladdings,but only fresh
fuel was used.
From these results two further themes are seri ous candi dates for the
definition of future tests :
- a slower transient in test trains with more uniform power profiles, so as to
maximize flow blockage ;
- the possible relocation in significantly irradiated fuel, liable to proeure a
larger flow bloekage.
For item b), P~EBUS tests highlighted the aeute sensitivity of individual
cladding histories, and resulting cladding burst strains, .to the 3-D local,
transient boundary conditions, such as the sub-channel flow fluctuations. As
such similar variations are expected to occur to some degree in power reactor
fuel assemblies, one may question if they do not definitely preclude a
detailed, accurate code prediction of the phenomena happening in the reaetor
core during a LOCA transient. However, such heterogeneities enhance azimuthal
cladding temperature variations and will lead to smaller channel blockage
ratios than expected in a uniform temperature field.
As concerns item c), PHEBUS tests results confirmed the good qual ity of
the RELAP 4 MOD 6 predictions for the overall thermal-hydraul ics. Conversely
fuel rod mechanical behavior in the bundle is not correctly predicted by
currently available codes (FRAPT 4, CUPIDON). Some code improvements are
presently achieved such as the modelling of the impact of azimuthal
heterogeneities on cladding deformation. Besides, an out-of~pile,
separate-effects test campaign has been initiated in the EDGAR fuel test rig
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RELAP5/MODI ASSESSMENT WITH LOBI-MODI TEST RESULTS
H.Staedtke, W.Kolar, B.Worth
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EURATOM Joint Research Centre - LOBI Project,
Ispra Establishment, 1-21020 ISPRA/Varese, Italy
ABSTRACT
Results of RELAP5 post-test calculations of selected LOBI-Tests , from
the large and intermediate break LOCA test programme, are described.
For each of these tests, two predictions have been performed using
two different code versions of RELAP5/MODl: (1) the original version
of RELAP5/MODI/Cycle 19 as received from INEL/ldaho and converted to
the IBM/AMDAHL computer system at Ispra and (2) an updated version of
RELAP5/MODI which includes several model improvements implemented at
Ispra. Measured key parameters are compared with the predicted
results and the existing discrepancies are analysed. Recommendations
are given for further code improvements needed to increase the re-
liability of the code prediction and to speed up the calculation.
INTRODUCTION
The RELAP5/MODI code is at present extensively used at JRC-Ispra, within
the framework of the LOBI Project, for pre-test and post-test analyses. The
predicted results are mainly used to support the ongoing LOBI test programme.
The experience gained with the code represents in addition a substantial con-
tribution to the independent assessment of RELAP5.
The LOBI test facili ty shown in Fig. 1, is built and operated to
investigate the thermal-hydraulic behaviour of a PWR under off-normal and
accident conditions. The main aim of the LOBI test programme is to provide
experimental data for the independent assessment and verification of large LWR
safety codes /1/.
The LOBI test facility was originally designed to investigate large break
LOCA transients (LOBI-MODI configuration). Within the period from December 1979
to June 1982, 25 large and intermediate break LOCA tests were performed. The
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LOBI-MODI test programme covered the influence of break size, break location,
downcorner configuration, pump control and ECC injection mode. During 1982/83,
the test facility was substantially modified to meet the requirements for the
investigation of small break LOCA and special transients (LOBI-MOD2 configura-
tion). The LOBI-MOD2 small break LOCA test programme started in June 1984. The
results of the small break experiments will not be released prior to the cal-
culation deadline for International Standard Problem No. 18 (LOBI 1% break in
the cold leg pipe).
LOBI TESTS SELECTED FOR RELAP5/MODI ASSESSMENT
From the LOBI large and intermediate break LOCA programme /2/ as carried
out in the period 1979-82, the following tests have been selected as assessment
cases:
Test Al-04, which was the first test of the programme, simulated a 2A-
break in the cold leg pipe of a PWR. For this test, the power to the electric-
ally heated bundle was shut off two seconds after the initiation of the blow-
down. For this reason, the heater rod temperatures showed only a short period
of deviation from nucleate boiling. The test is of interest for code assessment
because there exists only a very small coupling. between the thermal behaviour
of the heater rod bundle and the fluid dynamics in the primary system. For the
test, tpe upper head simulator was disconnected from the system. The test Al-04
was used for a Prediction Exercise (PREX) with international participation.
Test Al-04R was arepetition of test Al-04, but with an electrical power
input which simulated the thermal behaviour of nuclear fuel rods including the
effect of stored heat. The power to the bundle was shut off completely at 50 s
transient time. In this test the upper head simulator was connected to the
downcorner upper annulus and upper plenum. Both test Al-04 and test 'Al-04R were
performed with the large downcomer gap width of 50 mm. As typical for the LOBI
facility with this downcomer configuration, an extended positive core mass flow
resulted in an early rewet of the heater rods during the blowdown period.
Test Al-66 was the first test after the gap width of the internal down-
corner had been reduced from 50 mm to 12 mm. The test was a simulation of a 2A-
break in the cold leg pipe of a PWR. The reduced downcomer volurne resulted in a
more reactor typical core mass flow and heater rod temperature behaviour during
the blowdown period. However, the small downcorner gap width of 12 mm led to a
delay in the penetration of the ECC water into the pressure vessel.
Test Al-06 was arepetition of test Al-66 with nearly the same initial and
boundary conditions. The only difference to test Al-66 was the combined ECC
injection as typical for the German KWU PWR power plants. The ECC water from
the accumulators was injected into the intact loop hot and cold leg and into
the broken loop hot leg. For both tests Al-66 and Al-06, the electrical power
to the heater rod bundle was shut off at 30 s after blowdown initiation.
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CODE VERSIONS USED FOR TEST PREDICTIONS
For the selected tests, post-test predictions were performed wi th two
different vers ions of the RELAP5/MOD1 code /3/.
(i) the original INEL, Idaho, version of RELAP5/MOD1 converted to run on the
IBM/AMDAHL computer system at Ispra /4/. The conversion of the code
started with the CDC version of RELAP5/MOD1/006 distributed at the RELAP5
Workshop at Idaho Falls in 1981. Several updates were later incorporated
into this code version. The predicted results snown were performed with
RELAP5/MOD1/019. A number of test cases have been performed using both the
CDC and the IBM/AMDAHL version to ensure the correct implementation of the
code on the AMDAHL computer. The Ispra-IBM/AMDAHL version of
RELAP5/MOD1/019 is available via the NEA Data Bank in Paris.
(ii) the updated version of RELAP5/MOD1/019 which includes various JRC model
improvements.
The main improvements in the JRC updated version of RELAP5/MOD1 concern
changes to the following models and subroutines:
In the non-equilibrium evaporation and condensation model the mass transfer
equation was re-written taking into account a clear distinction between the
transport coefficient and the 'driving force', e.g. the difference between
the actual vapour quali ty and the corresponding equilibrium value. The
equilibrium vapour quality was redefined to give finite 'driving forces'
also in cases when one phase vanishes. Subroutines changed: MDOT and EQFINL.
New relations have been introduced to calculate junction properties for low
flow velocities (near stagnation conditions). A relaxation technique is
applied for the trans i tion from near stagnant junction properties to the
donor volume approach for large flow velociti es . The reason for this
modification is to avoid discontinuiti es in cases of flow reversals which
frequently occur during the transient, especially in bypass junctions and in
connections to dead-end volumes. Subroutine changed: JPROP.
The finite difference form of the momentum flux form was
unrealistic flow behaviour in case of large densi ty
between adjacent volumes. Subroutine changed: VEXPLT.
re-written to avoid
(void) differences
In the following cases, the cri~eria for flow regime selection were changed:
Annular flow map: the lower limit' for the occurrence of pure annular flow
(without any entrainment or de-entrainment of droplets) was increased from
Ol'g = 0.2 to c:Xg = 0.65.
Horizontal flow map: the upper boundary of the transition region between
stratified flow and various other flow regimes was enlarged from G = 200
kg/m' s to G = 600 kg/m' s.
A mOre continuous interpolation was introduced for the transition regions
between different flow regimes.
The averaging procedure for the interphase drag was changed for junctions
incorporated in branch components to avoid unrealistic mass distribution
during ECC injection.
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In the original INEL version of the code the thermodynamic fluid quantities
within a volume are evalualed [roln a set of steam-water property tables by
interpolation routines which leads to inherent discontinuities in state
derivatives. In the JRC Ispra version of RELAP5 the, property tables and
interpolation subroutines have been replaced by analytical formulations
based on the Helmholz equation. The new method has been proven to be as fast
as the table interpolation procedure with the advantage of consistent
property data, high accuracy and reduced core memory.
All these modifications are directed towards increasing the reliability of
the predicted data and reducing the large CPU time needed for slow transients.
The test predictions were performed with frozen load modules of the
original INEL version of RELAP5/MOD1/Cycle 19 and the JRC-Ispra updated version
of this code. No further updates have been incorporated between the test
predictions. For all the predictions the same base input data set was used for
the LOBI test facility. A total of 146 control volumes and 147 heat structures
were used to model the primary system and the secondary sides of the two steam
generators. The large number of heat structures were necessary to model
properly the heat release from the structural material of the test facility to
the fluid. The input data were modified only to describe hardware modifications
or different initial and boundary conditions between the different tests. The
nodalization scheme as used in the predictions is shown in Fig. 2.
COMPARISON OF PREDICTED AND MEASURED DATA
Examples of predicted and measured key parameters are shown in Figs. 3 to
14 for tests A1-04 and A1-04R. Both tests show a similar behaviour for the
fluid dynamic parameters. However, considerable differences in the'heater rod
temperature response are indicated due to the differences in the electrical
power curve.
Blowdown Period prior to ECC Injection
During the high pressure blowdown phase prior to ECC injection from the
accumulator (p> 2.7 MPa) the predicted parameters of both RELAP5 vers ions used
show a good agreement with the corresponding measured data. This good agreement
includes absolute pressures, differential pressures, fluid temperatures, fluid
densities and mass flows. For the electrically heated bundle (directly heated
rods) the time to DNB, the first temperature maximum and the subsequent rewet
behaviour (if rewet occurred) was correctly predicted.
During the intermediate blowdown period (system pressure 6.0 MPa> p > 2.5
MPa) a tendency exists in all calculations to overpredict the depressurization
of the primary system (Figs. 3 and 4). This could not be corrected by a
reasonable break flow multiplier (all predictions were performed wi th break
flow multipliers of 1.00 for subcooled and 0.85 for saturated conditions
upstream of the break). The overprediction of the depressurization seems to be
caused by the choking model of the code which does not correctly calculate the
mass and energy release through the break for the wide range of pressure values
and vapour qualities as occur upstream of the break during the LOCA transient.
For example the choking model does not account properly for the steep pressure
gradient near the break and the related changes of fluid properties between the
upstream volume and the break junction.
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Refill Period after Start of the ECC lnjection
Due to the overpredicted depressurization, the start of the ECC injection
from the accumulator(s) was calculated to occur 2 to 3 s earlier compared with
the experiments. For all the 2A-break test predictions, the original lNEL
version of RELAP5/MODl failed due to inherent flow instabilities which occurred
after the pipe near the ECC injection point was nearly filled with subcooled
water. The predictions were terminated wi th steam property errors after un-
realistic high fluid temperatures occurred in the pipe between the intact loop
pump (still running with 60% of nominal speed) and the ECC injection point.
With the JRC version of RELAP5/MOD1, the predictions could be continued
through the refill period of the transient without any stability problems. The
predicted thermal-hydraulic parameters agreed reasonably well with the measured
data. However, during the late blowdown/refill period (p 1.0 MPa) some of the
measurement signals (e.g. differential pressure, flow velocities, flow drags)
are reduced to very low values which are of the same order of magnitude as the
uncertainty band of the measurement. For this reason, no data evaluation could
be done for the mass flows, flow velocities and flow directions during the low
pressure period of the transient.
Relatively large uncertainties have been obtained for the prediction of
heater rod temperatures during the later period of the transient, as shown in
Figs. 12 to 14 for test A1-04R. Al though the time to dry-out (if dry-out
occurred), was reasonably well calculated, the predicted heater rod
temperatures deviated from the measured values by up to 150 deg C for test Al-
04R a'nd even more for the tests with the small downcorner gap width (tests Al-66
and A1-06). A general tendency exists to overestimate the heater rod
temperature in the lower bundle region and to underpredict the heater rod
temperature in the upper part of the bundle. This discrepancy, which indicates
insufficient phase separation in the core region, could be reduced in the JRC
version of the code. Parametric studies which have been performed for test
Al-66 show that the predicted heater rod temperatures are very sensitive to
small variations of the vessel and pump side break flows. For this reason it is
believed that the deviations of the predicted heater rod temperature are mainly
caused by incorrectly calculated fluid conditions in the core region, e.g. mass
flows, phase velociti es and vapour qualities. Other contributions to the
deviation of the predicted heater rod temperatures might be the underestimated
extent of phase separation (i.e. two-phase flow conditions are treated as being
too homogeneous) and the restriction that the least massive phase is always
saturated. This assumption of a partial equilibrium prevents the prediction of
superheated vapour for low qualities but high void fractions (g 0.96) in the
low pressure region.
CONCLUSlONS AND RECOMMENDATlONS
Post-test predictions have been performed for selected tests from the
LOBl-MOD1 large break LOCA test programme with two different code vers ions of
RELAP5/MOD1: (1) the original lNEL version of RELAP5/MOD1/Cycle 19 and (2) an
updated version which includes several model improvements implemented at JRC-
lspra. Apart from a slight overprediction of the depressurization rate, both
code vers ions showed a good agreement wi th measured data during the blowdown
period prior to the ECC injection.
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Due to inherent flow instabilities, the INEL version of RELAP5/MOD1 failed
to predict the refill period of the transient. The JRC version of the code
continued through the refill period wi thout any stability problems and gave
satisfactory agreement wi th most of the measured data. However, relatively
large uncertainties have been obtained in predicting the heater temperatures
for the intermediate and late period of the transient.
To increase the reliability of the RELAP5 code for large break LOCA pre-
dictions, a further effort is needed to improve the following code models:
non-equilibrium evaporation/condensation models
- critical mass flow calculation (choking model)
- flow regime criteria (flow maps) and interphase drag calculation
- heat transfer during transition and film boiling
Some of these items are addressed in the development of RELAP5/MOD2.
REFERENCES
/1/ W. L. Riebold, H. Staedtke:
LOBI-Influence of PWR Primary Loops on Blowdown. First Results.
ANS 27th Annual meeting, June 7-11, 1981, Bal Harbour, Florida/USA.
/2/ W. L. Riebold:
LOBI Experimental Programme A, Test Matrix Part Al and A2
Technical Note No. 1.06.01.111.79, November 1979.
/3/ V. H. Ransom et al:
RELAP5/MOD1 Code Manual, Volume 1: System Models and Numerical
Methods; Volume 2: User Guide and Input Requirements,
NUREG/CR-1826, EGG-2070, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
March, 1982.
/4/ W. Kolar, W. Brewka:
The IBM-Version of RELAP5/MOD1, EUR 6977 EN, Joint Research



















~ Ir- "'=Reaelor pressure-
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THE CATHARE CODE DEVELOPMENT
J.C. ROUSSEAU*, G. HOUDAYER** ***M. REOCREUX




is a best estimate code for simulation of P\>IR loss of
It is developed by the french CEA,' EDF and FRAMATOME
This paper deals wi th the obj ectives and fundamental characteristics
of the code. The assessment strategy is presented, based on a large analytical
experiment program (qualification) then on a verification procedure on
global experiments.
Finally some reactor calculations with CATHARE are presented.








joint effort of CEA* (Both IPSN-'
the participation of FRAMATOME.
CATHARE is a best estimate code aimed to the simulation of pressurized
water Reactor loss of coolant (large and small break) and any transient.
Moreover, CATHARE is used as a basis for a simulator development.
In order to develop the CATHARE code, an important experimental program
has been carried out over the ten past years this program includes
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Finally, the verification of the CATHARE code will be partially based
on the BETHSY integral test program.
11. CATHARE CHARACTERISTICS
Physical Characteristics
CATHARE simulates all the thermalhydraulics phenomena which occur
in the primary circui t of a PWR during a loss of coolant accident. (Some
other phenomena which are strongly connected to the thermalhydraulics are
also described, such as neutron kinetics, fuel thenmal mechanical and
chemical behaviour).
In order to get a good representation
the physical model must take into account
non equilibria of each phase.
of any two-phase flow behaviour,
all the mechanical and thermal
Consequently, the thermalhydraulics lD. two fluid model is needed.
In such a model, the mass, energy and momentum conservation equations
are written for each phase (six partial differential equations).
in
Energy and momentum interactions between liquid and






constitutive laws are the actual physical basis of the model.
contains a very specific and unique set of constitutive laws,
issued from a very large analytical experiment program.
Numerical and structural characteristics of the code
The CATHARE code is structured
types of installations Reactors





i t can describe different
4 loops, integral loops,
This obj ective led to a modular structure of the code any circui t
is decomposed into components, which are linked together in order to
represent any topology.
These components can be pipes, volumes, pumps, or tees, etc ...
CATHARE contains an actual steady state calculation, using the same
physical model as the transient calculation. For transient, a fully implicit
fini te difference scheme is used, which allows generally large time steps,
with no stability limit.
Finally CATHARE contains a
and for post-processing (graphics,
easy to handle, and facilitates
specific software for data acquisition
CRT display) which makes the code very
the analysis of a calculated sequence.
1668
111. REPRESENTATION OF A REACTOR CIRCUIT WITH CATHARE
One-dimension component (1. D 2 fluid model). This component is
used for representation of any pipe of the reactor, associated with a
1D radial conduction for simulation of the walls. The reactor core is
represented by one or several parallel channels. (No cross flows are
simulated in the present CATHARE version). A 2D (r, z) conduction calculation
is used for computation of the quench front velocity.
Clad deformation is calculated by a mechanical model up to the rupture.
Nevertheless. this deformation does not affect the pipe geometry for flow
calculation.
Clad oxydation and energy release are taken into account.
The secol)dary circui t of the steam gene·rators is point in the present
version of CATHARE. A complete representation of the secondary system
with a 1D model is underway.
Volumes :
A simulation of the volumes (upper or lower plenum)
flow model has not been considered, taking ac count of
no evidence of physical improvement (entrainment or
a geometry with complex internal structures).
with a 3D two-phase
i ts complexi ty and
de-entrainment in
A two point model has been prefered. The volume is then divided into
two parts separated by a moving interface. The lower sub-volume simulates
a liquid continuum wi th rising bubbles the upper sub-volume simulates
a vapor continuum wi th falling drop lets . Both sub-volumes may be in non-
equilibrium.
Pumps :
They are simulated by local momentum and energy source terms on a
pipe. These source terms come from homologous curves for head and torque.
with possible degradation due to two-phase flow.
A scheme for a reactor primary circuit with CATHARE is presented
on figure 1.
Hg. I RE AC TOR PRIMARY CIRCUIT REPRESENTATION
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IV. ASSESSMENT STRATEGY OF CATHARE
Preliminarly, some peculiar definitions of the CATHARE assessment
have to be specified :
1 - A Revision of the CATHARE physical laws corresponds to a coherent
set of constitutive laws, issued from the analysis of analytical or
"separate effect" tests of the CATHARE experimental program.
2 - Qualification procedure :
A given Revision, introduced in CATHARE is submitted to reconsti tution
of "separate effect" tests. This confrontation identifies the physical
imperfections of the model and defines the points which need new
physical developments.
3 - The quality assurance procedure is a planned and systematic pattern
of analytical experiment reconstitutions, which is attached to a
Revision and is used as a quality reference.
4 - Tests on integral experiments constitute the verification procedure.
The observed discrepancies between experiment and calculation during
this procedure have no direct impact on the physical model of the
code. They only may suggest new analytical studies for analysis of
new phenomena,or give user's guidelines.








IV.l The CATHARE analytical experiment program
The two fluid model contains constitutive laws which must oe established
by means of analytical experiments. These consti tutive laws are the mass,
momentum and energy transfers between phases, and the wall.
Experiments were designed in such a way that these transfers could
be separately studied.
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- Air water Moby Dick experiments (a < 0.6)
These experiments are performed at low pressure, low void fraction
and high velocities, in tubes 0.014 m ID.
- For higher void fraction, (a > 0.6), the DADINE experiment simulates
steady state flows in a tubular test section (0.012 m ID) at low pressure .
Mass flow rates and heat fluxes are low (0.2 to 1 kg/m2/s, 104 To 5.5.104
W/m2 ). The original feature of this experiment is the void fraction
measurement technique, which uses the scattering property of a thermal neutron
beam. This techniqu.e gives a high resolution in the range of high void
fractions in dispersed flow.
- Mist flows at high velociti es up to the critical conditions, low
pressure,very high void fractions (a > 0.96) are studied in REBECA experiment
The ECTHOR experiments simulate steady state air-water flows in
a tubular horizontal test section at atmospheric pressure. They give
informations upon stratification occurrence and mechanical interactions
in stratified flows.
- Finally, in order to cover the whole range of pressure and dimension
parameters, different test sections have been introduced in the Super
Moby Dick loop, in vertical and horizontal conditions, pressure varying
from 20 bars to 120 bars and diameter up to 0.135 m.
The mass transfer model for CATHARE is essent'ially issued fr\lm the
analysis of the MOBY DICK CF and SUPER MOBY DICK CF experiments.
Both test sections consist of a vertical channel (0.014 or 0.02 mID )
followed by a 7 degre p straight divergent . The inlet f'l.ow is subcooled
and a steam water flow develops in the test section by flashing. Downstream
pressure is decreased to obtain critical conditions. Pressure and vOld
fraction are measured along the test section. A large range of pressure
from 1 bar to 120 bars is investigated.
The OMEGA loop is used for tubular or rod cluster blowdown tests in
order to stuJy transient two-phase flow heat transfers.
The blowdown experiments consist in depressurizing a highly pressurized
vertical electrically heated test section (tube or 36 rod cluster) in
full length. The test section is strongly equiped wi th wall thermocouples.
Spool pieces are set at both ends of the test section. They consist of
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a 't beam densitometer, a venturi and a turbine allowing a good evaluation
of transient two-phase mass flow rates.
The ERSEC experiments are used to evaluate the quench front velocity
and the heat transfer downstream of the quench front in reflooding conditions.
The tests are performed wi th an electrically heated tube (0.012 m ID)
and a 36 electrica11y heated rod bundle. Wall temperatures, test section
pressure drop, carry-over and vapor temperature at the outlet are measured.
For these reflooding tests, irilet mass flow rate and quali ty are set.
More recently, the PERICLES experiment (357 heated rods) investigates
reflooding complex effects due to radial power distribution ..
Pumps behaviour in two-phase flow have been studied in the EVA (1/3
scale) and EPOPEE (1/10 scale) apparatus.
- Two-phase flow in the lower plenum of the vessel has been analysed
in the 1/4 scale air-water PIERO experiment.
IV.2. General approach for the constitutive laws development
The momentum transfer experiments (see IV.1.1) have been used to
elaborate a set of coherent mechanical interaction laws involving : wall-
liquid friction, wall vapor friction and interfacial friction. The method
of elaboration is very systematic It uses an "inverse" version of the
1D module of CATHARE which is applied to any experimental result
This method gives rise to the realization of data banks
Then correlations are developed by taking ac count of some pre-established
structures :
A representation of the interfacial friction factor
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Fig. 2 CATHARE INTERFACIAL FRICTION FACTOR
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The method of analysis of the mass transfer experiments is very simular
to the previous ones.
Assuming that mechanical laws are still valid in case
mass and energy exchanges, the use of the "inverse" 1. D.
provides a new data bank.
which leads to correlations under the form
of interfacial
CATHARE module
Finally, wall heat transfer correlations are developed from the diabatic
experiments by using the evaluated values of the local state of fluid











CATHARE calculations with "separate effect" test
qualification procedure. It allows the determination
confidence for each physical correlation, the
weaknesses and the definition of new needs for the
The "separate effect" test comparison deals wi th th.e following topics
- critical flow
- blowdown of an unheated test section
- swell level
- reflood
- blowdown of a heated test section
wall condensation
critical flow Tests belonging to the Moby Dick and Super Moby Dick
program are selected. They cover the range of parameters 1 bar< p < 120 bar
0< liT
sub
< 70 0 K
o < X < 10%
with long or short nozzles.
Figure 3 presents typical results of pressure and void fraction evolu-
tions along the nozzle.
Marviken CFT tests (nozzle alone) are also involved in the qualification
matrix, for large dimension nozzles.
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Fig. 3 b. SUPER HDBY DICK TEST SECnON VOIO FRAcnON PROFILE
As a conclusion. i t can be said that prediction of cri tical mass flow
rate is generally good for long or short nozzles (error < 3%) for high
inlet subcooling or positive inlet qualities. The error can reach 10%
or 20% for low inlet subcooling (- 0 to - 3°K).
Blowdown of an unheated test section :
- Marviken CFT in full geometry
Horizontal CANON tests covering a large area of break size and
initial water temperatures .
- Vertical CANON : Vertical pipe (0.10 m ID. 4 m long). depressurized
by a small break (form ~ 0.003 to 0.015 m) at the top.
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Fig. 4 b. VERTICAL CANON VOID FRACTION PROFILE
AT DIFFERENT TIHES
_ TAPIOCA experiment similar to vertical CANON, hut in a larger dimension
0.35 m ID. 2.4 m long. Breaks at different elevations, from the top to a
low lateral position.
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· Swell level :
G2 experiment 19 x 19 rod bundle, with axial eosine flux
(0.5 104 < 0 < 2.8 104 W m-2 ). at pressures between 1 and 55 bars.
These tests eonsisted in measuring a swell level for 'a given froth
level in a rod bundle. The CATHARE model failed in predicting a good swell
level and the analysis led to the eonclusion that the interfaeial frietion
had a different strueture in rod bundle than in a tubular pipe. Such an
improvement is neeessary to be introdueed in the next CATHARE revision.
• Reflood : DADINE and ERSEC (tubular and rod bundle) tests enter in the
qualifieation matrix for CATHARE.




















". 32.0 ~ 0 640
Fig. 5 ERSEC TUBULAR TEST SECTTON. WALL TEHPERATURES
EVOLUTTON AT DIFFERENT ELEVATIONS
The general eonelusions on this topie are :
The queneh front rises a little too slowly
The pressure drop is underestimated •
Nevertheless. the maximum wall temperatures and the earry - over are in
reasonable agreement.
All these anomalies are now weIl understood and should be eliminated
in the next Revision.
· Blowdown of a heated test seetion :
several tests of the OMEGA blowdown program (tube and rod bundle) are
involved in the CATHARE qualifieation.





eonsists of a unique steam generator pipe in small break
with eondensation inside the tube. Minor modifications
eondensation have to be introdueed in the next CATHARE
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As a general eonelus.ion for the CATHARE qualifieation i t ean be said
that no deep imperfeetion is observed in the present CATHARE Revision.
Only loeal improvements are needed for future revisions.
IV.4. CATHARE quality assuranee
The systematie pattern of analytieal experiments used for the CATHARE
quality assuranee belongs to the above qualifieation program.
The tests have been seleeted following several eriterion :
the thermalhydraulies eonditions must be near those eneountered
during a reaetor aeeident
- The largest range of parameters must be'covered
- Tests presenting very peeuliar physieal phenomena (level formation,
grid effeet for instanee)
- A partieularly good quality of the experimentalmeasurements is required
(The seleetion of the tests has been made with the experimentalists
themselves).
The number of tests is limited to forty.
IV.5. Code verifieation
Sinee the beginning of 1984, date of release of the CATHARE version
(with Revision 2), the verifieation program is underway.
This program eoneerns small break tests :
LOFT 3.5 and 3.6
LOBI SDSL 03
BETHSY (for future)
and large break tests
LOFT 1.5 and 2.5
PKL K5.a and K9
Presently, LOFT 3.5 (See figure 6) is the only global test for whieh the





Fig. 6 LOFT CIRCUIT REPRESEHTATIOH
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The general conclusions are G) the calculated mass flow rate at
the break is generally greater than the measured maSs flow rate, during
the 300 first seconds (fig. 7). The lack of physical model (entrainment















Fig. 7 LOFT 3.5 HASS FLOH RATE AT THE BREAK
An experimental program on two-phase flows in tees on the Super Moby
Dick apparatus is underway to investigate these phenomena.
Gb The calculations show a rupture of natural circulation at about 140 sec
and occurrence of reflux boiling in the active loop.
Instrumentation in LOFT 3.5 is not able to give precise enough
informations on these phenomena.
V. CATHARE PROGRESS
CATHARE version 1 is presently fully operationnal and several CPl
reactor accident calculations have been performed.
A large break calculation is now over, up to the end of the reflood
phase. However the physical results during refilling and reflooding are
questionnable, due to a lack of consistency of the condensation laws and
probably same other physical parameters such as singular pressure drops.
Significant efforts have to be made in order to improve these models.
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Several small break (3' and 6') caJ.roulations have been completed. The
different sequences are directly visualized on CRT display, and analysed.
They allow improvment in understanding the physical phenomena which can
lead to core uncovery and recovery.
Several objectives are now planned in the frame of CATHARE development
A maintenance of the code The code being released to the partners
CEA, EDF and FRAMATOME, i t consists in maintaining a user' s assistance,
editing new versions'and new procedures, updating the user's handbook, and
organizing workshops and seminars. A user' s club has been created in which
user's experiences are exchanged.
· The code verification :
This action is underway,
with user's guidelines at
the objective being to obtain a verified version
the end of 1985.
· Numerical improvement :
One of our short term major objectives concerns optimisation of the code.
For a reactor small break calculation, the average time step is high
( 0< 0,3 sec, due to the fully implici t method), however the CPU computing
time per mesh and per time step is rather important : ::: 20 msec on CRAY.1.
The simulator which is being developed on the
demonstrated that a significant factor on the computing
CATHARE, is now :baking account of this experience.
CATHARE basis,' has
time, is possible.
· Physical developments :
A new revision of the physical laws is in progress. Its introduction in
the code is planned for end 1985.
New modules developments :
A short term priority is devoted to an axial secondary circuit description.
For lang term, the following new modules are planned
- two dimension description of the downcomer
- introduction of non condensible gas in all the elements of the circuit
- one-dimension pump.
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A MODEL FOR TWO-PHASE JET EXPANSION AND IMPINGEMENT
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ABSTRACT
In this paper, data from large scale two-phase jet impingement
tests at Marviken are compared to a two-phase jet model. This jet
model applies conventional single-phase compressible flow methods to
predict the jet -expansion and pressures. A method-of-characteristics
solution technique is used to predict jet behavior from the jet
discharge to an impingement target in the jet path, where a standing
shock is assumed to occur. The jet model uses standard steam and
water propert i es to caIcul ate jet behavi or, assumi ng the phases
remain in equilibrium.
Model predictions of jet centerline static pressure compare weIl
with data for jets with steam and two-phase stagnation conditions.
Predictions of jet behavior for jets with subcooled stagnation con-
ditions in the region near the jet discharge are less favorable
because non-equi librium at the jet discharge makes it difficult to
define consistent equilibrium properties for the jet model. For
these cases, the model tends to overpredict jet centerline pressures.
Jet impingement pressures predicted by the model tends to be below























v radial ~elocity component
V u2 + V , jet velocity
x qual ity
z jet axial coordinate
a arcsin(c/V), Mach angle
e arctan(v/u), angle of velocity
p density
~ velocity potential
)1,11 conditions along characteristics
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INTRODUCTION
The evaluation of two-phase jet impingement loads plays an important role
in the design of light water reactor containment and piping systems. A rela-
tively simple but conservative model is the presently recommended design stan-
dard. This model for jet impingement loads and reaction loads on the pipe
which has ruptured is given in the American Nuclear Society Standard ANS-58.2
[IJ. In view of the importance of this particular design basis to the contain-
ment and piping design of the nuclear plant, there has been much interest in
better quantifying jet reaction and impingement loads.
There have been several experiments, most at small scale, to study the
behavior of two-phase jets and, along with these experiments, jet models which
have been largely empirical. More recent experiments, performed in 1980-1 are
the Marviken Jet Impingement Tests (JIT) conducted by Studsvik Engergiteknik at
the Marviken Power Station, Sweden [2J. Unique features of these tests are the
large pipe sizes tested (20 to 50 cm.) and initial pressures (50 bar) and range
of subcooling (30°C subcooled to saturated steam).
Since the completion of the Marviken tests, there have been several
theoretical investigations of two-phase jets using advanced numerical simula-
tion techniques which have relied at least in part on the Marviken data for
verification. These include a study by Kashiwa and others [3J at Los Alamos
usi ng the K-F IX code and the SALE code. In another study by Wei gand [4J and
others at Sandia, the CSQ code has been used to predict two-phase jet behavior.
In addition to these studies, arecent paperby Kawasaki [5J has described the
analysis of a jet using a "fluid-in-cell" method. The details of the model are
not given, but it is said that the jet is assumed to be homogeneous equilibrium
flow.
The present study is also a theoretical analysis of the two-phase jet.
This study, however, models the two-phase jet with the much simpler analysis
methods which are used for single-phase compressible jets. By treating the jet
as a homogeneous equilibrium mixture, the governing equations for the jet
reduce to a much si mp 1er form whi ch can be sol ved by the method of charac-
teristics.
JET MODELING
In an earlier paper [6J the governing equations for the two-phase jet are
discussed in more detail. The following is a summary of this discussion.
The governing equations of steady, axisymmetric
cylindrical coordinates z and rare [7J.
( u2) Uv (v2 ~r1 - 2 ~zz - 2 2 ~zr + 1 - 2) ~rr + --r = 0
c c c
where c is the speed of sound and
u = ~ = ~zaz
v =~ = ~r
ar






Using standard mathematical procedures [7], the following differential
equations for the characteristic curves of Equation (1) can be obtained:









where the subscripts land 11 refer to family land 11 of the characteristic
curves, respectively. These equations can be rewritten in terms of the velo-
city components Vand e by setting
u = V cos e ; v = V sin e and noting that sin a = ~
V
The equations for the characteristic curves are then transformed into




+ tan a + si n a tan a si n a
si n (a + a) r
( 6)
Equation (5) represents the directions in the physical plane of the right
(I) and left (11) running Mach lines. Equation (6) represents the correspond-
ing hodograph plane. Thus, the simultaneous solution of Equations (5) and (6)
for given initial conditions is equivalent to solving the original partial dif-
ferential equation for the jet, Equation (1).
Since Equations (5) and (6) each contains terms in both velocity and phy-
sical coordinates, it is necessary to solve them simultaneously. A detailed
description of the calculation procedure for ideal gas is given in [7]. The
following is an outline of the procedure used for a two-phase jet. The solu-
tion scheme generally consists of utilizing the solution in the physical and
hodograph planes at two points in the jet to calculate the solution at a third
point downstream. Given the location of the two points in the physical and
hodograph planes, the 1ocat ion and condit ions at a downstream poi nt whi ch i s
located at the i ntersect ion of the two Mach' 1i nes, can be determi ned from
solving the finite difference form of Equations (5) and (6). The pressure and
thermodynamic state at the downstream point in the jet are computed from the




2V = 2( ho - h)
h = hf + x hfg
x =[So - Sf]
Sg - sf
where his the flow enthalpy, s is the entropy, x is the quality, and the
subscripts 0, fand 9 refer to stagnation condition and saturated liquid and
gas, respectively. To compute the pressure corresponding to a given velocity,
Equations (7) to (9) are solved by trial and error. Apressure is assumed and
the flow quality and enthalpy are calculated using a thermodynamic properties
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model. A velocity is then computed by Equation (7) and compared to the actual
velocity. If the computed velocity is too large, then a larger pressure is
chosen and the process is repeated until the velocities match within a prede-
termined convergence criterion.
The boundary conditions for the jet are defined by a constant ambient
pressure at the jet outer boundary and by the critical pressure at the nozzle
exit. The critical pressure is determined by considering a homogeneous
equilibrium (HEM) critical flow at the nozzle. The mass flow rate in the
nozzle is given by:
G = Vp (10)
where V and p are the velocity and density of the mixture, respectively.




_ h)]1/2 ( 11)
Expressing the enthalpy and density in terms of the static quality x and
liquid and vapor specific enthalpies and densities and using Equation (8)
yields:
( 12)
The homogeneous equil i bri um crit i ca1 flow rate for a gi yen set of stagnation
conditions is the maximum value obtained when Equation (12) is evaluated at
different pressure states havi ng entropi es equa1 to the stagnation entropy.
The pressure at which the mass flux is a maximum is the critical pressure which
is used as a boundary condition in the free jet calculations.
The speed of sound c is calculated at each mesh point in the jet by
c
2 = (~) (13)ap s
For saturated stagnation conditions, the value of c calculated by equation
(13) at the critical nozzle exit pressure is equal to the mixture velocity
ca1cul ated by maxi mi zi ng Equat ion (12). Consequent ly, the nozzl e exit Mach
number is unity for saturatedand slightly subcooled stagnation conditions.
For subcooled stagnation conditions, the pressure corresponding to the maximum
flow prediction yields a speed of sound at the choke point which is less than
the flow velocity. This anomaly has been discussed by several authors, i .e.,
D. G. Hall [8]. To avoid this difficulty in the present model, the flow is
assumed to choke at the critical pressure predicted by the HEM and the flow
velocity is taken equal to that predicted by the HEM and not to the value
calculated by Equation (13).
Analysis of the two-phase jet using the method-of-characteristics approach
proceeds much as for a single phase underexpanded supersonic jet. Flow out the
nozzl e exit expands downstream until the free jet boundary turns in. Refl ected
characteristics from this boundary begin to intersect each other indicating the
formation of a shock wave. The coalesence of the characteristics first occurs
at the jet boundary forming an incident shock which curves inward downstream
forming anormal shock at some point in the jet flow. The characteristic net
cannot be extended past the shock wave without some information about the shock
structure and pattern of shock waves beyond the initial shock. In the present
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analysis, the characteristic net is only extended to the point where right
running characteristic line from the point in the characteristics net where the
first intersection occurs is propagated to the jet centerline. For conditions
typical of those tested at Marviken, the characteristics met is extended
several meters past the nozzle discharge, including the region of the jet,
where impingement loads are largest. .
From experience with single-phase supersonic jets it is known that a
standing shock wave will form in the flow approaching a target in the jet path.
Although the present jet is two-phase, this flow will also experience a rapid
irreversible compression as it approaches a target. There have been several
models proposed for shock waves in two-phase flow. A good summary can be found
in the book by Wallis [9J. In the present jet model, it has been assumed that
the shock is parallel to the target and that the two-phase mixture remains in
equilibrium as it passes through the shock. For a target perpendicular to the
jet centerline, the flow at the jet centerline will encounter anormal shock
whil e fl ow at the target edge may encounter an ob1i que shock. Thi s i s
illustrated in Figure 1. The governing equations for flow across the normal
shock are the same as for single phase flow:
mass: P1 V1 P2 V2 (14)
2 2
momentum: PI + P1 V1 P2 + P2V2 (15)
energy: hOl = h02 (l6)
where subscripts 1 and 2 refer to upstream and downstream of the shock.
For an oblique shock, the above equations are solved for the flow velocity
component normal to the shock.
Solution of these equations for a two-phase mixture is by trial-and-error.
Once condit ions behi nd the shock are obtai ned, the i mpi ngement pressure i s
taken to be the stagnation pressure based on the component of the flow which is
perpendicular to the target. At the jet centerline, the full stagnation
pressure behind the shock is recovered. At the target edge, the stagnation
pressure is based on the flow velocity normal to the target.
COMPARISON TO DATA
The first six tests in the Marviken JIT series were free-jet tests with
instrumentat ion to determi ne jet axi al and radi al pressures • These were
followed by six tests where pressures on impingement targets were measured.
Each test was conducted as a blowdown experiment so that, as the system
depressurized, stagnation conditions for the jet varied from test initial con-
ditions which were typically 30°C subcooled to saturated conditions to nearly
all steam as the level in the pressure vessel dropped below the standpipe which
delivers flow to the jet nozzle. Since the change in stagnation conditions
occurred relatively slowly compared to the transient time through the pipe and
nozzle, the tests have been analyzed as aseries of quasi-steady states, using
the nominal stagnation conditions which were measured at various times during
the blowdown.
One of the free jet tests and one of the i mpi ngement tests were steam
blowdowns, with the pressure vessel standpipe above the liquid or two-pnase
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level during the blowdown. These tests provide an ideal basis for comparison
to the method of characteristics solution since the steam jet should exhibit
perfeet gas behavior. From the other tests, jet behavior and impingement loads
with both saturated and subcooled stagnation conditions is available by
selecting different times in the blowdown transient.
Comparisons of model predictions with jet centerline pressures for several
of the free jet tests are shown in Fi gures 2 through 4. The data shown in
Figure 4 are from two different times in the steam blowdown test. Note that
the homogeneous equilibrium model of the jet does a good job of representing
the data.
The top two curves in Figure 2 are for two different times in a blowdown
where jet stagnation conditions were subcooled. The agreement with this data
i s not as good as for the steam b1owdown. Note that the HEM crit i ca1 fl ow
model is still able to predict the jet discharge flow. Using the HEM critical
flow model to predict jet velocity forces the same pressure in the jet as would
be predicted by the HEM critical flow model. This results in an exit match
number greater than 1.0 and a large initial expansion out the nozzle as can be
seen by the delay in the jet to depressurize at the nozzle exit in Figure 2.
Later in this same blowdown, shown in the lower curve of Figure 2, stagnation
conditions are saturated and the static pressure predictions at the jet
discharge are a much better match to the data. Figure 3 shows jet centerline
pressure late in another free jet test with initial stagnation conditions which
were subcooled, but with different nozzle size. These predictions are also a
reasonably good match to the data.
Fi gures 5 through 7 show data from the i mpi ngement tests. Three of the
tests in this series were nearly identical blowdowns with the impingement plate
target at different locations from the nozzle discharge. All of these tests
were initially subcooled blowdowns with a large diameter nozzle. Figure 5
shows data and predictions for three different times in these blowdowns. In
general, the model underpredicts the data. An interesting feature of this data
is that the impingement pressure on the target at its most distant location has
delayed to nearly the ambient pressure. The prediction for the data from these
tests i s the worst match to the data 1ate in the b1owdowns at 50 seconds.
During this period, conditions in the pressure vessel are rapidly changing near
the end of the test. Prediction of the data late in the blowdown was found to
be difficult for all the tests.
Figure 6 shows impingement pressures on the plate for a steam blowdown. Target
distance for this test was L/D = 2.15 and the target impingement pressures,
both predicted and measured are but a small fraction of the vessel stagnation
pressure.
Figure 7 shows data for impingement pressures on a cylinder in the two-
phase jet. Nozzle to target distance for this test was L/D = 2.97, and again,
the impingement pressures are only a small fraction of the stagnation
pressures •
For each of these comparisons, the impingement pressures predicted by the
model fall below the data. A possible reason for this is that the impingement
pressure is calculated from the jet velocity component, normal to the target.
This is a difficult pressure to measure even in single phase flow. Most total
pressure measurement devices attempt to be independent of incoming flow angle.
In this case, the probe would have to measure the pressure for flow only normal
to the plate. The test reports however show comparisons between the plate load
based on integrated pressure "measurements and the load cells. The data from
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these two independent measurements agree very well, supporting the accuracy of
the pressure data. Another possible explanation for the under prediction is
the model assumption that the jet expands fully. In the Marviken tests, the
jet centerline pressure typically recovers back to the ambient pressure within
a meter or two from the nozzle exit. This is likely related to the confinement
of the jet inside the test facility. The jet centerline static pressure is
under predi cted by model by about thi s same amount si nce the model does not
account for the jet confi nement. Thi s error instat i c pressure also carri es
through to the impingement pressures. The data predictions in both Figures 6
and 7, where the impingement pressures are very low, miss the data by nearly
the same as the difference in the static pressures for these two cases.
SUMMARY
Modeling of two-phase jets as a homogeneous equilibrium mixture and
applying standard method-of-characteristics techniques provides good predic-
tions of the Marviken JIT data with both two-phase and steam jets. Calculation
of stagnation pressures on targets withi n the jet requi res model i ng of the
shock wave which would be formed in front of any target in the jet path.
Impingement pressures calculated by the model fall below the Marviken data.
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Figure 3 - Jet Centerline Pressures for Test 6
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Figure 4 - Jet Centerline Pressures for Test 5
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ABSTRACT
The integral-type PMK-NVH test facility is a 1:2070 scaled m:x:lel of
the prim3.J:y circuit of the ViWER-type Paks Nuclear Pov;er Plant. The
operating pressure and terrperature are 16 MPa and 623 K, respecti-
vely. The elevations are the sarre as in the plant. The scheduled time
for the start-up is the end of 1984. The loop was designed for SB
I.OCA experiments above all, but operational transients can also be
investigated.
Paper presents the system description including instrurrentation,
control system and data acquisition. Sone inportant phenarena to
be expected fran SB tests as they could be derived fran pre-test
calculations are also presented. The effect of the loop seals
on the natural circulation, normal or reverse heat .transfer in steam
generators, core heat transfer at reduced prim3.J:y circuit inventoJ:y
are included.
:rNTroDOCTION
In Hungary a governnent-sponsored safety research programre has been ini-
tiated for nuclear reaCtor safety analysis in 1980 for a 5-year period of
1981-1985. The therrrohydraulic part of the programre was aimed at creating a
set of selected conputer codes tested by experiments, that w:lUld allC1tl ana-
lyses to be perforrred under different accident conditions for the Paks Nuclear
PC1tler Station. In support of these purposes an integral-type experimental
facility called PMK-NVH is \.inder construction. [IJ
As it is known four units of the Paks NPPate under construction on the
sarre site, all being equipped with a ViWER-440 M'i' pressurized water reactor.
The first unit has been running at naninal power for a year. These reactors
are slightly different fran other PWRs as: 6-1cop prim3.J:y circuit, horizontal
steam generators, loop seals in hot and cold legs, safety injection tank set-
point pressure higher than secondaJ:y pressure •
The PMK-NVH facility is a rrodel of the prim3.J:y circuit of the Paks NPP
and designed Il'ainly to investigate processes follC1tling SIl'all breaks in the
priIl'aJ:y circuit, but it was conceived in a way that allC1tls simulation of a
variety of different plant transients. SIl'all break processes are feIt to be
inportant since relatively few results have been published on these phenorrena
of the Soviet EWR-type plants.
Because of the lcop seals the natural circulation behaviour is also im-
portant. According to these considerations a planned test Il'atrix is given in
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Table 1 for the tirre interval of 1985-86. In order to corrpare the experirren-
tal programre of PMK-NVH to that of other test programres, a set of similar
experirrents had been studied for IDFT, PKL, IDBI and SEMISCALE. [1]
It can be stated that the a:irns of the experirrents and processes considered
to be irrportant are very similar in case of different facilities.
A short system description is given in the paper and results of TIDdelling
problems and pre-test analyses are presented.
In the frarrework of a cooperation between the International Atomic Energy
Agency /IAFA/ and the Central Research Institute for Physics /CPJ.p/, Budapest
Hungary an IAFA organized and coordinated Standard Problem has been selected
for rrernber states. The experirrent chosen is a 7,4% cold leg break fran full
power covering the blowdewn phase of the transient.
SYSTEM DESCPJ.PTIOO, M:JDELLING ASPECTS
In order to perform the experirrental programre surnrre.rized above a full
pressure test lcop was designed, considering the appropriate IlPdelling aspects
and scaling criteria. LI]
SYSTEM DESCPJ.PTIOO
The PMK-NVH facility is a TIDdel of the pr:inEry circuit of the Paks NPP.
The 6-1oap Pe is equipped with a WWER-440 reactor and a horizontal stearn ge-
nerator in each lcop. There are three parallel high pressure injection systems
/HPIS/ and four safety injection tanks /SIT!. HPIS systems are activated by
lCM system pressure and water level in the pressurizer. The SIT set-point
pressure is 60 bar, higher than the secondary pressure of 46 bar. The inlet
and outlet ternperatures are 267 and 297 °c, respectively, while the operating
pressure is 123 bar; the core theDffil power is 1375 MiT.
The PMK-NVH TIDdel system consists of the sarre corrponents as it is shewn
in Fig.1. Because of the gravity döminated processes in Sffi3.ll break r.o:::A the
elevations are the sarre as in the plant with' the exception of the lCMer plenum
and pressurizer. Scaling ratios of volurres and ~r are 1:2070~ A core TIDdel
of 19 rods is used. The 6 lcops of the NPP are TIDdelled by a single lcop. The
pressure drop in the TIDdel is approximately the sarre as in the plant. On the
secondary side of the steam generator the steam volurre ratio is kept. The PMK
loop is connected to the NVH loop as it is shewn in Fig. 1. The NVH loop is
the secondary circuit of the PMK, resulting in the PMK-NVH facility. The
operating pressure and terrperature of the TIDdel are 160 bar and 350 °c, res-
pectively. A list of instrurrentation is also presented in Fig.1. The control
and data acx;ruisition system is ce:trpletely corrputerized.
lWELLING ASPECTS
The design of an integral type test facility is a corrpromise between the
strict scaling criteria and the economical and experirrental requirernents. In
case of the PMK-NVH loop the volurre scaling criteria weIe selected. particular
attention was given to satisfy the volurre distribution requirernent in the sys-
tem, flCM area relationships in the core and the steam generator, elevations,
pressure drops and heat losses .
Test matrix for the PMK-N'i!H test facility
in the t:iIre interval of 1985-86.
Table 1.
Type Experirrent Aims / Remarks
One-phase flow natural Corrparison of the results with rreasured Paks NPP data. A
circulation "testing" of the test facility. Different core powers and
~
ccolant levels. Constant secondary side pressure .
Ul Ul Two-phase flow natural Effect of rnixture level on the flow rate. Mixture levels in
-IJ circulation upper plenum, hot leg and steam generator. The rraximum value€fß
Cll-IJ of power transported frorn the core. Constant secondary side
1l pressure.
U)
7,4% cold leg break without Investigation of the blowdown process. Initial conditions are
SITs and with one HPIS the naninal operating conditions, one HPIS and constant
secondary side pressure.
7,4% cold leg break with Aims and initial conditions are the sarre as the first 7,4% break




7,4% hat leg break without SITs Aims and initial conditions are the sarre as the first two1l
and with one HPIS 7,4% break cases. Effect of break location on the process.
1% cold leg break without Investigation of the blowdo1Nl1. process in case of long process
-IJ SITs and with one HPIS t:iIre. Real small break case. Initial conditions are the nominal
~ operating conditions ••.-1
~ 1% cold leg break without Aims and initial conditions are the sarre as in case of the firstSITs and with three HPIS 1% break experirrent. Effect of the three HPIS on the process.
3.3% break on the pressurizer Investigation of the blowdown process in case of such a




In a reduced scale system the surface area to volurre ratios are larger
than those in the reference system. For this reason the heat losses in the
model system will be larger than in the NPP. The heat loss for the PMK should
be kept as low as 2,5 kW. Lasses fram tubings and components can be minimized
by appropriate insulation, hCMever, experience with similar lcops shows that
instrurrentation penetrations and structural supports are sources of much
higher losses that are very difficult to evaluate beforehand. In order to mi-
tigate the consequences of the latter, additional heating is applied in areas
where the losses are important. As an exanple, surface area to coolant volurre
ratios for the semiscale M:lD3-PWR and PMK-NVH-Paks NPP are presented in Table
2. It can be seen, that the tvKJ systems give similar values.
Surface area to .coolant volurre ratios Table 2.
Prllna:ty Cireuit PWR semiscale semiscale i\WE;R-440 PMK- PMK-NVH
canponents /4-lcop/ M:lD-3 PWR Paks NVH WWER-440
Core 301.9 295.3 0.98 410.7 431.0 1.04
Hot leg 8.1 87.0 10.7
Intact lcop 5.6 60.0 10.7
Broken loop 5.6 117.5 21.0
Cold leg 8.1 87.0 10.7
Intact loop 5.74 60.0 10.5
Broken loop 5.74 117.5 20.5
Steam generator
primary 303.0 526.3 1.7
Intact loop 203.4 390.4 1.9
Broken lcop 203.4 203.4 1.0
The ti.ma history of the transients is effected by the axial volurre dist-
ribution. A corrparison was rrade between PMK-NVH and the Paks NPP /Fig.2/. It
can be observed that there is alrrost co!lll?lete agreement for the whole eleva-
tion range, with the exception of lower plenum and pressurizer.
SB I.CX::A PRE-'IEST RESULTS
In order to prepare SB-I.CX::A PMK-tests a large number of pre-test calcula-
tions have been perfonred using the REIAP4/rrod6 co!lll?uter code [2J, [3]. The
analyses covered break sizes from 0.5 to 7,4% located on the cold, hot leg or
the pressurizer, the steam generator secondary side being held at constant pres-
sure or cooled down. As to the safety injection systems, the effect of 1 or 2
of the three HPIS not being availabJe was investigated and calculations were
done with and without injection from the hydroaccumulators.
The IlDst important phenamena to be expected during SB LCCEs on the PMK-
NVH facility are discussed by presenting calculated results for a 1% cold leg
break case. In the calculations no SIT injection was considered and it was
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assurred that only one of the three HPSI P\.llTPs is available. The pressure on
the secondaly side was kept constant throughout the transient.
The basic processes can be explained with the aid of the pressure-t:irre
diagram in Fig. 3. IThe corresponding results for the paks NPP are sh= for
canparison in Fig. 4• I After scram at about 40 s the depressurization rate in-
creases. The pressurizer enpties at 78 s and this continues to enhance
depressurization until steam generated in the core begins to acctmll.l1ate in
the upper plenum thereby resulting in a slight increase of system pressure. At
400 s the mixture level in the upper plenum drops to the hot leg elevation and
the steam in the hot leg forces d= the liquid level on the reactor side of
the lcop seal that leads to increased repressurization of the prinary circuit.
One detr:irrental effect of the hot leg lcop seal is that it depresses
core mixture level [4J. On the other hand, system behaviour in this period is
govemed by the evolution of lcop seal pressure drop versus total loop pres-
sure drop. Figure 5 shows changes in elevation head losses in the loop seal
1It,s1 and the core IR I versus total loop pressure loss. IArrcms indicate
decreasing loop seal crnixture level. I Both losses vary several t:i.mes that of
the loop pressure loss, the lcop seal elevation loss increasing sorrewhat fas-
ter than core elevation loss decreasing. The difference of these two IR,:,I
keeps alIrost the balance with the total loop pressure loss the remaining
arrount decreasing the loop flcm rate.
The decreasing flcm rate leads to increased steam production in the core.
Figure 6 shows the variation of core steam flcm as a function of the relative
mixture level in the loop seal. Earlier to loop seal mixture level decrease
the volurretric loss through the break is balanced by the HPIS and the steam
produced in the core. Rcmever, with decreasing rnixture level the core volu-
rretric steam flolV rate scon exceeds the break flcm rate that leads to an in-
crease in system pressure. System pressure behaviour prior to hot leg loop
seal clearing depends on core power, break size and position. The pressure
build-up is enhanced with higher core pcmer, while the opposite is true if the
break size increases or the break position is at higher elevation, since both
lead to increased volurretric mass flcm rate through the break.
After all, the mixture level in'the loop seal decreases suffici~ntly to
perrnit the steam to pass to the steam generator collector. The calculations
indicate that steam first accumulates in the upper part of the collector and
only enters the steam generator tubings, when the rnixture level of the collec-
tor drops to the elevation of the latter IFig.3/. It is only then that system
pressure is rapidly decreasing very near to the secondary pressure, because of
the steam being condensed in the steam generator.
It is expected that the processes on the PMK-NVR facility will differ in
this period from those in the plant I due to sarre asyrnretric behaviour between
broken and intact loops that can not be reproduced with the single loop test
facility. Figure 4 shcms the variation of the collector mixture level both in
the broken and the intact loops. While the fo:rrrer drops to 2.62 m at 850 s
thereby allowing steam to pass to the steam generator, the latter does so only
at llGO S. The broken loop steam generator can not condense all the steam pro-
duced by the core - that is why system pressure does not decrease here as ra-
dically as in the PMK calculations.
Hat leg loop seal clearance and steam condensation tenporarily increases
natural circulation flcm rates. However, after 730 sloop and core flcm rates
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are again decaying because of the mixture level decrease in the cold leg
steam generator collector and scon the cold leg lcop seal is getting effec-
tive. This leads to increased steam production in the core and a decrease of
the mixture level in the reactor vessel, "hat is also reflected in fuel rod
terrq;:eratures. IThe PMK rod simulators W9re TOCJdelled in the calculation as real
fuel rods.1 Figure 7 shows average fue! rod center line, and cladding tenpera-
tures: while in the early part of the transient they closely fo11owed the sa-
turation temperature, at about 1120 s they rapidly cl:iJnb to about 740 K due
to DNB.
At 1420 s the cold leg lcop seal is cleared and lcop and core flows re-
cover. This leads to quenching of the fuel rods and increased steam generator
heat transfer. As a consequence system pressure drops below the secondary one
and the direction of steam generator heat flow is reversed that, in turn,
has a detr:irrental effect on natural circulation flow rates. In Fig. 8 the core
flow is plotted versus the relative primary mass ILe • mass at a given time
devided by the initial mass in the system1 for the discussed transient. The
flow rate is mainly governed by core ~r and lcop seal resistance.
After 1550 s another effect is superimposed on these processes: the down-
caner mixture level drops to the elevation of the break and this is reflected
by a sudden decrease in the break mass flow rate. The primary circuit pro-
cesses show a periodic behaviour that can be explained as follows: when steam
is leaving the system through the break, the critical mass flow rate is lower
than the arrount injected by the HPSI pUllp and mixture level in the downcorrer
begins to rise. Since the HPSI pUllp delivers cold water the gravitational head
of downcaner water col= is increasing that forces ccolant into the core le-
ading to a W9ak positive flow rate. The relatively low quality coolant ente-
ring the steam generator is evaporated because of the higher terrq;:erature on
the secondary side, the steam produced pushes water from the pUllp seal into
the downcaner. These effects lead to the fact that the breach is covered
again, this, 'in turn, along with the steam production in the stearn generator,
provokes a rather fast increase in the system pressure . At the sarre tirre, the
higher mass flow rate through the breach makes the downcorrer level to fall
again and the whole pIDceSS is repeated. Because of the sawtcoth-like behavi-
our in system pressure the average depressurization rate is very low.
It is evident fran the above results that the stearn generator plays an
important IDle during hot and cold leg lcop seal clearing as we11 as when
the break is uncovered. calculations indicate that the reflux condensation
mode , so effective at reduced primary inventory in FWRs with vertical u-tube
heat exchangers , is not existing in the iWJER geollletry, but already a very
small positive pressure drop across the stearn generator is sufficient to push
the condensed water into the cold leg.
When the break is uncovered or, with larger break sizes, ylben the break
flow becanes tv.D-phase the primary system behaviour very rnuch depends on break
size and elevation: while in the case of a 1% break the energy rernoved through
the break is not sufficient to render the primary pressure independent of the
secondary one, the 7,4% case shows a different picture. When there is tv.D-
phase flow at the break, primary pressure falls below the secondary one, but
stearn produced by the reverse heat flow in the steam generators maintains the
fonner very near the secondary level. This situation lasts until the break
becanes uncovered, this leading to fast depressurization of the system.
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The effect of the steam generator in different small-break transients is
illustrated by Fig. 9, where the pr:im:lry system pressure variation is plotted
versus power to steam generator/core power. Reverse steam generator heat flow
is a consequence of two-phase or steam break flow in all cases, but the one
with 0,55% break: here, due to 3 HPIS purrps injecting, the system subcooling
is getting so high that the pr:im:lry terrperature is lower than secondary alre-
ady at apressure of 8.4 MPa. The lcop seal effects are reflected by lcops
on the 1%-1 HPIS curve.
CONCLUSIONS
Pre-test analyses of SB-IDCEs to be perforrred on the PMK-NVl! facility
indicate that test results will reprod1.1ce the ilTportant pr=esses in the plant
during such transients. The single-lcop design of the facility will, of cour-
se, not represent asyrrrretric behaviour anong the six lcops but, on the other
hand, it does not suffer frau shorteomings that w::>uld arise if five intact
loops were lurrped into one. To keep heat losses as low as possible the loop
will be adequately insulated and heater bands will be applied at instrurrent
penetrations.
calculation results obtained with RELAP4/rrod6 are regarded as tentative:
the rnain aim of the PMK tests is to produce experirrental data for computer
code validation. The rrain areas where RELAP4/rrod6 results should be checked
are the follCMing:
- Phase separation in the upper plenum and loop seals has an ilTportant effect
on natural·circulation flow rates, while in the volurre next to the break it
greatly influences break flCM rate. It also detennines heat transfer in the
core.
- Condensation on the steam generator pr:im:lry side is of great ilTportance.
/RELAP4/rrod6 does not contain any condensation rrodel, the number of steam
generator control volurres rray also have an influence. /
- Thermal non-equilibrium pr=esses are encountered at SIT and HPIS injection,
as weIl as at pressurizer refill. Since REI.AP4 is a theDlEl equilibrium code
it is to be checked, whether these processes have an ilTportant effect on
overall system behaviour.
PMK instrurrentation was designed to give extensive information on rrost of
these processes. Mixture level in the upper plenum and lcop seals will be
tracked by using irrpedance void probes and Ap transducers . 26 therrrocouples
are rrounted on the uppermost part of the electrically heated fuel rod simu-
lators in order to give infoDlEtion on heat transfer in this part of the core.
A spcol piece containing a symretrlc venturi, a turbine, flow rreter and a
~ -densitorreter is being calibrated at the tw::>-phase test-loop of österreich-
isches Forschungszentrum Seibersdorf , in order to rreasure the low, t:l-ro-phase
natural circulation flow rates.
[2]
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PMK-NVH facility with list of rreasurerrents.
COntrol and data acquisition.
LIST OF MEASUREMENl'S
COntrol and Data Acquisition:
canputer system based on mini =puter for
control
canputerized rronitoring system to help the
operator
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Reactor vessel 43 8 1 3 3
Pressurizer 1 1 1
Stearn generator 2 2 2
Lcops 9 2 5 2
Hydroaccurnulators 2 2 2
Feed water Une 1 1 1
Steam line 1 1
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Fig. 2 Corrparison ofaxial volurre distributions for PMK-NVH and Paks NPP
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Fig. 3 Variation of PMK-NVH system pressure and steam generator hot collector
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POST ANALYSIS OF A 10 CM2 SBLOCA TEST IN THE OTSG
EQUIPPED GERDA FACILITY USING A BBR VERSION OF RELAP4/MOD6
Robert J. Salm




The paper evaluates a post analysis of a 10 cm2 SBLOCA
test performed in the BBR 1 B&W research facility GERDA.
The facility is a one-loop, full elevation, 1/1686 scale
representation of the BBR PWR design, a design which
incorporates once-through-steam-generators and reactor
internals vent valves.
The analysis, performed with an extensively modified
version of RELAP4/MOD6, shows good agreement with the data.
It follows the transient from its start in forced
circulation on through the SBLOCA phases of natural
circulation, intermittant circulation and the boiler-
condenser mode. It ends with the transient under control
and the primary loop refilling.
INTRODUCTION
The GERDA project, a joint venture of Brown Boveri Reaktor
GmbH and the Babcock & Wilcox Company, provided integral effects
test data on SBLOCA phenomena in PWR designs incorporating once -
through-steam-generators and reactor vessel internals vent valves.
This paper compares data from a 10 cm2 reactor vessel leak test to
the results of a post analysis with a special BBR version of
RELAP4/MOD6.
GERDA
GERDA (figure 1) is a full pressure, single-loop, single-cold
leg, full elevation, 1/1686 scale test facility. It has a .
functioning once-through-steam-generator and an electrically
heated core supplying decay heat. The reactor vessel internals
vent valves are simulated and enable steam venting from the core
outlet plenum to the downcomer. Forced circulation of up to 20 %
of plant design is provided by an external pump connected ahead of
the reactor coolant pump simulator.
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ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES
The purpose of this benchmark analysis was to demonstrate the
suitability of not only the code, a modified version of RELAP4 /
MOD6, but also the modeling techniques used by BBR in plant licen-
sing work. Therefore, in spite of known simplifications i3.nd
conservatisms, the established techniques were not altered except
to account for GERDA heat losses, and for the characteristics of




Horizontally, this technique enables a simple simulation of
stratified flow over short distances. Vertically, it prevents
steam / mixture "pancaking".
- Vertical slip:
A newly formulated model includes correlations for both bubbly
and annular flow regimes.
- Phase separation model:
Enables formation of distinct mixture / steam interfaces.
- 3-region non-equilibrium pressurizer:
Improves simulation of pressurization transients.
- Dynamic heat transfer package:
Covers all major heat transfer mechanisms including filmwise
condensation.
- Modified enthalpy transport model:
Adjusts out let junction properties to account for heat transfer
induced temperature gradients within control volumes.
- Vertically non-uniform control volumes:
Reduces the noding detail required to preserve the relationship
between fluid volume, level and driving head.
A notable weakness of this particular nodalization scheme (figure 2)
is the use of only a single node to simulate the steam generator
secondary side. Because of the thermoequilibrium nature of the
control volume, there is an underprediction of steam generator
performance. Heat transfer to the steam region must be neglected
(region cannot superheat) and the model cannot simulate the
subcooled heat transfer zone created by the injection of cold
auxiliary feedwater. While this is an acceptable, conservative
situation for SBLOCA licensing purposes, its effect on the
transient is discernable next to test data.
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COMPARISON OF ANALYSIS RESULTS TO DATA
The 10 cm 2 SBLOCA transient described in this paper is typical
for breaks of between 5 cm 2 and 50 cm 2 and is characterized by
three distinct phases:
1. Forßed and natural circulation,
2. Intermittant circulation, and
3. Boiler-condenser mode.
Phase 1: Forced and natural circulation
The test is initialized with the primary loop having 9 %forced
circulation and fluid conditions which will later key to those in
the plant at the time of pressurizer draining. The test is started
by opening the leak, a 10 cm 2 break at the bottom of the reactor
vessel, and tripping the external circulation pump. Primary
pressure (figure 3) immediately begins to fall as the pressurizer
slowly drains. Without a flywheel on the circulation pump, there
is a sharp drop in loop flow and a transition to natural
circulation (figure 4). The vent valve opens and establishes an
internal circulation path through the downcomer and core. By
4 minutes, the pressurizer is empty and safety actions are taken:
HPI is actuated, and secondary side level and pressure control
setpoints are switched from 3 to 8 m, and 7.9 MPa to 4.8 MPa.
Primary pressure stabilizes at 11.7 MPa as steam begins to form
and collect in the hot leg U-bend. Loop circulation diminishes
and soon boiling begins in the core. Steam accumulates in the
vessel (figure 5) and liquid is displaced out into the loop. As
circulation recovers, the resulting flow of subcooled liquid into
the vessel now condenses steam and draws liquid aut of the loop.
By 7 minutes (analysis: 8 minutes), loop flow is fully
interrupted.
Phase 2: Intermittant circulation
Although there is no longer sufficient liquid in the primary
system to support uninterrupted natural circulation, the shifting
of inventory between the reactor vessel and the loop continues to
provide regular pulses of loop circulation. Because individual
flow cycles are comprised of distinct steps that do not vary too
much from cycle to cycle, only the first flow cycle will be
described.
1. The hot leg mixture level falls below the hot leg U-bend and
loop circulation is interrupted. See flow (figure 4) at
7 minutes (analysis: 8 minutes).
2. Subcooling in the cold leg discharge piping / downcomer region
is not adequate to condense core steam (via vent valve path).
Primary pressure begins to increase as steam accumulates in
the reactor vessel. Liquid is displaced from the vessel region
into the loop. See both pressure (figure 3) and vessel level
(figure 5) at 7 minutes (analysis: 8 minutes).
3. The hot leg mixture level increases until liquid spills over
the hot leg U-bend and initiates loop circulation. See flow
(figure 4) at 9 minutes (analysis: 9.5 minutes).
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4. Primary pressure falls as subcooled fluid circulated from the
steam generator to the vessel condenses steam. Secondary side
pressure momentarily increases as hot primary fluid enters
the heat transfer zone. See pressure (figure 3) and vessel
level (figure 5) at 9.5 minutes (analysis: 10 minutes).
5. As vessel steam is condensed, liquid is drawn from the loop
back into the vessel and the hot leg mixture level falls below
the U-bend. Loop circulation is again interrupted and the
first flow cycle is completed. See flow (figure 4) at
11 minutes (analysis: 12 minutes).
Phase 3: Boiler-condenser mode
Since primary pressure is still too high for the HPI to overfeed
the leak, the loop continues to drain. At 32.5 minutes (analysis:
31 minutes), the primary side steam generator level drops below
the secondary level, thereby initiating the condensation of
primary steam. Primary pressure falls sharply while secondary
side pressure rises (figure 3). The analysis ends at 46 minutes
with HPI exceeding leak flow and primary pressure still
decreasing.
COMMENTS TO COMPARISON
The differences between the analysis results and the test
data are in most cases attributable to the underprediction of
steam generator heat transfer.
It explairts for example,
the somewhat greater degree of primary system
pressurization during the intermittant circulation phase
(figure 3), .
the markedly lower rate of depressurization in the boiler-
condenser mode,
the relatively small secondary side pressure rise that
accompanies each pulse of intermittant circulation and the
start of the boiler-condenser mode, and
the small shifts in event timing that result from the
inadequate subcooling of cold leg fluid.
Because the root cause of these differences is the simple one-
node secondary side model, switching to a best estimate multi-
node secondary side would markedly improve the analytical results.
The oscillatory flow behavior starting in the RELAP calculation
at 22 minutes (figure 4) is not numerical instability. It is a
10 second period cyclic process characteristic of the full
elevation, small scale GERDA loop when the vessel mixture level
is within the hot leg nozzle and the loop is draining. It is not
as evident in the plot of test data because of a low data storage
frequency and the tendency for the flow metering orifice to
uncover under these conditions and go out of range.
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CONCLUSION
Although using conservative licensing techniques, the
quantitative difrerences between the data and the analysis are
not large. Further, the BBR version of RELAP4/MOD6 reproduces
all major phenomena starting from the circulation pump trip,
through intermittant circulation, to the boiler-condenser mode.
Taken as a whole, the calculation demonstrates a fundamental
capability to perform this type of analysis.
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FIGURE 3: PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PRESSURE
-10 cm2 REACTOR VESSEL LEAK




























FIGURE 4: COLD LEG MASS FLOW
- 10 cm2 REACTOR VESSEL LEAK
- GERDATEST 1605AA
































FIGURE 5: MIXTURE LEVEL AND COLLAPSED LIQUID
LEVEL IN THE CORE VESSEL
- 10 cm2 REACTOR VESSEL LEAK
















POST TEST CALCULATIONS OF SEMISCALE PUMP SUCTION SMALL
BREAK LOCE, S-PL-4, USING RELAPs/MODl.S
P C Hall
Central Electricity Generating Board
Berkeley Nuclear Laboratories
(current address: CEGB, Generation Development and Construction Division
Barnwood, Gloucester, UK)
ABSTRACT
This report describes posttest analysis of the Semiscale S% pump
suction break experiment, S-PL-4, using RELAPS/MODl.S. MODl.S is a
direct development of MODI, with more sophisticated treatment of thermal
disequilibrium and interphase drag. It embodies many of the
improvements subsequently included in RELAPS/MOD2, though it retains the
use of only five conservation equations. Apart from requiring special
modelling to overcome a suspected code error in the break flow
calculation, the code ran without difficulty and accurately reproduced
the measured primary mass inventory, pressure his tory and overall
chronology. Potentially important errors in the calculated water
distribution within the primary system were observed, and were concluded
to be related both to difficulties in the calculation of the timing of
clearing of the intact loop pump suction pipework and to the calculation
of voidage distribution in a boiling channel. However, actual errors
in calculated clad temperature were less than SOKo
INTRODUCTION
The test considered in this report is S-PL-4, which was a S% area LOCE,
with the break located in the pump suction, conducted on the Semiscale
MOD-2B facility, at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Semiscale is
scaled to a reference 4-loop PWR based on a power-to-volume ratio of
l/170S.S. The system consists of apressure vessel with a simulated PWR
core and internals, an external pipe downcomer and two primary coolant loops,
each with an active steam generator. The intact loop is scaled to represent
three primary loops, while the broken loop represents the fourth. In order
to scale the facility correctly and to preserve important phenomena,
component elevations, dynamic pressure heads and liquid distributions were
maintained as close to the reference PWR values as possible. Test S-PL-4 is
the first in an integral facility to model a break in the pump suction
pipework, and may be seen as extending the existing Semiscale data base on S%
breaks, which includes the cold leg break tests S-UT-6, 7, and 8. 1,2 This
paper compares the results of test s-PL-4 with calculatiops performed using
RELAPS/MODl.S, with the objective of assessing the capabilities of the code.
DESCRIPTION OF FACILITY, AND CONDUCT OF TEST
Full details of the Semiscale }WD2B facility as configured for this
test can be found in references 3 and 4. The main feature particular to
this test was that the break orifice was positioned in the horizontal leg of
a tee, approximately half way up the upflow leg of the broken loop pump
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suction pipe. F10w 1eaving the break was routed via a condenser to vented
co11ection tanks. Break f10w rate was derived by measuring the rate of
change of hydrostatic head in these tanks.
The initial conditions for this test are summarized in Tab1e 1. A
comprehensive compi1ation of data from Test S-PL-4 is avai1ab1e. 5 The
primary was at normal 100% power with a core temperature rise of 32K. The
secondary pressures were a110wed to f10at. The course of the test was
re1ative1y straightforward. B10wdown was initiated at time zero, and a
SCRAM signal was genera ted on 10w pressurizer pressure (12.6 MPa) at 13s.
This signal activated core power shutdown, and the c10sing of the SG feed and
steam va1ves. Primary pumps were tripped at 43s, and high pressure
injection commenced at 44s. No further operator actions or trips were
simu1ated before the initiation of Low Pressure Injection at about 2400s.
The experiment was terminated at 2697s.
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The Semisca1e MOD2B system RELAP5 model is represented by the
noda1ization diagram in Figure 1. It is generally based on the Semisca1e
MOD2A Standard RELAP5 Mode1 6, with lmproved mode11ing of the guard heaters.
The model used for these ana1yses consists of 162 hydrodynamic vo1umes, 168
junctions, and 227 heat structures. All volume parameters are ca1cu1ated
with non-equi1ibrium code models. Steam generator secondaries, ECC systems,
system environmenta1 heat 10ss, and piping guard heaters (which were switched
off in this test) are mode11ed in detail. The core axial power profile is
mode11ed with twe1ve continuous heat structures over six axial hydrodynamic
vo1umes.
The steam generator secondaries are mode11ed with four hydrodynamic
vo1umes in the U-tube region and nine in the downcomer. Previous Semisca1e
mode1s 1,7 have used more detai1ed noda1ization than this, but have invo1ved
tests in which the SG secondaries p1ayed a dominant ro1e (feed and steam1ine
breaks, 2~% area LOCE). In this test, the secondaries are sea1ed ear1y in
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the transient and the primary-to-secondary heat transfer is expected to be
much less important in a 5% break. The riser and downcorner are modelIed as
pipe components.
Two discharge coefficients are applied to the RELAPS critical flow model
at the break, one (CDl) for subcooled flow and another (CD2) for two phase
and vapour flow. In the analysis of the 5% breaks in the ur series of tests
(which used the same orifice plate as this test) Leonard1, 2 found appropriate
values for these coefficients to be 0.9 and 0.8 - 0.84 respectively, when
using RELAPS/HODl. Preliminary checks indicated that, at 1000 psia, two
phase critical flow rates calculated with HODl.S were approximately 40% less
than those calculated using HODl. Brief investigation suggested that this
discrepancy resulted from a probable error in the break flow modelling in the
present cycle of RELAPS/HODl.S. In view of the different behaviour of the
two HODs it would not be appropriate to use the break flow multipliers
developed by Leonard, (with HODl) in this (HODl.S) calculation. Instead, it
was decided to minimize the effects of the suspected code error by attempting
to force HODl.S to give break flow behaviour similar to that experienced by
Leonard, modelling this orifice plate with HODl. A close match to HODI
performance could be achieved by adopting a single velocity model within the
break junction, and in order to force still closer correspondence between the
two HODs, the value of CD2 was increased to 0.88.
Initial Conditions
To simplify the finding of a steady state calculation, a simple control
system was modelIed using RELAPS control variables. For example, desired loop
flow was achieved by adjusting the speed of the primary pumps. Other items
controlled in this way were the secondary steam valve position (to achieve
desired pressure); and feed flow rate (to control secondary mass inventory).
During the approach to steady state, the primary pressure was held at the
required value using a very large dummy pressurizer, which was deleted from
the calculation 20s before the start of the transient. Calculated primary and
secondary conditions just before the start of the transient were somewhat
steadier than those obtained in the test.
The initial conditions obtained by these means are summarized in
Table I, and most parameters are shown to be within the experimental
uncertainty. The main discrepancy is in the broken loop SG secondary pressure
(and therefore, temperature). This temperature was purposely raised to
reduce an error of -9K in the calculated broken loop cold leg liquid
temperature. The error introduced into the initial pressure and temperature
must, of course, affect the calculation, but subsequent scrutiny of the
calculated results suggested that the effect was small.
Boundary Conditions
Core power was entered, using an input table of power versus time after
reactor scram. In this test, the pumps were coasted down manually.
Heasured values of pump speed versus time after break opening were inserted
via a table. Secondary steam and feed flows were ramped to zero after scram,
in accordance with the measured valve closure times. HPIS injection was
calculated from an input table of flow rate versus pressure, constructed from
measured data. The accumulators were modelIed using the RELAPS accumulator
component. Environmental heat losses were calculated mechanistically, and
were within the experimental uncertainty quoted by Loomis. 8
Table 11. Sequence of Events
1714
Blowdown initiated
Pressurizer pressure reached reactor trip
set point (12.6 MPa [1827 psi])(SCRAM)
Broken loop pump suction down-flow leg
clears
Break flow demonstrates sharp reduction
(indicates two phase ups team conditions)
Upper head drains
Void fraction in broken loop pump
suction exceeds 90%
Core starts to uncover (dryout
heatups start)
Intact loop accumulator injection starts
Broken loop accumulator injection starts
Core level starts to recover
Intact loop pump suction upf10w leg clears




















COMPARISON OF EXPERIMENTAL AND CALCULATED RESULTS
The measured and calculated pressure histories are shown to be in
excellent agreement in Figure 2. This is, in large part, a consequence of
the good agreement between measured and calculated break flows, especially
beyond 200s (Figure 3). Before 85s, the calculated discharge flow is some-
what too high, but as soon as steam appears at the break (void fraction
>2%) discharge flow falls by about 60% and remains too low until about 210s.
In terms of integrated mass discharge, these two errors fortuitous1y cancel
giving very accurate system mass inventory. Anomalies in the behaviour of
the RELAPS critical flow calcu1ation were noted above. The accurate pressure
and mass discharge calculations enable the code to ca1culate the chronology
of the experiment very accurately also, as illustrated in Table 11.
The first major process of the transient, the draining of the
pressurizer was calculated within the experimental uncertainty and this led
to accurate timing of the reactor trip signal (scram) at 13s. Several other
events are related to this trip (i.e., isolation of SG secondaries, starting
of HPI, and tripping of the primary pumps) and are therefore accurately timed
also. After the pumps coasted down, (54-58s) flows in the primary fell
close to zero enabling the vertical differential pressure measurements to be
used to assess liquid inventory. Measured and calculated drainage of both
sides of the SG U-tubes were in reasonable agreement, calculated emptying
times typically being within 25s of measured values.
The collapsed liquid levels in the pump suction pipework are shown in
Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7. Figures 4 and 6 i1lustrate the reversal of order of
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emptying the down side of the pump suctions. The broken loop pump suction
downside began to empty, but at about 85s, the draining was haI ted. Since the
calculated break flow fell sharply at this time, it was suspected that errors
in the break flow might have contributed to the errors in clearing the pump
suctions. A sensitivity calculation was performed in which the break flow
was forced to exceed data until l40s. The result was somewhat more rapid
emptying of both loops, but the reversal in the order of draining, and the
large delay in clearing the broken loop pump suction downside persisted. In
the base case calculation, draining of the downside of the intact loop pump
suction (Figure 4) is very accurately calculated until 190s. In the
calculation, this pump suction cleared, whereas in the experiment it
refilled. A possible contribution to this behaviour is the ability of
"homogeneous node" codes to pass steam through the pump suction before the
liquid level falls to the bottom. Davis 9 has previously observed this
behaviour, and Summers 10 has shown that finer noding of the downside can
ameliorate the difficulty. Consequences of the early clearing of the intact
loop pump suction included a maldistribution of steam flow in the loops in
the period 200-600s (the intact loop pump suction actually cleared at 600s);
and the delivery of a slug of water to the downcomer and also to the broken
loop pump suction, delaying its clearance still further.
In spite of the detailed errors in the calculated clearing of the loops,
the overall behaviour was reasonably accurate. . In particular, errors in the
calculated broken loop upside density were relatively minor. Hence, the
pressure and integrated break flow were in good agreement with data by the
time agreement between measured and calculated conditions near the break was
achieved (250s). In consequence, the timing of initiation of accumulator
injection was also calculated within 20s. Furthermore, since the calculated
total primary inventory was correct as the accumulators began to inject, the
pressure fluctuations caused by condensation on the cold water were also
accurately calculated.
Since the primary pressure and inventory were calculated reasonably
accurately, we might expect calculation of other features within the system
to be accurately calculated also. This does not prove to be the case. For
example, the measured heater rod temperatures at the top of the core indicate
a minor dryout commencing at about 460s, which does not appear in the
calculated results. Figure 8 shows that the mixture level fell below the
top of the core at this time, a feature which the calculation failed to
reproduce. Indeed the calculatedmixture density at the top of the core is
higher than that in the middle in spite of monotonically increasing steam
flow rate. This feature is at odds with a wide range of experimental
data 11 , including that of the present test. However, the calculated core
water inventory is only slightly too high at the time dryouts are observed,
suggesting the errors in the calculated water distribution within the core
may contribute to the core's failure to reproduce dryout. Excessive liquid
is also held in the upper plenum, and both hot legs for significant portions
of the calculation. This excess vessel inventory prior to accumulator
injection is consistent with the erroneous clearing of the intact loop pump
suction pipe wo~k. A consequence of the calculated existence of excess
water at outlet from the core is failure to reproduce the steam superheating
observed in these areas (see, for example, Figure 9). This unfortunately
precludes any test of the ability of the improved treatment of superheat
implemented in MODl.5.
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The calculated pressure response of the secondary side of the steam
generator is broadly correct, except in the broken loop SG after it became
a heat source. The test data imply that its coupling to the primary was
rather loose, whereas calculated secondary pressure followed that of the
primary. This erroneOus close coupling occurred because a small amount of
water, incorrectly calculated to reside in the lowest node of the inlet side
of the U-tube, permitted a region of transition or nucleate boiling, which
greatly enhanced the calculated heat removal from this secondary, and led to
overestimation of the depressurization rate within it.
The calculation was terminated at l411s, with the calculated pressure
approximately 0.15 MPa too high, at 1.9 MPa, 'and falling too slowly. The
reason for this fairly minor departure is suspected to be due to errors in
the measured HPIS flow rate starting at about 900s. In view of this
uncertainty it was considered unworthwhile to extend the calculation.
DISCUSSION OF PERFORHANCE OF RELAPS/MOD1.S
This calculation was performed as part of the independent assessment of
RELAPS/MOD1.S, and no special modelling of the Semiscale facility, nor
special code updates were used, with the exception of the changes made to
discharge flow modelling noted earlier. With this proviso, the calculation
of discharge flow and primary inventory was excellent, although some evidence
exists of cancelling errors in the calculation of dis charge flow in the
subcooled and very low quality regions. It is considered that the use of
finer noding in the pump suction near the break would not ameliorate these
problems, and is therefore unnecessary.
The accumulator model worked satisfactorily, though neither accumulator
had ceased injecting water at the time the transient was terminated. The
weak area of the calculation was in thewater distribution around the system.
In particular too much water was held in the upper core, upper plenum and
hot legs, and too little in the intact loop pump suction and the lower part
of the core. Although it has not been possible to identify particular
causes of this behaviour, an obvious candidate is the interfacial drag
modelling, allowing too much slip, and permitting steam genera ted within the
core and hot legs -in the period 80-120s to pass round the loops without
entraining water with it. Several alternative explanations, relating to
break flow modelling and initial conditions in the SG secondaries were
investigated, but found not to improve the representation of the loop flows
or clearance of the pump suctions.
For the initial part of the transient, the maximum time step was set at
O.Ss, and the RELAPS time step control system functioned to keep the actual
maximum time step below this limit. The minimum time step (10- 7s) was used
on a number of occasions during the first 100s of the calculation, and time
step dependent osclllations were observed, but the code did not fail.
RELAPS/MOD1.S cycle 34 includes a mass error mitigation scheme, and so no
significant mass errors were sustained at any point in the calculation. The
calculation proceeded without major difficulty until its termination at




1. Exce11ent agreement between ca1cu1ated and measured pressure his tory,
and chrono1ogy of events was obtained for this pump suction break. No
special mode1ling of the broken loop pump suction was required.
2. Loop pump seal clearing was ca1cu1ated reasonably we1l. Minor errors
in calcu1ated loop density 1ed however to errors in timing of the
clearing event.
3. Significant errors in the water distribution within the system were
noted throughout the ca1cu1ation. These errors are be1ieved to be
associated main1y with the ca1cu1ation of c1earance of the pump suction
pipe work, though other more detai1ed errors in the ca1culation of the
water distribution within the core may also be important.
4. The critica1 f10w model in RELAPS/MOD1.S/C c1e 34 gave significant1
lower discharge f10w rates than the corresponding model in RELAPS MOD1,
when two-phase conditions exist upstream of the break. In this
ca1cu1ation special mode11ing was used to avoid this feature. It is
be1ieved that the anoma1y has been removed from more recent vers ions of
the code.
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SMALL BREAK ANALYSES WITR COMPUTER CODES SMABRE AND RELAPS/MOD1
J. Miettinen
Technical Research Centre of Finland
Nuclear Engineering Laboratory
P.O. Box 169, 00181 Helsinki, Finland
ABSTRACT
The LOFT small break tests L3-S and L3-6 and the LOBI test SD-SL-03
have been analysed using the large system code RELAPS/Mod1 and the
simplified, fast running code SMABRE. The comparison against the
experimental results and comparison between the results of the codes
indicate, that the simplified solution method used in SMABRE is
satisfactory, when small break transients are calculated. Because
SMABRE computes at least ten times faster than RELAPS, it is a prac-
tical tool in extensive studies of parameter effects during small
break LOCA (SBLOCA) transients both in scaled experimental facilities
and real plants. RELAPS is used parallel for calculation of some pa-
rameter conditions. SMABRE has also been installed to the full scope
training simulator of the Loviisa plant.
INTRODUCTION
The development of light water reactor (LWR) transient analysis capabilities
has produced large system codes like RELAP4, RELAPS, TRAC, DRUFAN and CATRARE
for analysis of loss of coolant accidents (LOCA). The solution methods of the
thermohydraulics are developed to handle most severe LOCA transients as weIl as
milder LOCA transients in LWR's. The size of the code systems is typically
large, and hundreds of manyears may be used for code development. Computation
needs large computers and computation times are typically at least ten times
longer than real time. For code modifications specialists are needed.
In the case of a small break LOCA (SBLOCA). the possibilities for different
event paths are nearly infinite. Then the large codes are not practical tools
for plant response studies with many parameter combinations and a simpler model
with the following features is needed in addition to the large system codes:
o Real time simulation capability to allow large parameter studies. Inter-
active computer periphery gives a feeling about the real time sequencies.
o The process .parameters are simulated with sufficient accuracy: Very high
accuracy is not needed.
o All possible control functions affecting the thermohydraulics are
simulated.
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These may be seen as the main ideas in the development of the SBLOCA code at
the Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT). The development of this code
started in 1980 after TMI. The Finnish PWR's have some differences compared to
Western PWR plants and thus own code development was weIl argumented. The
SBLOCA transients with leak sizes from 0 to 10% are significant from plant
safety point of view.
The code is called SMABRE (SMAll BREak) /1/. SMABRE may be used for 0 to 10 %
SBLOCA analyses of PWR plants and for plant transients where neutron kinetics
are not important. The secondary side model is simple describing water and
steam parts as fully separated volumes. The modelling capability of the code
is versatile allowing calculation of the various systems including simple
separate test facilities as weIl as large nuclear power plants.
SMABRE is capable to simulate the transients in real time with a process com-
puter like PDP 11/70 and the modified version of the code has been implemented
as a primary side two-phase model to the Loviisa full scope training simulator
having two parallel PDP 11/70 computers for plant physical simulation /2/.
In thermohydraulic analyses of the Finnish PWR's the large computational tools
are the RELAP4 and RELAPS/ModI codes and in the near future the RELAPS/Mod2
version is expected to be installed. The computer used for assessment and
independent plant analyses at VTT is Cyber 173. The parallel use of RELAPS and
SMABRE has been seen beneficial both in plant applications and in code
assessment. If a large set of parameter variations is needed, a few selected
con~on cases are calculated with both codes after parameter variations with
SMABRE.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SMABRE AND RELAPS
Both the numerical solution methods and the set of physical correlations are
quite different in SMABRE and RELAPS. In Table 1 the main features of the codes
regarding SBLOCA calculations are compared.
The field equations in SMABRE are written for the conservation of mixture mass,
steam mass, integrated mixture momentum and water or steam energy. The two-
phase separation is calculated using the drift flux model. In RELAPS/ModI the
conservation equations for water and steam mass, water and steam momentum and
mixture energy are solved. The calculation of the two-phase flow is based on
interfacial friction correlations dependent on the flow regime map.
In SBLOCA calculations the accuracy of the heat transfer correlations has minor
significance, but the heat transfer logic must be complete, however. Typically
the wall temperatures follow closely the fluid temperatures. Some heat trans-
fer features, which often are not weIl modeled in large break LOCA (LBLOCA)
blowdown codes, but may become significant in SBLOCA transients, are:
o Steam condensation on the wall e.g. in the steam generator primary side.
o Heat transfer mode transition from film boiling to nucleate boiling.
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on the method of charac-
teristics, Two contrac-
tion coefficients
4 quadrant head and
torque homologous
curves, 2~ multiplier
for the head and
torque ~ /2~ difference.
Point neutron
kinetics.
Table 1. A comparison between characteristic features of SMABRE and
RELAPS/Modl codes
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During SBLOCA transients the separation of water and steam phases becomes the
most dominating process. By comparing the results of RELAPS and SMABRE a
difference has been seen in the calculated water level void gradients. The
RELAPS/ModI version cannot calculate sharp void gradients of water level with-
out very large number of nodes, like SMABRE does. The modelling of water level
becomes significant in the calculation of e.g. core uncovery, drying of steam
generator primary side and steam venting through vessel bypass connections.
SMABRE uses a simplified solution method for the calculation of the pressure
distribution. It is assumed that the local pressure differences are very small
compared to the absolute pressures. This feature is the main reason, why the
present version of SMABRE is not recommended for larger LOCA transients.
The numerical solution of RELAPS is described as a linear, semi-implicit fi-
nite-difference integration scheme. The equation set is solved with matrix
operations. The discretization in S~~BRE for loeal variables is based on
upwind discretizing and the solution method is semi-implicit. In the present
code version no matrix operations are used in the solution.
GO~mN TEST GASES
Apart of the SMABRE assessment work has been performed in the frame of the
internordic sÄK-3 project between Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland. The
capabilities of three codes, RELAPS, TRAG and SMABRE has been compared calcu-





2.5 % Pl~ cold leg break in operating intact loop. Prima-
ry eoolant pumps left running during the transient.
Test facility sealing about 1:60, Goolant volume to
break area ratio 38300 m3 /nf- ./4,7/
2.5 % Pl~ cold leg break. Same as L3-6, but pumps stopped
in the beginning /5,8/.
0.4 % PWR cold leg break in the LOBI/Mod1 test facility.
Test facility scaling 1:712. Goolant vo1ume to break
area ratio 235000 m3 /nf- /6,9/
The comparison between the codes and experimental results was performed by
choosing twenty most significant parameters describing the transient behaviour.
The set of chosen parameters includes primary and secondary pressures, average
densities in the cold and hot sides of the loops, fluid temperatures in the
loops, core cladding temperatures, loop mass flow rates and the break f10w
rate. The main conclusions coneerning calcu1ations with SMABRE and RELAPS are
1isted in Tab1e 2 for LOFT L3-6, in Tab1e 3 for LOFT L3-S and in Tab1e 4 for
LOBI SL-SD-03. Figure 1 presents the SMABRE nodalization for the LOBI faci1ity
and Figure 2 for the LOBI facility. The comparison of few parameters between
SMABRE and RELAPS are presented in Figures 3 to 11. The comments to the resu1ts
in Figures may be found in Tables 2, 3 and 4.
1725
In the comparison presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4 only those parameters are
mentioned, which were found most significant. E.g. the fluid temperatures
followed typically the saturation temperature during the transient, both in the
experiment and in the calculation, and were not important in the comparison.
The experimental data of LOBI SD-SL-03 showed strong subcooling effects for
water in uninsulated parts of the loop ,but these local heat losses were not
modeled.
The primary side nodalizations in the RELAP5 and SMABRE runs for all the three
cases were quite similar. With SMABRE several calculations were done for all of
the cases and during different runs usually only the contraction coefficient of
the break flow was varied. Several changes in the nodalization of the bypass
connections and in the upper plenum as weIl as variations of the pump two-phase
model were needed before the final run.
Additional comparisons in the SAK-3 project were performed later using a
different set of parameters and then some misunderstandings with respect to the
experiment were found. The SMABRE results were not good with respect to the
natural circulation and horizontal stratification in the L3-5 and LOBI SD-SL-03
experiments, but the calculations with a modified nodalization are expected to
give better results.
CONCLUSIONS
The development of the SBLOCA code SMABRE has proved to be successful. The
asses~ment of SMABRE has shown, that it is a very fast code and capable of
predicting the behavior of integral test facilities in SBLOCA transients
usually as accurately as large codes like RELAP5/Mod1.
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NOMENCLATURE
Symbols Subcripts:
u Velocity m/s I liquid
p Pressure N!rrf g gas, steam
h Enthalpy J /kg s saturated
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Table 4. Comparison of predictions for the LOBI test SD-SL-03
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Figure 1. SMABRE nodalization for LOFT facility. RELAPS nodalization for
the primary side was nearly the same.
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Figure 2. SMABRE nodalization for LOBI facility. RELAPS/Modi nodalization
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Figure 3. LOFT L3-5, see Table 3. Figure 6. LOFT L3-6, see Table 2.




















Figure 4. LOFT L3-5, see Table 3. Figure 7. LOFT L3-6, see Table 2.
















Figure 5. LOFT L3-5, see Table 3. Figure 8. LOFT L3-6, see Table 2.
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Figure 9. LOBI SD-SL-03, see Tab1e 4.
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ABSTRACT
The paper presents the post-test analysis of the LOFW/ATIiS experiment
L9-3 on LOFT apparatus, performed using RELAP 4/MOD 6 and ALMOD-JRC
computer codes.
Attention is given to their ability to simulate on ATWS incident; in
this connection parametric studies about modelling of core, pres-
surizer, secondary side of the steam generator and heat slabs effect
are described.
Limits and merits of the codes are also discussed from the point of
view of adequacy of the computed results to the experimental data as
,~el1 as f or their flexibility and running times,
INTRODUCTION
The experiment L9-3, performed on the LOFT /-1 / reactor simulated a
loss of feedwater ,~ithout scram (LOFW/ATIiS) in a-co~ercial PWR [2,3 l.
In accordance with the programmatic aim to provide experimental data
for benchmarking PWR computer codes, the experiment L9-3 specific objec-
tives were to:
1. Assess the applicability of the point kinetics model, used in predict-
ing transient reactor power;
2. Determine the steam generator secondary dry-out behaviour and its
effect on the primary system response characteristics;
3. Determine the two-phase and subcooled flow characteristics of the
pressurizer valves PORV and SRV at high pressures (17 MPa).
The post-test analysis of the experiment (for the first 200 seconds)
has been performed using two computer codes: RELAP 4/MOD 6 and ALMOD-JRC.
The main objective of the work has been the evaluation of the capa-
bility of the two codes for PliR plant ATWS simulation.
A second aim was the comparison of the performances of a computer
code (ALMOD-JRC), specially developed for PWR transients analysis L-4,5_/
with those of the RELAP 4 L- 5_/; this last code, even if specially suit-
ed for large LOCA simulation, has been used successfully at Pisa Universi
ty for the analysis of a larger class of accidents, particullarly small
break LOCA [7).
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DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPERIMENT
The sequence of events is given in Table I.
The experiment starts by tripping the feedwater pump, at a power level of
48.7 MWth; other experimental conditions are:
- hot leg temperature of 557.7 °K;
- pressurizer pressure of 14.98 MPa;
- pressure in the SG secondary side of 5.61 MPa.




.Main feedwater pump tripped off 0.0
.Pressurizer spray valve cycling initiated 29.5 ± 2.0
.Steam generator steam control valve closed 67.3 ± 1.0
.Experiment PORV opened 73.8 ± 0.2
.Pressurizer liquid reached top of indicating range
90.0 ± 0.4
(1.83 m above bottom)
.Steam generator liquid level reached bottom of
94.5 ± 4.0
indicating range (0.25 m above tube sheet)
.Experiment SRV opened 96.8 ± 0.2
.Experiment SRV closed 107 ± 1
.Experiment PORV closed 123 ± 1
.Experiment PORV cycling initiated 125.4 ± 0.2
SIMULATION MODELS
Calculations using RELAP 4/MOD 6 code
The aim of the analysis performed by the RELAP 4/MOD 6 computer code has
been not only to get as close aspossiblem the esperimental results, but also to
begin the development of a code utilization strategy suitable for prediction
calculations: for this reason no dial has been used to "fit" the experimental
data and none of the measured responses of the variables have been considered
as boundary conditions.
Sensitivity studies
The driving variable of the transient is the primary average temperature:
it is determined by the balance of the nuclear power and the extracted power
by the secondary fluid in the steam generator.
The former may depend on the axial nodalization of the fuel and the
moderator regions (the reactivity feedback is a function of the temperature
distribution in the core) , the latter depends on the SG thermal-hydraulic and
on the nodalization of the steam bundle, so that the modelling of the second-
ary side (much more than the primary side) becomes a crucial part of the
calculation.
The relationship between the primary average temperature and the pres-
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surizer (and system) pressure is strongly affected by the nodalization of the
pressurizer: the RELAP 4 computer code has no special non-equilibrium model for
the pressurizer, so that only an adequate subdivision in volumes allows to
account for the temperature stratification.
Core model - A parametric study has been made with a varying number of
contra1 volumes, each heated by one nuclear slab, to evaluate code sensitivity
on this respect. The results indicate that the nodalization of the core does not
affect very strongly the relationship between the average temperature of the
primary fluid and the generated power; however a good selection is important in
order to get a steady-state power as close as possible to the experimental one.
SG secondary side model - Two types ofnodalization have been tested. The
first had several volumes: 4 for the steam generator boiling region, 1 volume
for the downcorner and 1 volume for the steam separator-steam dome zone; it is
the result of a parametric study intended to simulate the complex thermal-
-hydraulic phenomena occurring in SG secondary side during the boil-off
transient.
The single node description, usually adopted for calculations of both
transients and LOCAs, involves several limitations in simulating the behaviour
of the secondary variables:
1) The true relationship between the water volurne and level cannot be preserved
because in RELAP 4 each control volume has a constant trasversal area, that,
on the contrary, varies in real SG secondary side; an incorrect calculation
of the level in the secondary side involves errors in the evaluation of SG
heat r~moval capacity.
2) The equilibrium assuption forces the entire secondary side to be at satured
conditions, so that all the energy input into the secondary side is used to
produce steam (rather than superheating it or taking to satured conditions
the subcooled water initially present in the downcorner of the steam
generator); this involves an incorrect partitioning of the water between
the two pahses, and then an incorrect calculation fo the mixture level.
3) The single volurne model neglects the recirculation flow in the steam genera-
tor; therefore, the mass flow across the boiling region cannot be calculat-
ed correctly.
The inadequacy of the second schematization is proved by the behaviour of
the calculated pressure, showing an increase less rapid than esperimentally
observed /-8 7. This result is almost independent from the bubble rise model
used in the ;econdary side, but it is strongly affected by the way we describe
its geometrical configuration and the initial distribution of the masses of
water above and below the top of the tube bundle L-8_7, in order to overcome
the first limitation (it is impossible to preserve all the parameters simul-
taneously).
Pressurizer -As aresult of parametric studies, the pressurizer has been
described by three volumes: at least two volumes are necessary in order to get
a qualitative agreement of the pressure response to the fluid expansion with
the experimental one. The third volume on the top, in which initially homoge-
neous conditions are assumed, allows a better quantitative agreement with the
experiment; it accounts for the real situation of turbulence, which occurs in
the upper part of the pressurizer when the cold water is injected, across the





Fig. 1: Nodalization of LOFT apparatus







The nodalization finally used consists of 36 control volumes and 42 junc-
tions, as shown in Fig. 1; the heat transfer is simulated by 28 heat slabs.
The LOFT vessel is modelIed by
8 control volumes: one for the
downcomer, the lower plenum and the
core bypass, two for the upper ple-
num and three for the core.
The structures of the vessel
have been described in detail, in
order to calculate accurately the
heat storage effect.
Piping between vessel and steam
generator is mode lIed by two volumes,
because the insurge flow temperature
is suited to be calculated with
good precision.
The primary side of the steam
generator (tube bundle) is describ-
ed with 7 control volumes and heat
transfer is simulated by 7 heat
slabs.
Piping between steam generator
and pump inlet, as weIl as from
pump outlet to reactor vessel, is
simulated by one volume. Steam
generator plena are conglobed in
piping volumes.
The two primary coolant pumps
are modelIed by a single homogeneous
control volume, so aS the spray line, which is connected to the pressurizer by
a valve, moved by apressure trip.
The inactive broken hot and cold legs are described by the volumes 15 and
14, respectively.
The experimental valve on the top of the pressurizer is modelIed by two
separate valves, whose flow areas have been established so that, at the same
pressures, the calculated steam mass flows are consistent with the measured
target flow rates for the PORV and the combined PORV and safety valves.
Two valves connect the volume, simulating the SG secondary side steam dome,
with two time-dependent volumes, simulating the condenser and the containment
free space.
Physical models and options
The HF-HEM critical flow models with transition quality 0.02, have been
chosen to compute the maSS flow rate at the junctions equipped with valves.
The vertical slip between liquid and steam is calculated only for junc-
tions concerning the pressurizer.
It has been established MVMIX=O for single path junctions and M~IIX=3 for
double-path junctions.
The enthalpy transport model is activated only for junction, 26.
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The Wilson model, with a bubble density gradient equal to 0.8, is used in
the volumes simulating the pressurizer: it is activated for volume 17 when the
mixture level in volume 13 approaches the height of junction 42. As regards
the steam generator secondary side, a fixed bubble rise velocity and gradient
(3 ft/sec and 0.8, respectively) has been used in downcorner and boiler, whereas
the complete separation model has been chosen for the steam-separator region
(volume 30).
The MOD 6 blowdo,Yn correlations package has been used to calculate heat
transfer; the heat exchange by natural.convection is also accounted for the
slabs concerning the steam generator.
The GHF correlation selected is the W3, Hsu-Beckner and Zuber modified,
while the transition boiling and film boiling correlations are those of Tong-
-Young and Gondie-Bengston, respectively.
Galculations using ALMOD-JRG code
The objective of this analysis has been the assessment of the capability
of ALMOD-JRG to simulate accidents like the one postulated in the L9-3 test;
a particular attention has been paid to the heat slabs model, recently implemen!
ed in the code, and to the Mai model, a new simplified model for the steam
generator, developed in order to simulate transients involving tube bundle dry-
-out.
Parametric studies of input values for some constants, affecting the be-
haviour of the steam generator and the pressurizer, have been performed,
Moreover, the importance of accounting for the heat exchanges with the
structural materials has been estimated. The representation of LOFT by ALMOD-JRG
code is ShOvffi in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2: Nodalization of LOFT apparatus







Steam generator - Aseries of pa-
rametric runs has been executed over the
constants and the quantities not ex-
actly kno,Yn from the experimental data
report, in order to optimize the results.
The most interesting results are:
the ratio between the mixture level
(swell level) and the density compen-
sated level (collapsed level) in the
boiling region (riser) is a function
of the input value for the inverse of
the average void fraction (GGO).
GGO value has been varied from 1.25 to
1.65; the pressure and the level in
the secondary side are better repre-
sented for the high value (but not
greater than 1.65 because, otherwise,
meaningless results would be obtained
for the mixture levels). Also the
pressure peak in the primary side
approaches the experimental one;
- the heat removed by steam generator depends on BETA, ratio between the
transmission numbers for the tubes on both sides of the SG: varying it
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0.5 to 0.9 a very small influence on the transitory has been observed. The
value assumed for the calculation (0.809) has been obtained as the mean value
of the corresponding quantities evaluated by °the RELAP 4/MOD 6 for the hot
and cold legs for the steady-state plant conditions.
Pressurizer - The condensation is modelIed in the code ALMOD-JRC as a non-
-equilibrium phenomenon, governed by a coefficient (the constant C) given in
input. For the pressure range in object (150-180 bars), the order of magnitude of
this constant is in the range of 1-10 kg/sec (if referred to power reactors,
accounting for the relative surfaces of water-steam in the pressurizer). A pa-
rametric analysis of C, varying between the abave values, has shown that the best
simulation of the pressure behaviour during the transient occurs for C=5 kg/sec.
Greater values of C correspond to a faster level rise in the pressurizer, which
quickly fills-up, causing therefore a greater maximum pressure peack. The re-
verse is true for lower values of C.
Another input datum is the fraction of water insurg~ in the pressurizer
directly, given to the buffer volume (EPS). The value 0.2, used in reactors
where the surge line is laterally connected to the pressurizer, is not suited
to the LOFT plant, where the surge line has a different geometrical arrangement.
Because no experimental data were found for the evaluation of this quantity,
the value best suited, from a parametrie analysis varying EPS between 0.01 and 1,
to represent the maximum pressure peak has been selected; the minimum value has
been chosen.
Heat slabs - The results of the calculation performed, with and without
slabs (with all the other input data unchanged), clearly show that the heat
exchanges with the structures play a very important role in transients such as
a LOFW/ATWS; this is specially true in small geometrical configurations (high
surface to volume ratio), as in the experimental LOFT reactor. As self-explana-
tory example of this observation, the primary coolant temperature behaviour in






















In this section, the results obtained using RELAP 4/MOD 6 and ALMOD-JRC
codes are briefly discussed, comparing them with the measured data.
Ten seconds of steady-state are added to 200 seconds of real transient in
all the plots.
Hot leg temperature - The hot leg temperature transitory is shown in Fig. 4:
both RELAP and ALMOD codes simulate the progression of events reasonably weIl.
In the first part of the transient (0~50 seconds), the only relevant
discrepance of ALMOD calculation is the anticipation of the first rise of tem-
perature; this is due to the inability of the code to account for the effects
of the recirculation flow and of the presence of a large mass of subcooled water
in the SG secondary side: for this reason, the secondary pressure (and then
the temperature), in disagreement with the physical reality, increases as soon
as the feedwater flow has been interrupted (Fig. 5).
More important discrepancies occur from 50 seconds onwards.
In RELAP 4 calculation, the temperature increases as quickly as the one in
experimental results and its behaviour is not affected by a poor estimation of
some of the secondary variables. The pressure has higher values than experimen-
talones (Fig. 5), so that a larger amount of water is calculated to escape
from the steam generator through the open valve: this involves a quicker drop
of the downcorner level (Fig. 6), but not of the level in the boiling region, so
that the heat trasfer rate can be computed correctly; we can say that an incor-
rect distribution of water between downcorner and boiler compensates for the
discrepancy in the pressure trend ..
Also the calculation by ALMOD code shows a quicker SG depletion, due to the
overestimation of the secondary pressure, and, then, a larger slope in the
calculated curve of the level in the downcorner: in this case, however, the dif-
ference of the levels in the downcorner and in the boiling region is estimated
accounting only for the different density, so that the tube bundle discovers
more quickly.
As the power extracted from the primary fluid by steam generator is calcu-
lated, as proportional to the mixture level in the riser, the heat exchange
drops too quickly and the primary temperature has a larger increase rate.
In the later part of the examined transient (from 100 seconds onwards)
RELAP 4 calculates a shight but continous increase, whereas ALMOD calculation
shows a flat curve since 160 seconds.
The difference (with the heat sink completely lost in both cases) may be
due to a little lower generated power level (Fig. 7) calculated by ALMOD, as a
consequence of the more abrupt increase of the primary temperature in the first
part of the transient, which can be balanced by the heat storage into the
structures.
Generated power - The generated power is shown in Fig. 7. We can say that
the behaviour calculated, by both codes agrees with the experimental one reson~
bly weIl, and it is consistent with the temperature transient: this shows that
the reactivity feedback is weIl estimated.
The adequate response of power versus the core inlet temperature of the
coolant (Fig. 8), although it cannot be considered a rigorous proof, shows the
applicability of the point kinetics (the same model is implemented in both
codes) in predicting LOFT reactor power in this transient.
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Fig. 4: Hot leg temperature.
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Pressurizer pressure - The ca1cu1ated press~
re responses (Fig. 9) are in accordance with the
temperature ones: an overestimation of the in-
crease rate in the AL~mD-JRC case, a 1arger in-
crease after the c10sing of the safety va1ve, in
the RELAP ca1cu1ation.
The pressure Peak ca1cu1ated using ALMOD-
-JRC is higher than the experimental one by 4
bars, whereas the RELAP 4/MOD 6 code ca1cu1ates
almost the same va1ue as the measured one.
Owing to the relevant differences of tem-
perature responses, the comparison between the
,pressurizer model of the RELAP 4 (assuming therm~
dynamic equi1ibrium everywhere) and that one used
by ALMOD-JRC (non equi1ibrium phenomena are de-
scribed) is not significative. It might be
interesting, however, to observe that, at the
time of PORV opening, the va1ue of the deriva-
tive of pre~sure against temperature, in the
test and in the ca1cu1ations by RELAP 4 and
ALMOD-JRC are 3.2±O.3, 3.S±O.1 and 4.3±0.1
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Fig. 9: Pressurizer pressure.
The main limitation of the non-equi1ibrium model imp1emented in ALMOD-JRC
lies in computing the condensation rate by the same constant C during the who1e
transient, independently of the pressurizer termodynamic conditions.
Valves f10w characterization - The issue concerns only RELAP 4 code, be-
cause in ALMOD-JRC empirica1 formu1as are imp1emented for the ca1cu1ation of
water and steam f1ow.
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The Henry-Fauske model allows a good agreement between the calculated sub-
cooled mass flow-rate and the experimental one, at the highest pressure (172 MPa):
4.2 kg/sec against 4.5±O.5 kg/sec.
CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of the LOFT L9-3 experiment has shown the capability of both
RELAP 4/MOD 6 and ALMOD-JRC computer programs to simulate correctly accidents
such as loss of feedwater flow ATWS.
Disagreement points originate, for both codes, from the simulation model
of the steam generator behaviour: the effect on the primary system response is,
fundamentally, an error in estimating the primary temperature increase rate,
after the secondary side dry-out has begun in ALMOD case, and in the later
transient in RELAP case.
From the point of view of the ability to evaluate accidents in commercial
plants, the results obtained by ALMOD~JRC can be considered more suitable, be-
cause of the conservative evaluation of the pressure peak. A calculation using
RELAP 4 is more accurate because can better simulate the thermal-hydraulic be-
haviour, of the steam generator, but it is very expansive (CPU ratio = 40).
Moreover, the non-equilibrium model implemented in AL}10D-JRC in order to
simulate the pressure response of the pressurizer, does not appear to be complet~
ly adequate to the aim, so that the RELAP 4 three-node equilibrium model can be
considered better (the pressure trend in the RELAP 4 calculation approaches
qualitatively better the experimental results).
Another significant consideration concerns the most significant events;
their progression can be reasonably weIl simulated, provided that the loss of
heat to the structural materials is taken into consideration.
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ANALYSIS OF RECOVERY PROCEDURES FOR A SINGLE STEAM GENERATOR
TUBE RUPTURE
Charles L. Nalezny and Tien-Hu Chen
EG&G Idaho, Inc.
P.O. Box 1625
Idaho Falls, ID 83415
ABSTRACT
The LOFT Experiments L6-8C-l and L6-8C-2 simulated a single steam
generator tube rupture, a transient that is likely to occur during
the lifetime of a commercial pressurized water reactor (PWR). These
experiments were designed to evaluate an alternative procedure for
recovery from such an accident, and to evaluate techniques used to
analyze reactor transients. Experiment L6-8C-l was the alternative
procedure, conducted with the reactor coolant pumps on while depres-
surizing the primary coolant system by feed and bleed of the
unaffected steam generator, and operation of the pressurizer spray.
Experiment L6-8C-2 simulated the standard procedure used in com-
mercial PWRs and was conducted with the reactor coolant pumps off
while depressurizing the primary coolant system by feed and bleed of
the unaffected steam generator, and operation of the power-opera ted
relief valve. The results of the study indicate that the pressur-
izer spray is as effective as the power opera ted relief valve for
reducing the primary system pressure, and can be used to reduce the
release of primary system coolant to the environment. The results
of the posttest calculations agreed very weIl with the data, and
indicated that the RELAPS/MODI code could be a capable analytical
tool for studying reactor safety problems.
INTRODUCTION
Understanding the behavior of comrnercial pressurized water reactors
(PWRs) during anticipated transients is a major objective of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) Reactor Safety Research Program. This concern
with anticipated transients sterns from the relatively high rate at which they
challenge the reactor protection and reactivity shutdown systems, the strin-
gent safety goals that are specified for reactors, and the increasing number
of nuclear power plants. Anticipated transients are a significant source of
risk because of the relatively high probability of occurrence, and the pos-
sibility of combining an anticipated transient with an equipment malfunction
or operator error which could lead to an inadequate core cooling situation.
One of the most important anticipated transients is a steam generator
tube rupture which is also a possible source of accidental radioactive release
from comrnercial PWRs.
LOFT Experiments L6-8C-l and L6-8C-2 simulated a single steam generator
tube rupture, and were used to evaluate an alternative recovery procedure.
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The Experiments were conducted on August 26 and 29, 1982, respectively at the
Loss-of-Fluid Test (LOFT) facility by EG&G Idaho, Inc., for the D.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.
The major objectives specified for the two experiments were to evaluate a
primary coolant system (PCS) recovery technique for a primary system-to-second-
ary system break, which avoids achallenge to the power-operated relief valve
(PORV); and to assist the NRC in evaluating reactor transient analysis techni-
ques used in reactor licensing by applying the same techniques to transients
performed in the LOFT facility [1].
The remainder of this paper presents a short description of the LOFT
facility, an overview of the experiments, a description of the RELAPS computa-
tional model used for the posttest calculations, a comparison between calcula-
tions and data, and conclusions.
DESCRIPTION OF THE LOFT FACILITY
The LOFT facility [2J consists of a containment structure, support
buildings, and a test assembly that contains a SS-~;(t) experimental PWR which
is designed to simulate the major components and system responses of a commer-
cial PWR during a hypothetical loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). The nuclear
core is approximately 1.7-m long, 0.6-m in diameter, and contains 1300 fuel
pins of 4.0 wt% U23S . The four control assemblies are of typical ~;R design.
The PCS consists of an intact loop and a broken loop. The intact loop,
simulating three loops of a PWR, contains an operating steam generator, two
primary coolant pumps, and a pressurizer. The brok~n loop, which simulates the
fourth loop, contains: a steam generator simulator; a pump simulator; and two
quick opening blowdown valves. The experiment assembly is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. LOFT system geometry.
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EXPERIMENT OVERVIEW
Experiment L6-8C-l simulated a single steam generator rupture to evaluate
a recovery technique that does not involve use of the PORV to depressurize the
system [3]. L6-8C-2 simulated an identical steam generator rupture with a
conventional recovery technique, involving use of the PORV. The results of
L6-8C-l were then compared to the results of Experiment L6-8C-2 to evaluate
the procedures.
Following a steam generator tube rupture in a commercial PWR, primary
coolant immediately enters the secondary system. The normal steam path then
transports the primary coolant (in the form of steam) and any radioactive
gases present through the turbine to the condenser where they are vented to
the atmosphere.
Normal procedure, in a commercial PWR, involves isolating the steam
generator with the ruptured tube(s), and using the other unaffected steam
generators and the PORV to depressurize the system. The disabled steam
generator's atmospheric relief valves and code safety valves operate, as
required, during the depressurization and are a major release path along with
the PORV. The U.S. NRC requires termination of the release as soon as pos-
sible but within 30 minutes. This is accomplished by reducing primary system
pressure to below the steam generator relief valve set point. A major object-
ive of the recovery procedure is to minimize the amount of primary system
coolant released to the environment. The total amount of primary system
coolant released during L6-8C-l was to be compared to the amount released
during L6-8C-2 to evaluate the alternate procedure, that does not involve use
of the PORV.
Experiment L6-8C-l was initiated by opening the purification system
letdown valve (to approximate the rupture of a single steam generator tube),
turning off the pressurizer heaters, and beginning steam generator feed and
bleed to establish the required plant cooldown rate (55.6 k/h). Initial con-
ditions for L6-8C-l were: hot leg pressure = 15.5 MPa, cold leg tempera-
ture = 562.1 K, PCS flow rate = 476.4 kg/s, decay heat = 0.34 MW. Under the
combined effects of the secondary system feed and bleed, and the simulated
break, the system began to cooldown and depressurize (as shown in Figure 2).
The specified cooldown rate was established by 72 ± 5 s. At 115 ± 3 s
into the transient, the pressurizer level reached zero, which indicated that
the pressurizer was almost empty (there is approximately 0.04 m3 below the
bottom tap of the pressurizer). By 200 s, calculations indicate that only an
additional 0.02 m3 of volume were lost from the primary system and a small
amount of coolant was still in the bot tom of the pressurizer. This was due to
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Figure 2. Coolant temperature in cold leg and pressure in hot leg
during LOFT Experiment L6-8C-l.
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expansion of the primary coolant as the pressure dropped. As soon as the pres-
surizer spray came on at 200 ± 2 s, the primary system depressurization rate
increased and a positive pressure liquid level was restored.
',hen emergency coolant injection from the high pressure injection system
(HPIS) started at 219.3 ± 0.7 s, the pressure began to increase, because the
HPIS injection rate exceeded the break flow rate. Once the pressurizer liquid
level was restored to approximately 0.10 m, the HPIS flow was reduced to main-
tain a constant pressurizer level. After the HPIS flow was reduced the system
pressure began to drop until the target pressure of 6.8 MPa was reached at
876.2 ± 1 s. The primary coolant pumps were operated continuously during
L6-8C-l in order to monitor PCS mass inventory after the pressurizer emptied.
Initial conditions for L6-8C-2 were hot leg pressure ~ 15.4 MPa, cold leg
temperature ~ 562.4 K, PCS flow rate ~ 473.7 kg/s, and decay heat ~ 0.28 MW.
The main difference was the initial pres8'lrizer liquid level "hich Has higher.
for L6-8C-2 than it "as for L6-8C-l. The experiment Has initiated in a manner
similar to L6-8C-l, by opening the purification system letdown valve, and
using steam generator feed and bleed to cool and depressurize the plant in a
controlled manner (the cooldo"n rate "as 55.6 K/hr as it Has during L6-8C-l).
Figure 3 shows pressure and coolant temperature in the intact loop hot leg.
The pressurizer level indicated zero at 157 s. The pressurizer took
longer to drain during L6-8C-2 than during L6-8C-l because the initial liquid
level "as higher (0.48 ± 0.04 m vs 0.35 ± 0.04 m). At 217.6 ± 0.4 s the
primary coolant pumps were tripped, at 219.4 ± 1.0 s the PORV"as latched
open, and at 220.0 ± 0.3 s HPIS flo" "as initiated. The pressurizer level
increased into the indicating range at 231.8 ± 2.0 s.
As shown in Figure 3, the pressure continued to decrease after HPIS flo"
"as initiated because the PORV was opened. The system pressure continued to
decrease because the flo" out the PORV "as steam Hith high energy content,
even though the steam flow rate from the PORV was much lo"er than the HPIS
flo". As a result, the liquid level in the pressurizer was increasing while
the pressure decreased. The rapid energy floH from the PORV resulted in the
system reaching saturation temperature at 267 ± 5 s, "hich stopped the rapid
pressure decrease (see Figure 3). HPIS flow "as decreased at 270.7 ± 1 s to
maintain pressurizer level. The primary system pressure reached 6.80 MPa at
282 ± 2 s.
The objective of L6-8C-l and L6-8C-2 was to evaluate an alternate proce-
dure for recovering from a steam generator tube rupture. Experiment L6-8C-2
used the standard procedure employed by commercial PWRs to recover from a
010 r-------r----,----....----, 20
-- Hot 10(3 t6nlp. ~ 4.4 K)
-~. HotJegpl/l..Ufa(:i.12MP.I)
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o
Figure 3. Hot leg coolant temperature and pressure during LOFT
Experiment L6-8C-2.
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steam generator tube rupture. The alternate procedure used during Experiment
L6-8C-I consisted of establishing a controlled cooldown with steam generator
feed and bleed, and turning on the pressurizer sprays instead of opening the
PORV when the pressurizer drained to depressurize the system.
Latching open the PORV during L6-8C-2 released 42 ± 5 kg of steam from
the pressurizer and increased the total coolant loss during L6-8C-2 compared
to L6-8C-I for the first 376 S. Better control of the pressurizer spray and!
or the HPIS flow during L6-8C-l would have prevented the repressurization that
delayed the termination of the test. However, the experiments demonstrated
tha't the pressurizer spray can be as effeetive as the PORV for depressurizing
the primary system.
ANALYTICAL RESULTS AND COMPARISON WITH EXPERIMENTAL DATA
,RELAP5 is a reactor analysis code that can be used to predict the
transient behavior of water cooled nuclear reactors (or simulators) subjected
to postulated accidents such as those resulting from a loss-of-coolant acci-
dent (LOCA) or anticipated transient without scram (ATWS). The RELAP5!
MODI!CYCLE22 computer code [4] was used for posttest calculations of system
thermal-hydraulic response for LOFT Experiments L6-8C-I and L6-8C-2. The
results were then compared with the measured data from the two experiments.
The purpose of performing these comparisons was to evaluate whether the
experimental results could be calculated with acceptable accuracy by the
RELAP5 code. Most of the measured initial and boundary conditions compared
weIl with the specified values used for performing the experiment predic-
tions [5-6]. The only boundary condition changes in the RELAP5 input model
used for the posttest ealculations were: pressurizer spray flow rate, which
was about 25% high and injected 25 s early in the pretest prediction; HPIS
flow rate, which was about 6% low and initiated 44 s too early in the pretest
prediction; and break mass flow rates, which were about 20% high in the pre-
test prediction. The input model changes also included correetion of the
steam generator U-tube equivalent diameter, Ineonel 600 volumetrie heat
eapaeity, and steam separator modeling.
Experiment L6-8C-I
Figure 4 eompares the ealeulated and measured hot leg and steam generator
seeondary pressures for Experiment L6-8C-l. The posttest ealeulations pres-
sures were in very good agreement with the experimental data. The slight
20,..-----,---..,---,----,
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Figure 4. Comparison between measured and ealeulated primary and
seeondary system pressure during LOFT Experiment L6-8C-I.
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repressurization that occurred in the primary system after about 220 s was
also calculated reasonably weIl. The primary system repressurization that
occurred during Experiment L6-8C-l is attributed to the fact that pressurizer
spray flow and HPIS injection were initiated later than specified. This
repressurization would not have occurred if the specified operation conditions
were rigorously followed.
Figure 5 shows the comparison of measured and calculated hot leg coolant
temperature. The calculated coolant temperature agreed very weIl with the
measured data. The slight difference between the measured and calculated
cooldown rate after about 220 s is related to the slight difference in the
repressurization response (see Figure 4). The difference between the
calculated and ~easured coolant temperatures is within the ±4.4 K










o 100 200 300 400
TIma(s)
Figure 5. Comparison between measured and calculated coolant temperature
in primary system hot leg during LOFT Experiment L6-8C-l.
Figure 6 presents the comparison between measured and calculated pres-
surizer liquid level. The calculated pressurizer liquid level response was in
excellent agreement with the experimental data. Although the calculation is
slightly overpredicted, the difference is small and weIl within the measure-
ment uncertainty of ±0.06 m (±0.20 ft). Figure 7 compares the calculated
and actual measured break mass flow rates. The calculated and measured flow
rates were generally in good agreement, although slight differences from the
measured data canbe seen between 80 and 160 s. The overpredicted break mass
flow rate during that per iod was mainly due to the break flow control problem.
The measured data clearly shows that the operator was unable to maintain the
desired flow rate specified for the experiment. The slight difference between
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Figure 6. Comparison between measured and calculated pressurizer
liquid level during LOFT Experiment L6-8C-l.
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Figure 7. Comparison between measured and calculated break flow rate
during LOFT Experiment L6-8C-I.
Experiment L6-8C-2
Figure 8 shows the comparison of the calculated and measured primary and
secondary pressures for Experiment L6-8C-2. Figure 9 shows the comparison of
calculated and measured temperature in the hot leg. As indicated in these
figures, the calculated pressures and coolant temperature were in very good
agreement with the experimental data. While a slight difference is noted in
primary pressure and coolant temperature, the general response characteristics
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Figure 9. Comparison between measured and calculated coolant temperature
in- primary system hot leg during LOFT Experiment L6-8C-2.
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liquid level during LOFT
Experiment L6-8C-2.
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Figure 11. Comparison between meas-
ured and calculated break
flow rate during LOFT
Experiment L6-8C-2.
Figures 10 and 11 present comparisons of the calculated and measured
pressurizer liquid level and break mass flow rate. These comparisons show
clearly that the calculated pressurizer levels and the calculated break mass
flow rates were in almost perfect agreement with data.
CONCLUSIONS
The comparison between L6-8C-l and L6-8C-2 demonstrated that the pres-
surizer spray is as effective as the PORV in depressurizing the primary system,
and can result in less mass loss from the primary system during recovery from
a steam generator tube rupture accident. However, it is more sensitive to
operator control, and will require more investigation before it can be
qualified as an alternative procedure.
The comparison between calculated and measured data for Experi-
ments L6-8C-l and L6-8C-2 demonstrated that RELAPS/MODI can accurately model
the major phenomena associated with a single steam generator tube rupture
transient. Those results add to the qualification data base for RELAPS/MODI,
and increase user confidence that the code can be used to accurately predict
the response of PWRs to small break transients and alternate recovery
procedures.
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STEA}! GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE IN AN EXPERIMENTAL
FACILITY SCALED FROM A PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR
G. G. Loomis
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
Idaho Falls, Idaho U.S.A.
ABSTRACT
Results from an experimental investigation of steam generator tube
rupture in the Semiscale Mod-2B system are presented. From the
experimental results, the characteristic system response signature
for a wide range of number of tubes ruptured has been described.
The tube rupture was assumed to occur during normal full power oper-
ation (15.6 MPa system pressure, 37 K core differential temperature).
In addition, recovery scenarios involving operatoractions were exam-
ined. The recovery scenarios included use of pressurizer auxiliary
spray and internal heaters, steam generator feed and steam, primary
feed and bleed, and main cooling pump operation. Recovery scenarios
suggested by typical U.S. pressurized water reactor emergency
operating procedures were followed.
INTRODUCTION
This paper presents results from an experimental investigation of steam
generator tube rupture as it pertains to the safety aspects of pressurized
water reactors (PWRs). Steam generator tube rupture transients are important
to study because the tube rupture allows a primary to secondary system flow
path which can eventually result in arelease of radioactive fluid to the
atmosphere. The experimental investigation was conducted in the Semiscale
Mod-2B facility which is a small, nonnuclear, high pressure, experimental
facility modeled from a PWR. The Semiscale facility is located at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory and is opera ted by EG&G Idaho for the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. Examined in this paper are the characteristic system
response signature, for a wide range of number of tubes ruptured, and the
effectiveness of emergency operator recovery techniques.
In actual PWR plant experience several tube rupture transients have
occurred in the United States. These include: Point Beach, Surry, Prairie
Island, St. Lucie and Ginna [1]. However, limited system response data was
available from those transients and the only experimental simulation of tube
rupture events were conducted by Semiscale in 1977 [2]. Those experiments
involved studying tube rupture concurrent with large primary pipe breaks.
Code calculational results have been published [3-6] but the calculations have
not been compared to experimental results. Therefore, the Semiscale steam
generator tube rupture experiments provide a needed and unique data base for
code verification and development.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND TEST PROCEDURE
Semiscale Mod-2B is a scaled model representation of the primary system
of a PWR plant, with a fluid volume of about 1/1705 of a PWR. The scaling
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philosophy followed in the design of the Mod-2B system (modified volume seal-
ing) preserves most of the first-order effeets thought important for small
break loss-of-eoolant transients. Most notably, the 1:1 elevation sealing of
the Semiseale system is an important eriterion for preserving the faetors
influeneing signature response to a tube rupture transient. The Mod-2B system
eonsists of apressure vessel with external downeomer and simulated reaetor
internals, an "intaet loop" with a tube and shell inverted U-tube aetive steam
generator, pressurizer, and pump; and a "broken loop" ineluding an aetive
pump, aetive steam generator, and assoeiated piping "hieh allows break simula-
tions. The intaet loop simulates three "unaffeeted loops" of a 4-loop PHR and
the broken loop simulates an "affeeted loop" in whieh the tube rupture is
assumed to oeeur. The tube rupture is simulated by a line and break assembly
eonneeting the primary and affeeted loop seeondary systems in the vieinity of
the tube sheet. The break assembly eonsists of a break orifiee, break valve
and venturi flowmeter. The break orifiee is an interehangeable symmetrie
eonieal flow tube. Three orifice sizes were used in the Semiseale experiments
to simulate double-ended offset shear hreaks of either one, five, or ten tubes
in " PHR near the tube sheet. The entire break assembly was locatable on
either the hot or cold side of the steam generator to simulate either hot or
cold side breaks. Vessel internals included a simulated core which consisted
of a 5 x 5 array of internally heated electrie rads, of which 21 to 23 leere
powered. The rads are geomet~ically similar to nuclear rads with a heated
length of 3.66·m and an outside diameter of 1.072 em. External heaters are
installed in a relatively uniform manner on the vessel and loop piping to
offset environmental heat lass. In addition, eOre power was augmented by a
continuous 20 kH during the transients to make up for heat lass unaccounted
for by external heaters. The pressurizer included internal heaters for pres-
sure control and a sealed power operated relief valve (PORV) which allowed
simulation of PORV operations in a PHR. In both unaffected and affected loop
steam generator secondaries special effluent flow controls were ineluded to
give properly scaled steam relief flow rates. These included apower opera ted
atmospheric dump valve (ADV) and a staged safety relief valve (SRV) both sit-
uated on the main steam line upstream of the main steam isolation valve (MSIV).
Conditions in the system were monitored by an extensive network of metal
and fluid thermoeouples and differential pressure transducers. In the affect-
ed steam generator a lang and short tube are extensively instrumented with
both primary and seeondary side fluid thermoeouples and several primary side
differential pressure transducers. Average fluid density was measured in the
loops and vessel with gamma densitometers while volumetrie flow was measured
wirh turbine meters. Condensing systems and eateh tanks were included to
measure secondary effluent from the steam generator ADVs and SRVs and the
pressurizer PORV.
As a general procedure prior to initiation of the transient, the system
was filled with demineralized water and vented to ensure a liquid-filled sys-
tem. The system was heated to initial conditions using eore power and pumped
flow, and pressurized using pressurizer internal heaters to draw a stearn
bubble. The steam generator secondaries dissipated the core heat by steaming
to atmosphere. The Semiscale initial conditions were typical of PHR full
power operation hydraulie eonditions in the primary and seeondary systems
(15.6 MPa primary pressure, 37 K eore differential temperature).
Most transients were initiated at 0 s by opening the tube rupture break
bloek valve allowing primary fluid to flow into the affeeted loop seeondary.
The primary system depressurized to the low pressurizer trip pressure
(13.1 MPa) whieh initiated eore seram and MSIV closure. As the primary system
further depressurized to the safety injeetion pressure trip (12.51 MPa), the
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following automatically occurring events transpired: safety injection initi-
ated, main feedwater terminated, auxiliary feedwater start-up, and main
coolant pumps off (start coastdown).
All experiments involved a 600 s operator diagnostic period during which
time only automatically occurring events, as discussed above, transpired. The
600 s time period was thought reasonable to determine which steam generator
had suffered the tube rupture and to initiate a planned recovery of the system.
Recovery involved first attempting to reduce primary pressure below the
affected generator ADV set point pressure (5.85 MPa in Semiscale) to isolate
secondary fluid release to atmosphere via the ADV and then to establish pri-
mary pressure and mass inventory control. Recovery techniques started with
terminating auxiliary feedwater to the affected loop generator and then
involved, either separately or in combination, the following: intact loop
generator feed and steam (using auxiliary feed and ADV steam), primary feed
and bleed (using safety injection and pressurizer PORV operation), pressurizer
auxiliary spray, pressurizer internal heaters, and intact loop pump operation.
RESULTS
The discussion of Semiscale experimental results are divided into two
areas: System signature response and system recovery. The system signature
response covers the early operator identification time per iod (0-600 s) when
only automatically occurring events transpire. The system recovery section
includes one of several specific recovery scenarios studied in the Semiscale
simulations.
System Signature Response
The occurrence of a tube rupture in the Semiscale system during typical
PWR type operating conditions has a very distinctive signature response. The
system signature response can be characterized by such parameters as primary
and secondary system pressure, system liquid levels, fluid flow rates and tem-
peratures. The signature response is discussed for a time period of 600 s
which was assumed to include only automatically occurring events without oper-
ator action. A time of 600 s was chosen as representativ~ of the time requir-
ed for an operator to identify the occurrence of a tube rupture transient.
For discussion purposes, a single cold side tube rupture in the Semiscale
system is used for this section.
The tube rupture, occurring at 0 s, caused a primary system depressuriza-
tion and loss of primary mass to the broken loop steam generator secondary
system. Figure 1 compares the primary and secondary pressures early in the
transient. Primary fluid, originally at 15.54 MPa f10wed through the conical
flow tube break orifice into the broken loop steam generator secondary origi-
nally at 5.58 MPa. The loss of mass from the primary system caused a steady
primary depressurization until the pressurizer emptied at about t = 134 s
(Figure 2) at which time the primary depressurization rapidly increased. The
increase in primary depressurization corresponded exactly in time to the inter-
facial liquid level1 of the pressurizer reaching the bot tom of the pressur-
izer. When the pressurizer level reached the surge line connecting the
pressurizer to the hot leg there was a large change in the amount of free sur-
face area for f1ashing of saturated pressurizer fluid. As long as the inter-
facial level was above the bottom of the pressurizer and not in the surge line,
the interfacial surface area was high and promoted flashing which in turn
retarded the primary depressurization. When the interfacial liquid level
depleted to the surge line (due to break flow), the interfacia1 surface area
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Figure 2. Pressurizer interfacial liquid level during a cold side, one-tube
rupture transient.
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decreased which retarded flashing resulting in an increase in depressurization.
Shortly after the pressurizer interfacial level cleared the bottom of the
pressurizer, the low pressurizer pressure set point of 13.1 MPa was achieved,
which automatically caused core power scram to the ANS decay Curve and the
MSIV closure on both steam generators.
Upon MSIV closure, primary to secondary heat transfer in both the broken
and intact loop steam generators caused a rapid pressurization of the second-
aries as shown in Figure 1. Prior to achieving the low pressurizer pressure
trip, both the intact and broken loop steam generator secondary pressure
remained fairly constant as full core power was removed via normal secondary
steaming conditions through a full open MSIV. The energy addition due to tube
rupture break flow from the primary to broken loop secondary caused a negligi-
ble rise in broken loop secondary pressure prior to MSIV closure. Following
MSIV closure the pressure rose quickly in both generator secondaries to the
ADV set point pressures and the ADVs were cycled several times. The secondary
pressure soon leveled out below the ADV set point as primary to secondary heat
transfer was reduced due to a reduction in primary heat source after core
scram.
Following core scram, the system primary pressure showed an increase in
depressurization rate due to a shrinkage of the primary fluid caused by pri-
mary to secondary heat transfer. No major change in primary depressurization
occurred when the primary pressure reached the safety injection signal
(12.51 MPa) which automatically induced termination of power to the primary
coolant pumps, initiation of safety injection, termination of main feed-water,
and start-up of auxiliary feed-water to the secondaries. The effects of the
automatic safety injection events were overshadowed by the rapid reduction of
core power and resulting primary fluid shrinkage due to primary-to-secondary
heat transfer. Eventually, the primary system depressurization was sufficient
for the hot leg fluid to reach saturation conditions at about 220 s, (Fig-
ure 3). Flashing in the system then caused a major reduction in the depres-
surization rate. The primary pressure made a slight recovery between 190
and 240 s. This repressurization was caused by a combination of: superheated
steam in the pressurizer due to heat transfer from the pressurizer walls to
the pressurizer fluid (Figure 3), and the change from forced circulation to
natural circulation heat transfer in the steam generators that occurs as the
primary pumps coast down. Following pump coastdown, the core decay heat
removal mechanism was single-phase natural circulation and the magnitude of
the flow rate is typical of single-phase results found previously in Semiscale
separate effects experiments [7].
Following the slight primary repressurization period (190-240 s), the
primary pressure first stabilized then followed a slow depressurization but
remained above the broken loop ADV set point for the entire initial 600 s
period. This slow depressurization was supported by a combined energy balance
including safety injection flow, primary to secondary heat transfer, break
flow, and primary and secondary heat loss.
During the first 600 s, only minor system mass voiding occurred as shown
in Figure 4 which compares a primary unaffected loop steam generator tube
collapsed level and the vessel upper head collapsed level. 2 The primary
tubes remained essentially full and the vessel upper head level was reduced
from 421 Cm to 375 cm above the cold leg. Because of the positive differen-
tial pressure between the primary and broken loop secondary, a positive break
flow persisted throughout the early period; however, safety injection flow,
once initiated, was slightly higher than break flow. A slightly larger safety
injection flow than break flow resulted in the slight filling trend in vessel
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Figure 3. Comparison of fluid temperatures and saturation temperature for
a cold side, one-tube rupture transient.
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Figure 4. Comparison of collapsed liquid level for unaffected loop steam
generator primary tube and vessel upper head during a cold side,
one-tube rupture transient.
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This basic signature response was found to be typical for one-, five- and
ten-tube ruptures; only the timing of events such as core scram, MSIV closure,
and safety injection were different. In addition, the signature response was
found to be essentially identical for hot side and cold side tube ruptures.
The fundamental difference for the break spectrum studied was the relationship
of safety injection and break flow. For the five- and ten-tube breaks, the
vessel liquid inventory was considerably less than for the one tube case due
to a much higher break flow in relation to safety injection flow. At 600 s,
the one tube break had a system mass inventory of about 87%; the five-tube
break had an inventory of 60%; and the 10-tube break had an inventory of 52%.
Even though the vessel liquid collapsed level was reduced to the top of the
core during the teh~tube rupture and within 15 cm of the top of the core for
the five-tube rupture, no core rod heatup occurred.
System Recovery
Recovery scenarios studied in the Semiscale experiments included a vari-
ety of simulated operation actions and compounding failures aimed at first
reducing the primary pressure below the affected loop ADV set point, thus
isolating the affected loop secondary from atmospheric release, and then cool-
ing the system fluid. A complete listing of the recovery scenarios studied in
the Semiscale experiments is found in Reference 8. Most of the operator
recovery scenarios in Semiscale started at 600 sand included test termination
criteria dicta ted by test length. Normal recovery combinations suggested by
typical U.S. PWR emergency operation procedures (9) were followed; however
deviations were made to allow meaningful. code comparison and to complete the
experiments in a timely manner.
One recovery scenario studied in Semiscale involved a combination of:
pressurizer auxiliary spray for primary pressure reduction and fluid inventory
control, including use of pressurizer heaters for pressure control and to
establish subcooling; use of unaffected loop secondary ADV with auxiliary
feedwater for subcooling control; safety injection flow for primary inventory
control; and the use of primary coolant pump operation to redistribute system
fluid energy and promote core cooling. Figure 5 presents the primary and
secondary pressures during a complicated multiphase recovery procedure.
Starting at 600 s pressurizer auxiliary spray was initiated and cycled on
pressurizer level for the remainder of the transient. The spray caused a pri-
mary depressurization from 6.2 MPa which is above the affected loop generator
ADV set point (5.85 MPa) to 5.6 MPa which is below the ADV set point. Pres-
surizer heaters were then used to establish pressure control and increase the
primary pressure from 5.6 to 5.85 MPa. The unaffected loop pump was then
turned on (the pump had coasted down to zero speed staiting at the safety
injection signal) which effectively mixed hot and cold fluid in the loop.
This mixing resulted in establishing hot leg subcooling as shown on Figure 6.
Next, unaffected loop feed and steam was initiateci by latching open the unaf-
fee ted loop ADV and continuing auxiliary feedwater. Figure. 5 shows a rapid
decrease in the unaffected loop secondary pressure which supported a rapid
increase in loop subcooling shown on Figure 6. The increased heat sink
increased primary to secondary heat transfer and subcooled the primary fluid.
During the entire recovery procedure the affected loop secondary pressure
followed the primary pressure closely. However, a small positive break flow
persisted as the primary pressure was slightly higher than the secondary.
After 7000 s the primary pressure was lower than the secondary and an actual
backflow of affected loop generator fluid to the primary pressure occurred.
Throughout the recovery procedure, the combined mass balance between safety
injection flow, break flow, pressurizer auxiliary spray, and break flow to the
affected loop secondary resulted in avessei collapsed level no lower than the
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The Semiscale steam generator tube rupture experimental results provide a
unique data set for use in code development and vetification. The experiments
can be used for both system signature res~onse analysis involving only automat-
ically occurring events and analysis of operator induced recovery procedures.
A tube rupture transient has a very distinct signature response. The
signature response is characterized by a rapid primary depressurization to
saturation conditions followed by a gradual slow saturated depressurization as
primary fluid flows through the tube rupture to the affected loop generator
secondary system. As part of the signature response the steam generator
secondaries show a rapid increase in pressure when the main steam isolation
valves are closed at Core scram due to primary-to-secondary heat transfer
without steam relief. The pressure rose in the secondaries to relief valve
set points and relief valves were opened (atmospheric dump valves). The sig-
nature response was found t; be similar for a wide spectrum of number of tubes
ruptured (one, five, and ten tubes) however the timing of automatically occur-
ring events such as core sCram and safety injection initiation are different.
In addition, the relationship between safety injection and break flow left the
primary mass inventory lower for the larger number of breaks. However, for
the break spectrum studied in Semiscale vessel liquid, inventory remained high
enough to preclude a core rod heatup~
1. Interfacial level is a "pooled" liquid level with. saturated steam above
and saturated liquid below and is determined using a differential pressure
measurement.
2. Collapsed level refers to all the fluid (both steam and liquid) between
the differential pressure measurement taps being treated as saturated liquid
only.
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A RAMONA-3B CODE DESCRIPTION AND NODALIZATION STUDY
FOR THE PEACH BOTTOM-2 TURBINE TRIP TEST 3*
G. C. Slovik and P. Saha
Department of Nuclear Energy
Brookhaven National Laboratory
Upton, New York 11973, U.S.A.
ABSTRACT
Abrief description of the BWR transient analysis code RAMONA-3B and
the results of a nodalization study for simulation of the peach Bot-
tom-2 Turbine Trip Test 3 using this code are presented. The code
employs a 1-1/2 group, three-dimensional diffusion model for neutron
kinetics, coupled with a one-dimensional, nonequilibrium, nonhomoge-
neous two-phase flow model for thermal hydraulics. Furthermore, the
reactor core is presented with parallel hydraulic channels, and the
code accounts for the acoustic effects due to valve closure in the
steam line.
The nodalization study indicates that even for a highly non-uniform
control rod pattern, RAMONA-3B can adequately predict °the transient
reactor power and vessel pressure for an overpressurization event
with relatively large neutronic nodes, each containing four (2x2)
fuel assemblies and a control rod.
INTRODUCTION
RAMONA-3B 1 is a best-estimate Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) core and systems
transient code with three-dimensional neutron kinetics coupled with one-dimen-
sional, nonhomogeneous, nonequilibrium thermal hydraulics. To be compatible
with 3-D neutron kinetics and power generation, the code employs parallel hy-
draulic channels in the reactor core. It includes a boron transport model and
all necessary BWR components such as jet pump, recirculation pump, steam sepa-
rator, steam line wi th all necessary valves and a limi ted plant control and
protection system. The code is particularly suitable for analysis of BWR tran-
sients such as Control Rod Drop Accident (CRDA), Abnormal Transients Without
Scram (ATWS) and partial ATWS, where a space-time neutron kinetics coupled with
an adequate thermal hydraulics is required because of strong void-reactivity
feedback.
The purpose of this paper is to provide: (1) abrief description
RAMONA-3B models and solution method, and (2) the results of a recen~
study that was performed using the Peach Bottom-2 Turbine Trip Test 3
model transient.




Neutron kinetics and thermal hydraulics are the two major parts of the
RAMONA-3B code. Heat conduction in the fuel rod links them together. Figure 1
shows the coupling and interaction among these parts as employed in RAMONA-3B.
*Work performed under the auspices of °the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
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Figure 1 Simplified Flowchart of RAMONA-3B Calculational Logic.
Neutron Kinetics
The neutron kinetics model of RANONA-3B starts from the following
two-group, three-dimensional, time-dependent diffusion equations:
Fast Neutrons:
I







i=1 to I where 1=6
However, in RAMONA-3B, it is assumed that the thermal neutron leakage term,
Le., Il'D21l<jJ2' can be either neglected or assumed to be constant. Thus,
RAHONA-3B uses the well-known 1-1/2 group, coarse mesh diffusion mode1
3
• The
boundary conditions at the core periphery are specified with parameters related
to the extrapolation length for the fast flux and the albedo for the thermal
flux.
The three-dimensional power generation is the sum of prompt and delayed
energy deposition rates. The prompt component is proportional to the instanta-
neous fission rate, whereas the delayed energy deposition rate is calculated
from the 1979 ANS Standard 5.1 for decay heat. As shown in Figure 1, the
cross section dependence on fuel and moderator temperatures, void fraction,
boron concentration and control rod positions is taken into account in the neu-
tron kinetics calculation. The code uses the following form of the two-group
cross sections and diffusion coefficients:
(4)
The first two terms account for the effect of void feedback and the presence of
control rods. The third term accounts for the effect of moderator temperature
feedback, while the fourth term accounts for Doppler feedback. Finally, the
term ol:(cB' a) accounts for the effect of standby soluble boron injection
should it occur.
Heat Conduction in Fuel Rod
Thermal energy storage and heat conduction in the fuel elements (pellet,
gas gap and cladding) are computed using the following discrete-parameter mod-
el:
pc oT = V • kilT + q" ,
ot
( 5)
No axial conduction is allowed; heat capaci ties (pc) in the pellet and clad-
ding, along with the thermal conductivity in the cladding, are assumed to be
constants. The gas gap conductance is a prescribed function of pellet tempera-
ture.
Thermal Hydraulics
The reactor vessel thermal-hydraulics model of RAHONA-3B starts from the













1St [apgug + (1-a)P2u 2] + 3z [aPgvghg + (1-a) P2v 2h 2] ~A+ q"'(1-a) (9)
Two further simplifications are made before the above set of equations are
solved in RA}IONA-3B. First, the mass and energy equations for the entire reac-
tor vessel are combined (along with equations of state) to yield an equation
for the average vessel pressure • This pressure , which is a function of time,
but not of space, is used to compute the steam-water properties inside the
reactor vessel.
The second simplification calls for integration of the momentum equation,
i.e., Equation (8), through each of the parallel channels in the core to obtain
a number of closed-contour integral momentum equations. These equations along
with the volumetrie flux equations, i.e., Equation (7), are solved first to
calculate the flow field in the entire vessel. The vapor mass and mixture
energy equations, i.e., Equations (6) and (9), are then solved to calculate the
void fractions and liquid temperatures in the vessel. Thus, the above two sim-
plifications reduce the computation burden of RA}IONA-3B without significant
loss in accuracy.
The code uses a slip model of the form:
(10)
to calculate the relative velocity between the vapor and liquid phases. Non-
equilibrium vapor generation and condensation are accounted for through approp-
riate correlations. However, the vapor phase is assumed to be at saturation,
while the liquid phase can be either subcooled, saturated or superheated.
Appropriate correlations are also used for wall friction, form losses and wall
heat transfer, including the post-CHF regime.
The code uses a boron transport equation. However, boron is assumed to
move with the liquid velocity, and no boron stratification is allowed.
The code employs models for typical BWR components, namely, jet pump, re-
circulation pump, steam separator and steam line wi th all necessary valves.
However, all circulation loops and steam lines are lumped together to one re-
circulation loop and one steam line, respectively. The code also tracks the
two-phase mixture and collapsed water levels in the reactor vessel downcorner •
The latter is used to activate some of the control and safety systems. For the
steam line, it uses the mass and momentum equations with the assumption of an
adiabatic process. Note that the steam line pressure is a function of both
time and space. Therefore, the acoustic effects in the steam line due to valve
closure and/or opening are taken into account.
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plant Control and Protection Systems
RAMONA-3B ·has simplified but adequate models for the plant control and
protection systems which directly affect the main steam supply system. Specif-
ically, RAMONA-3B simulates the actions of the pressure regulator, the Safety
and Relief Valves (SRV) , the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV), and the plant
protection system through trip logics. It also includes the High Pressure
Coolant Injection (HPCI) and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) sys-
~~~A_J~ea:e;~~:t;~mea~d :e~~~;:~:~:~~PI~:;c~~:t,ro;;NE;r4', ~:i:gls~m~~~:;n~~~e~~
faced with RAMONA-3B so that an entire BWR plant can be simulated.
Solution Method
In RAMONA-3B, all partial differential equations are firs t transformed
into ordinary differential equations. The initial or steady-state conditions
are then obtained by setting the time derivatives to zero, and iterating to ob-
tain the eigenvalues of the system of equations. For the transient calcula-
tion, different methods are used for the different parts of the code. Specifi-
cally, the Gauss-Seidel iteration is used to integrate the fast neutron equa-
tions, explicit integration for delayed neutron equations, an iterative predic-
tor-corrector method for heat conduction, the explicit first-order Euler method
for vessel thermal hydraulics, and finally, the fourth-order Runge-Kutta-Simp-
son for the steam line dynamics. The neutron kinetics and fuel heat conduction
equations are integrated with a master time step, whereas the thermal-hydraulic
equations use a substep. There are several time step controls to assure sta-
bility and accuracy of the calculation. The details of the RAMONA-3B code can
be found in References 1 and 5.
NODALIZATION STUDY
Ideally, a nodal code such as RA}IONA-3B should represent each fuel assem-
bly by aseparate neutronic channel. However, this could be quite expensive in
terms of the computer running time for a systems calculation such as Anticipat-
ed Transient Without Scram (ATWS) • Therefore, a detailed core nodalization
study has been performed in order to provide user guidelines on the optimum
number of computational cells that should be used for a RAMONA-3B systems cal-
culation. One of the Peach Bottom-2 Turbine Trip Tests, namely Test No. 3, was
selected as the reference test. These were severe overpressurization tests,
and particularly challenging for the nodalization study because of highly non-
uniform initial control rod pattern. The initial conditions for Test 3 are
shown in Table 1. The test was initiated by the closure of the turbine stop
valves and' was terminated by the delayed scram. The details of the test can be
found in Reference 2.
Five calculations with decreasing number of nodes in the core have been
performed using a quarter core symmetry. The number of neutronic and hydraulic
nodes as used in these calculations are presented in Table 2. Note that the
number of hydraulic nodes outside the core was kept constant at 99 in all five
calculations.
Case 1 is the reference case with 4584 neutronic and 843 hydraulic cells
which had earlier provided the best agreement with the test data (Section 7.4
of Reference 1). In this nodalization, each fuel assembly along with the
appropriate control blade was explicitly modeled as aseparate neutronic chan-
nel having the dimensions of ßX = ~Y = 15.24 cm. With 24 axial levels in the
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Table 2. Noding Details for the RAMONA-3B Nodalization Study
Gore Nodalization Total Total
Axial Neutronic Hydraulic Neutronic Hydraulic GPU/Real
Gase Level Ghannels Ghannels Nodes Nodes Time
l(Ref) 24 191 31 4584 843 789
2 12 191 31 2292 471 410
3 24 55 31 1320 843 341
4 12 55 31 660 471 192
5 12 22 23 264 375 149
core, the height of each neutronic and hydraulic node was also 15.24 cm. How-
ever, several neutronic channels were grouped together to form thirty coolant
channels in a core octant. Thus, the total number of core hydraulic channels
including a bypass channel was thirty one (31).
Gase 2 was made by changing Gase 1 axial levels f~om 24 to 12. The same
extrapolation lengths used in the reference run, Le., Gase 1, were used to
represent the reflectors, but new albedos were calculated to match the initial
average axial power distribution. This type of adjustment was made for each
nodalization. The only other modification made to the nuclear data was to add
a fuel parameter data set. This was done to collapse two zones in the fuel
which became necessary in reducing the.number ofaxial levels from 24 to 12 in
the core. This particular collapsed node contained a region which was made up
of a section containing burnable poison (i.e., gadolinium) while the other sec-
tion did not. The new fuel data set was generated by taking the volume average
for each of the coefficients in the diffusion coefficients and cross sections.
This new set was then used in every calculation that used 12 axial levels in
the core.
The next modeling change (for Gases 3 and 4) was made by combining four
fuel assemblies into one neutronic channel. This was a relatively straightfor-
ward process because each control blade controls four assemblies; hence, the
positioning of the fuel and its associated control blade was completely consis-
tent wi th the reference case. This produced neutronic nodes that had dimen-
sions ofAX = bY = 30.48 cm while bZ = 15.24 and 30.48 cm to represent the core
with 24 (Gase 3) and 12 (Gase 4) axial levels, respectively.
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The final core model (Gase 5) in this nodalization study had 12 axial lev-
els and 22 neutronic channels. Difficulties arose in this nodalization because
the nodes contained an equivalent of about 9 assemblies. Also, the hydraulic
channels and control blades had to be remodeled since the reference case had 31
hydraulic channels and 54 control blades. Because of large neutronic nodes,
the model lost its direct relationship ta the details of the reactor core.
Hence, the control blade pattern from the test data was abandoned and the con-
trol blade positions were adjusted to yield the most accurate initial average
power distribution. Each node was assigned a unique hydraulic channel and con-
trol blade to preserve as much of the three-dimensional effect as possible.
For the neutronic nodes, this coarse mesh representation crossed many fuel
zones and no clear collapsing was possible. However, the fuel types were ar-
ranged as appropriately as possible using the same fuel types as in the refer-
ence case. The dimensions of these neutronic nodes were 6X = AY = 45.72 cm and
AZ = 30.48 cm.
The initial relative axial power distributions for each of the different
core nodalizations and the main global parameters predicted for this transient
can be seen in Figures 2 through 5. The BNL GDG-7600 GPD to real time ratios
to run each model out to 2.0 seconds are also presented in Table 2.
It can be seen from Figures 2 and 3 that the core models that used either
191 or 55 neutronic channels were able to represent the initial power distribu-
tion reasonably weIl. This ability stems from the fact that in the 191 neu-
tronic channels representation, each assembly was repres"ented along with its
assigned control blade, which in turn, controls the four nearest assemblies.
This symmetry was taken into account when constructing the 55 channel case
which grouped the four assemblies into one neutronic node; hence, the same con-
trol blade pattern as used in the test was employed in these models, thus con-
tributing to good agreement with the transient data shown in Figures 4 and 5.
Gase 1 and 2 with 24 and 12 axial levels, but with 191 neutronic channels,
predicted almost identical results. However, in Figure 4 the relative power
for Gase 3 with 24 axial levels (and 55 neutronic channels) predicts the peak
to within 6 percent , while Gase 4 with 12 levels (and 55 neutronic channels)
predicts the maximum value to within 10 percent. While these differences did
exist, hydraulically the results of the 55 channel cases were very similar to
the reference case because the total integrated power was still close to the
reference case. In Figure 5, this fact is borne out since the system pressure
for the cases with 191 and 55 neutronic channels (Gases 1 through 4) predicted
the same pressure response.
For Gase 5 with 12 axial levels and 22 neutronic channels, the results
were not as good. In Figure 3 it can be seen that the initial average relative
axial power distribution was underpredicted in the lower part of the core and
overpredicted near the top. This situation existed because a neutronic node
encompassed about 9 fuel assemblies on the horizontal plane. Hence, the effect
of inserting a control blade into the node affected a larger area. RAMONA-3B
was not designed to control this type of node since the control blades are rep-
resented explicitly in the core, which means that as the control blade moves
into a core, the node preceding it must be completely controlled. lfuile this
is appropriate when representing one assembly in anode, it greatly underpre-
dicts the nodal power when used in neutronic nodes containing 9 assemblies,
particularly when each assembly may have a different control blade pattern.
This problem can be circumvented by using the control density in anode; how-
ever, that option is not presently available in RANONA-3B. The same problem
caused the underprediction of the transient relative power and system pressure
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Figure 5 Comparison Between the Measured (---) and RAMONA-3B (---)
System Pressure
In conclusion, the Peach Bottom Turbine Trip Test 3 can be best simulated
with a quarter core representation of one node per assembly (i.e., 191 neutron-
ic channels) with either 24 or 12 axial levels in the core with almost identi-
cal results. This test can also be represented by using 55 neutronic channels,
i.e., grouping four assemblie5 around a control blade, because the control
blade pattern can still be explicitly expressed. Hence, a RAMONA-3B user can
represent the Peach Bottom-type reactor cores with reasonable accuracy by using
a neutronic channel containing four fuel assemblies. This would result in a
significant saving in the computer running time. Also, it was found that for a
highly non-uniform control rod pattern, the number of assemblies in anode
should not exceed four (4) since such a pattern cannot be accurately defined in
RAMONA-3B. This could be alleviated if a control density option was added to
RAMONA-3B. It will be included in the future improvement.
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"SYSTEHATIC PROCEDURES FOR CORE NEUTRONICS HODELLING
IN THE 3-D BWR SYSTEM TRANSIENT CODE RAMONA-3B"




RAMONA-3B is a BWR System Transient Code with a full 3-D core neutronics
model. The neutronics modelling is based on the PRESTO nodal method
extended for kinetics. Established procedures exist for cross-section
and kinetic parameter generation. The methods are fully compatible with
state-of-the-art static methods for 3-D LWR core simulation and produces
results with a high accuracy.
The neutronics model and cross-section data generation methods are
described. Results from 3-D calculations are presented in comparison with
experimental data, to illustrate the accuracy under steady state as well as
transient conditions.
Procedures for generating consistent 1-0 and point kinetics data, also
applicable in RAHONA-3B, are being described.
INTRODUCTION
RAMONA-3B1 is a BWR system transient code. It is unique in that it can
calculate the core with 3-D neutronics, while also simulating the remainder
of the nuclear steam supply system. The core neutronics are based on the
PRESTO no~al method, a 1 1/2 group coarse mesh diffusion model. The
hydraulics model describes the corewith several parallel flow channels and
1s based on a 4 equation two-phase flow nonhomogeneous, nonequilibrium
model. The steam supply system is described by e.g. recirculation pumps,
steam separators, steam-lines, plant protection and control systems.
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This paper emphasizes the core neutronics modelling in RAMONA-3B. The
systematic FMS (fuel Hanagement ~ystem) methods of generating 2 group
macroscopic cross-section data are described as well as the interaction
with the 3-D static simulator, PRESTO, used to determine the actual core
burnup state.
Benchmarks and qualification against experimental data are presented in
order to demonstrate RAHONA-3B's ability to accurately predict 3-D power
distributions both under steady state and transient conditions.
RAMONA-3B may also be used with a 1-0 (axial) core model. Such a model
requires plane average cross-section data, producing consistent 1-0 power
distributions. Procedures for generating 1-0 cross-sections are described
together with results from a qualifying benchmark case.
NEUTRONICS MODEL
The neutronic model of RAMONA-3B is based on the two-group, time-dependent
diffusion equations combined with six delayed precursor group equations.
The equations are differenced with the PREST02 coarse mesh method, in
general using a mesh spacing equal to the assembly pitch. The equations
are solved with the assumption of asymptotic thermal flux, but with a
corrective method accounting for the thermal flux leakage between the
nodes. Albedo boundary conditions are defined on the core periphery. In
the steady state applicatio~, the RAMONA-3B model is identical to that of
the PRESTO Static simulator .
Nuclear data are represented by two group macroscopic cross-sections,
defined for each fuel bundle design. To account for various feedback
effects the cross-sections are represented as functions of
• burnup state
- exposure





• control rod presence
• Xenon concentration
The cross-sections are evaluated for each node: the burnup and Xenon
effects are determined at the initial conditions only, whereas the instan-
taneous parameters and control rod feedback is updated at each time-step
throughout the transient. Delayed neutron parameters are treated in
analogy with the cross-sections, but with the instantaneous variation with
void and temperatures neglected.
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INTERACTION WITH NUCLEAR DATA AND CORE STATE FILES
RAMONA-3B is apart of Scandpower's integrated code system IFMS) for LWR
core analysis4 As such it interfaces directly with cross-section data
files as well as data files describing the actual core burnup state,
The basic code for cross-section generation is RECORD5 It is a fast
production code for calculation of neutron spectrum, group cross-section
data, kinetic parameters and reactivity as functions of fuel burnup in LWR
fuel assembliel, With individual treatment of each fuel pin, the code
calculates reaction rates, power and burnup distributions in two
dimensions, ta king into ac count most features which arise in present-day
LWR designs. '
Two-group macroscopic cross-sections, homogenized over the assembly, are
taken from aseries of RECORD runs, processed by a da ta processing code and










Fig. 1 FMS Code System
The reactor core state, defining the initial conditions for RAMONA-3B, is
genera ted by static simulations with PRESTO, updating the burnup, void
history as well as Xenon state on a nodal basis. The role of PRESTO in
this approach is also illustrated in Fig. 1.
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QUALIFICATION OF J-D POWER DISTRIBUTIONS
A wide experience exists in calculating J-D power distributions using the
Scandpower codes in steady state (i.e. RECORD/PRESTO). Since RAMONA-JB and
PRESTO are identical in the static application, these data also serve as
the basis for qualification of RAMONA-JB's ability to predict the initial
conditions of any transient. The qualification base consists of core
follow calculations of about JO reactor cycles, along with comparisons with
measured TIP-data. In addition, measured y-scan data from 4 different BWR
reactors have been analyzed. A representative measure of the achievable
accuracy can be found in Ref. 6, and is summarized in Table 1. The data
refer to comparisons between calculated and measured nodal power distri-
butions, and show an accuracy of roughly 8-9 1., as compared to TIP data.
The y-scan data, which has a lower measurement uncertainty, show an even
better agreement (4 - 6 1.).
Of equal importance in RAMONA-JB, is the ability to calculate the shifts
in power distribution during the transient, Experimental da ta on detailed
transient power distributions are sparse, but the recorded detector re-
sponse from the Peach Bottom Trubine Trip Transients form an important
experimental data base, Results from the RAMONA-JB analysis7 of these
tests are shown in Fig. 2 (examples of individual detector readings),
Fig. J and Table 2 (aXial average detector response).
PROCEDURES FOR GENERATION OF A CONSISTENT 1-0 AXIAL NEUTRONICS MODEL
Many BWR system transients show power shifts only in the axial direction,
It may therefore be cost-beneficial to perform the simulation of such
transients using a 1-0 axial core model. The nodal neutronics model of
RAMONA-JB also applies in 1-0 and a systematic procedure for generating
average cross-section data for such a model has been developed.
By use of a stand-alone computer code, PETRA, nodal distributions of cross-
sections and associated state variables are being collapsed to average
planar values. Appropriate averaging schemes with e.g. adjoint flux/flux
weighting is used and with the reflector effects taken into account. A
radial buckling term is introduced in order to reproduce the J-D solution
exactly (in the average sense). The functional dependence in the 1-0 cross-
sections from coolant density and temperature as well as fuel temperature is
calculated by fitting the da ta to several reactor states.
In addition to the 1-0 data, PET RA also produces core average point
kinetics parameters.
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A qualification of these methods was done by applying them to the Peach
Bottom Turbine trip Test (cf. § 4. above). Fig. 4 shows the result of the
1-0 simulation in comparison to the original 3-0 result*.
SUMMARY
RAMONA-3B combines the state-of-the-art methods of 3-0 LWR core simulation
with that of an advanced system transient code. lts application to a
variety of transients, such as pressurization, AT~S ar,d control rod drop
transients have been demonstrated and documented ,7, I 9.
* This work was performed under a contract
for Brookhaven National Laboratory.
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TABLE 1. COMPARISON BETWEEN CALCULATED AND MEÄSURE NODAL POWER




Brunswick-l. cycle ~-4 ] 0.OB7
Brunswick-2. cycle
Quad Cities-l. cycle 1-2 0.093
"(-Scan Heasyrements
Quad Cities-l, EOC2 0.037
Hatch-l, EOCl 0.064
TABLE 2. TRANSIENT POWER PEAK VALUE ON VARIOUS AXIAL LEVELS
PEAK VALUE I INITIAL VALUE
On Detector Level Total
A B C D Average
RAHONA 3. 65 4.50 5.01 5.24 4.67
Tll Heasurement 3.47 4.46 5.23 5.56 4.6B
RAHONA 3.54 4. 45 4. 76 4.88 4.46
Tl2 Heasurement 3.53 4.56 4. 94 5.09 4. 53
RAHONA 3.35 4.47 5.29 5.26 4.58




















Fig. 2 CaLcuLated and Measured LPRM response, Peach Sottom
Turbine Trip Test TT2
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FIGURE 3 Average LPRM Response on Various AxiaL LeveLs, Peach






PEACH BOTTOM -2 TT3
FIGURE 4 Fission Power vs. Time, Comparison between 1-D and 3-D ResuLts,
Peach Bottom' Turbine Trip Test TT3.
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A QUICK RUNNING DYNAMIC SIMULATION
CODE FOR BWR TRANSIENTS
C.S. Lin and W.E. Kastenberg
Mechanical, Aerospace and Nuclear Engineering Department
University of California, Los Angeles
Los Angeles, California 90024
ABSTRACT
A quick running computer code for the analyses of BWR system tran-
sients has been developed. The code is based on a four equation
flow model which accounts for non-homogeneous two phase flow snd a
five equation flow model which accounts for non-homogeneous, non-
equilibrium two phase flowo Several transients have been analyzed,
including turbine trip with and without bypass, and a step reactivity
insertiono For the case of turbine trip without bypass, steam flow
reversal is predicted, consistant with more recent calculations for
this transient.
INTRODUCTION
A number of computer codes have been developed for the simulation and anal-
ysis of nuclear reactor system transients. These system codes are important for
design, research and assessment of safety. The capabilities and limitations
of existing system codes are reviewed and summarized in detail by Wulff [1].
The purpose of this paper is to present a fast-running simulation model for
BWRso Important goals in this effort have been (a) to provide better under-
standing of complex two-phase flow phenomena under transient conditions, (b) to
strive for real time simulation. These considerations require balance between
modeling detail and computing time required for application.
In order to meet these goals, a four equation flow model which accounts for
non-homogeneous two phase flow and a five equation flow model which accounts for
non-homogeneous, non-equilibrium two phase flow were developed. The four equation
model is an improvement over the homogeneous equilibrium model found in such codes
as RELAP [2] and RETRAN [3,4] yet is more simple than the five and six equation
models found in such codes as TRAC [5].
FLUID DYNAMICS
One of the improvements represented by this model lies in the development
of two-phase flow models and numerical solution methods which are used to solve
the flow field equations. It has been recognized that modeling of two-phase
flow is the central issue of system simulation because it determines both capa-
bilities and limitations, and it dominates the cost of computing. This is par-
ticularly true for BWRs since they always encounter two-phase flow under normal
operation as weIl as under transient conditions. Hence, in order to more ac-
curately determine the dynamic response of BWRs, to increase the understanding
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of the two-phase flows that are encountered, and to extend thecapability of
simulation, non-homogeneous (NH) and non-homogeneous, non-equilibrium (NHNE)
models are developed. Both models are derived from the rearrangement of the
six-equation two-fluid model.
The non-homogeneous four-equation model employed has been derived by Lin
and Kastenberg [6] and can be expressed as folIows:
(1) Mixture Continuity Equation
E (W + W ) _
\HoT. 9-v gv
l.




(2) Total Internal Energy Equation
E [(WnH~ + WH*) ] + Q.
" " g g V l.V8I
i
(2)
(3) Liquid Momentum Equation
(4) Vapor Momentum Equation
*where i, j=l, ... ,N; v,k=l" .. ,K
(3)
(4)
The subscripts i, j represent volume indices, and v,k junction indices, The
flow in a critical junction is determined by an algebraic relationship:
The equation of state is given by




where y = col: [WU"'W9-KWgl ...WgK"'Ul",UNMl'''~] and F=col:[Fl, .. F2K+2N].
We introduce the following Jacobian matrix:
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(8)
where the elements are assumed to be continuousfunctions, and H~k' Hgk, Qi' f~k'
and f
gk
are also continuous with time.
By differencing Equation (7) and using ~quation (8), we obtain
(9)
(11)
Rewrite Equation (9) as
where I is a unit matrix of (ZK+ZN) order and ~t is a time step. The one-step
integration method, Equation (10), has been proven to be consistent and con-
vergent [7] for a large ~t. In Equation (10), the numerical time advancement
could be accomplished by simultaneous solutio~ of the 2K+ZN system of linear
equations. However, because of the simple nature of the continuity and energy
equations, all of the variables except the liquid flow rate (or vapor flow rate)
can be eliminated.
The elimination process is described in Reference [6] and a reduced system
of K equations containing only the unknown W~+l is obtained:
AWn+l = _Z,
=-~
where ~ = [Akv ] is a KxK matrix; ~~= col: [W~l"'W~K]; ~ = col: [Zl" "ZK]'
The detailed formulations of A
k
and Zk can also be found in Reference [6].
The NHNE model contains five-equations: two for continuity, two for momen-
tum and one for energy. The one energy equation is supplemented by the constraint
that the least massive phase is always at saturation. The numerical solution of
the NHNE model is similar to the NH model and will not be given here.
GEOMETRIe NODALIZATION
With the fluid dynamics developed above, a free system topology is achiev-
able. However, in order to save computer storage and computing time, a fixed
system topology is used. Only two fixed types of geometric nodalizations are
utilized to represent a primary system for BWRs.
The simplified nodalization (type 1) is shown in Figure 1. This type
utilizes 14 control volumes and 19 junctions or flow paths. The twenty jet pumps
and two recirculation loops are combined into one loop to reduce the number of
control volumes and junctions required. The steam line piping is divided into
four volumes to provide an accurate determination of the pressure at the turbine
valve, bypass valve and safety relief valves. The values of the pressure at those
valves are important because they determine the control logic of the valve action.
In other words, the timing and the number of valves to be opened or closed are
controlled by the pressure signals. The core is modeled using one control volume.
The rod drive flow and the cleanup demineralizer flow can be accounted for by in-
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increasing the feedwater flow slightly to establish a mass and enthalp~ balance
with the assumed main steam flow.
The simplified nodalization described above actually combined two recircu-
lation loops into one loop. Therefore, it cannot simulate a number of important
transients, such as a recirculation pump failure and a LOCA in any recirculation
loop. In these transients, the system response in the two recirculation loops
are different and it is necessary to utilize two loops. Figure 2 shows the com-
plicated nodalization (type 2) of the primary system for BWRs. There are 17 con-
trol volumes and 24 flow junctions.
It can be shown that the structures of the matrix A corresponding to the
networks of Figure 1 and 2 are close to diagonal matrices (Figures 3 and 4).
Hence Equation (11) can be efficiently solved by a combination of the block
elimination [7] and factorization methods [8].
REACTOR CORE POWER GENERATION AND THERMAL ANALYSIS
The point model is used for the neutron kinetics and the power generated is
assumed to be distributed uniformly over the fuel cross section; however a cer-
tain fraction is given directly into the coolant. The feedback reactivity effects
include fuel temperature (the Doppler effect), water temperature and moderator
density. Power generation continues after the reactor is shutdown because of
fission product decay. It has been widely assumed that decay heat can be fitted
to a polynomial of eleven exponentials. By defining a 'concentration' for each
group, we can model fission product decay heat as 11 decayed neutron groups.
The fission heat generated in the fuel is transferred from the fuel across the
gap between fuel and cladding, and then through the cladding to the coolant. In
addition, the fuel temperature contributes to the reactivity feedback through
the Doppler effect. The thermodynamic behavior of a reactor core is represented
by a "single channel" model. A whole-core lumped parameter model for heat con-
duction equation is employed [9].
SYSTEM COMPONENT MODELS
The system component models include centrifugal pumps, jet pumps, valves,
trip controls, steam separators, critical flow models and constitutive corre-
lations.
Pumps. For Boiling Water Reactors, two kinds of pumps should be modeled.
They are centrifugal pumps and jet pumps. A pump model is given to calculate the
pressure difference between both sides of a centrifugal pump and are described by
homologous curves. The development of the homologous curves are for single-phase
flow conditions. The pump model also allows the option of accounting for cavi-
tation or two-phase degradation effects on pump response. A separate set of
homologous two phase curves for heat and torque ratios which are in the forms of
difference curves are also supplied.
Apart from the centrifugal pumps, a compressible two-stream flow with one-
dimension momentum mixing equation is utilized for a jet pump. This equation is
based on single stream flow equation, with some modifications.
Valves. Simple valves and check valves can be modeled'to simulate the tur-
bine stop valves, main steam isolation valves and steam bypass valves. Once a
trip action occurs, the flow area for the valve is given from an input area-
versus-time table. Two types of check valves are modeled. One exhibits a
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hysteresis behavior one does not. Both types are controlled by flow-dependent
pressure drops of the formula.
Trip Contro1s. The trip logic of a reactor system can be simu1ated by
trip contro1 data. An arbitrary number of these contro1 data can be input.
These signals are, in general, the following: 1) reactor power, 2) volume pres-
sure or temperature, 3) elapsed time, 4) mixture level, 5) liquid level, 6) water
temperature, 7) fuel temperature, 8) mass flow at junctions.
These controlling signals can be used to perform a number of reactor system
actions such as reactor scram, valve open or close, ECC fill water injections
and pump shut off. When the signal reaches the setpoint, the trip is actuated
after the specified delay.
Steam Separator Model. In the conventional separator design for BIVRs, two
phase mixture 1eaving the upper plenum region enters the steam separator from
the bottom and impinges on vanes which impe1 the liquid radial1y and allow
vapor to pass vertica11y through the device. The separated liquid is collected
by gravity and returned downward to the reactor downcomer region. The short-
coming of this approach is it assumes the quality of the outlet steam flow
path to a value of 1.0 for all inlet f10w conditions and does not reflect the
actua1 efficiency of aseparator nor its variability of separation performance
as a function of flow condition. Since the separation is not perfect, some
liquid (carryover) is entrained in the vapor path and some vapor (carryunder)
is entrained in the liquid path. The separator model defines the values of
carryover and carryunder in terms of the significant parameters which affect
its performance. The separator performance varies with inlet qua1ity and mix-
ture level in the separation.
Critical F10w Models. Many theories on critica1 flow rate have been pro-
posed and are produced in a number of tables. Currently, these tables are
transferred into a set of empirical formulas as shown in Reference [4]. These
polynomials are functions of stagnation pressure, P, and stagnation specific
entha1py, h. They are exp1icit and convenient to use.
Constitutive Correlations. The governing equations derived in the fluid
dynamics indicate that individual models are required for mass exchange and,
interphase and wall-to-phase momentum and energy transfer. It is evident that
the number of constitutive models required is dependent on the complexity of
the two-phase f10w models. The constitutive cdrre1ations are thus dependent
on the topo1ogy or structure of the flow fie1d, i.e., f10w regimes. Models
for the f10w regimes are also required. A detailed review and discussion of
flow regimes and constitutive models which have been widely applied to simu-
lation codes can be found in a number of References [2,4,5,10]. Those emp10yed
here are given in Reference [11].
CODE VERIFICATION
The BWR plant mode1ed. is a General E1ectric BWR-4. Three different tran-
sients, i.e., a turbine trip without bypass (TTWOB), a turbine trip with bypass
(TTWB) and a positive reactivity insertion (PRI) are analyzed. A1though each
of the three transients requires slightly different models, the major initial
conditions for each are identical. Table 1 1ists the initial conditions used
for each transient. They are the same as assumed in the Safety Analysis Re-
port (SAR) for the La Sal1e Plant [12]. End-of-core (EOC) conditions are used
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to develop the physics parameters including the scram curve worth. Most of the
results from this study will be compared with the La Salle SAR [12J and RETRAN
predictions [13,14J for various transients. Comparisons with the plant SAR and
RETRAN predictions are made on a qualitative basis to check general trends and
not from a quantitative viewpoint. The qualitative comparisons are made only to
assure that no major errors exist in the simulation code.
Turbine Trip \,ithout Bypass (TTWOB). A variety of turbine or nuclear system
malfunctions can initiate a turbine trip. Once a turbine trip is initiated, all
trubine stop valves achieve full closure within about 0.10 second. The TTWOB
transient represents the fastest possible steam flow shutoff and a severe nuclear
system pressure increase. In this transient, the turbine is tripped and it is
assumed that steam bypass valves (which will normally open to relieve pressure)
fail to operate.
The system response for TTWOB is shown in Figures 5-7. The transient is ini-
tiated by the closure of the turbine stop valves. Once these valves are closed,
apressure shock appears in the steam line. Hence, the steam flow leaving the
vessel decreases. Since the core is continuing to generate power with a reduced
steam flow, the reactor vessel pressure increases. The pressure continues to in-
crease until the safety/relief valves open. This rise in pressure causes a re-
duction in the core voids which, in turn, results in a core power increase. The
power continues to rise until the new voids generated by the higher power, the
Doppler reactivity feedback and the scram reactivity feedback override this posi-
tive effect and then begins to reduce the core power. The steam flow is reversed
twice. because of a large pressure shock induced by the fast closure of the tur-
bine stop valves and failure of the steam bypass valves. The flow reversals oc-
cur at t=.44 second and t=1.46 seconds.
Comparisons with vendor calculations of La Salle County Station nuclear
power plant are also shown in Figures 5-7. The results indicate that the system
pressure and power responses compare reasonably weIl with the plant SAR predic-
tions. However, the plant SAR predictions do not show the flow reversals. In
the SAR, the steam flow was reduced only to 25% but did not reverse or exhibit
any oscillations. The steam flow reversals were also predicted by the RETRAN
study. This discrepancy has been carefully evaluated and a conclusion was made
that the momentum and inertia effects in the steam line were not accounted for
in the vendor calculations. The finding of the new-simulation model presented
here also enhances the confidence of this conclusion.
In this simulation, a uniform time step (0.02 sec) is used. The computing
time needed to simulate up to two seconds of real time is 6 CPU seconds using an
IBM 3033 computer (compared with 33 CPU seconds in the RETRAN study). It is be-
lieved that if error control criteria were included for variable time steps (as
in RETRAN) , computing time will be further reduced.
Turbine Trip with Bypass (TTWB). The TTIfOB transient discussed above is an
unlikely event because the steam bypass valves will norma1ly open. Consequently
the turbine trip with bypass (TTI,B) is a more 1ike1y event. From the plant SAR,
this transient is estimated tooccurwith a moderate frequency. The assumptions
and conditions are the same as the TTWOB transient except the steam bypass va1ves
are assumed to function normal1y. The steam bypass system capacity is set to 26%
of the rated steam f10w as 1isted in Tab1e 1.
Figures 8-l0show the resu1ts expected from 105% of rated power for this
transient. As can be seen from these Figures, this transient is less severe
than the TTWOB transient. The core power increases rapid1y because of the void
reduction caused by the pressure increase. However, the power increase is limited
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only to 132% of its rated value. The peak pressure at the steam dome does not
exceed 1116 psia. The steam flow exist oscillations as the TTWOB transient.
However, unlike the TTWOB transient, steam flow reversals never occur during the
time per iod of the transient because the effect of the steam bypass flow greatly
reduces the magnitude of the pressure shock. Camparisans with vendor calculations
of La Salle County Station plant are also shown in Figures 8-10. The results in-
dicate that the system pressure, core power and flow responses compare reasonably
weIl with the SAR predictions for this transient.
Positive Reactivity Insertion (PRI). It is assumed that this transient is
produced by an earthquake. The acceleration forces of the earthquake can cause
compaction of the reactor core due to elosing the radial gaps between the fuel
assemblies. This can result in a net positive step reactivity insertion t? the
eore. lfhen the control rads are scrammed, the rate of inward motion is de-
creased from the normal rate. This is because a retarding force resulting from
the seismic event, delays the motion of control rads. A 609 step reactivity in-
sertion is assumed in this case. Figure 11 shows the power response for the PRI
transient. The reactor power rapidly increases to 240% after the positive re-
activity insertion takes place at 0.1 sec. Then, the increase of the eore power
becomes slowly saturated due to the negative feedback reactivity of the Doppler
effect. After the reactor scram signal is initiated, the core power begins to
decrease. Recently, more validations of the simulation model presented have
been earried out. They include the simulation [15] of Peach-Bottom TTHOB ex-
periments and sensitivity studies for each transient described above.
CONCLUSION
A fast running simulation model for Bl;R transients has been presented which
emphasizes computer cast, ease of use and suffieient aceuracy for most transients
of interest. The simulation is expeeted to be capable of predicting the most im-
portant parameters of pressure, flow, coolant enthalpy and temperature as a func-
tion of time. Since all reaetor plant transients take place in real time, the
new code is designed to strive for the same goal. Several transients have been
analyzed, ineluding a turbine trip with and without bypass, and a step reacti-
vity insertion. The results are in good agreement with the La Salle SAR and
RETRAN predictions.
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NOMENCLATURE
H~ junction total liquid energy H
per unit mass g
M total mass Wg
U total internal energy Q
P thermodynamic pressure lIt
\V~ liquid flow rate e
k,v= junction index i,j
T. set of in-coming junctions 1.1 1
N total # of control volumes K





a number between 0 and 1
volume index
set of out-going junctions
total # of normal f10w junctions
TABLE 1
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A ßWR STABILITY PREDICTION MODEL AND ITS QUALIFICATION
AGAINST TESTS IN OPERATING REACTORS.
Yngve Waaranperä and Häkan Svensson
AB ASEA-ATOM
Box 5.3 S-71204 Västeräs, Sweden.
ABSTRACT
This paper describes briefly a time-domain stability prediction code in the form of a
general-purpose BWR transient analysis code, which has been deve10ped under an EPRI
contract, starting from the existing code BISON. The code has a four equation slip model
with core and bypass channels, one-dimensional two-group diffusion neutron kinetics,
fuel heat transfer model, steam line model, and balance-of-plant models. Briefly
outlined is also the stability prediction validation against tests in Peach Bottom-2,
ASEA-ATOM BWRs and the FRIGG loop.
INTRODUCTION
The stability of the coolant f10w and the power is weakened, when the operating state is
altered in the direction of increasing power/flow ratio. Nuclear parameter modifications such
as a reduced fuel time constant, more negative void reactivity coefficient, smaller delayed
neutron fraction, and hydraulic design changes such as increased steam separator pressure
losses or reduced core inlet orificing have an unfavourable effect on stability. Thermal-
hydraulic dynamic instability is caused by interaction between opposite phase oscillations of
non-boiling and boiling flow pressure losses, driven by a f1ow-induced density head variation,
and has to be considered at the design of the individual core channels. Nuclear coupled flow
and power instability is caused by a density head feedback loop in which density reactivity
directly affects the fission power, and via the fuel time constant and the related time
integrated evaporation rate variation alters the core density head with a phase lag of about
1800. This reactivity coupled instability phenomenon also has to be considered in the core and
coo1ant loop design. Thanks to the high operating pressure of commercial BWRs, which
reduces density variations in the boiling f1ow, and the long time constant of the Zircaloy-c1ad
U02 fuel, which attenuates the gain in the feed-back loop from power to void, adequate
stability can be ascertained by proper design and imposed operational constraints.
The stability of the operating state of a BWR is primarily a concern of availability.
Operational constraints and possible transients originating from oscillatory operating modes
have a negative impact on the capacity factor of the plant. Reduced fuel pin radius, extended
operating range or Pu recycling may be used for improvement of fuel characteristics and the
overall economy provided that stability is not unduely impaired. Accordingly there are
economic incentives to improve the accuracy of stability predictions by the development of
prediction tools validated against experiments in commercial power stations. Ultimately
stability is also a concern of safety, inasmuch as instability may lead to operational transients,
and transients may be precursors to more severe incidents. On the other hand a transient may
bring the reactor into astate of degraded stability, which brings the question of stability into
focus in ATWS considerations.
THE STABILITY PREDICTION MODEL
The BISON code has a one-dimensional hydrodynamic model for the reactor pressure
vessel coolant flow paths, in which the core is represented by a heated channel and a bypass
channel. Recirculation pumps are modelIed by a homologous model and jet pumps can be
represented. A four-equation model of the slip model type is employed, in which the momen-
tum and energy balances are solved for the mixture and the mass balance for vapour and
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mixture. Constitutive equations preserving thermal non-equilibrium describe boiling or con-
densation anywhere in the loop. The steam generation in the core is described by two
alternative models, Lellouche-Zolotar's mechanistic model (1) and Solberg's model (2).
The ASEA-ATOM void correlations AA74 and AA78 and Lellouche-Zolotar's void correlation
(I) are available for the core. For the other loop parts Bryce and Holmes' correlation modified
by ASEA-ATOM (3) is used. The code provides also several choices for the two-phase friction
multiplier, the most important being Chisholm's correlation of Baroczy type and ASEA-
ATOM's two-phase friction correlation based on FRIGG data. Steam separator pressure loss
and steam carry under from the separators can be calculated from special correlations based
upon experiments.
The mathematical model forms a set of partial differential equations in one space
dimension and time. This system is reduced into a system of ordinary first order differential
equations by discretization of the space variable and finite difference approximation of
spatial derivatives. The flow loop thus is subdivided into subsections, and a set of first order
ordinary differential equations is obtained for the mass of liquid and vapour, internal energy
and momentum in these subsections. The momentum balance is space integrated and solved
for entire loop sections. Integral momentum balance or subdivided momentum balance can be
chosen. The hydrodynamic model can handle reversed flow and counter-current flow.
Time integration is made by a general explicit time integration method in the code,
which includes first order (Euler) or second-order (Heun) methods as options. The mass and
momentum balance equations may be time integrated by aso called G-method, which incorpo-
rates implicit time integration as a special case. Seeing that the energy equation is integrated
by an explicit method, the material transport Courant limit required for numerical stability
applies to the time step size, i. e. (time step) < (node mass) / (mass flow rate). The time step
length is adjusted within prescribed limits so as to keep the error in each step within specified
bounds. The initial state is calculated by iterative solution of the system of equations, which is
obtained by setting all time derivatives equal to zero.
The neutron kinetics model is a two-group finite difference diffusion model with space
dependence in the axial dimension. Each core subsection in the hydrodynamic model and the
top and bottom reflector are discretized into a user-specified number of mesh intervals. The
time integration of the fluxes is made by a G-method or a prompt jump approximation method.
Up to six groups of delayed neutrons may be represented. The neutron kinetic proper ties are
calculated directly from cross section data specified as polynomials in the density and
temperatures of moderator and fuel. These data can be given on a disc file from which data
sets can be selected to describe the axial variation of the properties. The properties of several
fuel types can be weighted arithmetically. The axial burnup distribution may be deterTl)ined by
a search procedure in the code for a specified axial power shape and keff-value and a given
control rod distribution. Similarly the control rod distribution can be searched to give a target
power shape and keff-value for a given distribution of neutron kinetic properties. These
options are valuable for the code user, since the axial power shape is very important in
stability analysis as weil as transient analysis in general. Manual trial-and-error search for
desired axial profiles tends to be tedious and time-consuming.
Fission power is calculated as prompt power, proportional to the fission rate and delayed
power, released at the radioactive decay of fission products. A fraction of the fisson power is
generated directly in the core and bypass channels. Bypass void reactivity may be accounted
for at user's option. Control rod movements specified by the user or calculated by the
hydraulic scram system model are taken into account.
The void coefficient predicted by a given set of neutronic3 data may be adjusted by
means of a user-specified void factor, which does not affect the steady state solution. This
extends the range of applicability of a neutron cross section data set, and is very useful, since
a complete data set covering equilibrium core conditions is quite expensive and rather time-
consuming to produce. Similarly a doppler factor can be used to modify the doppler reactivity
coefficient.
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The fuel thermodynamics model represents the average pin, and applies a finite diffe-
rence solution of the time dependent radial heat conduction in the fuel, gasgap and cladding.
The gasgap heat transfer coefficient may be supplied as a function of pellet temperature or
calculated by use of two alternative models, based on the solid pellet and the cracked pellet
concepts, respectively. The second model has a small radial gap with a rather large heat
transfer coefficient, but the pellet heat conductivity is deteriorated by a crack pattern
containing fission gas. The heat transfer from the cladding to the coolant is described by flow
regime dependent heat transfer correlations.
The steady state solution for the coupled hydrodynamic, neutronic and fuel temperature
models is obtained by power-void iterations, after which the initial state is calculated for the
external system models. The steam lines model calculates the mass flow and pressure in a
multinode model assuming isentropic behaviour of the steam. Time integration is made by the
Q-method. Relief and safety valves can be located in the steam line and the turbine valves and
dump valves can be connected to it. The balance-of-plant models include all the systems that
are required for the analysis of the time-dependent behaviour of a BWR power station. They
embody the trip and interlock system, process monitoring systems, scram system, pressure,
water level and power control systems, turbine and generator, condensate and feedwater
systems and relief and safety valves.
The decay ratio predicted by the code is to some extent time step dependent and also
affected by the spatial discretization. This is an inherent feature of a discretized model
employing low order integration schemes, as the decay ratio error depends on the truncation
error. The first order Euler's method gives an almost linear overprediction of the decay ratio
with the time step size, whereas the second order Heun's method makes a rather small
overprediction, quadratically dependent on the time step size. Furthermore method studies on
one-component second order systems as apart of the code development work show that a first
order implicit method underpredicts decay ratios, with a linear dependence on the time step
size. A Q-method time integration scheme predicts a rather time step independent decay ratio
for Q=0.5 according to these method studies , and so does also Heun's method. The truncation
error affects stability predictions but not transient analysis. Although slightly inconvenient
this time step effect does not present any serious problems once the code user is made aware
of it and corrects for it, as has been done in the calculations presented in this report. Th'e error
is practically negligible for Heun's method but nevertheless use of Euler's method appears
suitable with corrections based on sensitivity studies using different time steps.
The code can be used to analyse hydrodynamic and nuclear-coupled stability, all kinds of
non-LOCA events, and the initial phase of LOCA events. Channel stability and the transient
behaviour of individual channels can be analyzed by a slave channel version of BISON using
time-dependent boundary conditions from the complete BISON. Besides that the loop inde-
pendent core stability option in the complete BISON can be selected to analyse core stability.
VALIDATrON OF THE STABILITY PREDICTrON MODEL
The code validation plan includes the following stability tests:
1. Peach Bottom-2 end-of-cycle 2 stability tests (4)
2. Peach Bottom-2 cycle 3 stability tests (5)
3. TVO I 1978 stability tests
4. Forsmark 1 1980 stability tests
5. FRIGG loop hydrodynamic stability tests.
This paper discusses the code validation against the tests in Peach Bottom-2 at end-of-
cycle 2 and in TVO I.
Nuclear coupled oscillations mechanism
As a background for discussions below the basic mechanisms behind reactivity coupled
thermal-hydraulic flow and power oscillations in a BWR are briefly described. This is done by
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reference to the phase'relationships between crucial process variables in a BISON case with
limit cycle oscillations. The core outlet flow oscillation lags 900 behind the inlet flow in this
case, and the core average density lags 900 behind the inlet flow, as expected from a mass
balance consideration. Core power oscillates in phase with the core density reactivity, and
changes the core heat flux to the coolant, attenuated and phase retarded about 900 by the fuel
time constant. In phase with the heat flux is the evaporation it generates, and lagging 900
behind it the time integral of this evaporation, corresponding to a void variation, which is in
phase with the void variation generated by the opposite phases of the inlet and outlet flows.
This forms a feedback loop with a 1800 phase shift and a gain dependent on the reactivity
coefficient, the delayed neutron fraction, the fuel time constant, the flow rate, the steam
velocity, the power level and power distribution. The flow oscillations are sustained, since the
dominating single-phase and two-phase pressure losses are at opposite phases, with the phase
of the core density head in between and opposite to the temporal acceleration pressure losses
of the oscillating flows. The high steam velocity in the riser and steam separators attenuates
the density head variation above the core and gives a small phase lag between core two-phase
pressure losses and the steam separator pressure losses. Furthermore the normalized power
distribution fluctuates at opposite phase with the void distribution variation, the relative
power at the top and bottom of the core being 1800 apart. However, in absolute terms the
power at the core outlet lags only about 900 behind the inlet power, since the normalized
variation is superimposed by the global variation.
Peach Bottom-2 stability tests
Peach Bottom-2 is a BWR/4 product line reactor of GE design, having arated thermal
power of 3293 MW and arated flow of 12 915 kg/s driven by jet pumps. The fuel inventory of
the 764 assembly core was 576 7x7-type assemblies of the initial load and 188 8x8-type reload
assemblies during cycle 2. A number of 404 initial load assemblies remained in the core during
cycle 3. All fuel assemblies contained burnable absorber rods. The stability tests were
conducted as aseries of small pressure perturbation tests composed of pseudo-random binary
switching (PRBS) of small step (about 0.5 bar) inputs to the pressure regulator set point (4).
Decay ratio and natural frequency at the test points were estimated by least square fits of
transfer function models to the transfer functions from the core pressure to fission power,
which were estimated from the recorded data using Fast Fourier Transform.
The coolant loop model was based upon data in reference 6 and some additional informa-
tion supplied by EPRI. Bypass boiling was predicted by the code in all the four tests for the
flow fractions given in reference 6. The core exposure distribution, calculated for incore fuel
management purposes, was also supplied by EPRI. The neutron cross section data versus
burnup were calculated by the ASEA-ATOM cell code PHOENIX for four fuel types. The
corresponding cross section polynomial sets were derived for each fuel type, exposure void and
burnup level, and stored on a disc file. This file was used to prepare additional coefficent sets
by interpolation with respect to burnup so as to get data for the average burnup of each fuel
type in each axial subsection in the core. The fuel type data were weighted arithmetically to
obtain the average neutron cross section data in each subsection to be stored on a temporary
disc file for the current case. Delayed neutron data, inverse velocities and bypass void
reactivity data were also obtained from the PHOENIX calculations. Fuel gasgap heat transfer
data, which are rather important for stability predictions, were calculated by ASEA-ATOM's
code STAV4 for 7x7 and 8x8 fuel for the solid pellet concept and STAV5 for the cracked pellet
concept.
The steam dome pressure was given as a boundary condition, and a perturbation was
prescribed as a triangular pressure pulse, generating a damped nearly sinusoidal oscillation in
the state variables. The decay ratio of the response of a process variable described by the time
function f(t) was defined as ( f(t+T)-<f> ) / ( f(t)-<f> ), where t corresponds to maxima or
minima, <f> is the equilibrium value and T is the period. In general the decay ratio was not
quite constant for consecutive periods, and suitable averaging had to be made. The perturba-
tion and evaluation method is consistent with the experimental stability data, which are based
upon transfer functions from core pressure to average neutron flux signal.
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. Results of the code validation analysis versus Peach Bottom-2 EOC2 tests are given in
table I for the cracked pellet fuel model and Lellouche-Zolotar'.s void model. Similar results
were obtained for the solid pellet model, whereas AA74 void correlation gave higher decay
ratios. Experimental data in the A columns are given in reference 6, and those in the B columns
were evaluated by an ASEA-ATOM method (7) referred to previously.
Table 1. Measured and calculated stability data for Peach Bottom-2 EOC2 tests
Experimental Results Theoretical Results
Test- Flow Power Decay Natural Decay Natural
point % % ratio frequency ratio frequency
(Hz) (Hz)
A B A B
PTl 52.3 60.6 0.26 0.45 0.19 0.44
PT2 43.8 51.7 0.30 0.23 0.45 0.46 0.21 0.40
PD 40.4 59.2 0.33 0.35 0.43 0.41 0.36 0.41
PT4 40.3 43.5 0.27 0.24 0.39 0.37 0.25 0.37
Unfortunately the transfer functions are not sufficiently accurate for an evaluation
using the ASEA-ATOM method at and above the resonance frequency for PT land PT2, the
recording interval, which was doubled in PT3 and PT4, being too short. Thus no datacould be
evaluated for PT I, and for PT2 rather uncertain figures could be obtained only with difficulty.
For PT3 and PT4, however, the two methods for the experimental results in columns A and B
agree reasonably weil, the differences indicating the range of uncertainty. With these
circumstances in view credit should be given to the good agreement between experimental and
calculated results for PT3 and PT4, and less attention be paid to the deviations for the two
other test points, PT2 in particular. Extensive sensitivity analyses have been made, showing
among other things that deviations mayaiso be caused by errors in power and flow.
TVO I stability tests
TVO I & II in Finland and Forsmark 1 & 2 in Sweden are internal pump BWRs of ASEA-
ATOM's design. Rated thermal power is 2000 MW for TVO and 2700 MW for Forsmark. The fuel
assemblies are of the standard ASEA-ATOM 8x8 design. Stability tests using the normal
instrumentation including a transient data acquisition system were integrated with normal
startup testing. The reactor stability was evaluated by Fourier inversion of the transfer
function from reactor pressure to average neutron flux, determined by use of sinusoidal
perturbation of the turbine admission valve positions. Inherent process noise in 18 process
variables was also recorded, and the APRM signal was used for an alternative determination of
stability characteristics (7). These tests at minimum pump speed and natural circulation
continued astability test program that had started by tests in Barsebäck (8).
The TVO I stability tests were conducted on 17-18 October 1978 preceeded by a nine
hour hot standby following commissioning tests at 0-20 % power. After start at 1.45 pm on
October 17 equilibrium conditions were established at 5.45 pm for test point I at minimum
pump speed and 28 % power. A 12 minute noise recording was followed by apressure
perturbation test lasting from 6.45 until8.15 pm, while recordings were made successively for
13 perturbation signals in the frequency range 0.012-1.5 Hz •
Thereafter the six internal pumps were tripped one by one, and the plant operation was
continued at natural circulation with stationary pump wheels. Noise recordings were taken at
test point 2 at 23 % power, and control rod withdrawal commenced at 9.45 pm. Temporarily
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halted by a turbine trip at 9.57 pm, during which the full steam load capacity condenser served
as heat sink, the power ascension was resumed at 1.21 am on October 18, when the the
generator was brought back on the grid. Documented by use of plant process computer
loggings at 10 minute intervals, the power raise was carried on, untillimit cycle oscillations
were observed at 4.30 am in core flow and power signals at 50 % power. Noise recordings were
made at this point, test point 3. Subsequently Xenon build-up caused a power redistribution
and a drop to 48 %, test point 4, where apressure perturbation test was made during 8.00-9.30
am, followed by a 12 minute noise recording.
Pump restart began at 10.00 am, and noise recordings were made at test point 5 at 63 %
power with four pumps operating at minimum speed. Before the remaining two pumps were
star ted, control rods were inserted to compensate for the steep flow controlline between test
points 4 and 5, the steepness bearing evidence of bypass channel boiling. All six pumps
operating at minimum speed, test point 6 at 62 % power was established at 12.00 am after
some further control rod insertion. Noise recordings followed by apressure perturbation test
during 0.30-1.30 pm concluded the test program.
Using the recorded process variables and six computer loggings Mr Stig Andersson (8,
similar TVO 11 tests ), identified a higher core state oscillation mode at limit cycle conditions
in test point 3. Thus the oscillation pattern of the core flow and power evidently had been
azimuthai, dividing the core along a diagonal, which shifted as a function of time, the flow and
power being at opposite phases in the core halves. Furthermore the dividing diagonal at a given
axial plane shifted azimuthally about 1800 from inlet to outlet at a given time. Accordingly
the inlet and outlet flows to any arbitrary core half were at opposite phases, and the power at
the top lagged about 1800 behind the power at the bottom. The data analysis confirmed that
the channel flows had been within permissible ranges, as could be deduced from the eight core
channel inlet differential pressure cell signals, which form the flow monitoring system
together with hard-wired square-rooting, summation and averaging circuits.
In contrast to later tests the eight individual channel flow signals were not registered.
Nevertheless it can be concluded that a large scattering in the channel flow amplitudes
occurred in test point 4. This conclusion is based upon the behaviour of the transfer function
Gwd, from the above mentioned hard-wired flow signal to the pressure difference over the
internal pumps, and thetransfer function Gpw' from the steam dome pressure signal to the
flow signal. At the core resonance frequency the gain of Gwd drops to about 20 % of its off-
resonance value for test point 4, while on the contrary the gain of Gpw increases drastically.
Absolute amplitudes are also affected, since the steam dome pressure amplitude is relatively
constant: For test point 6 there is a smalI, hardly significant dip at core resonance, and at
other test points in this test sequence and at other occasions no such dip can be discovered. To
judge from the phase at core resonance of relevant transfer functions there is no reason to
suspect transmitter dynamic effects in Gwd' Therefore differences in channel or zone flow
amplitude'and phase in test point 4 is the logical explanation, bearing in mind the variation of
channel power level and axial distribution, the radial orificing distribution, and the fact that
the peripheral channels are not represented in the flow signal.
The calculations show that the core and bypass channel flows are in phase with each
other, and that the bypass flow amplitude is about 10 %, nearly the same as in the hard-wired
flow signal. As the eight channel flow devices are evenly distributed in the central orificing
zone of the core, they should giv,e a good measure at least of the average zone flow variation,
but they are few enough to overemphasize individual channel flow variations. Obviously the
relative flow signal amplitude is much greater than the pump flow amplitude, the true
magnitude of which is revealed by the pump pressure difference signal. Accordingly the flow
signal in test point 4 has to be dominated by channel flow signals, the amplitude of which is
greater than the average relative core flow amplitude. As a hypothesis it is therefore
suggested that the flow amplitude increases in the channels or zones which are closest to their
natural frequency. The downcomer flow, restricted by static and dynamic pump head losses,
which are considerable for higher power levels at natural circulation wi th stationary or
windmilling pumps in the main flow path, is diverted to the resonance channels, reducing and
in some cases even reversing the flow variation in the other channels. This conclusion about
unequal channel flow amplitudes is supported by the test recordings in the natural circulation
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teSts in TVO II (8), where the large number of recorded signals - 70 - included the eight channel
flow signals and 38 neutron detector signals. The standard deviation of the eight flow signals
varied from I % to 12 % at limit cycle, in which no higher instability modedeveloped. Flow
signal spectral densities showed two pronounced peaks, one at the global' core resonance
frequency, 0.34 Hz, and the other one in the range 0.26 - 0.31 Hz. Plots of oscillations in local
fluxes and channel flows showed beats, indicating that they were produced by superposition of
two oscillations with frequencies dose to each other. Minimum flow amplitude in a rather
peripheral channel nearly coincided with maximum amplitude in a central channel.
The fact that the downcomer flow amplitude may be highly unevenly distributed to the
core channels complicates the task of predicting the stability using a model with one or a few
core channels at such operating points where the stability of the fundamental mode oscilla-
tions is highly dependent on the downcomer flow restrictions, as will be seen below.
Results for test point 6 at 62 % power and minimum recirculation pump speed are shown
in table 2 for the cracked pellet fuel model (A) and the solid pellet model (B). The difference
between the fuel model options is greater than in the Peach Bottom-2 calculations for nearly
equilibrium core burnup conditions. The measured transfer function Gpq from pressure to
average neutron flux indicates an overtone at 0.8 Hz, and a tendency to a secondary resonance
peak at the possible ground tone 0.4 Hz, the frequency predicted by the cracked pellet model
( A ). Since the core resonance frequency, 0.33 Hz, is dose to the frequency predicted by the
solid pellet model ( B ), this could be an indication that only a minor part of the fuel pellets
have cracked at this early stage. However, a more plausible interpretation will be presented
below.
Table 2. Measured and calculated data for TVO I 1978 stability test point 6
Power Flow Stability characteristics
Case MW kg/s Decay ratio Natural frequency
(Hz)
Exp. data 1226 2890 0.25 0.33
A 1226 2890 0.26 0.40
B 1226 2890 Q.22 0.32
For test point 4 at 48 % power and natural circulation the measured transfer function
Gpq from pressure to average neutron flux shows an overtone at about 0.67 Hz, roughly twice
tlie core resonance frequency, 0.33 Hz, and an overtone at 1.1 Hz, corresponding to a ground
tone of 0.28 Hz, where the transfer function gain curve has a weak tendency to a secondary
peak. The observed phase curve appears to be composed of the phase curves of two overlapping
resonance peaks. Below 0.2 Hz and above 0.36 Hz the phase curve resembles the phase curve of
a rather stable second order system with resonance peak at 0.28 Hz and transition from phase
advanced to phase retarded occurring between 0.2 and 0.35 Hz. From the slope of this inferred
phase curve at resonance a damping factor of 0.20 and a decay ratio of 0.211 is estimated. In the
frequency range 0.3 -0.11 Hz the phase is dominated by the observed, pronounced peak and its
rapid phase transition. From the steep slope of this phase curve at the peak resonance a decay
ratio of 0.73 is calculated. A transition between the two phase curves occurs in the frequency
range 0.2 - 0.3 Hz. Compared to test point 6 the two overlapping resonance peaks have been
shifted towards lower frequency and the higher one now corresponds to the core resonance
peak. As observed above, the two resonance frequencies might be the effect of cracked and
solid pellets, but more likely the higher frequency corresponds to resonance channels or core
sections, which are weakly revealed in test point 6, and the lower one to the fundamental
mode, which is suppressed in test point 4.
The results for test point 11 are summarized in table 3. Reversed core bypass channel
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flow, leading to boiling and counter-current steam flow, was predicted. As hinted above case 1
underpredicts the decay ratio calculated from measured data for the pronounced resonance
peak. The stability data inferred for the ser.ondary peak at 0.28 Hz are, however, well
predicted by case Ib, the fundamental mode BISON calculation using the solid pellet fuel
model, whereas case 1 with the cracked pellet model, which is used for the cases in table 3
unless otherwise stated, underestimates the period and overestimates the decay ratio.
Table 3. Measured and calculated data for TVO I 1978 test point 4 at natural
circulation and 48 % power.
Case Comment Power Flow Decay Natural Case characteristics
ratio period
MW kg/s sec
Exp. Test data 960 1845 0.74 3.0
Exp. Fundamental 0.24 3.6 Inferred fundamental mode data
mode for secondary resonance peak
960 1826 0.35 2.60 Dynamic and static downcomer
losses equal.
1b 960 1826 0.22 3.35 As 1, but solid pellet model
2 Core stab. 960 1826 0.42 2.45
3 _"- 960 1826 0.47 3.00 Less bottom-peaked power 1)
4 _"- 1150 1826 0.54 2.22 Relative power = 1.20
5 _11- 1150 1600 0.63 2.34 As 4, but reduced flow
6 _11_ 1150 1600 0.69 2.90 As 5, but central zone orifice2\
and less bottom-peaked power 1
7 960 1826 0.49 2.65 Minimum measur)ed dynamic
pump loss slope3
8 960 1826 0.57 2.62 As 7, but central zone orifice
9 960 1826 0.75 3.18 As 8, but less bottom-peaked1)
10 960 1826 0.75 2.62 Constant pump losses
11 960 1826 0.89 2.62 Constant downcomer restriction
losses
12 960 1826 1.05 2.60 As 11, but central zone orifice2)
13 960 1826 0.88 3.12 As 11, but solid pellet model
14 960 1826 1.08 3.10 As 12, but solid pellet model
Note 1 The measured bottom-peaked power distribution has a maximum of 2.06 at 12.5 %
core height. The profile in this case is adjusted to a peak of 1.45, more representa-
tive for an annular core region with high control rod density.
Note 2 Orifice pattern: Central zone 368 channels 60 velocity heads
Intermediate zone 64 channels 100 _"-
Peripheral zone 68 channels 140 _"-
A weighted restriction coefficient is normally used in BISON input.
Note 3 Deduced fram the transfer function Gwd from measured flow to pump pressure
difference, the slope interpreted as a measure of the true dynamic restriction.
Attempts were made to reproduce the stability characteristics corresponding to the
observed, pronounced core resonance peak in the following manner. The option for loop
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independent core stability analysis was used in cases 2 - 6 to simulate the core, or actually a
part thereof, with constant boundary conditions, and the effect of less bottom-peaked power
distributions, power level, and flow rate was analysed for this option. For the complete BISON
model the dynamic downcomer flow restriction was reduced to the slope deduced from the dip
at core resonance frequency in the gain of the transfer function Gwd from flow to pump
pressure difference in cases 7 - 9, and to zero or near zero values in cases 10 - 14. Noteworthy
is that the constant core boundary conditions in case 2 give a higher decay ratio, although the
destabilising effect of steam separator pressure losses is not present as in case 1 and Ib. The
reduced downward tilt of the power in cases 3,6 and 9 increases the decay ratio and the period,
which otherwise is somewhat underpredicted as in table 2 for the cracked pellet fuel model.
However, a further reduction of the downward tilt makes the decay ratio decrease again.
Increased power in the core section simulated in case 4 also gives a higher decay ratio and a
sm aller period, and so does the reduced flow in case 5. Case 6 predicts a central zone decay
ratio of 0.69, for a relative power of 1.20, if the measured flow would be overestimated by as
much as 15 %.
Since the transfer function Gwd actually does not give a true measure of the dynamic
flow resistance of the pumps at core resonance, according to the previous discussion, the
justification for cases 7 - 9 is questionable, and they are more to be considered as part of the
sensitivity studies, with regard to the dynamic single-phase flow restrictions. Case 9, which
predicts the measured decay ratio, represents resonance channels located in a less bottom-
peaked area of the central zone, whose response is assumed to dominate the entire loop.
Contrary to the core stability cases 2-6, this core section interacts with a reduced dynamic
flow resistance in the downcomer and a full flow resistance in the steam separators.
In case 10 zero dynamic pump flow restriction is assumed at resonance, and in cases 11
and 13 even the small remaining downcomer restriction pressure 10ss is assumed constant.
Finally cases 12 and 14 show the result when the central orificing zone is chosen as representa-
tive for the entire core. The solid pellet model in cases 13 and 14 give a natural period dose to
the measured value, whereas the cracked pellet model in the corresponding cases 11 and 12
underpredict the period. The decay ratios are equal, in contrast to the fundamental mode
cases.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Satisfactory results were predicted for the forced circulation stability tests in jet pump
and internal pump reactors. Further validation analysis of tests with intermediate and high
decay ratios is desirable. At natural circulation in internal pump reactors the single core
channel model predicts the inferred fundamental mode decay ratio and frequency, but the
core resonance does not occur at this mode, which is very stable thanks the large flow
restrictions of the stationary or windmilling pumps in the main flow path. Instead the core
resonance corresponds to resonance channels or core sections in an oscillation mode, which
appears not to be restricted by the downcomer dynamic pressure losses. For jet pump reactors
which do not have large downcomer flow restrictions at natural circulation, as shown by their
higher flow rate at natural circulation, the core resonance can be expected to occur at the
fundamental mode resonance at least below the limit cyde threshold.
The merits of the idea of using zero or low dynamic flow resistance in the downcomer for
the predictions of the limit cyde threshold at natural circulation are doubtful, in particular
due to the inconsistent assumption that the steam separator dynamic pressure 10ss is not
influenced. To a certain extent this assumption may be justified by the fact that the density
head variation in the resonance channels generates a power variation of a more global nature
and causes steam flow variations at the outlet of other channels, creating aglobai two-phase
flow variation through the steam separators at opposite phase with the resonance channels
inlet flows. The drawback is that this method always will predict a higher decay ratio than the
fundamental mode. Even if the limit cyde threshold would be predicted, the decay ratio would
be overpredicted for operating states not too far from instability. For the code to be used as an
independent prediction tool, it should rather not depend on measured data, which are likely to
be plant and operating state specific. Therefore this concept would be truly useful if the zero
dynamic flow resistance assumption 1V0uid turn out to be adequate, but the problem of
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deciding when to use this approach would remain. Based on an assumption of loose neutronic
coupling between oscillating core sections, the core stability option with constant boundary
conditions has some potential to predict the instability mode corresponding to the core
resonance peak at natural circulation in internal pump reactors, predicting a higher decay
ratio than the fundamental mode, when the latter is stable thanks to downcomer flow
restrictions. Further studies with increased radial buckling and control rod density and actual
power profiles may improve the agreement with experimental data. Some interaction with the
steam separators is, however, bound to be caused by the large global power variation
superposed to the fundamental mode. In the end, therefore, brute force in the form of a three-
dimensional multi-channel model such as ASEA-ATOM's code ANDY CAP may be required.
At limit cycle conditions the large dynamic pump restriction loss presumably is instru-
mental for the development of the higher instability mode observed in test point 3. The reason
for the absence of a higher instability mode of the same kind at limit cycle in TVO II may be
the two windmilling pumps, the higher flow rate, the less bottom-peaked power profile, and/or
the different radial control rod distribution, especially since all these factors probably affect
the degree of suppression of the fundamental mode. To judge from the predicted natural
frequency the solid pellet concept is valid for the fresh core in the TVO I tests. The degree of
pellet cracking during fuel exposure might therefore be inferred from the resonance frequen-
cy determined from noise recordings.
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A GOMPARISON OF RELAPS/NOO1.6, TRAG-BOI/VERSION 12,
ANO TRAG-BOl/MOOl ASSESSMENTS IHTH OATA FRON A
ROSA 111 SMALL BREAK TEST
K. G. Wagner and R. J. Dallman
EG&G Idaho, Inc.
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415, U.S.A.
ABSTRAGT
A comparative analysis of three assessment studies of Run 912 from
the ROSA-III small break LOGA test series has been performed. Two
of the studies were done using the TRAG-BDI computer code, while the
RELAPS code was used for the third study. The studies are part of
INELs support to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Gommission for
the independent assessment of reactor safety codes. The ability of
each computer code to calculate pertinent thermal-hydraulic phenom-
ena in the experiment is presented. The run time assessment
statistics are also presented.
INTRODUGTION
A comparison of three assessment studies of the Rig of Safety Assessment
(ROSA)-III, Run 912 is lnade. In each study, an advanced, best estimate, reactor
safety code was used to calculate the transient. Two of the studies used the
TRAG-BDI computer code [1,2], while the RELAPS code [3] was used for the third
study. They were performed at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL)
in support of the Uni ted States Nuclear Regulatory Gommission (USNRG) for the
independent assessment of reactor safety codes. The object of this paper is to
compare the ability of each code to predict the pertinent thermal-hydraulic
phenomena measured in the experiment, discuss the improvements from the earlier
version of TRAG-BDI to the more recent version, and compare the run time sta-
tistics of each code.
FAGILITY AND TEST DESGRIPTION
The ROSA-III facility was a weIL instrumented, volumetrically scaled
(1/424) BWR system with an electrically heated core [4]. There were four half-
length power bundles in the core. One bundle simulated a high power channel
while the other three bundles simulated average power channels. Each bundle
contained 62 heated rods and 2 water rods in an 8 x 8 array.
There were two recirculation loops attached to the pressure vessel. Each
loop had two jet pumps and one recirculation pump. A prototypical BWR has the
jet pumps inside the pressure vessel in the downcomer region. However, the
ROSA-III jet pumps were placed external to the vessel due to modeling con-
straints imposed in scaling the downcomer flow area. The break location was in
the recirculation loop and just upstream of the recirculation pump.
The ROSA-III facility has a prototypical BWR Emergency Gore Gooling System
(EGGS) which includes a High Pressure Gore Spray (HPGS), a Low Pressure Gore
Spray (LPGS), and a Low Pressure Goolant Injection (LPGI).
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The main steam line at the top of the vessel serves three functions.
First, it simulates the resistance of a steam turbine during steady state oper-
ations. Secondly, it acts as a Safety Relief Valve (SRV) during transient sit-
uations to maintain the vessel pressure below 8.47 MPa. Finally, it acts as an
Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
to reduce the system pressure.
Run 912 simulated a 5% break of the recirculation pump suction piping [5].
The transient was initiated when the break valve was opened. The pump power was
turned off and the core power was controlled to simulate a prototypical BWR
power decay. The system pressure decreased until 24 s when the Main Steam Iso-
lation Valve (MSIV) was closed. Following MSIV closure, the system pressure
rapidly increased until the SRV was manually opera ted to keep the system pres-
sure below 8.47 MPa. The ADS valve opened at 158 sand caused a rapid depres-
surization. The heater rods began to heatup from 206 s to 261 s. The LPCS and
LPCI were initiated at 318 sand 406 s, respectively. All heater rods were
quenched between 328 sand 433 s. The peak cladding temperature of 839 K
occurred at 410 s at the midplane of the high power rod.
COMPUTER CODE AND MODEL DESCRIPTIONS
This paper compares assessment studies using three different computer
codes. Two studies were performed using different vers ions of the TRAC-BDl
code [6] and one study used the RELAPS code [7J. A description of the computer
code and the computer models is given below.
The two vers ions of the TRAC-BDl computer code were written specifically
to examine various transients in a BWR. TRAC-BD1/Version 12 was released in
late 1981 and represents the oldest code in this comparison. Conversely,
TRAC-BD1/MODl was released in June 1984 and represents the state-of-art BWR
transient code at the INEL. Both TRAC-BDl codes feature a full nonhomogeneous,
nonequilibrium two fluid thermal-hydraulic model in all portions of a BWR sys-
tem and multi-dimensional treatment of a BWR vessel. The major improvements of
the code from TRAC-BD1/Version 12 to TRAC-BD1/MODl that would influence the
present calculation include: a comprehensive control system model; a two phase
level tracking model; a moving mesh quench front tracking model for the fuel
rods and both sides of the channel wall; and improved constitutive relations for
heat, mass, and momentum transfer between the fluid phases and the structure
surface [1,2].
The TRAC-BD1/Version 12 vessel nodalization is shown in .Figure 1. The two
dimensional vessel model featured twelve axial levels and three radial rings.
No azimuthai dependency was simulated in the vessel. The two inner rings
between levels four and seven represented the high and average power channel
and bypass regions. The annular downcomer was modeled in the outer ring. The
guide tubes and the channels were modeled internally in the vessel by using one
dimensional components and source connections to the vessel.
The advent of the level tracking model in TRAC-BDI/MODI permitted a coarser
vessel nodalization than the Version 12 model. In the new model, to reduce
costs, levels two and three, six and seven, and nine and ten were combined to
reduce the number ofaxial levels from twelve to nine. Use of the level track-
.ing model in the downcomer region of the vessel permitted the axial location of
the one dimensional components to be specified independent of the cell location.
In the newer model, the liquid level was tracked in a continuous manner through-
out the downcomer region. Hence, the correct void fraction (above or below the








































































Figure 1. TRAC-BDI vessel nodalization of ROSA-III.
The core regions in the TRAC-BDI models were simulated using the CHAN com-
ponent. A CHAN component in ring 1 of the vessel simulated the high powered
bundle, while another CHAN in ring 2 modeled three average power bundles. In
the TRAC-BDI/Version 12 model, four rod groups were used in the CHAN component
of the high power rod. Three groups corresponded to the three radial peaking
factors while one group corresponded to the two water rods. The average power
channel used two groups. One group simulated all the heated rods while the
other group modeled the two water rods. The advantage of using several rod
groups in the CHAN component is for radiation calculations at elevated tempera-
tures. After examining the results from the Version 12 calculation, it was
determined that.radiative heat transfer in the bundle was not a dominant heat
transfer mode. Therefore, it was decided to only use one rod group per channel
in the MODI model.
The TRAC-BDI system nodalization is shown in Figure 2. Both the intact and
broken loops were modeled. One JET PUMP component was used in each loop to
60
60







ADS - Automatie depressurization system
LPCI - Low pressure coolant injection
LPCS - Low pressure core spray
MSL - Main steam line
SRV - Safety relief valve
Figure 2. TRAC-BDI system nodalization of ROSA-III.
Notes:
1 Junction 1----Component 1
INEL33561
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model the two jet pumps in the facility. The small break was modeled at junc-
tion 26. The LPCS and LPCI were connected to both ring 1 and 2 to assure uni-
form mixing. Flow versus pressure tables from the test data were input as
boundary conditions for the ECCS flows. The LPCI and LPCS components were
activated when the calculated system pressure was below 2.38 and 1.81 MPa,
respectively.
Ambient heat loss from the facility was also modeled. No experimental data
was available for the ROSA-III heat loss distribution. However, the total heat
loss was measured to be roughly 150 kW. The Version 12 model used a 50 kW heat
loss from the vessel and 50 kW from each of the two recirculation loops. The
Version 12 results indicated the vessel heat loss distribution should have been
increased. Therefore, a higher heat loss from the vessel (75 kW from the vessel
and 38 kW from each of the two loops) was used in the MODI model to achieve
better agreement with the data.
Several other boundary conditions were put into the model. A flow versus
time table derived from the experimental data was used for the main steam line
(MSL) and feed water flows. A rotational speed versus time table for the two
recirculation pumps was used after the pump power termination. Pressure versus
flow tables were used for the SRV and ADS flows. The SRV was activated only
when the system pressure was greater than 8.40 MPa. The ADS was activated
120 s after the downcomer level reached 4.25 m.
The RELAP5/MODl.6 computer code was used in the third study [3].
RELAPS/MODI. 6 was an intermediate version of RELAPS, satisfying interna 1 model-
ing re~uirements at the INEL until RELAP5/MOD2 [8] was completed. It contained
many of the same models found in RELAP5/MOD2. RELAP5/MODl.6 did not have multi-
dimensional capability, hence, a one dimensional solution was used throughout
the model. The code was released at the INEL in early 1983.
The RELAPS model nodalization was similar to the TRAC-BDI models except for
a one dimensional pressure vessel. Similarly, the core was divided into two
channels. The heater rods were modeled in groups similar to the TRAC-BDI/
Version 12 model. The water rods were not modeled. The guide tubes and the
bypass regions were also modeled using PIPE components. A RELAPS SEPARATOR
component was used to simulate the ROSA-III steam separator. Heat structures
were used to model the ambient heat loss from the vessel and the recirculation
loops. AlSO kW steady state ambient heat loss was calculated from the system.
The RELAPS heat loss distribution was similar to the TRAC-BDI/Version 12 model,
50 kW from the vessel and 50 kW from each loop.
The RELAPS recirculation loops, ECCS, and MSL nodalization were similar to
the TRAC-BDl models. The same boundary conditions used in the TRAC-BDI models
were used in the RELAPS model.
RESULTS
This section compares the results from three assessment studies with the
measured data. An uncertainty analysis was not performed on the data, hence,
most of the measured results are presented without an uncertainty range.
Although no uncertainties were given for the heater rod temperatures, the data
were processed by elevation and linear heat rate (high or low power channel) to
determine the minimum and maximum data. Both curves are presented with the
calculated results to illustrate the range of data.
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Several comparisons are presented in order to judge the ability of the
codes to predict the pertinent thermal hydraulic phenomena during the experi-
ment. The system pressure and heater rod response were determined to be
important parameters that characterize " small break simulation. These param-
eters are directly influenced by an accurate calculation of the steam line flow,
break flow, and regional mass distribution. To facilitate the discussion of the
code and data comparisons, the calculated results from the three analyses will
be referred to as V12 for the TRAC-BDI/Version 12 analysis, MODI for
TRAC-BDI/MODI analysis, and RELAPS for RELAPS/MODI.6 analysis.
Figure 3 compares the calculated and measured steam dome pressures. The
pressure remained fairly constant at the initiation of the transient until the
core power decay began at 8.8 s. Subsequently, the pressure decreased until
the MSIV closure at 24 sand then rapidly repressurized to the SRV set point
(8.40 MPa). The experimental and V12 results showed a slight depressurization
after 100 s until the ADS was actuated at lS8 s (164 s in V12). The RELAPS and
MODI results remained near the SRV set point until the ADS valve was opened.
The calculated break flow for these two calculations was lower than the measured
break flow and V12, which appeared to contribute to the calculated pressure
hold up.
After ADS actuation, there was a rapid depressurization until 318 s when
the feedwater line flashed and LPCS liquid fell into the core and vaporized.
The measured depressurization was greatly reduced after the initiation of the
LPCS, thus LPCI was delayed until 406 s when the system pressure reached
1.81 MPa. In each of the calculations, the ECCS was also initiated by a system
pressure trip. Consequently, variations in the calculated depressurization rate
from the measured value caused variances in the initiation of the LPCS and the
LPCI. The RELAPS results showed an over calculation of the depressurization
rate and no influence of the feedwater flashing or the LPCS initiation. Exces-
sive condensation in the RELAPS upper plenum after LPCS initiation caused the
calculated depressurization to be too high. Consequently, the RELAPS LPCI ini-
tiation was 80 s premature. The V12 calculated depressurization rate agreed
with the data until 318 s. There was feedwater flashing in the V12 results but
the LPCS fluid was held up in the upper plenum by high steam velocities at the
core exit. As a result, the V12 LPCI initiation was also earlier than measured.
The MODI depressurization rate matched the measured value and had the best
agreement with the data after 318 s. Several improvements in the MODI inter-
facial drag package permitted the LPCS liquid to drain into the core after LPCS
initiation and improved the agreement with the data. The MODI results were
above the data at the beginning of the ADS blowdown due to an over calculated
initial pressure and a slight delay in the actuation of the ADS (lS8 s in the
experiment versus l6S s in MODI).
The break mass flo,,, is compared in Figure 4. The measured break flow had
a long subcooled blowdown until the ADS valve opened and the flow transitioned
to saturated flow. The MODI and RELAPS results also show the transition to
saturated flow after ADS actuation. The V12 break flow went saturated 47 s
prior to the measured time. The sharp decrease in the V12 break flow, however,
was not reflected in the calculated system pressure response which continued to
decrease after the transition. Conversely, the MODI and RELAPS calculated sys-
tem pressures appeared more sensitive to the break flow. It appeared the MODI
and RELAPS break flows were underpredicted during the subcooled portion of the
transient and caused the repressurization rate to be too high. It was believed
that the V12 subcooled break flow was too high and contributed the slightly
premature depressurization at 80 sand the early transition to saturated flow.
Several factors influenced the differences between the MODI and V12 break
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Figure 4. Camparisan of measured and calculated break mass flows.
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at the break plane because there were severe flow oscillations. Consequently,
a characteristic analysis of the h~eak flow was used until 111 s when thc flow
went saturated. The critical flow model was revised in MODl and worked satis-
factorily for the entire transient. The MODl critical subcooled flow model was
extremely sensitive to the amount of liquid subcooling. The MODl steady state
lower plenum subcooling was approximately 6 K, whereas, the measured value was
11 K. Several attempts were made to lower the amount of liquid subcooling,
however the model always converged to approximately 6 K subcooling. A hand
calculation using the MODl subcooled critical flow equations showed a 15%
increase in break flol' with 11 K subcooling versus 6 K subcooling. The lower
amount of liquid subcooling in the MODl model may indicate insufficient ambient
heat lass or an incorrect heat lass distribution. The MODl model had less heat
lass in the loops than the V12 model and that may have contributed to the dis-
crepancy. The total ambient heat lass in the two models was identical. The
additional amount of heat lass in the MODl vessel did improve the agreement
with the measured pressurization rates.
A camparisan of the high power channel thermocouple da ta at the core mid-
plane with the calculated surface temperatures is shown in Figure 5. The meas-
ured results remained near saturation conditions until 200 sand then departed
from nucleate boiling conditions. The measured thermocouples were quenched
between 380 sand 440 s after the ECCS fluid entered the core. The RELAPS and
MODl results show reasonable agreement with the data whereas theV12 results ha,
three distinct heatups versus one in the data. A discussion of each
calculations' heater rod response follows.
The RELAPS core dried out at a slightly higher rate than was measured and




































Figure 5. Camparisan of measured and calculated high power bundle midplane
temperatures.
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same as the measured value. The calculated PCT was 751 K at 297 s versus a
measured value of 839 K at 410 s. The RELAPS temperature turned around shortly
after the calculated LPCS initiation and rapidly quenched after LPCI started
(325 s). The variances in the calculated and measured pressure response
directly influenced the premature rod quench and event timing during the
reflood portion of the transient.
The V12 results indicated three heatups during the transient. The first
departure from saturation conditions was caused by an underprediction of the
core inlet flow during the pump coast down. The ROSA-III external jet pumps
were rather atypical of a prototypical BWR and were not satisfactorily modeled
in V12. During the pump cöast down, the total jet pump flow was underpredicted
and caused adeparture from nucleateboiling in the core. The rods returned to
nucleate boiling upon the initiation of the core power decay. The second heatup
was caused by restrictive Counter Current Flow Limiting (CCFL) at the core upper
tieplate. Liquid was retained in the upper plenum during the V12 calculation
whereas liquid was measured to hold up in the upper plenum and subsequently
drain back into the core. The V12 heater rods were quenched by flashing of
liquid following ADS. The final V12 heatup also was slightly delayed from the
data. A reduced calculated "patup rate was attributed to an overprediction of
the forced convection heat transfer in the core region. A calculated PCT of
665 K occurred in the final heatup at 397 s. The calculated core quench
preceded the experiment because of the premature LPCI initiation.
The MODI heater rod response was in excellent agreement with the data. The
MODI heater rod temperatures and core inventory results represent a significant
improvement over the V12 simulation. The improvements in the interfacial drag
and heat transfer relationships provided a better simulation of the phenomena
in this transient. The jet pump model was improved and nO anomalous heatup was
calculated early in the transient. A comparison of the behavior at the upper
tie plate revealed good agreement between the calculated and measured results.
The fine mesh model was used in the MODI reflood. As seen in Figure 5, the
quench occurred in successive reductions in the heater rod temperature. This
corresponded to individual fine mesh nodes quenching as liquid entered into the
core. The MODI model also adverted a calculated pressure spike observed in V12
(395 s) during the core quench.
CODE RUN TIME STATISTICS
The pertinent run time statistics are given in Table I. An indication of
how fast a computer code runs is found by taking the ratio of the Central Proc-
essor Unit (CPU) time divided by the calculated transient Real Time (RT). The
CPU/RT ranged from 18 in the RELAP5 calculation to 65 in v12. The TRAC-BDI two
dimensional vessel calculations add significantly to the expense of the simula-
tion. The MODI calculational cost was greatly reduced from the V12 calculation
TABLE I. SUMMARY OF RUN TIME STATISTICS
Parameter TRAC-BDl/V12 TRAC-BDI/MODI RELAPS/MODI. 6
Transient time (RT) 500 425 387
Number of cells (C) 142 131 140
Number of heated surfaces 201 186 146
Number o'f time steps (DT) 84116 28546 17138
CPU time (CPU) 32500 14922 6969
CPU/RT 65 35 18
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by the economizations in the vessel and ChAN components. The MODI and RELAPS
simulations were allowed to run near the calculational Courant limit whereas
the V12 simulation was limited to a maximum of 0.01 s time steps.
CONCLUSIONS
The overall trends of the Run 912 transient were weIl predicted by the
three respective codes. Each code did a reasonable job predicting pertinent
thermal-hydraulic phenomena and the sequence of events. Many of the deficient
areas observed in the V12 simulation were corrected in the MODI version. The
areas of discrepancy in the MODI simulation may be directly attributable to
modeling sensitivities rather than to code deficiencies. RELAPS provided a
good simulation of the phenomena in the core, however, the system depressuriza-
tion after ADS and excessive condensation after LPCS affected the sequence of
events. On the other hand, the RELAPS simulation ran much faster than the TRAC
simulations. A significant improvement in the runtime statistics was obtained
in the MODI simulation from the earlier version.
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ABSTRACT
TRAC-BDl is a best-estimate system code, developed at INEL for BWR LOCA
analysis. ROSA-I II program at JAERI conducts the LOCA integral system
experiment on a BWR. The large break test, Run 926, was analyzed by
TRAC-BDl to assess the predictive capability of the system behavioI on a
BWR during LOCA. A comparison between calculation and experiment
indicated that TRAC-BDl predicted overall data trends and key phenomena
very weH. However, the peak cladding temperature was overpredicted.
The heat transfer correlations in the code were reviewed. The peak
cladding temperature, calculated by the modified heat transfer
correlation, was in good agreement with the data.
INTRODUCTION
TRAC-BDl code [1] is a best estimate system code developed at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) for Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) loss-
of-coolant accident (LOCA) analysis. This code features a three dimensional
treatment of the BWR presssure vessel and a one dimensional treatment of fuel
bundles and pipings. The thermal hydrodynamic model is a nonhomogeneous,
nonequilibrium two-fluid formulation for two-phase flow.
The Rig of Safety Assessment (ROSA)-III test program at the Japan Atomic
Energy Research Institute (JAERI) conducts the LOCA integral system
experiment on a BWR. Run 926, which is a 200 % guillotine break at the inlet
side of a recirculation pump with assumption of HPCS failure, was analyzed by
TRAC-BDl to assess the predictive capability of the system behavior for a BWR
during LOCA. The results are discussed in this paper.
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ROSA-III AND TEST DESCRIPRION
The ROSA-III test program, whieh has been eondueted at JAERI, is a LOCA
integral system experiment on a BWR. The test faeility is designed to
simulate LOCA in BWR/6. The volume of eaeh eomponent is sealed to 1/424.
Figures 1 and 2 ,show the sehematie test faeility and internal struetures in
the vessel, respeetively. The faeility eonsists of pressure vessel, steam
line, feedwater line, reeireulation loops and ECCS. The eore is simulated by
four half length bundles with eleetrie heater, rods heated indireetly. Eaeh
bundle has 62 heated rods and 2 water rods in an 8 x 8 array. The total
maximum heater power is 4.2 Mw. Three of four bundles have the same power,
while the other has 1.4 times larger power. Eaeh bundle has radial power
distribution. The axial power distribution for eaeh rod is ehopped eosine
with a peaking faetor of 1.4. There are two primary reeireulation· loops. Eaeh
loop has a reeireulation pump and two jet pumps, respeetively. Jet pumps
are loeated outside of the vessel. The faeility has three eoolant injeetion
systems as ECCS, namely high pressure eore spray (HPCS), lower pressure core
spray (LPCS) and lower pressure eoolant injeetion (LPCI) systems. The flow
rate for eaeh system is sealed to 1/424 of the aetual plant eondition.
The break is simulated by two orifiees or nozzles, two quick opening
valves and one quick shut-off valve, to enable simulating the various break
eonditions from a small diameter split break to a double ended-break. The
discharge flow rates are measured by using 2-beam gamma-densitometers and
drag disk upstream from the break loeations.
RUN 926 TEST
Run 926 [2] is a 200 % guillotine break at the inlet side of the
reeireulation pump with assumption of HPCS failure. Breaks are simulated by
nozzles. Primary initial eonditions were the 7.37 MPa steam dome pressure,
10.0 Klower plenum subeooling, 16.3 kg/s eore inlet flow and 3.967 MW total
bundle power.
After the break, the feedwater stopped at 4.0 seeonds and the steam
flow stopped at 5.4 seeonds by the level trip signal. LPCS and LPCI initiated
at 71.0 seeonds and 96.3 seeonds, respeetively. A 783.5 K peak eladding
temperature (PCT) was reaehed at 118.5 seeonds after the break, during a
reflood phase. The entire eore was eompletely quenehed and eooled by ECCS and
the ECCS effeetiveness was eonfirmed.
ANALYTICAL MODEL
TRAC-BDl (version Bo02) was used. Figure 3 shows a TRAC-BDl noding for
ROSA-III large break test. The pressure vessel is modeled by a VESSEL
eomponent with fourteen axial levels and three radial rings (no azimuthal
dependeney). The inner two rings in levels 5 through 9 model the bypass
region. The steam-separator model was applied to level 13. Two CHAN
eomponents are used to simulate the four bundles. One in the inner ring
simulates the high power bundle. The other one in the seeond ring simulates
the three average power bundles.
The radial power distribution in eaeh bundle was aeeounted for by
speeifying four rod groups. Three groups eorresponded to the different
peaking faetors and the fourth modeled two water rods.
The eountereurrent flow limiting (CCFL) model with side entry orifiee
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(SEO) eoeffieient was utilized at the inlet of both CHAN eomponents. The
CCFL model with upper tie pJate (UTP) coeffieient was used at the outlet of
both CHAN eomponents.
Jet pumps were modeled by TEE eomponents, sinee the jet pump eomponent,
JETP, has problems in regard to simulating the external jet pumps {3}.
In the CHAN eomponent, several user-speeified heat transfer options are
provided. In the present ealeulation, the following options were used.
Critieal heat flux (CHF) was ealeulated with the CISE-GE eritieal quality CHF
eorrelations. The minimum stable film boiling temperature was taken to the
maximum of those ealeulated by homogeneous nueleation and Iloeje eorrelation.
A threshold void fraetion value of 0.9 was used for radiation ealeulation.
The ealeulation ineluded steam and droplets, and eorreet view faetors were
used for anisotropie refleetion.
Before transient ealeulation, a steady state ealeulation was performed
using the initial heater power, pump speeds, main steam flow and feedwater
flow. Table I shows eomparisons of the measured and ealeulated steady state
eonditions. The ealeulated steady state eonditions are very elose to the
measured values.
Caleulated break flow was dependent on the nodalization at the break in
TRAC-BD1. ealeulation [3]. The nodalization at break was deeided upon as a
straight pipe model, after sensitivity ealeulations on a truneated eone model
and a straight pipe model.
In the transient ealeulation, measured steam, feedwater, LPCS and LPCI
flows were used for boundary eonditions.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
The transient ealeulation was performed until all heater rods were
quenehed. In this ealeulation, a speed ratio of eentral proeessor unit (CPU)
seeonds divided by transient seeonds, -was 72:1 for blowdown phase (before 70
seeonds) and 210:1 for reflood phase (after 70 seeonds). The time step sizes
were limited by Courant limit during blowdown phase and by eonvergenee speed
during reflood phase.
Figure 4 shows a eomparison between the measured and ealeulated pressure
histories in the lower plenum. Up to 35 seeonds after the break, the
ealeulated pressure is in good agreement with the measured data. After 35
seeonds, the ealeulated depressurization beeomes higher than the measured
data. This is probably due to a overpredietion of a break flow shown later.
At around 70 seeonds, the depressurization rate is deereased due to flashing
of water in the feedwater line. This phenomena is also observed in the
ealeulation.
Figure 5 shows eomparisons between the measured and ealeulated break
flow rates. In the vessel side break, the ealeulation is in good agreement
with the measured data, before the reeireulation suetion is uneovered (about
18 seeonds). After approximately 18 seeonds, the ealeulated break flow rate
is slightly greater than the measured data. In the pump side break, the
ealeulated break flow rate is slightly greater than the measured data.
Figure 6 shows a eomparison of differential pressure between the lower
plenum snd steam dome. The ealeulation agrees weIl with the experiment,
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during the blowdown phase. However, the calculation is lower than the
measured data, during the refload phase (after 90 seconds).
Figure 7 shows a comparison of bundle differential pressure. The
calculation agrees with the experiment during the blowdown phase. The
measured data drops at around 70 seconds. This is caused by the bundle
draining into the lower plenum which was praduced by reduced steam
generation from depressurization decrease at the feedwater flashing. However,
this phenomena is not observed in the calculation. In the experiment, the
differential pressure starts to increase soon after LPCS initiating. However,
in the calculation, it starts to increase soon after LPCI initiating. This
discrepancy was caused by preventing LPCS water from drainig into the bundle
shown Fig. 10.
Figure 8 indicates upper tie plate fluid temperatures of the high power
channel. Above the upper tie plate, fluids are always saturated in both the
calculation and experiment. Below the upper tie plate, superheated fluids
appeared soon after the break and disappeared at the lower plenum flashing in
both calculation and experiment. At around 50 seconds, superheated fluids
again appeared. In the experiment, the superheated fluid temporarily
disappeared at the time of feedwater flashing but this phenomena is not
observed in the calculation. Times at which superheat appeared are almost the
same in the calculation and experiment. This means that core uncovery times
are almost the same in the calculation and experiment.
Figures 9 and 10 show calculated channel inlet and outlet velocities of
the high power bundle, respectively. The inlet flow are co-current upward
before LPCI initiation. Then, velocities oscillate: All bundles were
completely uncovered soon after the feedwater flashing in the experiment, but
were not uncovered in the calculation. Probably the high interfacial shear
prevented fluid from draining into the lower plenum from bundles in the
caluculation. The bundle outlet flow is also co-current upward during both
blowdown phase and refload phase. This indicates that HPCS spray did not fall
into the bundle in the calculation.
Figure 11 shows comparisons of heater surface temperatures of the
average power bundle. At the top position, the heater surface temperature
started to Increase at about 10 seconds and rewetted at the lower plenum
flashing in the experiment. This temperature history is well simulated by
TRAC. At around 45 seconds, the temperature again increased in both the
experiment and calculation. The dryout time is almost the same in the
calculation and experiment. The measured temperature dropped at the
feedwater flashing, but the calculation did not. At the middle point, The
calculated dryout time is slightly later than in the experiment. Calculated
heatup rates at the top and middle positions also agree with the data. Rads
at the bottom position did not heatup in the calculation, since the bottom
position was not uncovered.
Figure 12 shows comparisons of heater surface temperatures of the high
power bundle. In the high power bundle, the first and second dryout times at
the top and middle positions agreed well in the oalculation and experiment.
However, the bottom position did not heatup in the calculation. These results
are similar to those of the average power bundle. The PeT was observed at the
middle position of the higher bundle. The heater surface at the middle





for this is probably problem in the heat transfer model of TRAC, since the
calculated bundle differential pressure agrees with the measured data as
shown in Fig. 7.
In the original TRAC-BD1, quenching occurs when the cladding temperature,
Tclad, decreases below the minimum stable film boiling temperature, Tmin,
calculated as follows:
Tmin = min (Tl, max (TZ, T3))
where Tl Hsu's maximum rewet temperature (811 k)
TZ homogeneous nucleation minimum stab1e film boi1ing
temperature
T3 I1oeje's corre1ation
In Bq. (1), Tmin is independent from surface properties. However, Groeneve1d
and Snock [4] indicated that Tmin was dependent on surface properties in all
experiment reviewd and that Tmin increased with a decrease in kpc of the
wall. Therefore, the authors incorporated Henry's corre1ation [5]P for Tmin
calculation in TRAC-BD1, that is:
Tmin = max (TZ, T3, T4), (2)
where T4 is Henry's correlation, including the effect of surface properties:
_ . [Jek Pcl j hf JO.6
T4 - TBer + O.42·(TBe,,-1 j l' (kiJC) '~Bw w er
T = T +0 j27. Pj hfg . [gepj-Pgl) ~~ r 0 JI/~ [~) "'
Bel' f' kg Pj+Pg Lg(Pj-PgJ gtPj-PgJ
(5)
In the present ca1culation, (kpc )/(kpc) is the order of 0.1-
Therefore, Tmin from Henry's correlationPis larg~r than that from I1oeje's
corre1ation by about 100 K. In Fig. 1Z, the heater surface temperature
transient at the middle position ca1culated using modified Tmin, is in
exce11ent agreement with the measured PeT.
CONCLUSIONS
The following conc1usions were obtained in this study,
1) TRAC-BD1 can predict the overall trends and key phenomena very well.
2) Investigations are necessary on
a) Correlation for Tmin
b) Interfacial shear at CHAN in1et and outlet
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fg; heat of vaporization
Table I Comparison between Calculated and Measured Initial
Coditions
Parameter Measured Data TRAC-BDl
Steam Dome Pressure (Pa) 7.3x106 7.29x10
6
High Power Channel Inlet Flow 3.9 3.40
(kg/s)
Average Power Channel Inlet 3.9 3.85
Flow (kg/s)
Bypass Flow (kg/s) 0.72 0.82
Intact Jet Pump Discharge Flow 1.lx10-3 1. 02x10-3
(m**3/s)
Broken Jet Pump Discharge Flow -3 1. 05x10-31.1x10
(m**3/s)
1'1P between Upper Plenum and 4x104 3.81x104
Steam Dome (Pa)





Jet Pt.unp OUtlet Line
Feedwater Line
Upper Plemun
High Pressure Core Spray Sparger
Lew Pressure Care Spray Sparger
Law Pressure Coolant Injectian NaZ1.1e
Core Shraud
1X>wncomer
Jet Pump Suction Line
SiJnulated Fuel Btmdles (Core)
InteYllal Structure of Pressure
Vessel of ROSA-III
Main Steam Line Nazzle
IVn~"'1!'f!C-- Dryer
f21..=tt== ~~~: ~~Tatar










i: :!_.J -J__ __
I--r- --+
_.J ..L_
I I__ L l-_
~===t=4__{1 :
I I_...l .... 4-_
I I





'--+<:: '""-- I -t----r- :__r-t-'----'-~-
lPCl
Feea..ater
Fig. 3 TRAC-BD1 Noding for ROSA-III Large Break Test
~









I F\oF ""---~ I
Cl ! , , ! ':::----, J
o 40 80 120 160 200
TIM EiS)












































Upper Tie Plate Fluid Temperatures













o l ! " • I





















01,..., \ ~ ~ Iiii! I.. l
1: nIlli: ::
~1\ n:\:::1
I:: l ll~ 1ll JI
1~ I I ll~ 11
II:~ lid 11:
J ,I ~ IJI I~r I
) 1111111\
~t j!::~:'~'1§ ~ l' ,....r....' I ~ nA :
)I,' ~ tl ,\ I,~ \~) ,~" },...).~J' !!~ ::~ \' -..1:- \ ,.", ~" 'U '/"1' \. ..~ lt ~' '
~ ~Il~ \1 :
> "'" u.. \,
LPCS LPCl
;::1 I j, ,
'0 40 BO 120 160 20U
TIME (5)
Fig. 10 Calculated Velocities at CHAN Outlet
--- VAPOR
- L10UIO






,!\J.'~d I':: I :;l
J r: ~:il :ll :1 [:1\,v'{~'\Pll :'"'," I,t dl,'
.Nr-'" IItll hf.j (,
t't,.A.J'V • lllllllll 1Jl1:' ~l~lll I,.. ,rt :: :ll 111~)1 h:::
l/'~ ~" 111 I HIlI :'"/1 U II : 11, I 'lU









~! t 1 ! I I J
'0 ,0 BO 120 160 200
TIM E (s)
Fig. 9 Calculated Velocities at CHAN Inlet


























2 61Xl - Bottom
Fi. 11
~ 500 -~ - I! 400 [ I , I ~-~----;----,-"") I I
o 40 80 120 160 200
TIM E (s)
Heater Surface Temperatures of Average
Power B1.IDdle
1821
TRAC-BD1 ASSESSMENT UNDER SEVERE
ACCIDENT BOIL-OFF CONDITIONS
G. Th. Ana1ytis and S. N. Aksan





Postu1ated small break 10ss of coo1ant accidents in PWRs may
invo1ve partial core uncovery. It is important to be ab1e to
predict histories of dry-out point and resulting fue1 tempera-
ture during the transient. In this work, we shall compare
experimental data obtained during boil-off experiments in the
NEPTUN test facility at EIR and calcu1ations performed with
the best estimate thermal hydraulic code TRAC-BD1 version
12. The TMI-type accident conditions which 1ed to boil-off of
the coo1ant and subsequent uncovery of the core were chosen
for this comparison. In general, TRAC-BD1 predicts well the
temperature histories of the boil-off experiments; though,
some problem areas have been identified and are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
After the occurence of the TMI-2 accident, in LWR safety analysis,
increased attention has been paid to 10w flow and intermediate or 10w
pressure transients which, if no remedia1 measures are taken, may se~
quentially lead to uncovery, overheating and damage of the core. When
the reactor power is at decay heat levels and t he coo1ant entering the
core is subcoo1ed, uncovery of the core is like1y to occur only at re1a-
tive1y 10w coo1ant mass flow rates. As a result of TMI-2, hydraulic and
heat transfer mechanisms associated with cooling of fue1 rods in a pool
of water without externa1 circu1ation is needed to be understood. In par-
ticu1ar, there is an obvious need for assessing thermal hydraulic safety
codes as far as their ability to correctly predict the level swell (or expan-
sion of the boiling pool) and the fue1 rod temperatures in the uncovered re-
gion is concerned. Consequently, considera'b1e effort is being spent not
only in improving and extending the availab1e transient thermal hydraulic
codes, but also in performing carefully contro1ed experiments in test faci-
lities; the results of these simulations can be directly utilized for asses-
sing the predicting capabilities of these codes or even for deve10ping new
models, hence giving a direct feed-back to the code deve1opers.
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At the Swiss Federal Institute fnr Reactor Research (EIR), the
NEPTUN heater rod bundle was originally designed for low pressure
( f!f!::. 5.10 5 Psc) reflood experiments whose aim was to study the heat
transfer characteristics between the rod and the coolant. Additionally,
a number of core-uncovery (boil-off) experiments have been performed
to investigate the mixture level decrease and resulting fuel rod heat-up
above that level that may occur in a PWR during a small break LOCA.
These boil-off tests have been performed under defined conditions using
different initial parameters (eg. rod power, system pressure, coolant
subcooling etc.). In this work, we shall report on comparisons between
experimental data obtained in five boil-off tests in the NEPTUN facility
with the corresponding predictions obtained by using the best estimate
thermal hydraulic code TRAC -BD1 version 12 / 1 /. Although reasonable
agreement between experimental results and code predictions was obtained,
specific problem areas which resulted in considerable deviations in tran-
sition regions between flow regimes where the models of the code change
have been identified and discussed in some detail.
DESCRIPTION OF THE NEPTUN F ACILITY AND TEST PROCEDURE
The NEPTUN heater rod bundle was originally built to simulate a PWR
core. It contains 33 electrically heated rods and four guide tubes. Each
heater rod has an axial height of 1.68 m and radial dimensions simi.lar to
PWR nuclear fuel rods. There are five fuel assembly spacer grids, axi-
ally located at equal distances. Additionally, a continuously variable axial
power profile can be achieved. The instrumentation allows the measure-
ment of cladding (at eight equi-distant axial levels), housing, thermal insu-
lation and coolant temperatures, absolute and differential press ures at se-
veral axial positions, flow rates, carry-over rates and heating power.
The differential pressure measurement stations at eight axial levels were
intended for tracing the two-phase mixture level. For a complete descri-
ption of the NEPTUN facility, the interested reader is referred to / 2 /.
Although NEPTUN was originally designed to simulate a PWR core,
the presence of the housing enclosing the heater rods opens the possibility
of comparing experimental measurements in NEPTUN' with predictions of
system codes specially developed for modeling BWRs. Consequently, the
boil-off experiments were analyzed by using TRAC-BD1. We shall report
on the comparison between measurements and code predictions in the
following section.
The NEPTUN boil-off tests were initiated by turning on the full defined
power and terminating the coolant flow to the bundle at a given pressure.
The coolant swells in a rather unknown manner in the boiling length of the
test section and a certain amount of water is expelled out, depending on
the power supplied to the heater rods. As the upper parts of the test
section are uncovered, due to the transition from nucleate boiling to steam
cooling, heat-up of the rods is initiated. Experimental rod surface tempe-
rature data shows that no multi-dimensional effeets are present and that
the movement of the mixture level can be described as a one-dimensional
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process. Finally, we should point out that each experiment was performed
more than once and the data was found to be consistent.
COMPARISON OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS WITH CODE PREDICTIONS
The TRAC -BD1 code was developed for the detailed thermal hydrau-
lic analysis of design basis LOCAs in BWRs. The bas;ic features of the
code / 1 / include a full non-homogeneous, non-equilibrium, two-fluid
thermal hydraulic model of the two-phase flow in all parts of the BWR
system, with a three-dimensional thermal hydraulic treatment of
the reactor vessel which could be of importance in asymetric transients .
In relation to the NEPTUN boil-off experiments, the important fea-
ture of TRAC-BD1 which was developed to enable modeling of a BWR
core heat transfer and coolant flow is the channel (CHAN) component,
which also includes a package of constitutive relations specific to BWRs.
The CHAN component simulates a rod bundle and channel box assembly
and is therefore closely representative of the NEPTUN bundle geometry.
Here we should mention that while implementing the code to our system,
certain changes had to be made to enable the calculation of temperature
dependent material properties for materials used in the NEPTUN heater
rods. These additional materials are Inconel 600, aluminium dioxide,
copper and Kanthal / 3 /.
For the comparison between the NEPTUN boil-off tests and the TRAC
predictions, five representative experiments were chosen in which diffe-
rent parameters have been varied; these experiments are summarized in
Table I.
TABLE I
Experim. Total bundle Pressure Initial
Nr. power Subcooling
















Summary of the 5 boil-off experiments.
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The model chosen to simulate the NEPTUN facility is shown in
Fig. 1. There are 18 hydrodynamic volumes in the CHAN component,
and a BREAK and FILL component for supplying the no-flow and con-
stant pressure boundary conditions respectively. The number and sizes
of the cells were chosen to coincide with the 8 axial measured data le-
vels. The cross-section of the CHAN model is also shown in Fig. 1; we
have modelled the NEPTUN bundle bya 2X2 rod array. Finally, the Bi-
asi local CHF correlation and the maximum of the Henry-Berenson and the
lloeje correlation for the minimum stable film boiling temperature were
chosen as the user options.
The comparisons between measurements and code predictions are
shown in Fig. 2 - 6. Here we should point out that all TRAC calculations
were performed by turning-off the heat transfer due to radiation; the ne-
cessity for doing this was dictated by findings reported in a previous work
/ 4 / according to which with the radiation heat transfer turned-on, there
were discrepancies between measured and predicted rod surface tempera-
ture histories .
In Fig. 2, the measured rod surface temperature history at the peak
axial power level (level 4 in Fig. 1) and computed collapsed liquid level
for Exp. 5007 are compared with the corresponding TRAC-BD1 predictions.
One can readily recognize two problem areas, the first one at approxima-
tely 30 sec. into the transient at the onset of nucleate boiling; this can be
seen both in the temperature history curve in which case the code calcu-
lates the onset approximately 10 sec. earlier than the data shows, and in
the collapsed liquid level where the sudden voiding of the test section is
also predicted to occur earlier. The second problem area is related to
the fact that the code predicts an earlier (by 75 sec.) CHF or dry-out;
consequently, the predicted peak rod surface temperature is approximately
155 °K higher than the measured one. As we shall see, these two pro-
blems persisted throughout our calculations far all cases. 8imilar discre-
paneies have been reported by other authors / 5 /; though, due to the fact
that the experiments reported there were performed under high pressures
typical of a BWR, the differences 'between measurements and predictions
were much smaller. We shall briefly discuss this point in due course.
In Fig. 3, we compare the time histories of the same variables for
Exp. 5006 with the code predictions. As it can be seen from Table I, in
this experiment, the power was higher than in Exp. 5007 but the pressure
and the initial water subcooling were the same. 8imilar differences be-
tween measurements and predictions can be seen, although now the agree-
ment is somehow better than with Exp. 5007. In particular, the onset of
nucleate boiling and the voiding of the test seetion are very well predicted,
while the CHF is now predieted to occur 30 sec. earlier than the data
shows; the difference between predicted and measured peak rod surface
temperature is 120 °K.
In Fig. 4, we compare the measured rod surface temperature histo-
ries at the axial levels 3, 5, 6 and 7 (cf. Fig. 1) for Exp. 5007 with the
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corresponding code predictions. For all 4 axial levels, the CHF is pre-
dicted to occur approximately 70 sec. earlier. Though, the differences
between predicted and measured peak rod surface temperatures change
as one moves to higher axial levels and while below the peak axial power
level (level 3, Fig. 4a) this difference is 155 °K, at levels 5, 6 and 7
(Fig.4 b, c, d resp.) the difference is 100 °K, 13 °K and -82 °K respecti-
vely; in particular, at axial level 7, the predicted peak rod surface tem-
perature is lower than the measured one. These differences also persisted
throughout all our comparisons and would indicate that at the 1ater stages
of the transient, in the upper parts of the voided section, the heat transfer
is over-predicted.
Finally, in Fig. 5 and 6 we show comparisons between measured and
calculated rod surface temperature (at the peak axial power level 4) and
collapsed liquid level histories for Exp. 5008 and Exp. 5005 respectively.
For Exp. 5008 (low power; cL Table I), the voiding of the test seetion is
predieted to occur40 sec. earlier than the data show while up to 700 sec.
into the transient, both measurements and calculations show that at level
4, the CHF has not yet been reached. Also here, TRAC-BD1 underprediets
the rod surface temperature after the nucleate boiling transition by appro-
xima~ely 4 °K. In Fig. 6, the same comparisons are shown for Exp. 5005
(high power, high subcooling). All the differences between measurements
and code predietions we have already discussed also persist in this case.
In this experiment, the measurements were stopped before the power was
turned off and hence, the subsequent decrease of the rod surface tempera-
ture is not shown. Lastly, we should point out that due to space limita-
tions, we do not show the comparisons between measurements and TRAC
predictions for Exp. 5002. For this low pressure experiment, TRAC pre-
dicted an almost immediate CHF, as much as 260 sec. earlier than it
actually occured, while it overpredicted the peak rod surface temperature
at level 4 by as much as 250 °K; though, surprisingly enough, it pr,edicted
much lower void fraction in the test section than the measurements showed.
Clearly, the differences between measured data and TRAC-BD1 predictions
increase as the pressure decreases; this is also supported by comparisons
reported elsewhere / 5 /.
CONCLUDING DISCUSSIONS
Rod surface temperature and collapsed liquid level histories from 5
boil-off experiments in the NEPTUN test facility at EIR have been compa-
red with the corresponding predictions obtained by using the best estimate
thermal hydraulic code TRAC - BD1 version 12. Although in general the
code does relatively wen in predicting the time histories of the aforemen-
tioned variables, certain problem areas have been identified; these can be
summarized as follows:
(a) TRAC-BD1 predicts an earlier voiding of the test seetion and onset of
nucleate boiling.
(b) TRAC - BD1 prediets an earlier CHF than the measurements show; the
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differences between measured and predicted CHF are much larger for the
low pressure Exp. 5002 and also for the low power experiments. The
earlier CHF predicted by the code is clearly related to the fact that the
code also predicts an earlier voiding of the test seetion.
A third problem area reported in a previous work / 4 / was related
to the difference in slope between measured and calculated temperature
history curves indicating that some high temperature phenomena such as
radiation heat transfer were not accurately predicted. This was rectified
by turning-off the heat transfer due to radiation; with radiation heat tran-
sfer included, the temperature history curves cross the measured ones
somewhere above the CHF and the predieted peak rod surface temperatu-
res are lower than the measured ones.
Concluding, we can say that TRAC-BD1 does weIl in predicting the
uncovery and heater rod heat-up behaviour for the NEPTUN boil-off expe-
riments, charaeteristic of conditions experienced during a small break
LOCA in a PWR. Some of the aforementioned difficulties and problem
areas may be due to the fact that TRAC - BD1 is designed for a BWR in
which real flow conditions exist; in the NEPTUN boil-off experiments, we
are dealing with a no-flow situation for which the code may not be well-
suited. The incorporation of specific correlations would probably improve
the predieting capability of the code in this type of transients .
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Fig. 2 Measured and calculated rod surface
temperature and collapsed liquid level histo-
ries for Exp. 5007. Temperatures measured
at level 4.
Fig. 3 Measured and calculated rod surface
temperatures and collapsed liquid level histo-
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Fig. 4 Measured and calculated rod surface temperature histories for Exp. 5007 at axial levels
3, 5, 6 and 7 (cL Fig. 1).
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Fig. 5 Measured and calculated rod surface
temperature and collapsed liquid level histo-
ries for Exp. 5008. Temperatures measured
at level 4.
Fig. 6 Measured and calculated rod surface
temperature and collapsed liquid level histo-
ries for Exp. 5005. Temperatures measured
at level 4.
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ANALYSIS OF SINGLE ANTI PARALLEL TUBE COUNTER-CURRENT
FLOW LIMITING EXPERIMENTS WITH TRAC-BDI CODE*
P. Saha, L. Neymotin and U. S. Rohatgi
Department of Nuclear Energy
Brookhaven National Laboratory
Upton, New York 11973 U. S. A.
ABSTRACT
Simulation of single and parallel tube Counter-Current Flow Limit-
ation (CCFL) tests conducted at Dartmouth College has been per-
formed using the TRAC-BDI (Version 12) code. Comparison between
the code predictions and the experimental data presented in this
paper indicates that the code is capable of predicting most of the
qualitative aspects of the experiments. However, there are signi-
ficant disagreements between the code results and the data which
warrant improvement of the interfacial shear package of the code,
particularly for the annular flow regime. The improved pacl(age
should consist of correlations developed from the counter-current
flow experiments and should be valid for the entire annular flow
regi~e map, i.e., wavy-transition-rough film regimes.
INTRODUCTION
It is weIl known that Counter-Current Flow Limitation (CCFL) is one of the
controlling phenomena during a Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) in both Pressur-
ized and Boiling Water Reactors (Pl~s and BWRs). Therefore, the advanced safe-
ty codes such as TRAC-PFI I, TRAC-BDI 2 and RELAPS/MODI 3 are expected to predict
this phenomenon wi th reasonable accuracy. As apart of the independent code
assessment program at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) , these codes were
applied to several basic CCFL tests. This paper will present the results of
the TRAC-BDI code for single and parallel tube CCFL tests 4,5 conducted at Dart-
mouth College. (RELAPS/MODI results were in poor agreement even with the sin-
gle tube test data, and TRAC-PFI did not produce useful results for the paral-
lel tube tes t.)
In order to concentrate on the hydrodynamic aspect of CCFL, only the air-
water tests were simulated using the TRAC-BDI (Version 12.0) code. Liquid en-
trainment was minimal during these tests; water was injected into a liquid fil-
led upper plenum from where it flowed down to a lower plenum through the test
section. Thus the tests were suitable to assess the interfacial shear package
of TRAC-BDI in counter-current flow situations which might be expected during
the refill/reflood stage of a Bl~ LOCA.
TEST DESCRIPTION
The basic test apparatus consisted of an upper plenum which could be
connected to a lower collection chamber by one, two or three vertical tubes up
to 1.52 m in length. A schematic diagram of the apparatus is presented in
Figure 1. The upper plenum and lower collection chamber were constructed of
*Work performed under the auspices of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
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0.33 m IoD. lucite cylinders. Water was introduced into the upper plenum by
means of an annular injection ring to minimize asymmetrical entrance effects in
the tubes. A drain was installed to provide a constant water level of
approximately 10 cm in the upper plenum for a11 tests. The upper portion of
the plenum was open to the atmosphere through a disentrainment device designed






Figure 1 Schematic Diagram of Experimental Apparatus.
The lower chamber was sealed at both ends and was 0.71 m in depth. A
drain was provided to expel water accumulated during testing, and a port in the
side of the chamber accepted an air injection system. An aluminum honeycomb
baffle was installed above the air injector to reduce asymmetrical entrance ef-
fect in the tubes being tested. All tubes tested were machined with square
edges at both ends and were mounted vertically in the apparatus with the end
surfaces aligned flush with the end plate surfaces of the upper and lower cham-
bers.
During the experiment, the air flow rate was changed stepwise. After each
step, a sufficiently long time was allowed for the flow to establish. The air
flowrate was changed either in the ascending or descending order with the only
requirement that none of the tubes experienced asolid water downflow regime.
Therefore, throughout the experimentseach tube remained in ei ther a counter-
current flow or a pure air upflow regime. After a steady-state condition was
achieved, the pressure drop across the tubes, i.e., the pressure difference be-
tween the top of the lower chamber and the bot tom of the upper plenum, the air
flow rate and the integrated water downflow rate were measured. The water
downflow rate was measured by means of a graduated scale installed in the lower
chamber. All experiments were conducted at near-atmospheric pressure and room
temperature.
Two sets of experiments, each conducted in round tubes of 0.0254 m IoD.
and 1.52 m in length, were simulated with the TRAC-BDI code. However, the
first set used only one tube, whereas the second set employed three identical
tubes. Thus a direct comparison between the test results and the code predic-
tions is possible for both single and multi-tube CCFL phenomena. The details




The test apparatus was modeled by eonneeting three TRAG-BDI TEE eomponents
in series as shown in Figure 2a. Part of the upper plenum and drain pipe were
modeled with the upper TEE, part of the upper plenum with water injeetion. the
test seetion and part of the lower plenum were modeled with the middle TEE, and
the bottom TEE represented part of the lower plenum and the air injeetion
pipe. The water and air injeetion pipes and the elosed end at the bottom were
modeled with FILL eomponents where the water or air flow rates were speeified.
The upper open end and the end of drain pipes were modeled with BREAK
eomponents where the atmospherie pressure was speeified. The test seetion was
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b) Parallel Tube Test
Figure 2 TRAG-BDI Nodalization for the Dartmouth Gollege GGFL Tests.
Steady state ealeulations were performed for different air flow rates.
Eaeh ealeulation produeed one point on the flooding or /J"g versus /~
eurve where j*g and j*f are defined as
(1)
(2)
(In the above equations, Qg. Qg" A imd D represent the volumetrie gas and
liquid flow rates, tube flow area and the tube diameter. respeetively.
Standard symbols are used for phasie densities and aeeeleration due to
gravity.) The liquid flow rate was determined by ealeulating the liquid
inventory in the lower plenum for a given time interval.
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Parallel Tube Test
These experiments were modeled using the VESSEL, CHANNEL, PIPE, BREAK and
FILL components of TRAC-BDl, and the nodalization used is shown in Figure 2b.
The vessel had one radial ring divided symmetrically into three azimuthai cells
each containing one vertical tube. The lower and upper plena were represented
by the VESSEL component, whereas the three tubes connecting them were modeled
by three CHANNEL components with ten equal cells in each channel. Air was in-
jected into the lower plenum vertically at Cell Junction 2 using a FILL compo-
nent.
In order to maintain a constant water level in the upper plenum, a verti-
cal drain PIPE connected to atmosphere through a BREAK was attached at Cell
Junction 7. Water was introduced into the upper plenum between Cell Junctions
5 and 6 horizontally in radial direction at a rate exceeding the conservatively
estimated free-fall water downflow rate in a channel. The excess water was al-
lowed to leave the upper plenum through the drain pipe. The air entering the
upper plenum through the vertical channels was allowed to leave through PIPE 2
and/or the drain pipe.
PIPE 1 and FILL 1 shown in Figure 2b were not present in the experimental
facility, but were added for the convenience of computation. The code had to
be run for a certain period of time for each operational point (with fixed air
flux) until a steady-state condition was reached. During this time water col-
leeted in the lower plenum could fill it up, thus changing the flow conditions
at the entrance of the tube. During the experiment the lower plenum was peri-
odically drained by means of a manually operated valve. This drainage was sim-
ulated by attaching PIPE 1 at the bottom of the lower plenum where the water
was collected without altering the tube entrance conditions.
Another difficulty related to the size of the lower plenum had to be over-
come. Since the air volume in the lower plenum would affect the time response
of the system, an air shield (or restrietion) was placed between the lower ple-
num and PIPE 1 (shaded area in Figure 2b). In order to drain the water down,
but at the same time keep the air fr6m diffusing into the drain pipe (PIPE 1),
a very high value of the additional friction loss coefficient for the air was
used. Thus the effective lower plenum volume in the model was kept the same as
in the experiment.
CODE PREDICTIONS AND COMPARISON HITH DATA
Single Tube Test
Figure 3 shows the comparison between the data and TRAC-BDI results for
the water downflow rates in the single tube test. It is clear that TRAC-BDI
highly overpredicts the water downflow rate for a given air upflow rate. In
addition, "dumping" (alternate heavy downflow of water and l!EQow of injected
air) is predicted at a much higher air upflow rate (/j*g ~ 0.65) than
observed in the test (lJ*g ~ 0.2). However, the code did compute a stable
countercurrent flow situatl0n at higher air upflow rates although, as seen in
Figure 3, the water downflow rates were highly overpredicted.
There are several possible reasons for this discrepancy. The most
probable reason is the underprediction of interfacial shear in the annular flow
regime. In TRAC-BDl, the interfacial shear correlation developed from the
cocurrent data has also been used for the counter-current flow situations
without sufficient verification. A correlation based on counter-current flow
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data such as that due to Oukler 6 has produeed better results with TRAG-PFI for
this same experiment 7 Other possible reasons are inadequate wall frietion
and a lack of automatie entranee loss at the area ehanges Ce.g., junetion
between the upper plenum and the test seetion) in TRAG-BOI.
I.0,----,-----,---,-----,--,----,--,---,-
OARTMOUTH COUNTER CURRENT FLOW TEST
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Figure 3 Gomparison Between the Oata and TRAG-BOI Predietion for the
Dartmouth Gollege 0.0254 m I.D. Single Tube Test.
Parallel Tube Test
Sinee the water downflow rates during the parallel tube experiments were
not reported, only the data on overall pressure drop aeross the test seetion
were available for code eomparison. Figure 4 shows the TRAC-BDI results and
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In the above equations, 11P, L, Og total' Atotal and D represent the measur-
ed pressure differenee between the' lower and upper plena, tube length, total
volumetrie gas flow through all three tubes, total tube flow area and the tube
inside diameter, respeetively. Standard symbols are used for the phasie densi-
ties and the acceleration due to gravity.
In Figure 4, the alphabets A-B-G-D-E represent the experimental path as
the air flow rate was deereased in steps, whereas the numbers 1-2-3-4-5 denote
the TRAG-BDI results. For J*g greater than approximately 1.0, the code pre-
dietion is in elose agreement with the data (see Paths A-B and 1-2). This is
to be expeeted sinee in this region only air flowed through all the pipes and
no water was able to flow down. This also eonfirms that TRAG-BOI eorreetly
prediets the wall frietion due to single phase gas flow.
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Figure 4 Comparison Between the Data and TRAC-BDI Prediction for the
Dartmouth College 0.0254 m I.D. Parallel Tube Test.
As the air f10w rate was. decreased further , L e., J*~ < 1. 0, according
to TRAC-BDl, water started to f10w down through one of the p1pes whi1e on1y air
continued to f10w up through the two remaining pipes. In the experiment, how-
ever, there was two-phase counter-current annu1ar f10w in one pipe and single-
phase air upf10w in two pipes. This corresponds to Point C in Figure 4. No-
tice that the non-dimensional pressure drop ~P* increased as the f10w pattern
changed from Point B to C. A change in f10w pattern was also observed in the
ca1cu1at:lon (Point 2 to 3). However, instead of having one pipe in the coun-
ter-current annu1ar f10w regime, TRAC-BDI ca1cu1ated the pipe to be in a 10w-
void (a ~ 5%) two-phase downf10w regime and the other two pipes in the single-
phase air upf10w regime. This resu1ted in higher air f10w rates through the
air-fi11ed pipes and caused higher ~p* across the parallel tubes (compare Point
3 with C). As the total air f10w rate was decreased further, the ca1cu1ated
~p* started to decrease as it shou1d be (Path 3-4). However, when J*g became
10wer than approximate1y 0.7, another pipe switched to the 10w-void two-phase
f10w regime and air was f10wing up through one pipe on1y. This resu1ted in a
sharp increase in the ca1cu1ated va1ue of ~p* (see Path 4 to 5), which was in
contradiction with the experimental path D-E. Ca1cu1ations cou1d not be con-
tinued be10w J*g of approximate1y 0.5 because of the code fai1ure in numer-
ies.
In short, some qualitative aspects of the experiments were predicted by
TRAC-BDl. However, there were significant dis agreements between the code pre-
diction and the experimental data regarding ~p* and f10w pattern be10w J*g of




It is apparent that the interfacial shear stress used in the annular flow
regime in TRAC-BD1 must be increased to obtain a better agreement with the
single tube data. The same objective can also be met using a CCFL correlation
(e.g., Kutaleladze correlation) by adjusting the free coefficient(s). The code





with the constant K = 1.05 for the single tube tests discussed in this paper.
The definitions of Kg and Kk are:
K (Q / A) IP / [<1 g( Po -g g g "-
Kk = (Qi A) ,rp; / [<1 g( Pk -
( 6)
(7)
where a is surface tension. Note that the value of K suggested for this test
series is quite different from the default or standard value of 3.2 which
indicates that different values of K would be needed for different
experiments. This is obviously a shortcoming for a best-estimate, advanced
code like TRAC-BD1.
Situation is even more complicated for the prediction of parallel tube ex-
periments due to a fundamental difference between the single and parallel tube
CCFL operations. Figure 5 shows the typical M'* vs. J*g curve for counter-
current flow in a single 0.0254 m I.D. vertical tube connecting two plena. For
J*g greater than 1.0, no water can flow down, and only air flows upward.
Therefore, M'* decreases as J*g is decreased from a high value of 1.0 (part C
of Figure 5). As J*g is decreased below 1.0, water starts to flow down and a
counter-current rough film annular flow regime develops in the tube. Since the
interfacial friction increases as the liquid film becomes thicker, the pressure
drop increases with the decrease in the air flow rate. This is Part B of
Figure 5 where the Wallis-type correlation 9 for interfacial friction in the an-
nular flow regime is valid. As the air flow rate is decreased further (J*g <
0.5), the liquid film becomes smoother or wavy, and the pressure drop starts to
decrease with the decrease in the air flow rate. This is Part A of Figure 5.
Although the flow is still in the counter-current annular flow regime, no es-
tablished correlation for interfacial shear is available for this region.
For a single-tube J*g-controlled experiment, it is possible to traverse
all parts of the curve shown in Figure 5. However, in a multi-tube system,
where only the total J*g can be controlled, but not J*g through each tube,
stable operation in Part B is not possible. Therefore, in the three-tube sys-
tem discussed earlier, one tube starts to operate in Part A whereas two tubes
continue to operate in Part C as soon as the total J*g is decreased below
1.0. It must be reiterated that the flow regime in the tube operating in Part
A is still in the counter-current annular flow regime and not in the low-void
downflow regime. TRAC-BD1, however, predicted a low-void mixture flowing down
in one tube as soon as the J*g is decreased below 1.0. The code essentially
uses a Wallis-type correlation for the annular flow regime which increases the
interfacial shear as water starts to flow down. This tends to increase the
M* and reduce the air flow rate through that tube. Since the code does not
have any correlation to describe Part A of Figure 5, the calculation eventually
stabilizes when the tube becomes almost water-filled and a very low-void two-
phase mixture flows down. As a result, the air flow rate through the other
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two tubes increases significantly (--50%) and the total l\P* across the tubes
jumps appreciably (from Point 2 to 3 in Figure 4). Therefore, it is apparent
that unless the interfacial shear package can be modified to include Part A of
Figure 5, the code will not be able to predict the multi-tube CCFL data.
GENERALIZED CURVE OF
liP* VERSUS i;























Figure 5 A Typical l\P* vs. J*g Curve for Counter-Current Flow in a
Single Vertical Tube (Approximate Data for 0.0254 m I.D. Tube).
CONCLUSIONS
1. TRAC-BDl, without the use of CCFL correlation, highly overpredicts the
liquid downflow rate for a single tube counter-current flow situation.
The prediction for the multi-tube CCFL experiment is also inadequate.
2. Modifications in the interfacial shear package of TRAC-BDI seem necessary
for better prediction of CCFL. The new package must consider data obtain-
ed in the counter-current flow experiments, and both Parts A and B of the
l\P* vs J*g curve of Figure 5.
3. Use of CCFL correlations such as that due to Kutateladze would require
different constants for different experimental apparatus and hardware.
This is not a desirable feature for a best-estimate, advanced code like
TRAC-BDl.
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ABSTRACT
The FIST power transient test 6PMC2 was analyzed to further the
understanding of the FIST facility and provide an assessment of
TRAC-BDl/MODl. FIST power transient 6PMC2 investigated the thermal-
hydraulic response following inadvertent closure of the main steam
isolation valve and the subsequent failure of the reactor to scram.
Failure of the high pressure core spray system was also assumed,
resulting in only the reactor core isolation cooling flow for inven-
tory makeup during the transient. The experiment was a sensitivity
study with relatively high core power and low makeup rates.
This study provides one of the first opportunities to assess
TRAC-BDl/MODl under power transient and natural circulation condi-
tions with da ta from a facility with prototypical BHR geometry.
The power transient test was analyzed with emphasis on the follow-
ing phenomena; (a) the system pressure response, (b) the natural
circulation flows and rates, and (cl the heater rod cladding temper-
ature response. Based on the results of this study, TRAC-BDl/MODl
can be expected to calculate the thermal-hydraulic behavior of a
BHR during apower transient.
INTRODUCTION
Interest in boiling water reactor (BHR) plant behavior during transients,
with a failure to scram, has increased in recent years due to several events
at commercial sites. This interest has led to the development or enhancement
of several computer codes to calculate plant behavior, and an experimental
program which in part investigated the BHR response during power transients.
The Full Integral Simulation Test (FIST) program, co-sponsored by the United
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI) and the General Electric Company (GE), included several experiments
during phase I testing to investigate BHR thermal-hydraulic response during a
power transient. FIST is weIl suited to investigate power transients as it is
a full height facility with a full sized bundle. Being full height, FIST
provides the prototypical water level movement, static head, for fidelity in
natural circulation flow. FIST provides some of the first experimental data





(Reference 1), an advanced best estimate thermal-hydraulic
used to simulate the FIST power transient. The code results
with the data to assess the code's capabilities to simulate
FIST test 6PMC2 was chosen for analysis as it provides the
power transient for the first part of
ing the later part of the experiment.
phenomena were assessed using one set
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the experiment and a refill/reflood dur-
Thus two very different type transient
of experimental data.
FACILITY DESCRIPTION
The FIST facility was designed and constructed to represent the nuclear
steam supply system (NSSS) of a BWR/6 with avessei diameter of 5.537 m
(218 inch). The facility includes two complete, independent recirculation
loops. Pump inertia is adjusted for each loop to achieve proper core flow
coastdown which is characteristic of a BWR. A heated feedwater system capahle
of delivering make-up water at BWR rated temperature and scaled flow rates is
also featured in the FIST facility to allow steady state operating conditions
and provide characteristic downcomer temperature gradients. Other systems
included in the facility which were used during power transients are: reactor
core isolation cooling (RCIC) system and the safety relief valves (SRV). Five
SRVs are used to simulate the five banks of SRVs in the BWR.
The FIST pressure vessel is shown in Figure 1 with the BWR vessel for
comparison. The FIST facility is full BWR height with volume scaling (1/624)
to a single full sized fuel bundle. All flow areas were scaled based on the
single bundle in FIST to the 624 bundles in a BWR. Thus the fluid volumes are
also representative of the BWR on a 1 to 624 basis. The simulated downcomer
annulus and part of the lower plenum form a separate region connected to the
main vessel. The main vessel contains the remainder of the lower plenum and
downcomer, along with the other simulated BWR regions. This division of the
vessel allows installation of two scaled jet pumps as weIl as maintaining a
scaled cross-sectional area in the downcomer. The jet pumps are designed to
provide the appropriate core flow and are the same height as a BWR which pro-
vides a prototypical core liquid level and proper natural circulation flow.
The core region contains a single, full size, electrically powered 8 x 8
bundle employing direct heaters. The bundle is surrounded by a typical BWR
zircaloy channel which is physically and thermally in contact with the bypass
region, thereby a110wing bundle to bypass heat transfer typical of a BWR. The
FIST bundle inlet and outlet regions are geometrically similar to those in a
BWR.
The FIST facility is fully instrumented to measure pressure, temperature,
differential pressure, liquid level, and other miscellaneous parameters.
Table I summarizes the measurements. A complete description of the facility
and the instrumentation can be found in the Facility Description Report
(Reference 2).

















































Figure 1. Comparison of FIST facility with a BWR and TRAC analytical model.
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GODE AND HODEL DESGRIPTION
TRAG-BDI/HODI provides a best-estimate analysis capability for analyzing
the full range of postulated accidents or transients in a BWR system and
related experimental facilities. The code allows consistent and unified analy-
sis capability for all areas of a large or small break loss-of-coolant acci-
dent, beginning with the blowdown phase, through heatup, reflood with
quenching and finally, the refill phase of the accident.
Unique features of the code include: (a) a full nonhomogeneous, non-
equilibrium two-fluid thermo-hydraulic model of two-phase flow in all portions
of the BWR system, with a three-dimensional thermal-hydraulic treatment of the
vessel; (b) detailed modeling of a BWR fuel bundle, including a thermal radia-
tion heat transfer model for radiative heat transfer between multiple fuel rod
groups, liquid and vapor phases, and the fuel channel wall with quench front
tracking on all fuel rod surfaces and the inside and outside of the fuel chan-
nel wall for both bottom flooding and falling film quench fronts; (c) detailed
models of BWR hardware such as jet pumps and separator-dryers; and (d) a count-
ercurrent flow limiting model for BWR-like geometries. Other features of the
code include a nonhomogeneous, thermal equilibrium critical flow model, and
flow regime dependent con~titutive relations for the interchange of mass,
energy, and momentum between the fluid phases and between the phases and the
structure.
The TRAG-BDI FIST model nodalization is also shown in Figure 1. The
model used avessei component to simulate the lower plenum, bypass, downcomer,
upper plenum, separators, dryers, and the steam dome. The FIST vessel had one
radial ring and two azimuthai sec tors separating the downcomer from the core
region. This configuration allowed one-dimensional flow through the vessel
and modeling of the vessel walls for both the downcomer and core regions.
Double sided heat slabs were used to model the vessel walls and an average
heat transfer coefficient was applied to the outside of the heat slab modeling
heat losses to the surroundings.
A GHAN component was placed in the core region (Gell 2) at Levels 5 and 6.
It simulated an average power bundle with two rod groups, one group represent-
ing the water rods and one group for the 62 heated rods. Other systems model-
ed included (a) the main steamline, main steam isolation valve (HSIV) and the
SRVs, (b) the feedwater and the RGIG system, and (c) both recirculation loops
with each driving a JET,PUMP component.
The FIST TRAG model was run in the steady state mode to establish pretest
conditions similar to those in the experiment. A summary of the code calcu-
lated initial conditions and those measured prior to the start of the experi-
ment are given in Table 11. Several boundary conditions were





























specified as tabular input or a time trip. The following were input in a tab-
ular form; the feedwater flow rate and the RCIC flow rate. The recirculation
pumps were tripped on high pressure and the loops were isolated at 73 s by a
time trip. The core power was terminated on high heater rod cladding tempera-
ture similar to the experiment.
The SRV flow was calculated by the code during the transient after the
valve area had been sized during sensitivity runs. The sensitivity runs were
necessary as TRAC allows the user to input a single value of the hydraulic
diameter and valve area. This method is adequate as long as the valves being
modeled are identical (such as in an actual BWR). However, the FIST facility
used 5 valves to represent the 16 valves in a BWR. Each FIST valve modeled a
valve bank prototypical of a BWR/6 and was therefore of a different size.
The TRAC code assurnes the hydraulic diameter varies linearly with valve
area. This is a good assumption if multiples of identical valves are being
modeled. However the five FIST SRVs were scaled to represent one, three, four,
and seven valves. In this case, the hydraulic diameter would vary more like
the square root of the flow area. Thus the valves were sized during sensitiv-
ity runs to match the flow at the design point of the BWR valves.
TEST DESCRIPTION
FIST power transient 6PMC2 investigated the thermal-hydraulic response
following the inadvertent closure of the main steam isolation valves (MSIV)
and the subsequent failure of the reactor to scram. Test 6PMC2 was a sens i-
tivity experiment with relatively high core power and low inventory makeup
rates. The core power history was calculated using a BWR/6 plant deck and a
one-dimensional neutronic code. Assumptions in the neutronics calculation
were boron injection at 120 sand the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system
was available. When the 6PMC2 experiment was conducted the HPCS system was
inhibited. Therefore, the power curve was higher than the RCIC system would
be expected to handle. The effects of this will be discussed shortly.
The experiment was initiated, after a short per iod at steady state by
activating the preprogrammed bundle power controller. The steam valve (MSIV)
closed 2 s after test initiation. The programmed bundle power peaked at
7300 kW (157% nominal) at 5.5 s. The bundle power was terminated at 357 s
when an administrative limit of 895 K on rod cladding temperatures was reached.
The rod cladding heatup was a direct result of using apower curve genera ted
assuming HPCS operation and conducting the experiment with only RCIC opera-
tional. A rod heatup is not expected during apower transient in which only
RCIC is available, see test 6PMC2A of the FIST test series (Reference 3).
As system pressure increased, after steam valve closure, the SRVs opened
to halt the pressure rise. The SRVs opened and closed on pressure setpoints
identical to the BHR settings. The high system pressure tripped the recircu-
lation pumps at 4 sand started the timer for loop isolation which occurred at
73 s. The feedwater system was opera ted as close to a BWR as possible within
the FIST feedwater pump shut-off head restrictions. Liquid level in the down-
corner decreased as system inventory was lost through the SRVs. Level 2 was
reached at 70 sand the RCIC flow was activated at 85 s. RCIC flow was not
large enough to res tore the downcorner level until core power was terminated
and the SRVs closed.
The rod cladding temperatures above the 1.448 m level in the core under-
went heatup. Thepeak cladding temperature of 895 K was reached at the 2.972 m
elevation. The cladding temperatures turned around and decreased due to the
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bundle power trip at 357 sand the following reflood by the RGIG system. The
core uncovery and rod heatup was a result of the mismatch in the programmed
power and the unavailability of the HPGS system in the experiment, as
discussed previously.
RESULTS
The power transient calculation was analyzed and compared with data in
what were considered to be the areas of most interest to individuals using the
code in the field of severe accident analysis. This section will provide a
review of the code's capabilities in the following areas: (a) system pressure
response, (b) natural circulation flow rates, and (c) the heater rod cladding
response.
A key parameter during the power transient is the system pressure
response, as this parameter has a large influence on the void feedback in a
nuclear plant. The FIST power transient pressure is compared with the TRAG
calculated pressure response in Figure 2. The system pressure increased in
response to the MSIV closure. The code calculated a peak of 8525 kPa versus a
measured peak of 8425 kPa at about 6 s. The pressure rise was halted by the
opening of all the SRVs in both the calculation and the experiment. The pres-
sure oscillated between 6650 kPa and 7800 kPa, the setpoint for the SRVs. The
pressure response of the facility lagged that of the calculation after the SRV
closing as the system repressurized. During the fifth pressurization the cal-
culated pressure reached the setpoint of the third and fourth SRVs and they
opened u~like the experiment. The experiment was very close to the setpoint
(within 300 kPa) but the SRVs in the facility did not open. The programmed
power decreased shortly thereafter and the measured pressure decreased. It is
believed that the large flanges in the FIST facility damped the pressure
response slightly and were enough to prevent the system pressure from reaching
the SRV setpoint before the programmed power decreased. The large flanges,
which are not prototypical, were not modeled in the TRAG calculation. Gonse-
quently a higher pressurization rate was calculated.
The system pressure after bundle power termination was approximately
7000 kPa in both the calculation and the experiment. Subsequent to the power
termination, the calculated pressure remained higher than the experiment
during the remainder of the transient. There were several reasons for the
higher pressure. First, the ambient heat loss for the calculation was half
that actually measured prior to the experiment. The generic heat loss value
was used, later the actual test specific heat loss was available. Second, the
separator may have provided mixing of the superheated vapor from the core with
the saturated liquid present; the mechanical mixing is not accounted for in
TRAG. Most important of all, the reflood rate of the core after bundle power
trip was much higher in the calculation and the increased rate of energy addi-
tion caused the pressure to remain higher than the measured value. The re-
flood rate will be discussed as part of the heater rod response discussion.
Next, the calculated natural circulation rate was compared with the
experiment. The bundle inlet flow rate was examined as a function of the
liquid level in the downcomer. The code calculated values were in good agree-
ment with those measured during the experiment, as shown in Figure 3. At the
lower elevations, around seven meters, the code calculated flow was slightly
less than the measured flow. The ambient heat loss was smeared over the
entire vessel, due to the limitation of the code, whereas the downcomer was
the highest heat loss region experimentally. The downcomer temperatures were
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Figure 3. Cornparison of calculated and rneasured natural circulation flow
versus downcorner level.
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loss of the FIST facility, much like all subscaled experiments, is not proto-
typical of the BWR and therefore the code should calcu1ate BHR natural circu-
lation better at· lower downcomer elevations.
The downcomer water level is interrelated with the natural circulation
flow rate. The code may calculate the correct flow for a given elevation in
the downcomer but the code must also track the level movement with time to
provide a truly accurate description of the transient phenomena. Figure 4
compares the calculated and measured downcomer liquid levels. Early in the
transient there was excellent agreement between the two. At 41 s the measured
level decreased as the level passed the bottom of the separator skirt. The
calculated level did not show a similar decrease as the separator still had a
reasonably low void mixture which drained into the downcomer. The liquid
drainage from the separator was due to the nodalization of the facility. Sub-
sequent models have moved the separator liquid discharge to Level 11 eliminat-
ing the liquid storage in the separator. Though the measured and calculated
levels differ for the remainder of the transient, the level movement does show
similar slope and trends.
Overall TRAG calculated both the level movement and the natural circula-
tion flow very well. The code also calculated the pressure response of the
facility well during the early portions of the transient until bundle power
termination. The discussion will now shift to the refill/reflood of the core
after the bundle power termination and the phenomena which is usually associ-
ated with loss-of-coolant accidents but may be important during apower tran-
sient with several auxiliary system failures.
The heater rod cladding response was examined and a typical TRAG calcu-
lated rod temperature and several measured cladding temperatures at the same
elevation are shown in Figure 5. The TRAG calculated temperature shows a
departure from saturation conditions approximately 35 s earlier than the meas-
ured values. The early heatup is due to the higher integrated vessel mass
loss when the SRVs opened during the fifth vessel repressurization, as
discussed earlier.
Both the calculated and measured temperatures peaked at 895 K when the
bundle power was terminated. The measured temperatures rolled over as the
bundle power was terminated and decreased as the core was reflooded. The
calculated temperatures rapidly decreased 25 K before showing a cooling rate
similar to the experiment. The differences were due to the location of the
measured versus the calculated temperatures. The measured temperatures were
on the inside of the cladding and thus exhibited a delay in cooling after bun-
dle power trip, whereas the calculated temperatures were for the outside of
the cladding. Due to code limitations on where cladding temperature can be
monitored and plot ted it was necessary to use the calculated outside tempera-
tures and inside measured temperatures. After the initial turnaround the tem-
peratures are believed to differ very' little from inside to outside.
The TRAG calculation showed quenching earlier than the experiment. The
core quench front position versus the Core liquid level is shown in Figure 6.
The liquid level and quench position were the same for the experiment. The
TRAG calculation showed a quench front preceding the liquid level. Entrain-
ment of fluid in the bundle caused the quench front to precede the liquid
level. The top three nodes in the channel quenched as fluid in ~he lower
downcomer flashed forcing liquid into the bundle. The flashing was apparently
caused by too little heat loss in that portion of the downcomer; therefore
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Figure 5. Comparison of calculated and three typical measured heater rod
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TRAC-BD1/MODl "as capable of calculating the thermal-hydraulic phenomena
in the FIST facility during a po"er transient event. Both the natural circu-
lation and do"ncomer liquid level "ere "eIl calculated. The heater rod re-
sponse and peak cladding temperature "ere also in good agreement "ith the data.
Calculated system pressure matched the experiment "eIl enough that pressure
effects should be represented adequately for the neutronics package in TRAC
"hen used for plant calculations. Quench front propagation and time to quench
"ere not in good agreement "ith the data due to entrainment "ithin the bundle.
Modeling of subscale SRV systems should be undertaken "ith care due to the code
limitation on the hydraulic diameter. It is suggested that the valve area and
hydraulic diameter be sized ~uring sensitivity runs using data or valve design
conditions.
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ABSTRACT
Analytical expressions are presented for calculating condensation
heat transfer coefficients during and after blowdown at specific
locations in a containment structure. A forced convection model is
used during and immediately after blowdown when much turbulence
exists, and a free convection model is used after blowdown end when
the turbulence subsides. The forced convection expression depends
primarily on a turbulent velocity relationship which is dependent on
the distance from the break. The free convection expression depends
on the wall-mixture temperature difference and the ratio of air
partial pressure to total air-steam pressure. Experimental results
were used to refine both of these expressions. Recommendations are
given on how they are to be used. Calculations are compared with
experimental values.
INTROOUCTION
Ouring a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), the blowdown effluent
results in apressure increase of the atmosphere inside the reactor
containment structure. This presslIre rise could possibly damage the
containment structural integrity and allow the release of radioactive
material into the environment. The maximum pressure is highly dependent
on the heat transfer from the fluid to the interior surfaces of the
structure. Condensation heat transfer is the dominant mechanism for
energy removal from the incoming fluid. Therefore, an accurate estimate
of the containment pressure response requires an accurate estimate of the
condensation heat transfer coefficient during blowdown.
At the start of blowdown, the containment air mixes in a turbulent
manner with incoming steam. For a short time very high values are
measured for the heat transfer coefficient which are typical of dropwise
condensation. However, shortly thereafter as the surfaces become covered
with water from the condensing steam, and the wall temperature increases,
the heat transfer mechanism is dominated by filmwise condensation. After
* Completed at Gesellschaft für Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH (Köln) while
on research leave of absence from Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, Livermore, California.
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blowdown ends, the high mass flow rate ceases and the containment atmos-
phere becomes less and less turbulent. During this time free convection
condensation dominates which is dependent on the mass ratio of air to air
and steam.
A review of heat tran~f~r coefficient values (h-values) in a LOCA
~omQleted by Slaughterbeck\l) recommended the use of the Tagami-Uchida
\2,3) correlation to determine the containment pressure response for
reactor licensing assessment. This approach provides an average h-value
to be used for the entire containment structure and generally results in
calculated pressures greater than those measured. For a more detailed
multi-room model, a h-value that could vary depending on location would
enable a more realistic calculation.
FORCED CONVECTION CONDENSATION
The filmwise condensation model by Whitley(4) considers a liquid
film forming on a vertical wall at uniform temperature and then running
downwards. The analysis assumes laminar flow in the liquid but turbulent
flow in the vapor and a ripple free liquid-vapor interface. The resis-
tance through the liquid layer is small compared with that through the
vapor. A closed form solution is presented that contains a velocity
term. The solution applies to arbitrarily oriented surfaces for irregular
dropwise and filmwise condensation because for forced convection, gravity
plays a major role in the steam condensation. When the solution was
evaluated using experimental data, it was observed that many of the
temperature varying properties were nearly self compensating. Also, it
was found that a log-term could be closely approximated by the wall-
atmosphere temperature difference multiplied by 0.051. This simplified
the equation to only 3 terms, velocity, characteristic length and density.
This solution was ~omRar~d with local experimental h-values from
various test facilities\5,6,7) for times through blowdown to 300-600
seconds afterwards. When the h-values were referenced relative to the
distance from the break, it was noted that the maximum h-values were
proportional to z-2.5, where z is the distance in meters from the
blowdown break location.
When using the experimental h-values in the closed form solution, to
determine the turbulent velocity, it was observed that the velocity could
be defined as a function of the distance from the break. During
blowdown, the velocity was relatively constant but decreased exponential-
ly with time after the end of blowdown. Combining the velocity relation-
ship with the closed form solution yields the following equation for the
condensation heat transfer coefficient during and immediately following
blowdown. Here L is the film length (m), r is the containment atmosphere
density (kg/m3), and tb is the end of blowdown time (s). In these
expressions the velocity term is ~n~losed by square brackets.
Containment velocity measurements\8) made in a small opening
(800x600mm) between the break room and an adjacent room were used to
refine the velocity term. At 0.2 seconds after the start of blowdown,
the maximum measured velocity was 160 m/sec, but at 2 seconds had
decreased to 60 m/sec, at 18 sec to 30 m/sec and at 28 sec to 16 m/sec.
Therefore, the velocity term was modified to limit the maximum velocity
to 35 m/sec wpich is in the range of reasonable measured containment
velocities.
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h _ 630 p [ 7045 JO.8 (during blowdown)
(1 )
-~ z3.6 + 200
h 630 p
[ 7045 e-0.054(t-tb)f·8 (for t > t b) (2)
L'Q."2"" z3.6 + 200
Experimental values for L, z and density were used in eq (1) to calculate
maximum h-values (W/m2K) during blowdown and compared with experimental
values as shown in Figure 1.
FREE CONVECTION CONDENSATION
After the end of blowdown the turbulent steam-air atmosphere quickly
attains more or less still conditions and the heat transfer is dominated
by free convection. When vapor and a non-condensable gas are present,
the vapor (steam) must diffuse thr.o~gh this gas film to reach the cold
surface. Henderson and Marchello(9} performed a controlled experiment
with steam-air and to1uene-nitrogen mixtures condensing on a horizontal
pipe. Experimental data from HDR, Marviken, and Battelle a1lowed eval-
uation of their h-expression, as well as a comparison to the actual
experimental values as shown in Figure 2. In this figure, H is the ratio
of the actual h (W/m2K) to the Nusselt h for the pure condensable. Y
was ca1culated by estimating the partial pressure of steam assuming
saturated steam at the measured bulk temperature. This value was
subtracted from the bulk pressure to obtain the air partial pressure and
then divided by the containment pressure to give Y. For the experimental
conditions representative of the blowdown environment, the limited
property variations allowed the Nusselt h to depend only on D (m), the
characteristic dimension (watet film 1ength) and the temperature
difference (K) between the bulk atmosphere and the wall surface. It was
found that a va1ue of 66 produced a good fit to the data. This was
slightly 1arger than 51 as suggested by Henderson and Marchello. It is
possible that the difference was due to the sharp contrast of the clean
glass cy1inder compared to the containment structure with its dust and
other debris. The final free convection condensation expression in





Eq (3) can be used to estimate h at times long after b1owdown, or in
rooms far removed from the break during blowdown. It is valid only when
there is no turbulence in the atmosphere and for conditions of condensa-
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Fig. 1: Comparison between experimental and calculated
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Fig. 2: Heat transfer ratio for filmwise condensation under
conditions of free convection for a steam-air mixture
COMPARISON OF h-EXPRESSIONS WITH EXPERIMENTAL OATA
Equations (1) and (2) were used to calculate h-values during and
immediately after blowdown when turbulence dominates. Eq (3) was used
after blowdown end or when conditions are characteristic of free convec-
tion with condensation. A transition time was defined as the time at
which the h-value calculated by eq (2) is equal to that simultaneously
calculated by eq (3). Figure 3 shows a qualitative plot of the h-values
and equations during and long after blowdown.
Figures 4-6 compare calculated h-values with experimentally measured
h-values at various distances from the break. These distances are z =
5m, 11m and 31m. Note that the transition time occurs nearer blowdown
end as the distance from the break increases. These examples show that
the condensation express ions adequately represent the actual measured
data. Typically, the greatest differences are at early time near the
break location. Considering that the experimental data is from different
test facilities with differing measurement systems and experimental
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DISCUSSION
This analysis used data representing bare steel surfaces (HDR),
painted concrete surfaces (Battelle and Marviken), and a painted steel
liner on a concrete surface (Marviken). The heat transfer coefficient
expressions. presented are to be used without any special factor for
painted concrete or steel. Co~parisons of maximum h-va~ues reported(7)
and those calculated for HDR(5j suggest no significant difference
between painted concrete and bare steel.
Others(10,11,12) have reported conflicting opinions on this
subject. This lack of consensus is in all probability due to the
difficulty in determining the correct surface temperature from
measurements located in the substrate material. For example, the
temperature drop across a 0.15 mm paint layer (k = .225 W/mK) for a
typical early time heat flux of 2 x 104 W/m2 is 12°C. If the bulk
fluid is at 120°C and the substrate surface is actually at 100°C one
obtains 6T = 20°C when the 12°C 6T in the paint layer is neglected, and a
~T = BOC when it is not neglected. The experimental h-value (h = Q/~T)
is dependent on the true atmosphere-surface temperature difference. ' The
above example results in a h-value ratio of 0.4 (1000/2500). This is the
same ratio as that suggested for the difference between concrete and
steel.
Equations (1) and (2) contain two variables L, and z and are valid
for the walls as well as the ceiling. A value for L should be chosen
that has physical significance in relationship to each containlnent room.
As a first approximation, the radius of an equivalent spherical room
volume should be used. The variable z, the distance from the break, also
requires judgment. In a complex containment structure, the value chosen
should represent a rather direct path from the actual break to the center
of the room in question. In the break room, use the radius of the equi-
valent spherical volume. Equation (3) contains D. In practice one may
choose to use the diameter of an equivalent volume for each containment
room.
A final problem in judgment is estimating values for Land z in a
simple one room model calculation. Until many one room calculations have
been completed, one should use the diameter of an equivalent spherical
volume of the entire containment for L, D and z.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The maximum value for h decreases in a well-defined manner as z
increases.
2. During blowdown a turbulent velocity can be defined that is constant
at a specific containment location.
3. Immediately following the end of blowdown, the turbulent velocity
decays rapidly in an exponential manner.
4. At times after blowdown end, the heat transfer is characterized by
free convection with condensation.
5. The expressions to use for h during and after blowdown is that which
provides the largest value using eqs (1), (2), or (3).
6. The expressions defined estimate values of h that show reasonable
agreement with those determined experimentally.
7. These expressions enable realistic local values to be estimated for
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MULTIVENT EFFECTS IN A LARGE SCALE
BOILING WATER REACTOR PRESSURE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM*
Edward W. McCauley
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Livermore, California 94550, U.S.A.




The steam-driven GKSS pressure suppression test facility, which
contains 3 full scale vent pipes, has been used for 5 years to
investigate the postulated loss-of-coolant accident in a Mark
11 and Type 69 boiling water reactor. Using the results from
several of these tests, wetwell boundary load data (peak
pressures ~nd spectral power) during the chugging stage, have
been evaluated for "sparse" pool response (one and two vents in
the three vent pool) and for "full" pool response (one, two, or
three vent operation in pools of constant wetwell pool area per
vent). The "sparse" pool results indicate the pool-system,
chug event boundary loads are strongly dependent on wetwell
pool area per vent, with the load increasing with decreasing
area. The "full" pool results show a substantial increase in
the pool-system, chug event boundary loads upon a change from
single cell to double cell operation; only minor change occurs
in going from double to triple cell operation.
INTRODUCTION
The postulated loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) in a commercial boiling
water reactor (BWR) has been the subject of extensive and detailed
international study for several years. Because of its complex thermodynamic
nature, the most fruitful information regarding the related two phase
condensation phenomena and dynamic load production of the LOCA has come from
full-scale tests.
*This work was supported in part by the United States-Nuclear Regulatory
Commission under a memorandum of understanding with the Uni ted States
Department of Energy.
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Experimental results from full scale, "single cell", one vent tests have
provided an important data base for design of reactor containment structures.
The actual reactor system, however' contains about 70-100 such vent pipes and
therefore much effort has gone into study of the relation between one vent
"single cell" test results and the expected behavior of an actual mUltiyent
system. The small scale (1 :7.5) concrete cell tests of Kraftwerk Union
provided, for that scale, information regarding dynamic loading resulting from
tests with 1, 2 or 6 vents operating in a 10 vent pool as well as results from
tests using "full" pools containing 2, 6 and 10 vents. These small scale
tests (80 mm diameter vent pipes) tended, in a qualitative sense, to confirm
the conservative nature of full scale "unit cell" tests. Lack of complete
scaling of the two phase flow in this small system prevented quantified
confirmation.
The GKSS-PSS tests reported here, were conducted in a three vent test
facility2 shown schematically in Fig. 1. The full scale (600 mm diameter)
vent pipes have an LID ratio of 11.3-18.1. In a KWU type 69 containment, LID
is ca. 18.7; in a G.E. MK-II, the LID is ca. 23. The standoff distance (vent
exit to pool floor) is one meter in the GKSS facility; for a plant it is ca. 2
meters. The vent pipe lengths and standoff distance of the test facility are
considered sufficient, however, to avoid distortion of the two phase flow and
resulting condensation effects at the vent exit during the chugging stage.
(This is particularly so with regard to the standoff distance since the
condensation-induced rarefaction, which excites the pool-system frequency and
gives rise to the higher frequency dynamic loads seen during chugging, occurs
inside each vent pipe near its exit 13/, rather than below the vent pipe. The
shorter vent pipes of the GKSS-PSS facility increase the acoustic (organ-pipe)
frequency over that expected in a plant, where the acoustic frequency is
expected to be ca. 8-10 Hz. In the PSS tests this frequency is found to be
ca. 12-14 Hz from vent A and 16-18 Hz from vents Band C. This acoustic
frequency, observable in both pool and boundary pressure histories, is
characteristic of the condensation oscillation stage (CO) and is often
triggered in a steam filled vent pipe during the chugging stage. According to
the schematic of Fig. 1, the 3.8 m deep wetwell pool provides a uniform vent
submergence depth of 2.8 m, typical of plant design, so that no distortion due
to pool pressure-head effects are expected.
The pool-system frequency is that facility dependent frequency which is
excited by the steam-ring collapse (condensation). It is in this domain that
the strong chugging loads are found. The pool system frequency of earlier
single-cell and multivent experimental studies has ranged from 14-52 Hz. The
GKSS-PSS pool-system frequency has been both observed and measured to be about
38 Hz. The GKSS-PSS facility thus provides an adequate basis for tests
investigating further the multivent effect (MVE).
SELECTION OF EXPERIMENTS AND DATA
This study into the multivent effect is based on four tests selected from
the larger GKSS-PSS test series. These tests were conducted under similar
thermodynamic conditions, using no drywell preheat. The analysis matrix is
shown in Table 1.
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The results of several repetitions of the standard-conditions test Ml
show that although the CO to chugging transition time may vary, for a given
time into a blowdown the chugging character of a test type (which decreases in
strength and frequency with time) is effectively reproducible. This
observation suggests that evaluations of simulated LOCA tests, intended to
investigate a multivent effect, could become substantially distorted if only
the strongest chug events from selected tests were evaluated. Rather it
appears necessary to investigate under conditions of constant mass flux in the
vent pipe(s).
The threshold mass flux for onset of the chugging stage in the GKSS-PSS
tests is about 10 kg/m2s. Because the in-vent steam flux decreases with
time in a simulated LOCA experiment, and more rapidly with a larger delivery
orifice, efforts to provide evaluations within a reasonably narrow band of
mass flux dictate a shorter rather than longer evaluation time period.
Therefore, to obtain a reasonable set of statistics with a nearly constant
mass flux, ten successive chug events, beginning at a conveniently chosen
steam mass flux of 5 or 3 kg/m 2s, were evaluated for each of the selected
tests.
Table I. TEST MATRIX FOR DATA EVALUATION
Steam DW vol. WW area WW air vol.
Active Vents Orifice per vent per vent per vent Speci al
Test No. No. Name Dia.,mm m3 m2 m3 Features
Ml-5 3 A,B,C 100 19.9 5.4 23.7 (a)
Zl-AB 2 A,B 70 29.2 8. 1 36.3 (b)
El-A 1 A 50 56.9 16.2 74.0 (c)
Ml-Z.B-2 1/2 ß/A,C 100 19.9 5.4/5.4 23.7/23.7 (d)
a) standard or basis test
b) vent pipe C blocked
c) vent pipes Band C blocked
d) "unit ce11" boundary p1aced around vent ß
Thermodynamic conditions for these tests were:










The evaluated results are hased on pressure histories measured
on the submerged wetwell boundaries. As shown in Fig. 1, the
primary "load" is taken as pressure, measured on the wetwe11 floor
directly under each of the three vent pipes. In addition, one wall
pressure history measured at vent-exit level is also included. The
dynamic pressure data which provide the basis for these evaluations
are PCM data digitized with a time step of 0.15 ms after being
low-pass filtered at 1600 Hz; no further data filtering is imposed.
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Because of the strong and varipJle nature of the frequencies resulting
from chugging events, our analyses of the boundary pressure histories also
include development and study of the power spectral density (PSD). For a time
window of about D.75 s, the complete original data are analyzed for each chug
event. The pool-system peak overpressure and peak underpressure are
determined relative to the local prechug event mean pool pressure.
EVALUATION OF THE EXPERIMENTAL DATA
Loading in the three-vent pool with one, two, or three active vents
Figure'2 shows, on identical ordinate scales, the peak overpressures
(POP) and peak underpressures (PUP) from tests Ml-5, Zl-AB and El-A plotted
versus the nominal time of rarefaction for each event. These data indicate a
clear and systematic reduction in boundary pool-system loading as the number
of active vents in the three vent pool is decreased. The data also
demonstrate a strong periodicity of the chug strength with time.
Loading in one-, two-, and three-vent pools
In order to further study the multivent effect, the PSS facility was
modified by placement of a steel single-cell boundary around vent B. This
provided a wetwell configuration suitable for conducting simultaneo~s double
cell and single cell tests; each vent pipe has a pool area of 5.4 m. The
geometry of this modified wetwell and the location of the pressure transducers
used to evaluate its response are shown in Fig. 3. In general, the same
measurement evaluation method is applied; however, the floor transducers PA42
and PA50, along with the lateral boundary transducer PA43, are now associated
only with the double cell (vents A and C) operation. For the single cell
(vent B), floor transducer PA47 and a new lateral boundary transducer PA56 are
used in the evaluations.
The peak over- and underpressure from the one-, two-, and three-vent
"full pool" tests plotted against the rarefaction time, are shown in Figs. 4a
and 4b. These data indicate a somewhat stronger response from the two-vent
pool than from the three-vent pool. The one-vent pool response is rather
weaker than in either the two- or three-vent pools.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
This study into the multivent effect is perhaps the first to be based on
well modeled, steam driven LOCA experiments conducted with full scale vent
pipes.
Evaluation of both floor and wall boundary data taken from selected
GKSS-PSS multivent experiments indicates a pronounced multivent effect exists
during the chugging stage of a postulated loss-of-coolant accident.
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Consideration of the peak overpressure and underpressure (POP and PUP) or
chug event spectral power shows that for steam mass fluxes of 5 to 3 kg/m 2's
the chug strength is strongly cyclic in time with, in general, a strong chug
being followed by a weak chug (or vice versal. From the viewpoint of boundary
pressure, the multivent effect has been observed in several ways. First, the
mean peak differential boundary pressure is found to increase monotonically,
and with an increasing slope, with a decrease in pool-area-per-vent. Second,
the mean peak differential boundary pressure tends to increase with an
increase in the number of vents-per-full-pool (constant pool-area-per-vent).
Both of these effects are consistent for overpressure and for underpressure.
In addition, study of the power spectral density associated with the chug
events indicates not only a consistency in these findings with regard power
delivered to the boundaries, but also a strong variability in the relative
frequency content from the boundary loads produced by the consecutive chug
events.
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VERIFICATION OF THE 3-D, 2-FLUID, 3-FIELD CONTAINMENT CODE
COBRA-NC WITH HDR- AND BATTELLE-FRANKFURT DATA SETS
M.J. Thurgood
Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory
Richland, WA 99352, U.S.A.
K. Fischer and L. Wolf
Battelle-Institut e.V.,
Am Römerhof 35, 6000 Frankfurt/Main 90, FRG
ABSTRACT
Pressure differences between subcompartments in a nuclear
reactor containment during blowdown are dependend upon intensity
and direction of the blowdown jet, as well as upon the geometri-
cal arrangement of obstacles in the jet vicinity. This was shown
in recent HDR experiments. The computer code COBRA-NC was used to
perform apre-test calculation for the 3-D flow distribution in
the break subcompartment for the first time as well as to sirnu-
late the entire containment flow distribution in a lumped para-
meter mode. Preliminary results are given for the 3-D calcu-
lation, helping to understand the flow structure and the de-
ficiencies of the lurnped-parameter approach. Results of the com-
parison between measured data and lumped parameter calculation
are presented in detail.
INTRODUCTION
Recent HDR-containment experiments indicated a high depen-
dency of differential pressure built-up and water carry-over
through vent flow openings between containment subcompartrnents
upon details of the break room internal flow structure. It was
found, that the flow inside the break room is affected by subcom-
partment internal structures such as the jet impingement plate
(distance and inclination with respect to break position) as well
as local subcompartment flow resistances posed by metallic struc-
tures such as piping etc. These distributed effects cannot be a
prior i accounted for by present lumped-parameter containment
codes used for design and licensing purposes. In fact, it could
be shown that the selection process of important input parameters
to those codes - although resulting in sometimes perfect agree-
ment with data - does not rest on a concise physical rationale.
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Besides of these unresolved issues, a variety of local spe-
cial measurement techniques applied for the HDR-tests such as 10-
cal heat transfer, local steam/air concentration and steam/air
concentrations as well as droplet velocities within the vents
connecting the break room with its neighbours have not been con-
sistently assessed by computations simply because most of these
phenomena necessitate highly local discretization as well as ad-
vanced fluid modeling. This situation calls for the application
of a truely three-dimensional containment code with advanced
best-estimate models for the fluid conditions expected in realis-
tic containment atmospheres after LOCA.'COBRA-NC is such a code.
DESCRIPTION OF COBRA-NC
The COBRA-NC computer code has been developed by the
Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory for the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. It provides a two-component, two-fluid,
three-field representation to allow the modelling of water and
its vapor as well as a noncondensable gas mixture. The two-fluid
capability is needed to account for condensation of steam in the
containment atmosphere and on structural surfaces, containment
sprays, pressure suppression pools etc. The three fields repre-
sent the vapor-gas mixture, the continous-liquid phase and the
liquid-drop phase. The continous-liquid phase is used to model
liquid films on containment structures, pools on containment
floors and film built-up in vents, whereas the liquid-drop phase
is used to model the two-phase blowdown jet, containment sprays
as well as drop entrainment and de-entrainment between subcom-
partments. COBRA-NC features an extremely flexible noding scheme
that allows the code to be run in a traditional lumped-parameter
mode, one-dimensional, two-dimensional, three-dimensional mode or
a mixture thereof, i. e. 3-D breakroom, l-D vents, lumped-para-
meter for neighbouring rooms. The code has a finite-difference
slab conduction model for structural heat conduction which allows
to use any number of materials in each slab. A mixing-length tur-
bulence model has been incorporated to model turbulent shear
flows and turbulent diffusion of gas species due to concentration
gradients.
COBRA-NC has been already assessed against a large set of
experimental containment data. The present paper focuses on some
selected applications in connection with recent HDR investi-
gations.
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THREE-DIMENSIONAL MODEL OF THE HDR BLOWDOWN SUBCOMPARTMENT
In order to study the effects of multidimensional flow pat-
terns in the HDR blowdown room for HDR experiment T31.3, a three-
dimensional model has been developed. Figure 1 shows a vertical
plane of the model. The grid spacing ranges from 0.225 m to 1.0
m. In the upper section the locations of the blowdown nozzle and
the impingement plate are indicated as they are represented by
the computational grid. The model consists of 898 spatial control
volumes and 81 heat slabs representing structural heat transfer
surfaces.
The histories of mass and enthalpy discharge rates into the
blowdown subcompartment were specified by PHDR based on past ex-
perimental evidence. Later evaluations of the mass flow data
showed that the actual blowdown rate was up to 20 % lower than
the pre-specified one. Therefore, the present results are of pre-
liminary nature and are given without comparison to experimental
data. The computations will be repeated with the corrected
blowdown rate in the near future. However, important general
features of the flow patterns in the blowdown room can already be
observed on the basis of the present results.
The blowdown subcompartment is connected with its neigbours
via a number of complex. vent flow openings. The boundary condi-
tions for these vents were taken from aseparate lumped-parameter
model calculation of the entire containment. This calculation was
similar to the one described in the subsequent section.
The three-dimensional model calculation was carried out up
to a point in time of 0.113 s within 1 hour of CRAY-l computer
time. During this time period, pure steam discharge occurs in the
blowdown nozzle. Figure 2 shows a horizontal plane of the upper
model section with the impingement plate representation. At the
time of 0.113 s, about half of the break subcompartment space is
filled with steam. Near the main vent, a homogeneous pressure of
2.1 bar is calculated which is higher than the calculated pres-
sure in the blowdown room of the lumped-parameter model (1.85
bar). One possible reason for this difference is the lower heat
removal by structures in the 3-D model, because only half of the
structures has come in contact with steam at the time of
0.113 s. The local pressure in the area where the deflected jet
hits the wall is enhanced to maximum of 3.3 bar. Figure 3 shows
some horizontal steam velocities in the upper section. The de-
flected blowdown jet causes some additonal entrainment flow into
the lower right corner of the room. The approach velocities of
the main vent are much larger in the lateral direction (92 m/s)
than in the straight direction (32 m/s). This means that a cer-
tain increase of the vent loss coefficient may be expected, re-
sulting from an enhanced dynamic restriction of the flow path due
to non-uniform inflow conditions.
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Further applications of the 3-D model shall be undertaken
with the corrected discharge rates; Elxtending the model time up
to the occurence of droplet flow (0.5 s).
Lill1PED-PARAMETER MODEL OF THE HDR CONTAINMENT
As a contribution to the International Standard Problem
No. 16, a lumped-parameter post-test prediction of HDR experiment
V44 was performed. The control volumes and flow paths of the
model are shown in figure 4. Some of the control volumes were
further subdivided into two or more nodes. The model comprises a
total of 81 nodes in 9 vertical sections, together with 112 heat
slabs. A transient of 5 s model time took 154 s of computer time
on a CRAY-l.
Vent flow loss coefficients were taken as specified by GRS
except for the vents ÜÖ 140 and 143 where an enhanced coefficient
was used in order to account for the additional flow resistance
caused by the blowdown jet. For the two-phase part of the blow-
down jet, a drop size of 200 11 m was specified. For the base case
calculation, it was assumed that no drop deposition occurred in
the vents. Steam condensation at the structures was calculated
according to the Uchida correlation.
The enthalpy history of the blowdown jet specified by PHDR
between 0.3 sand 2 s was slightly modified to give a continuous
steam discharge rate, which seems to be more realistic than the
original values for ISP 16.
Figure 5 shows the comparison of calculated and measured
pressure in the break compartment during 5 seconds after blowdown
initation. The experimental data show large scattering bandwiths
caused by different measured pressure values at different loca-
tions induced by pressure waves and/or sensor vibrations. The
calculated values tend towards the upper boundary of the measured
data bandwidth.
Local pressure variations within the blowdown subcompartment
as shown e. g. in figure 2 cannot be represented by a lumped-
parameter model. Therefore, the pressure differences calculated
in the lumped-parameter model are not strictly comparable to the
experimental data which are locally measured quantities.
Figure 6 shows measured and calculated pressure differences
adjacent to the blowdown subcompartment. Because the experimental
reference pressure in the blowdown room shows considerable local
variations, a better agreement between data and calculated
results should not be expected.
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The long-term pressure variation in the containment is dis-
played in figure 7 and shows excellent agreement between experi-
ment and COBRA-NC. It can be concluded that the distribution of
energy between stearn, droplets, water films and structures is
modeled in an acceptable way. The plot of the atmospheric tem-
perature in the dorne region, figure 8, shows that the lurnped-
parameter model does not fully represent the mixing induced by
natural convection currents at later time, thus giving a too low
temperature in the upper region. It would be possible to reach
some irnprovements in the calculations by changing the noding con-
nections; however, the only safe way of predicting the actual
mixing process would be to use a finite difference model with a
large number of nodes.
Additional informations about COBRA-NC application to the
HDR-experiment V44 and a detailed d{scussion of the results of
sensitivity studies are contained in /1/.
CONCLUSIONS
The computer code COBRA-NC has been verified for lurnped-
parameter and multidimensional mode applications. Due to lack of
space, comparisons of hydrogen distribution experiments with
COBRA-NC calculations cannot be shown in the present paper. The
interested reader is referred to /2/. Parameter variations have
been performed to show the model sensitivity to the major input
variables. The model results lead to an irnproved understanding of
the thermohydraulics in a containment.
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Figure 2. Horizontal distribution of pressure and steam in the
upper section at time t 113 ms
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Figure 3. Horizontal verlocity distribution in the upper section
Figure 4. Lumped-parameter model of HDR containment
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APPLICATIONS OF PROBABILISTIC TECHNIQUES AT NRC
A. Thadani, F. Rowsome, and T. Speis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555
ABSTRACT
The NRC is currently making extensive use of probabilistic
safety assessments in the reactor regulation. Most of
these applications have been introduced in the regulatory
activities in the past few years. Plant Probabilistic
Safety Studies are being utilized as a design tool for
applications for standard designs and for safety assessment
of plants located in regions of particularly high population
density. There is considerable motivation for licensees to
perform plant-specific probabilistic studies for many,
if not all, of the existing operating nuclear power plants
as a tool for prioritizing the implementation of the many
outstanding licensing actions on these plants as well as
recommending the elimination of a number of these issues
which are judged to be insignificant in terms of their
contribution to safety and risk. Risk assessment
perspectives are being used in the prioritization of
generic safety issues, development of technical resolution
of unresolved safety issues, assessing safety significance
of proposed new regulatory requirements, assessment.of
safety significance of some of the occurrences at operating
facilities and in environmental impact analyses of license
applicants as required by the National Environment Policy Act.
NRC's regulatory and licensing decisions are based on the
defense-in-depth concepts emphasizing quality and high standards for
design, construction, and operation. These concepts are focused
towards prevention of accidents by requiring reliable shutdown
and cooling systems, provisions for reduction in the amount of
fission products that could be released to the environment, and siting
in areas that are not in close proximity to highly populated areas.
Since the publication of the Reactor Safety study (WASH-1400) in 1975
and more so in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island accident, greater
attention was given to the value of probabilistic safety analysis
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for systematic and integral evaluation of plants to identify
vulnerabilities and as a tool for making safety trade-off studies.
The NRC is currently making extensive use of probabilistic
safety assessments in the regulation of nuclear power plants. The
scope of the probabilistic studies performed is governed by the
intended application of the assessment. For standard designs where
the PRA is used as a design tool, a thorough probabilistic analysis
of the integral design is performed where as only limited, narrow
assessments are conducted for evaluating risk significance of changes
in plant technical specificqtions.
PRA provides the central theme of the development of NRC policy
concerning requirements to improve protection from risk posed by
severe reactor accidents. The policy for the generic approval, by
rulemaking, of new standard plant designs requires the applicant to
employ risk assessment techniques as a design tool, and to include a
PRA in his license application. Near term Construction Permit
applications must supply a PRA within two years of the granting of a
construction permit. This PRA is to include consideration of
alternative designs for core and containment heat removal systems
which would enhance the safety of the plant in a cost effective
manner. In the safety evaluation of standard nuclear island design
proposed by General Electric as GESSAR 11, the PRA is being used to
supplement the conventional staff safety analysis and to guide in
formualting any new requirements for this standard design. Current
plans call for similar application of PRA in evaluating the advanced
PWR design proposed by Westinghouse.
Concern that reactors located in regions of particularly high
population density might pose a disproportionate share of the
societal risk has lead the NRC to consider special provisions to
mitigate severe reactor accidents at such plants. The owners of
plants, Indian Point Units 2 and 3, and Zion 1 and 2 volunteered PRAs
to develop a rational basis for such decisions.
The owners of Limerick and Millstone-3 were required by NRR to
supply a PRA. In each case, where the PRA review has been completed,
the PRA has identified a few alterations in plant design or operation
that would be very effective in reducing the vulnerability of the
plants to severe reactor accidents, and, where the NRC staff
assessments have been completed, shown that expensive alterations to
containment systems were not necessary. The fixes that have been
adopted have had spectacularly good cost/benefit ratios. The
striking success of these ventures into the use of PRA in the
regulatory arena is attracting a good deal of attention in the NRC
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staff as well as in the industry. It is becoming increasingly common
for licensees requesting exemptions from specific requirements to
document their case with PRA-based arguments. As the staff becomes
more accustomed to thinking in terms of risk, it is becoming
increasingly receptive to this approach.
The leading example of this approach has been the PRA of Big
Rock Point submitted by Consumers Power. Initially, CPC took this
approach to avert the premature shutdown of the plant. They had
calculated that full compliance with all the new requirements spawned
by.the accident at TMI would cost more than the very small Big Rock
Point plant could earn back in its remaining years of power
generation. Then, too, CPC felt that many of the TMI Action Plan
items were poorly suited to a plant of the unique design of BRP. CPC
offered to perform a risk assessment of the plant, and to fix any
prominent accident vulnerabilities revealed by the study, to the
extent that their economic analysis indicated to be feasible. The
staff approached the idea with deep reservations, but it has worked
out very well. The staff and the licensees are now using the PRA as
a source of perspective with which to resolve a wide array of
outstanding license actions and generic issues on the plant. The
program is serving as a pilot project for the new Integrated Safety
Assessment Program. Then, too, CPC is pioneering in the use of a
plant specific PRA as an operations management tool. Their risk
management program is looking increasingly attractive to the NRC.
The NRC has instituted a program designed to screen
newly-proposed generic safety issues by importance. It serves a dual
purpose: it provides a technical basis with which to allocate staff
resources to the technical resolution of safety issues, and
coordinate issue resolution. Estimates of the risk attached to the
proposed issues, developed using PRA-based methods and insights,
plays a key role in the priority evaluation. This application of PRA
is employed with liberal doses of conservatism. Since the results
are only employed in staff resource allocation, little penalty
accrues to overestimating the risk, but an important issue that is
dropped from further study because its risk was underestimated could
affect public health and safety but then if new information indicates
that the issue merits further consideration it can be resurrected.
Recent work in this program has been documented in NUREG-0933. NRC
has also introduced a new priority ranking scheme to guide in the
development of the Long Range Research Plan. It, too, entails the use
of risk-assessment-based perspectives.
Many of the Unresolved Safety Issues and generic safety issues
under review or recently resolved by the staff have been analyzed with
risk assessment techniques. The Station Blackout issue and the OC power
issue were analyzed principally using PRA. Risk perspectives were
also employed in the analysis of Anticipated Transients Without Scram,
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the reactor .vessel thermal shock problem, water hammer events
impacts, containment sump performance and many other issues, among
them Systems Interactions and Decay Heat Removal are employing PRA
methods or results.
Probabilistic models have also been used to perform sensitivity
studies for providing insights into the bases for limiting conditions
of operation (LCO), LCO extensions and testing and maintenance
requirements. Some specific examples include revisions in Reactor
Protection Systems testing requirements and extensions in Diesel
Generator LCO. These techniques are also being applied to operating
experience to identify the high-risk features of plant design and
operation.
A quiet revolution has been going on within the NRC staff since
the advent of the Committee for the Review of Generic Issues (CRGR).
This group has been tasked by the Commissioners to serve a screening
and filtering function for new generic requirements. IT imposes
strict standards of regulatory analysis or value/impact analysis on
proposed new requirements. The sponsors of new generic requirements
must document a convincing case that the risk reduction value of a
ratchet must amply warrant the expense of its enforcement. This is
forcing the staff to do a much more through job of evaluating the
risks as well as the costs of new requirements than the staff was
accustomed to do in years past.
In summary, the NRC staff has utilized some of the lessons
learned from probabilistic safety studies and several new initiatives
such as the Integrated Safety Assessment Program, the Severe Accident
Policy, and the Safety Goal Evaluation Plan are underway which are
expected to further illuminate the value of these studies.
SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF APPLICATIONS OF PROBABILISTIC TECHNIQUES AT NRC
1. High Population Density Site
A staff report on population near nuclear sites, NUREG-0348,
"Demographie Statistics Pertaining to Nuclear Power Reactor Sites"
(NRC, November 1979) documented the population distribution around all
U.S. nuclear power stations on the basis of the 1970 census. The NRC
staff concerns that plants located in high population density zones
may present a disproportionately high segment of the total societal
risk from reactor accidents has led to the completion of full scope
PRAs for four sites (Indian Point Units 2 and 3, Zion Units 1 and 2,
Limerick, and Millstone Unit 3). The staff has completed its review
of all but the Millstone 3 PRA and the summary results of the staff
assessment are provided in figures 1, 2, and 3. Questions concerning
scope, consistency of approach, adequacy of data, level of detail, and
analytical quality assurance are being raised as potential areas where
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comparison between studies could be faul ted. The state of the art of
the PRAs is evolving rapidly and continuously. Thus the more
important use of these studies should be from the insights gained 'and
the value of potential improvements considering uncertainties. One
such application of the PRA is the case of improvements made at Indian
Point Units 2 and 3.
The licensees for the Indian Point plants submitted probabilistic
assessments to the staff to provide perspective on the safety of their
plants. Subsequent to a review of the PRAs, the staff had several inter-
actions with the licensees regarding dominant contributors to core-melt
likelihood and severe offsite consequences. Several design and operations
modifications that addressed the dominant contributors were implemented
prior to restart of the plants. For Indian Point 2, these modifications
included 1) installation of a bumper between the control room building and
an adjacent structure and the ceiling tiles connected to the grid
structure to reduce the potential of an earthquake to disable the control
roomj 2) installation of alternate power lines for a charging pump, com-
ponent cooling water pump and two service water pumps to reduce the
potential of a fire resulting in a reactor coolant pump seal failure and
1055 of ECCS and leading to core-meltj 3) modification of the Technical
Specifications to require a plant shutdown in the event of a severe
hurricane off of the New Jersey coast to reduce the potential for 1055 of
all AC power, because of 1055 of high wind sensitive structures, that
would lead to core-melt. Subsequent analyses indicated that these
modifications had a high value-impact.
For Indian Point 3, the modifications included connecting the ceiling
tiles to the grid structure and providing alternate power to charging,
component cooling water, and service water pumps similar to that done for
Unit 2.
2. Big Rock Point
The licensee performed a probabilistic assessment of the Big Rock
Point plant in order to address the relative safety concerns of the TMI
action items. As a result of the study, the licensee initiated several
plant modifications to reduce the likelihood of core-melt as indicated by
his study. These voluntary actions which addressed the dominant sequences
included 1) replacement of a manual valve (located inside containment)
with an automatie ot powered valve to provide alternate makeup to the
emergency condenser which would reduce the potential for overpressure
events and a stuck open safety valve; 2) revise procedures to utilize the
high pressure feedwater sytem with recirculation from the containment to
reduce dependence on the reactor depressurization system; 3) installation
of position locks on seven valves in the post LOCA recirculation system
to reduce the potential for misalignment of the system after test or
maintenancej 4) elimination of the 15 minute delay for the containment
spray actuation to reduce the potential failure at high temperatures of
essential systems inside containment.
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Subsequently, the NRC staff concurred that the licensee could be re-
lieved of making additional modifications to improve control room habit-
ability and adding an additional senior reactor operator based on
probabilistic arguments. Both of these items were from the TM! Action
Plan. Additional relief from TM! Action items is under consideration by
the staff.
3. Auxiliary Feedwater Studies
After'the TM! accident, the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation sponsored aseries of studies to review the design of
auxiliary feedwater systems in U.S. PWRs. These studies used PRA
techniques to identify potential failures that could dominate the un-
reliability of auxiliary feedwater systems during transients caused by
a 1055 of main feedwater, including the station blackout sequence. (The
ability to cope with this particular sequence had not been a licensing
requirement for the earlier licensed plants.) This study, which
demonstrated the value of applying PRA techniques when at the system
level, led to changes in the safety review process. A quantitative re-
quirement on auxiliary-feedwater availability was added to in the
standard review plan, and studies of auxiliary-feedwater reliability
have become a routine requirement for licensing.
4. Station Blackout
Two studies addressed the unresolved safety issue A-44, "Station
Blackout." Together they provide the technical bases for resolving the
A-44 i ssue. The fi rst study, "The Re1i abil i ty of Emergency AC Power
Systems in Nuclear Power Plants," when combined with the relevant 1055-
of-offsite-power frequency, provides estimates of station-blackout
frequencies for 18 nuclear power plants and 10 generic designs. The
study also identified the design and operational features that are the
most important to the reliability of AC power systems.
The sßcond study, "Station Blackout Accident Analysis," (NUREGI
CR-3226) focused on the relative importance to risk of station-blackout
events and the plant design and operational features that would reduce
this risk.
The technical bases supplied by these PRA-type special issues
studies are currently being used to formulate the NRC strategy for re-
solving of the station-blackout issue.
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Anticipated Transients without Scram (ATWS)
The NRC staff evaluation of anticipated transients without scram in
NUREG-0460 was one of the first applications of PRA techniques to an un-
resolved safety issue. The evaluation highlighted the relative frequency
of severe ATWS events for various reactor types and estimated the expected
reduction in frequency for various postulated plant modifications. The
study also proposed quantitative goals for resolving this issue.
Other notable examples of PRA application to the ATWS issue are the
NRC-sponsored survey and critique of the reactor protection system (RPS)
and the quantitative evaluation of proposed ATWS-related modifications
sponsored by a consortium of U.S. utilities. The RPS survey reviewed
some 16 reliability studies, mostly in published PRAs, to compare the
predicted failure probability per unit demand, the anticipated-
transient frequency, and primary influences on RPS unavailability.
There was a surprising degree of agreement among the 16 studies. The
second study quantified the relative improvement to be gained by
implementing a set of recommendations being proposed by the utility






H16 L L- ---l ---l --.l. ---'
11
NOTE: Estimates are obtained from staff review, exclude
and are for the entire region of the plant sites.
excludes severe seismic and hurricane events. 2/












c>: 0.. 0.. -""W U
>- s:: s:: .~
'" '" ...er: .~ s:: Q)0
'·04


















11 11 11 11
Estimates are obtained from staff review, are based on
supportive medical treatment and are for the entire region
of the plant sites. 1/ Estimate excludes severe seismic
and hurricane events.- 2/ Estimate excludes severe seismic
events. -
I Limerick L't I G




Mean Value fram PRA
Best Estimate trom NRC Review
[before design ChangesJ
Best Estimate fram NRC Review
Indian Point 2
I Indian Point 3 '--~ 1
I Z'on Li I G
00
'"o
10. 5 10' 10·J
NOTE:
Fi gure
FREQUENCY PER REACTOR YEAR
Core damage frequency with high density population plants - uncertainty range of
internal and external events.
The PRAs were not necessarily performed using consistent methodologies or
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Figure 1 Core damage frequency with high density popula ti on plants - uncertainty range
of internal and external events.
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A PROPOSED APPROACH TO BACKFIT DECISION-MAKING
USING RISK ASSESSMENT AND BENEFIT-COST METHODOLOGY
E. P. O'Donne11 and T. J. Raney
Ebasco Services Incorporated
Two Wor1d Trade Center
New York, New York 10048, U.S.A.
ABSTRACT
This paper out1ines a proposed approach to backfit decision-making
which uti1izes quantitative risk assessment techniques, benefit-
cost methodo1ogy and decision criteria. In general terms" it is
structured to provide an objective framework for decision-making
aimed at ensuring a positive return on backfit investment whi1e
a110wing for inc1usion of subjective va1ue judgments by the
decision-maker. The distributions of the independent variables
are combined to arrive at an overall probability distribution for
the benefit-cost ratio. In this way, the decision-maker can
exp1icit1y estab1ish the probability or level of confidence that
a particu1ar backfit will yie1d benefits in excess of cost. An
examp1e is presented demonstrating the app1ication of methodo1ogy
to a specific plant backfit.
INTRODUCTION
Backfitting of nuc1ear power p1ants is required for a variety of reasons.
Changing regu1atory requirements throughout the operating 1ife of the plant
may impose changes to plant design as a condition of continued operation.
Uti1ities may also initiate plant modifications aimed at improving plant
performance or avai1abi1ity. In either event, decisions have to be made by
regulators, plant designers or owners with respect to whether, when and in
what manner a backfit shou1d be imp1emented. The issues invo1ved rare1y
permit straightforward decisions without analysis of impacts on safety, plant
performance and economics. Risk assessment techniques, combined with benefit-
cost methodo1ogy, provide a method for rationa11y approaching backfit
decision-making which can aid the regulator or uti1ity in arriving at the
optimum solution to a wide variety of problems. This paper describes one
approach and presents an examp1e of methodo1ogy as app1ied to a hypothetica1
backfit problem.
CONCEPT DESCRIPTION
The concept of a benefit-cost analysis is simple - the benefits and
costs of the item of interest are estab1ished and compared. There are two
common ways of comparing benefits and costs. One is the net worth, where the
cost is subtracted from the benefit. The other is the benefit~cost ratio,
where the benefit is divided by the cost. The 1atter is considered more
usefu1 because it gives a rate of return rather than absolute return.
However, either must be considered in conjunction with the total cost because
a Uti1ity has 1imited capita1 avai1ab1e for improvements.
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Benefits are defined as the expected returns from the change and costs
as expected out1ays required to implement the change, a1though either can
turn out to be positive or negative. For a nuc1ear plant backfit, candidate
changes are usua11y proposed based on a perceived benefit(s) of increased
plant avai1abi1ity (B1), reduced economic risk of plant 10ss (BZ)' reduced
pub1ic radio10gica1 risk (B3) or reduced inp1ant exposure (B4). These
benefits are ca1cu1ated direct1y in units other than dollars, so a va1uation
factor (U) must be app1ied to each to convert the benefit to the common
denominator of dollars for comparison to cost. Costs inc1ude engineering and
design services (Cl)' material and equipment purehases (CZ), installation and
construction (C3), operation and maintenance activities (C4) and any plant
downtime required for installation (Cs).
The benefit-cost ratio (R) is determined by mu1tip1ying each benefit by
its respective va1uation factor, summing these products then dividing by the
summation of the costs. In equation form this is:
Quantitative information required for the analysis comes from a variety
of sourees. The effect on plant avai1abi1ity comes from the operating
his tory of the plant (or simi1ar plant) coup1ed with a re1iabi1ity analysis
of the changed system. Both the plant 10ss and pub1ic radiologieal' risk
change come from a sensitivity study of the plant PRA. Inp1ant exposure
change comes from operating experience or is ca1cu1ated from time and motion
studies of installation, operating, test and maintenance actions associated
with the proposed change coup1ed with plant radiation zone information.
Va1uation factors come most1y from the Uti1ity. The va1ue of plant
avai1abi1ity is usua11y avai1ab1e from the Uti1ity's economic dispatch
program. Economic risk can inc1ude the plant capita1 cost, c1eanup costs
and rep1acement power if this cannot be readi1y passed on to the consumer.
The NRC has stated a va1ue for pub1ic radio10gica1 risk in the Safety Goal
Po1icy of $1000/man-rem, but the Uti1ity may wish to propose va1ues that are
more in 1ine with other imp1icit societa1 va1ues for averted deaths. The
Uti1ity must also p1ace a va1ue on a change in inp1ant exposures.
It is understood that the parameters invo1ved have significant
uncertainties. The traditiona1 approach to dea1ing with this has been to
use conservative or best estimate va1ues in the model. However, this has
two severe drawbacks. First, differing studies of the same problem can
yie1d wide1y differing resu1ts. Second and more important, those charged
with making decisions based on the resu1ts have nO idea of what level of
confidence to p1ace on the resu1ts.
The best way of dea1ing witp uncertainties is to recognize and accept
their existence and treat them exp1icit1y. This invo1ves expressing uncertain
input parameters as probability distributions rather than single numbers and
propagating these distributions through the analysis. The techniques for
doing this do exist and shou1d be used.
The essential link between PRA and benefit-cost analysis shou1d not be
apparent. PRA is the on1y means avai1ab1e to quantify plant 10ss and pub1ic
radio10gica1 risks, so it is an irrep1aceab1e input to the analysis. Also,
the operating history studies and re1iabi1ity ana1yses required to quantify
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plant availability ehanges are usually eonsidered to fall under the general
heading of PRA. The same is true for the uneertainty eharaeterization and
propagation.
EXAMPLE BENEFIT~COST ANALYSIS OF BACKFIT
The best way to demonstrate the usefulness of PRA based benefit-eost
analyses for backfit deeision-making is to show an example. A PRA for an
operating plant showed that the dominant tauses of eore melt were eomplete
eleetrie power lasses (eaused by fires, earthquakes or high winds) that lead
to both a Reaetor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal failure LOCA through lass of
eleetrie powered seal eooling and a lass of safety injeetion. Containment
eooling was lost as weIl, although this does not affeet eore melt probability.
De-eoupling the seal failure LOCA from the lass of eleetrie power would
prevent the eore melt beeause Auxiliary Feedwater is partially independent
from eleetrie power and is by itself suffieient for eore eooling as lang as
the reaetor eoolant pressure boundary is intaet. This eould be aeeomplished
by adding a steam turbine driven pump for emergeney RCP seal eooling, as the
Freneh PWR designs have. This would reduee the frequeney of these dominant
sequenees enough to essentially eliminate them as dominant.
Losses of RCP seal eooling that eause seal damage but do not proeeed to
eore melt have oeeurred at operating plants. Replaeement of badly damaged
seals ean take a month, eausing a substantial availability loss. Sinee the
standby seal eooling system eould avert seal damage in such instanees, the
system has the potential benefit of inereased availability as weIl.
This problem was set into the benefit-eost framework using the parameter
values given on Table I. Reduetion in eore melt frequeney was determined by
multiplying the eore melt frequeney (ranges) of the sequenees involving seal
failure LOCAs given in th~ PRA by the average.unavailability on demand of a
steam turbine driven pumping system. Population dose ranges from these
aeeidents were taken direetly from the PRA. Plant availability ehanges were
estimated from operating data on seal failure frequeney and repair times.
The value of inereased availability was taken from published replaeement
power eosts. Value of avoiding eore damage was taken from eleanup eost
estimates (adjusted for insuranee eompensation) and replaeement power eosts.
Value of averted man-rem exposure was taken as a range between the proposed
AIF and NRC values. Costs were taken from engineering and eonstruetion
estimates of the proposed change. All eosts were annualized over a five-year
paybaek period, whieh is typieal of what a Utility desires (maximum) when
making a backfit investment deeision.
Known uneertainties that were not treated probabilistieally in the model
are:
- Whether a loss of RCP seal eooling aetually does result in a small
LOCA. There is evidenee that it does not and tests are ongoing to
investigate this area, but the PRA used for parameter quantifieation
for the model assumed that it does.
Whether Auxiliary Feedwater by itself is adequate for eore eooling
following a small LOCA. Reeent analyses have shown that it may be,
but the PRA assumed that it is not.
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TABLE I: STANDBY RCP SEAL COOLING

































* All eosts are initial eosts in 1983 k$
annualized over five-year paybaek period
- Whether the Utility aetually sees indireet benefits such as redueed
publie risk by reeovering them through the rate strueture. This is
highly dependent on the Utility and Publie Utility Commission, but
the model implieitly assumes that they ean.
- Whether the backfit ean be installed within a planned refueling
outage. The model assumed that it eould.
The first two were not ineluded beeause they are essentially binary and
one answer of eaeh simply validates the results where either of the other
answers render the analysis moot. The third is also binary, and one answer
was simply chosen as an assumption of the analysis. The fourth was not
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included for a lack of available information. The model assumptions for each
of these uncertainties used in the analyses enhance the benefits of the fix.
Thus, the resultant distribution of benefit-cost ratio is conservative to the
high side by the known but untreated uncertainties.
The parameter distributions were propagated through the benefit-cost
model using a simulation technique. The resultant benefit-cost curve, given
on Figure 1, shows that at the best estimate (50%) point the value of the fix
is slightly below the break even point. The curve exhibits a long tail to
improbable but high benefit-cost ratios because of the 10gnormal function
that describes the decrease in core melt probability.
Analysis of the results showed that at the best estimate, 73% of the
total benefits were from offsite risk reduction. This sterns from the facts
that the sequences affected by the backfit involved severe radionuclide
releases. The high fraction for this benefit underscores the importance of
the structural uncertainty that the Utility can recover investments for public
protection. Otherwise, this benefit is not seen by the Utility in a strict
accounting sense and may not be appropriate for inclusion in the analysis.
Twenty-five percent (25%) of the total benefits were from plant economic
risk reduction and the remaining 2% were from increased plant availability.
Thus, the backfit is primarily "insurance", with probabilistic rather than
expected return.
Based on this analysis, the backfit would appear attractive to a Utility
that is averse to low probability-high consequence risks. Re-doing the
analysis to increase this risk aversion would shift the benefit-cost curve to
the left, thereby increasing the probability of a benefit-cost ratio greater
than one. However, it must be remembered that there are two uncertainties
not treated in the analysis that could render the study moot (devoid of
benefits). The costs of further tests and/or analyses to eliminate these
uncertainties should be considered against the cost of backfit before making
adecision.
PROS AND CONS OF APPROACH
The benefits of using the approach described are decreased costs of
backfitting for existing plants and reduced capital costs for neW plants.
This is deemed achievable because the structure of the benefit-cost analysis
forces consideration of all costs and benefits of a backfit and assures
proper balancing of the two. Given the present proven high level of safety
at today's nuclear plants, very few backfits would survive such a test. Any
backfits that were recommended would be money weIl spent, as return on this
money is assured.
The principal drawbacks of using a PRA based benefit-cost approach for
backfit decision-making are money and time. Regarding money, a high quality
baseline PRA is required to assure a sound basis for benefit calculations.
The PRA must include external events since many older plant backfits and
some of the existing criteria to be examined concern external event
protection. It also must include a highly detailed treatment of human
reliability because many proposed backfits are for instrumentation and
operator training/qualification. Such a PRA would cost several million
dollars. Also, it is not hard to envision a group of five or more full-time
professionals to perform the benefit-cost analyses, and maintaining this
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staff is a cost of the approach. However, the cost of engineering feasibility
and cost studies are not properly assigned to the benefit-cost approach
because these would be performed for a bftckfit regardless.
Regarding time, the benefit-cost studies are not trivial and do require
time to perform, which delays the decision on a backfit. This time is not
always available, particularly if the backfit is related to a shutdown order
or is arestart issue. The work required to justify exclusion of the existing
regulatory criteria could take one or two years not even including NRC review.
However, this time is available today for most Utilities while the need for
new capacity is not imminent.
'On the balance, the potential benefits should far outweigh the costs.
Many plants are engaged in backfit programs costing'several hundred million
dollars, even exceeding the original plant costs in many cases. If the
benefit-cost analysis eliminated even a few percent of this backfitting, it
would morethan pay for itself. The same is true for using PRA to determine
criteria,for a new plant. Indeed there is so much money at stake that any
effective method to moderate regulatory requirements should be pursued by
the Utilities.
A significant uncertainty of this approach is acceptance by the NRC.
The NRC presently uses some form of benefit-cost analyses in the CRGR review
of new generic requirements, but this does not assure acceptance of benefit-
cost analyses for plant-specific backfits, especially those that may stern
from generic requirements. The NRC has accepted such an approach to some
extent at Big Rock Point, but it is not reasonable to extrapolate the
experience of that unique plant to today's typical plants. Although some
senior NRC officials have individually expressed willingness to consider
such an approach, there is no definitive policy. Such a policy will probably
not be forthcoming until and unless a Utility makes a proposal on an active
plant docket.
CONCLUSIONS
PRA based benefit-cost analyses are an effective means of judging
backfits and existing criteria for nuclear power plants. They permit such
decisions to be made based on solid value and technical hases with explicit
consideration of uncertainties. Incorporating provisions for such an
approach in the regulatory process, although not a panacea,could greatly
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ABSTRACT
The d9lel oprent and appllcatlon of two quantltat Ive IlBtOOds, W'l I eh
ccul d be used as part of the decl slon rrak I ng process In nuc Iaar pC>ler
plant lleenslng, are descrI bed. lhese IlBthods are the use of
quantitative screening crlterla to assess the adequaO{ of the safety
functlons In exlstlng plants and the use of cost/benefltanalysls to
detennl ne Ilml ts to the cost effeetlve e>llendlture on "back-fitting" to
Inprove safety, It Is shown that the results obtalned by the t..,
method; are not neeessarily coopatlble wlth one another, The need for
claar gJldance fram regulatory bodles on the cOOlce of same rrajor
paramters used In cost/beneflt ana Iys Is I s demonst,'ated,
INTROD LeTi ON
In the US, the UK and e Ise<here there I s currently a conslderable I nterest In the deve Iqment of
quantitative IlBthods for eva luatl ng the safety of exlstlng nuclear power plant (NPP) , part I cular Iy I n relation
to severe accldents (I,e, those I eadlng to extensive core damge, or core me It, posslbly accoopanled by severe
fa I lure of the contal nment) , and In the d9le Iopnant of IlBthods for assessl ng the cast effect Iveness of
posslble Improvements In safety,
The authors have been I nvolved In several aspects of these deve Iqrnents and In th Is paper we shOi that,
when used as part of the declslon rraklng process In the I leenslng of nuclaar power plant (NPP), different
approaches can lead to dlsslmllar concluslons coneernlng the deslrabll Ity of "back-fitting" to Improve the
safety of exlstl ng plants,
The first of the two approaches dI scussed In th Is paper I s the appllcatlon of quantitative safety goals,
or quantitative design obJectives (QOO), todevelop "QJantltatlve Screening o-Iterla" (c;EC) crlterlawhlch
cculd be used for a simple prellmlnary asses"",ntof the adequaO{ of the DfR functlon In a large nlJ1\ber of
exlstlng plants, lhese QSC ..,uld be used In a flexible rmnner las descrlbed In Slctlon 5,2, bei",,) wlthout
prejJdlce to any subsequent regJlatory actlO<l.
The second approach Is the appl lcatlon of cost/beneflt (ar, In US tenn;, value/lmpact) analysis. 1hese
approaches are descrlbed at same length In 11 and 21, accordlngly In thls paper on Iy an cut 11 ne of aach nBthod
15 provlded so that more spaee can be glven to dlscusslon of the differences bemen the concluslons that
mlg,t be reached by the two nBthods,
2 THE APPLICATION OF QU\NTITATI\'E DESIGN OBJECTI\'ES
2,1 Posslble Dlfflcultles In the Practlcal fppllcatlon of wes
In prlnclple, glven a QOO e>\lressed In sultable tenn; and a probablilstic rlsk asses"",nt (PRA) for the
plant In question, It should be a simple matter to daclde W'lether that plant rmets the <;00,
In practleea nlJ1\berof dlfflcultles may arlse, for e"""l'Ie:-
(I) The QOO may not be stated In a form whlch 15 dlrectly cooparable wlth the results of the FRA,
(11) If therelsmorethanoneQOO, Itmay not be Imrredlately obvlcuswhlch Isthemore IImlting.
(111) The posslble extent of the uncertalntles In the results of the FRA may make Interpretation of the
cooparlson wlth tha QOO dl fflcult,
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(Iv) The fact that FRA;, of a"'l sort, rrey be ava Ilable for on Iy a sma II fractlon of the plant popul atlon
Iffilch Is of Interest.
(v) In a partlwlar probi"", Interest may be Ilmlted to the adequaq! of only one safety functlon e.g.
rarova I of decay heat.
Each of these potential dlfflwltles Is dlSOJssed beIOl:-
2.2 The 0101 ce of QDOs
At the present time the situation In the U5 Isthat the ~C have not yet declded whether to adopt the
concept of us I 09 QDOs for regulatory purposes, they are carryl ng out an ova luatlon program Iffi I ch shoul d be
c011' leted In 1985 13 and 41. ror the purposes of th I s paper we have asslmed that, I f a decl slon I s made to
adopt the concept, the QOO used would be the same as those ""Ich are currently belng ....a luated. Two of the
QlXl> def Ine acceptable Ilml ts to the r I sk to the pub 11 c and a th I rd, wh Ich I s descrl be!4as a "Slbordl nate
obJectlve", deflnes alimit to the probebility of core melt, Pm' (median va lue, 1 x 10 per reactor year, r.
yr.). ThustheQOOforp Is Ina formwhlch Is Imrredlately C01J'arablewlththeresultsof aFRA. fbwevar,
slnce the QOOs lor Indlvld'Jal Risk and S:x: Ieta I Risk are expressed In terms of percentages of the U5 fatal
accldent rate and of the naturally ocwrrlO9 rate for fatal cancers respectlvaly, th"( are not dlrectly
conparable wlththeresultsof atyplcal IRA, nor Is It Immediate Iy obvlous ""Ich ofthethreeQDOs Ismost
: Iml t 109 I n relation to Pm'
Folloling the procedJre adopteJ In other areas of radi ologl cal protectlon It Is thereforeconwnlent to
deflne par_ters, ""Idl may be descrlbed as "derlved QOOs" Canalogous tothe "derlved IOrklng levels" for,
say, surface conteni nation In radiologi ca' protectlon practlcel, wh Ich can readlly be c011'ared wlth the
results of a ffiA.
51 nce both of these QDQ; are related prlrrerlly to the amount of radi oactlvl ty released I nto the
a1nosphere In the event of a severe acc Ident the most convenlent par_ter for the "dar Ived QOOs" Is
"probablll1y" of a large release, denofed here by p. "Large release" In thls context Is arelease large
enough tocauseearly fatalltles at a dlstance of 1~6 km (1 mlle) framthe plant, ""Ich Is thebasis ofthe
QOO for Individual Risk. Thls correspondi to a minimum release of abcut 5 per cent of the Inventa<y of the
morevolatlleflsslon products (e.g.lodlneandcaeslum) Inthecoreofa 1000MW(e)reactor. IntheUK, Pr
has been used successfully for sweral years as the prlnclpal Quantitative parameter for speclfylng safety
requlrerrents for NPP151.
The Indlvl dual RI sk QOO can be transl ated I nto a requl re:nant that th~addltlonal probability of
accldental death, due to the presence of an NPP, should nof exceed 5 x 10 per r. yr. for an Individual
Ilvlog In the vlclnlty. Taklng Into ~CaJnt the randcm dlrectlon of the plume frcm a swere accldent, thls
corresp:>nds to a va lue of about 5 x 10 per r. yr. tor Pro
The Socletal Risk QOO can be translated I nto a requlrerent that the additional probablll~ of death due
to cancer, awraged ovar a radius of 80 km (50 mlles) around an NPP, should not exceed 2 x 10 per r. yr.,
due to the presence of the NPP. A s Imp Ie analys I s, assuni ng a un.!.!orm popul atlon dI strltutlon around the
NPP, shOis that th Is QDO woul d be met I f Pr ""re as high as 2 x 10 per r. yr. Th I s conc luslon should also
be valid for non-unlform population dlstrlOJtlons,
Thus, evan I f the contal nrrent were c011' Ietely 1neffect Ive, 1.\'e QOO for Socletal RI sk woul d be met I f the
QDO for probebllity ofcoremelt ""re ach I wad (I.e. p «1 x 10 per r. yr.). H""""""rtheQDO for
Individual Risk Is conslderably more restrlctlva and I~ can be seen that unless the conditional~robabilltyof
S ....ere conta I nrrent fa I lure 1011 owl ng a sequence lead Ing to core me It, Qc' ""re Iess than 5 x 10 per event,
:;el~:~1 ~~idR~~~ ~~~11~0~b: :if :~'~Wt"=d~~'~~o~se~s~i~:t~:; h/~ f~ufn~~i~lt~s~~~~
also be met. Thus the contrltutlons to both Pr and to Pm nust be consldered In the Quantitative evaluation
of the adequacy of the OHR or other safety funerlons.
SumllBrlslng these derlvad QDQ;, we·have:-
QDO for probability of large release to atrosphere, Pr'
QOO for probablll ty of core me It (I f Qc C 5 " 10-
2
), Pm'
5 x 10-6 per r. yr.
1 x 10-4 per r. yr.
It may be noted that In the UK the two utllitl es wlth NPP (The Olntra I Electrlclty Generating lhard and
the South of Scotland Electrlclty Board) have adcpted a "design 90 Ide 'I ne" In thelr purchaslng specl flcatlons
of 1>< 10-6 per r. yr. Ior lerge releases and wlsh to sae thls achl ....ed wlth a rrlnllOOll1 rellance on6the
contalnrrent, the design targats for the safety functlons are therefore based on a value of 1 X 10 per r. yr.
for Il. 161. Thls daslgn gJlde IIne Is conpatlble wlth tha UK legel requlrarrent that, In al.1 Industrlal
actlvrtles, the rlsk to the publlc and to ef11Jlotees should be made "as 101 as reasonably practlcable", the
Interpretation of thls r""ulrarrent Is dlscussed further In Sectlon 3.3.4, beiOI.
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2.3 Trea1nent of Uncertalmy In the Develq:ment of QJantltatlve Screening Q-Iterla
It Is generally agreed that estlnates of Pm' or of large releases to a-mosphere, Pr' are stbJect to large
uncertalntles. The sources of uncertalnty In estlnatlng Pm and Pr can be classlfled In 3 broed groups,
name Iy:-
Group 1 The uncertalntles In theparameters, such as fallureratesof plant Iters, used In calOJlatlonsof
the probabIlIty of core melt and containment fallure due to faults wlthln the systems and plant
Iters therselves, where the modelllng of the systen bahavlOJr Is weil establlshed.
Group 2 The mcertalntles relatlng tothe probabIlIty dlstrlbJtlons for, and theeffects of, events external
to the systens (e.g. ceble race f I res, f Iood;, sei 9111 c dlsturbances) and those re latlng to faults
wlthln the system where the modelling Is not ",11 establlshed.
~roup 3 The uncertalntles arlslng from relatlvely rare causes whlch can be vlsuallsed but have
not yet baen e~rlenced In the operation of NPP, for example, speclflc des Ign errors; obscure
camon mode faul ts and systen I nteractlons; bizarre behavi our of the operator.
It will be seen that the great majorlty of exlstlng probablllstic rlsk assessrents (FRAs) on Iy Inc IlIle
the Group 1 uncertalntles; efforts are belng made to develq> method; for tad<11 ng the Group 2 uncertalntles
and In soma recent US FRAs (e.g. those for 210n and Indian Point) It has baen found that the contribution to
core me It due to "external" events I s cOllParable wlth that due to the "I nterna I" faults.
As more operat I ng e>\ler lence Isobta1ned and ana Iysed I t shoul d ba poss I bl e to reduce the IlI]Xlrtance of
the Group 2 and 3 uncertal ntles but at the present time th"l shoul d be reger<led as mak I ng a substantla I
contrlbJtlon to the probability of core melt.
Thus In order to derlve a !;SC whlch can be applled to a large number of plants at the present time, It Is
necessary to base It on a fractlon of the QOO whlch corresponds to the Group I condltlons deflned abovSc The
problem of sub-dlvldl ng the overall i;(JQ; beooen the 3 groups I s dlscussed In Ref. 1. f>ny division must be
somewhat arbltrary bJt soma seml-quantltatlve argurents stggest that a 40:30:30 allocation bat...en the grwps
wou I d be reasonable. Th I s has the merlt thaf, on the one hand, It avold; extrara situations I n wh I ch the
IlI]Xlrtance of the Group 2 and 3 uncerta.lntles could be so over-estlrreted that the system rellabillties
r"'lul red In the condl tlons of Group 1 uncertal nty woul d be unreall stlca Ily high. U1 the other hand, I f the
proposed allocatlon does represent an over-est Irrete of the If11lOrtance of Group 2 and 3, the maxinun short fall
(a factorof 2.5) In the Group 1 allocation could not be regerded as very slgnltlcant.
lJslng thls allocation we can proceed to develop !;SC for the OHR functlon from ader Ived QDO for Pm of
4 x 10-5 per r. yr. and a derlved QOO for Pr of 2 x 10-6 per r. yr.
2.5 Sub-dlvlslon of the "Derlved QOO" for Pm and Pr s,t",en the S3fety Functlons
Core me It can OCQJr as a rasult of:-
(I) Fa I lure of the reactor to tr Ip I n response to an adverse change In the rat I0 of heat remova I to heat
Input.
(11) Fallure to remove heat at an ad"'luate rate after the reactor has trippe<!.
(111) Fa I lures of certal n ''<:rltlca I structures" wh I ch lead to a situation I n wh Ich the reactor shutdown or
heat remova I systers are made I neffeetlve.
It Isconvenlenttosub-dlvlde (11) Intotwo parts, sothatwe canconslderseparately the Initial phase
after a large or medium LOOA, when the rreln problem Is to ensure that refloodlng of the corl' ocours qulckly
enwgh to prevent darrage to the fuel, and the later phases of these LOO!s, together wlth the entlre post-
trip behaviour In other types of fault, where the rreln r"'lulrement Is to renove the decay heat. In thls
paper we are concerned on Iy wl th the second part.
The proposed sub-dlvlslon of Pm beoo,en the 4 safety fmctlons Is base<! on the followlng:-
(a) Publl shed results of PR!s.
(b) Q>nslderatlon of the fr"'luencles of events whlch create a darrend for each of the functlons.
(c) R>lat Ive dl ff I cultl es of achl evl ng high rellablilty In the dl fferent functlons.
As descrlbed In Ref. I, these conslderatlons have led to the foliOiI ng al Iocat Ions for the OHR, In the
post reflood phase, In Group 1 condltlons of mcertalnty:-
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PWR 75 per cent I.e. Pm = 3 x 10-5 per r. yr.
BIIR 50 per cent I.e. Pm = 2 x 10-5 per r. yr.
A slmllar sub-division 15 prcposed for Pr but In thls case It 15 necessary to dlstlngJIsh be1ween those
cases In whlch core .-elt 15 foll"""d by severecontalrment fallure due to randan events and those In wh Ich
there Isa cOl1l1On cause (the I~ter are descrl bad here as "Special Casesl'). It 15 prcposed that 20 per cent
of the der Ived 1;00 of 1.5 x 10 per r. yr. shoul d be allocated to the ":pec IaI cases" and 80 per cent to the
rest. These allocations are then sub-dlvlded amonglt the functlons In the sarre way as the 1;00 for Pm' Thus
the proposed !;SC for the OHR funetlon, for PIIR, In Group 1 candltlons of uncertalnty are:-
General Case Pr = 1.2 x 10-6 per r. yr.
:peclal case Pr = 3 x 10-7 per r. yr.
The correspondl ng va lues for B\\R are two-th I rds of those for PWR.
(Note: 'Severe Cbntalnnent Fallure' In thls context 15 one whlch, assoclated wlth core nelt, \<lOuld glve
°r I se to a release Iarge enOJgh to cause ear Iy fatalltles In the vi cl nlty of the pi ant).
A further sub-d lvision of the !;SC, bet",en the ear Iy and later stages I n wh Ich the OHR systems are
requlred to funetlon 15 descrlbad In Ref. 1 but thls 15 not requlred for the purposes of thls paper.
2.5 f'ppllcatlon of the !;SC for the OHR Funetlon
It 15 vi sua11 sed that by varleus devlces (e.g. greuplng, synthesls of FRA; fran exlstlng asses9TlElnts, or
rellabllityanalyses of IImlted scope) estlnetes oftheoontrlbutlons to p and to p duetofallures of the
OHR funetlon, In Group I condltlons of uncertalnty, will becone avallable V'or many ".bre of the exlstlng US
plants than those for whlch AlAshave been carrled out. Thus Itshould be posslbletoapplythe !;SC tomast of
the pcpul atlan.
It 15 recognlsed that the!;SC are sorrewhat arbltrary and are probably conservatlve. Thus, If these
oontr Ilutlons to Pm or Pr for apartl cular plant are observed to be greater than the correspondl ng !;SC, th I 5
sheul d on Iy be regarded as an I ndl catlon that the plant In question sheul d be examl ned more c losely. for
exaßllle, If It can be seen that Pm and Pr for the plant as a whole maet the correspndlng QDOs fran whlch the
QSC have been derlved, no further action woul d be necessary. The Interpretation of the results of th I 5
conparlson wlth the !;SC 15 dlseussed further In Sletlon 5.2 bei",.
3 THE APPLICATION OF COSMIENEFIT ANN..YSIS
3.1 Sources of Data on ßlnef Its
A nuclear reaetor accldent can cause harrn to the health and prcperty of the publlc (''aft-slte'' costs)
and to the plant Itself and to the health of the operators ("on-slte" casts). A further IßjlOrtant cause of
on-slte costs 15 the need to replace nuc lear p",er fran plant wl th h Ig,er operating cost.. SI nce
Inprovenents to the plant to reduce the probability of an accldent, or to reduce Its effects, have the effeet
of avertlng damage, these "averted costsl' can be regarded as the "benefli" resultlng fran the e>q>endlture on
the IßjlCovenent, whlch can then be conpared wlth the aetual casts whlch ,""uld be Incurred by the utillty In
maklng the Ißllrovenents"
The detalled make-up of the "benefltsl' and the "costsl' are descrlbad In 17 and 81 and more recently In
191. However, forthepurposesofthlspaper apartlcularlyuseful conpllatlon 15 thatof 1101, wh Ich
sunnarlses the avertable "off-sltat' and "on-sltat' costs, for each of the exlstlng and prcposed NPP In the US,
for each of 3 'standard" accldents. The sane assunptlons are made for each NPP. lhus, although there may
be dlsagreenentabcut sone of theassunptlons, thesetof data 15 se If-consI stent. Arevi", of the
assunptlons In 1101 slggests that the absolute va lues of the costs for each plant are 1Illlkely to be an error
by a faetor of more than 3 191. Th 15 set of data 15 therefore sultable for Illustrating the argument whlch
WB wlsh to develop In thl 5 paper.
3.2 aJmnery of the Beneflts Assoclated wlth "Avertable GastsI'
Same broad oonc luslons wh I eh can be drawn fram the data of 1101 are as toll '"'5:-
(a) "On-s I tat' casts per MW(e) of Installed capacity sha< IlttJe variation over the whole set. Glven that
core melt has occurred, a representatlve value 15 $4 x 10 per MW(e) Installed; the maximum variation
abcut thls value 15 abaut +50 per cent. The "on-sltat' casts, for an accldent whlch leads to core melt,
are vi rtually Independentof the slze of the release to atmosphera.
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(b) "Off-slte" costsperMW(e) of Instelledcapaclty shOl a substantlal sltetosltevarlatlon. lhls
variation depends na In Iy on (lC4)ulatlon dens Ity so that It Is poss Ibl e to dlstl ngJ Ish bat_n 3 types of
slte, for each of whlch a representatlve value can be Identlfled, for an accldent of glven severlty.
Glven that the rrost savere accldent consldered In R:>f. \101 (kcldent 'OSSTI", >kllch corresponds to
releases of fran 45 to 67 per cent of the rrore I""ortant volatlle Isotcpes, notably es 137 and 1131)
has ocOJrred, these va lues are as follews:-
La.< Population Site (e.g. Palo Verde or Surry) aboJt $ 1 x 106 per MW(e)
M>dlun Population Site (e.g. Peach Ebttan or Mlilstone) aboot $ 3 x 106 per MW(e)
HIg, Population Site (e.g. Indian Point or LI""rlck) aboJt $10 x 106 per MW(e)
For our purposes It Is suff Iclent to cons Ider a centra I va lue of $3 x 106 per MW (e) Install ed and to
exanl ne the sen~ltlvlty of conclus Ions based on th 15 va lue to Increases and decreases by a factor of 3.
(c) The ''off-slte'' costs are alrrost linear Iy proportlona I to the fraetlona I release to afrrosphere of the rrore
I""ortant volatlle Isotcpes, notably es 137. Thus the restllts of the ana Iys 15 wh Ich re late to "off-sltEl'
costs are very senslt Ive to the perfomance and rellability of the conta Innant. <bnsequent Iy,
''off-s Itel' costs based on the "ssn" type of ace Ident are I Ike Iy to be greater than those wh Ich wou Id
result fromnearly all theaccldents >kllch mlg,toccur In praetlce.
(d) /'part fran the "hlg, pcpulatlon" sltes, the "on-sltEl' costs are Iarger than the "off-sltEl' ones, even for
the rrost severe accldents. However, slnce the latter are likely to be rrore Inportant from the regulatory
point of vi", It Is deslrable to keep the two sets of costs separata.
From these broad conc luslons we can now est lnate the naxlmum e'l"'ndlture on IlfIlrovenants to ach Ieve glven
redJctlons In Pm and Pr that would be cost effeetlve.
3.3 Limits on <bst Effeet Ive Expendlture for Inprovarents to Avert Losses
3.3.1 Limit to <bst Effeetlve Expendlture for Improvenant, CE' based on "Off-51te <bst~,
If a proposed Inprovarent can be shown to reduce the probability of a large release, of glven slze, SI'
by an amcunt 4>rl the maximum sun that woul d be strletly cost effeetlve, In tenn; of averted off-slte costs,
CE' can be determlned from the toll ""I ng equatlon:-
all I
CE = n L4>rl BI (1)
>klere n Is the effeet Ive nunbar of years of plant II fe r"",1 nIng, takl ng Into account any dl scountl ng poil cy,
and BI Is the beneflt arlslng fran the cost averted by preventlng release SI'
In 1101 adlscount rate of 4 per cent per annum Isused, whlch Isconslstent wlththeassUl1ptlonsthat
all benef Its are measured In constant (19B1) va lue dollars. lhe use of a 4 per cent d Isccunt rate leads to
effeet Ive plant lives of 17 to 21 years for near Iy a I I the exlstl ng and proJeeted US plants. For our
purposes It Is sufflclent to assune a uniform value of 20 years.
In the case of off-slte costs the relative Inportance of the contrlbJtlons to CE from the SSTI, 2 and 3
types of accldent depends on the perfornance and rell abll Ity of the contal nnant after core me It. For Indl an
Point, for exa""le, whlch Is a PrlR wlth a large dry contal rvrent, NRC have taken the vlew that the condltlonal
probabi IItles of ssn, 2 and 3 releases, glven core ""It, are 0.03, 0.01 and 0.96 1111. SI nce the off-slte
costs attrlbJtable to SST2 and SST3 releases are of order 1 per cent and 0.\ per cent respeetlvely of those
due to an ssn release, It can be seen that the smaller releases would not contrlbJte slgnlflcantly to CE'
The results of the RSS 1121 s~gest that for other PrlRs the condltlona I probability for SSTI releases mayoe
hlg,er than 0.03, posslbly aboJt 0.1).
For B\\R; wlth Mark 1 contalnnants, the RSS predlcts a condltlonal probabi IIty of abcut 0.95 for releases
aboot one thlrd of the slze of an SSTI releas~, the correspondlng off-slte costs ""uld ba 30 per cent of those
for an ssn release IBI. HJwever, If the operator were able to pravent severe contalnnant fa I lure by
ventlng, as ncw appears to be the case, the condltlonal probabll Ity of a large release shoul d be s Imllar to
that estlnated for Indian Point.
Th Is uncertalnty concernlng contalnnant perfomance and re II ability can be a naJor seurce of uncertalnty .
In estlnatlng CE'
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3.3.2 L1ml t to Cost Effectlve Expendl ture for Inpro\<3lT9nt, OE' Based on "01-51 tel' Chsts
It toll Ck/S from the /Teced Ing dl SOlSS Ion that there I s an equat Ion s Imllar to Eiln (1) ahove for OE'
Hatlever, In th I s case we are concerned wI th the redJct Ion In core me It probablll1y, 6p • rather than 6Pr'
slnce Bs' the on-slte cost averted by preventlon of core malt, Is vlrtually Independen'11 of the slze of
release. Thus we have:-
OE = n 4>m Bs (2)
It follOls that estlmetes of OE are subJect to less uncertalnty than those of CE'
3.3.3 (hnparlson of Llml ts to Cost Effectlve Expendl ture Based on "Df f-51 tel' and "01-51tel' Chsts
Soma concluslons whlch can be drawn from the /Tecedlng dlsOlsslon are as follCk/s:-
(a) 51nceBs IsgreaterthanB1 fornearly all plantsandslncep Isequal to, orgreaterthanPrl forall
plants, OE I s less than CE for on Iy a few plants, for most pTants OE Is rtllCh larger than CE' Thus a
c lear understandl ng I s requlred as to the extent to wh Ich regJ I atory declslons based on conslderatlon of
cost effect lveness shoul d take account of on-s Ite costs. (See next sect Ion).
(b) A general redlctlon In source tems would accentuate the Inportance of on-slte costs, conpared to off-slte
costs, I n relation to establlsh Ing the limits on cost effect Ive expendlture. HCk/8Ver, I nc luslon of a
"r Isk aversion factor" In estlrratl ng the benef It obtalned by avertlng off-s Ite costs wou I d have the
opposlte effect.
3.3.4 Nlmarlcal Values for LImits to Cost Effectlve Expendlture on Inprovements
liiuatlons (1) and (2) can be used to find va lues of CE and OE eorresJXlOdl ng to selected va lues of Band
/:tJ. The range of va lues of 4> wh I ch has been used to prepare Table I provl des sone Ins Ight I nto the extent
of Inproverrant that mlght be posslble wlthln the limits of cost effectlveness. The läble Is based on the
avertablecosts for I,OOOMW(e) plantwlthan effectlve rerralnlng Ilfeof 20 years, on an average U5 slte.
It I s assumed that the add Itlona I /Tobabi IItv of savere conta I nment fa I lure, 9 Iven core ne It qc IsO. 1.
Table I Soma Representatlve Val!!gs for the LImits to Cost Effectlve Expendlture on the Redlctlon of Pr to
the QDO Va lue of S x 10 per r, yr.
Facfor of I I
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(a) (huld be spent on "preVllntlon" or "mltlgatlon".
(b) I'ssumlng expendlture Is used for '\>rENentlon", I.e. redu:tlon of Pm'
(c) f6sunlngcondltlonal probabllltyof seVllrecontalmentfallure, glvencoremelt, Is 0.10.
(d) I'ssumlng that wIlole of expendlture Is used to reduce Pm; slnce the limit for expendlture on redlI:tlon of
Pr by mltlgatlon I s determi ned by 4>r' not [)Pm'
It can be seen frcm Table I that I f the limit to cost effeetlve e~endlturewere detenrl ned by off-slte
costs alone then:-
Ca) lhesums avallablefor Impro""",ntwouldprobably ba too sma I I toobtalnal1f substantlal redJctlon In Pr'
un less the In Itl a I va lue of th I s probability ""re at least ten t lmes larger than the QOO va lue of 5 x 10-6
per r. yr. suggested In Sectlon 2.2 above.
Th Is Imp 11 es that the suggested QOO for Indlvl dJa I RI sk woul d not be ful Iy consI stent wIth the concept of
a cost effeetlve limit on expendlture, based on off-slte costs, unless a sutstantlal "rlsk aversion" factor
were IntrodJced, In the UK the relevant legal requlrerents d~ In effeet, necessltatethe useof such a
factor. lhls Is because It Is necessary to show that all ''reasonably practlcable"steps havebeentaken to
redJce the r I sk. lhe Interpretation of th I s phrase by the Cburts, In other I ndJstrles, has been that the
limit to expendlture on Inproverent Is only reached when thecost of the Inprovenent Is becomlng "grossly
dI sprcportlonate" to the redJctlon In r Isk wh I eh wou I d be ach levecl. kh le""",nt of the UK design target
(I.e. Pr less than I x 10-6 per r. yr. wlth I Imlted relfance on the contal ment) on a sIte wlth high
pcpulatlon denslty would Imply a cost effeetlve limit of about $2 x 106 to redJce Pr from 1 x 10-5 to 1 x 10-
6
per r. yr., based on averted off-slte costs. Even In a new des Ign It Is most unllkely that an Inproverent of
thls magnltuJe could be achleved at a cost of less than $10 x 106• lhus thls cholce of design target shOJld
also satlsfy the 'ALAW' requlrenent.
(b) lhe effeet of a substantlal decrease In the sOJrce terns for most sequences would have the effeet of
reduclng Pr,ln any glven des Ign, slnce fewar sequences woul d glve rlse to 'Iarge' releases, so that the
question ot further Impro""",nt to meet the QOO woul d be less Ilkely to arlsEl.
(c) An alternative Interpretation of theresults In Table I Isthatthe proposed QOO for Individual Risk Is
more severe than woul d be necessary to cOl1jlly wlth the "ALAR!'I' concept, as used In the USo tbwevar, It
could also be argued that, I f the publl c ware offered a QOO for Ind Ivldua I Rl sk, deels Ions whether or not
to meet that QOO for a speelflc plant shOJld not be Influenced by cost effeetlvaness conslderatlons based
on soc Ieta I effects.
It can also be seen frcm Table I that I f the i Imlt to cost effeetlve e~endltureto meet the prq:lOsed QOO
for Individual Risk ""re determlned by on-slte costs then, for a plant wlth the same Initial value of Pr.' the
suns avallable for redJclng Pr COJld be very much larger If, as In our example, thecondltlonal probabIlIty
of severe contal ment fallure s reasonably 1<>1 CO.l per demnd). Of course, I f thl s probability ""re high,
thls would not be truEl. In the extrene case, If It were unlty (I.e. Pr. = Pm) the cost effeetlva limit, for
an average plant on an average slte, based on on-slte costs would be only 30 percent greater than that based
on off-s Ite cost.. tbwever, such extrene cases shOJ I d be uncamon,; In the case of a s Ite I n an araa wI th a
high population dens Ity, I f the condltlona I probabl IIty of SENere contal ment fa I lure ""re high, the avertabl e
off-slte costs cOJI d exceed the on-slte one.. ~vertheless evan for the worst s Ite In the US (Indian Point),
theoff-sltecosts would beonly afactorof 2 greater If qc ""reequal tounlty. Ha.ever Inthatpartlcular
case we have Pr ~ 0.03 Pm' so that the on-s I te I Iml t wou I d, In pract Ice, be dOlTl nant.
It Is apparent from thl s large dlfference In the limits on cost effeetlve expendlture that, I f a
regu latory bc>dt decldes to use cost/beneflt conslderatlons I n declsl~k Ing, It must declde at the outset
whether or not to Inc lude avertab Ie on-s Ite costs I n the cos t/benef I t ana Iys I sand whether or not to Inc lude
SOlT9 form of r I sk avers Ion factor. 01 fferences In condl tlons between cOJntrles may, of course, lead to
different deelslons on these aspeets, e.g. In the UK, a substantla I rlsk aversion factor Is Introduced; In a
cOJntry wlth aState owned electrlclty generating IndJstry Incluslon of the on-si te costs would be easler to
jJstlfy than 1f the IndJstry ""re pr lvateIy OWled.
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roST EFFECTIVE llMI TS TO THE EXPEl'lllnRE ON IM'ROIEMENT OF THE OfR FUNCTI~
It Is now posslble to canblne the results obtalned In s.ctlons 2 and 3 I norder to coopare the extent ot
the I fTll rovarent that mlg,t be made In the OfR tunet Ion, as detennl ned I:tt cost ettectlveness conslderatlons,
wlth the extent ot IfTllrovement that mlg,t be requl red I norder to maet the "der Ived QDOs" dl seussed In s.ctlon
2, e.g. tor PrlR:-
(I) <bntrlbJtlon to Pr' In Groop 1 condltlons ot uncertalnty, ot 1.5 x 10-6 per r. yr.
(11) OontrlbJtlon to Pm' In Groop 1 condltlons ot uncertalnty, ot 3 x 10-5 per r. yr.
Proceedlng as In Seetlon 3 It will be seen that the limits to cost ettectlve e~endlturewill be one
th Ird ot those shown In Table I. However, In those cases where I t can be shown that an IfTllrovarent a lmed at
redJclng the contrlbJtlon to 4>r' or 4>m' In Greup 1 condltlons ot uncertalnty sheul da Iso be ettectlve In
soma Group 2 or Groop 3 condltlons ot unosrtaI nty , then clear Iy the ovara I I va lue ot IIp , or lip woul d be
greatar, so that a larger benetlt woul d be obtalned I:tt the modi t lcatlon and thus the coh ett;,;;qrlve Ilml t
should be h Ig,er.
Thls IfTlllles that, on the basis ot oft-slte costs, the maximum sun avallable tog IfTllrovement ot the DfR
tunetion, In Group 1 condltlons ot unosrtalnty, would ~e unllkely to exceed $10 x 10 (I.e. correspondlng to
/',pr' In Groop 1 condltlons ot uncertalnty, ot 1 x 10- and SOl1B benetlt In Groop 2 and/or 3 condltlons ot
uncertalnty) tor a 1,000 M\'I(e) plant, ot average age, on an average US slte, Major changes to an exlstlng
sub-systen sheul d be possl ble tor a sun ot th Is s Ize but I t I s un IIke Iy thet I t woul d cover the cost ot an
additional OfR sub-system such as an Independent high pressure I nJectlon train 1131.
Hc>iever, It on-slte costs were used as a basis tor estlnatlng limits to cost eftectlve e~endlture, It Is
poss Ibl e that, In the tota I population ot US plants, there mlg,t be a tew I n wh Ich the addition ot a turther
OfR sub-systen wou I d be cost-ettect Ive.
In the "Special Gases" Identltled In Sectlon 2.4, where the sare Inltlatlng event (e.g. prolonged
"station Black-out") coul d lead to core me I t and to severe cont'Sl nment ta I lure, Pr ""ul d be "'" I I si nce the
trequency ot the Inltlatlng eventwould be small (ot order 10 perr. yr.), thusthevalu~otlip
correspondlngtocOfTllleteellmlnatlonotthesequence ""uldalsobe "",11 <Iessthan I x 10
5
per F. yr).
Consequently the cost ettectlve limit on IfTllrovarent woul d be sna II also (Iess than $6 x 10 tor our average
case). Ibr"eover, s Ince the condltlona I probabIlIty ot severe conta I nment ta I lure ""ul d be un Ity, I:tt
detlnltlon, we would have Pm = Pr and 4>m = /',pr' lhusthecostettectlve limit basedon on-sltecostswoold
also be relatlvely "",11 (Jess than $8 x 105).
For BI'R the limits would be tw::>-thlrds ot those tor PrlR In slmllar condltlons.
CCMAAISON OF RB)UIREMENTS FOR OHR REllABILITY BASEO ON
QSC ANO ON COST/llENEFIT CONSIOERATIONS
5.1 Formulatlon ot QJantltatlve Screening (tlterla tor the OHR fiJnetlon
WB have sho," that tran a set ot QDQ; tor IndlvldJal and Socletal rlsk, such as those prq>Osed by NRC tor
eva luatlon In 1983, a correspndl ng set ot 'IlJer Ived QDOs", expressed I n terms ot nax lmum acceptabl e probabilIty
ot Iarge release to the atlnosphere (Pr) or maximum acceptable probabilIty ot core me It (Pm)' can be obtal neel.
The t-RC's QDO tor Ind lvidual Rlsk IfTllOses a more ~trlngent satety requlrement than that tor ax:letal
RI sk and, un less the condltlona I probabIlIty ot severe contal nment tal lure (Qc) I s I ess than 0.05 per d9l1Bnd,
the '\;ubordlnate QDO" tor Pm proposed by NRC (I x 10-4) per r. yr., medl um va lue ""ul d not be a sutt Iclent
crlterlon to meet the QDO tor Pr'
In the appllcatlon today ot these derlved QDQ; to a praetlcal probien, such as assesslng the adequacy ot
the OHR tunetion In a large population ot exlstlng plants, It I s nacessary to take account ot the Quallty and
sC'l'e ot the Al'" whlch are avallablEl. lhe maJorlty ot these only provlde estlnates ot p and, In SOl1B
cases, Pr. tor sequences arlsl ng tran "Interna I" Inltlatl ng events (I.e. those occurrl ng wl'tl, I n the plant
systam Thanselves). lhusat present It Is only posslble, In ma"! cases, toevaluatetheadequacy ot the OHR
tunctlon In these condltlons, ""Ich correspond to the "Groop 1 condltlons ot uncertalnty" detlned In 5>ctlon
2.3 above.
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Thus In order to obtaln a set of Quantitative screening crlterla (QSC) agelnst whlch the plants can be
conpared It 15 neeessary to sub-<l Ivlde the "der Ived QOOs" In two stagas:-
FI rstly, to take accamt of the Ilml ted scope of the exl stlng FRA;. Ws have suggested a 40: 30: 30
division bat"",en our 3 groops.
Secondly, to take accoont of the contrlbJtlon to the overall va lues of p and p due to the fallure of
safety related funetlons other than OHR. We have stggested 75 per cent for BHR In R;R and 50 per cent In
B\\R, In each of the 3 groops.
These proposals lead to \SC (median va lues) for the OHR funetlons, In Groop I condltlons of uncertalnty,
whlch are as foll<>ls:-
Pr (OHR, \) = 1,5 x 10-6 per r. yr, for FWR and 1.0 x 10-6 per r. yr for B\\R
Pm (OHR, \) = 3 x 10-5 per r. yr. for FWR and 2 x 10-5 for BWR, I f Qc <{ 5 x 10-2 per damnd
For the "Special Caseg' In whlch the saoo Inltlatlng fault leads to core melt and to severe containment
fa I lure, Pr (OHR, \) = Pm (OHR, \) = 3 x 10-7 per r, yr. for FWR and 2 x 10-7 per r. yr, for BWR,
5.2 O:>st Effeetlveness of Improveoants to the OHR Funetlon
The brief ana lysis of the limits to cost efleet Ive eJql6(ldlture for reduc I ng p and p sh<>ls that
avertable off-slte costs can on Iy Justl fy a relative Iy sme II expendl ture on Impro~nts B'ut a substantlally
larger eJql6(ldlture could ba justlfled on the basis of avertable on-slte costs. If we assurne that the maxlm.m
value of 4>F4requlred to meet the suggested \SC for the OHR funetlon, In Groop 1 condltlons of uncertalnty,
""'re I x 10 per r. yr, the sum avallable for Inprovement of the OHR functlon (I nb"n exlstl ng 1,000 M\'/(e)
plantwlth a 20 yeareffeetlve IIfe, on an average US slte) I'<lUld beaboot $6 x 10, If basedon avertable
off-sltecosts. Themodlflcatlons whlch could be made fO[4a sumof thls slze kOuld not beextenslveand
woold.notnecessarlly ba sufflclenttoredJce Pr by 1 x 10 perr. yr.
Thus a situation could arlse In whlch the "cost effeetlve" concept kOuld not be fully conpatlble wlth the
suggested \SC for the OHR funetlen. In thls situation It mlght be posslbleto shew that the proposed
modlflcatlon kOuld also be effeetlve In reduclng P, sufflclently In condltlons of uneertalnty other than Groop
1 to meat the overa II \SC for the OHR funetlen. In th I 5 situation the Ilml t to cost effeetlve expendlture
kOuld be correspondlngly higher. Alternatlvely the posslbliities of reduclng the contrlwtlon to Pr due to
fallures of the other safety funetlons (e.g. the SCri.n syst6"") or of Increaslng the mltlgatlon of the effeets
of core malt could ba examlned, as ameans of """tlngthederlved QDO for p at mlnlmumcost. lheseoptlons
for Improvl 019 syst6TB other than the OHR, or for I ncreaslng the extent of mltlgatlon, shool d also be open to
the Ileensee as an alternative means of """tlng the derlved QDO for Pr' wlthout fully """tlng the \SC for the
OHR funetlon, I f these options provl ded a less expensive method for meeting the derlved QOO for Pr'
I f the avertabl e on-slte costs ""'re used as a bas 15 for establlsh I ng the I Iml t to cost effeet Ive
expendlture, th I 5 Ilml t eoo I d be h Igher by a factor of order 10 than In the prevl 005 case so that the
llkellhood of an unresolvable Ineonpatlblilty bat_n the r;sC for the OHR funetlon and the "cost effeet Ive"
eoncept wou I d be greatly redJeed.
A redJetlon In the "sooree tems" would redJee the Initial value of Pr' for any glven plant, slnee f""er
sEQuanees should lead to "Iarge releases", as deflned In S>ctlon 2,2 above. Thus a situation eould ba
reached In whlch thesuggested \SC fortheOHR funetlonderlved fromPr would be met wlthaJt dlfflaJlty by
most, I f not a I I, of the exlstl ng plants, sven though the r;sC der Ived tram Pm ""re axceeded,
Nevertheless, the Ilml t to eost effeetlve expendl ture fer Impro,errent wou I d also be redJeed, I f th 15 were
based on avertable off-slte costs. Thus the posslbility of an Ineonpatlbility bat_n the stggested r;sC (or
the OHR funetlon whlch Is based on p and the "eost effeetlve" eoncept would be greater. I-bdaver, If on-slte
rosts ...re usad as a basis for the e~ndlture limits, tha sum avallable for Inprovement of the OHR funetlon
W9U1 d not be affeeted by tha change In the sooree tams.
It will be seen that a regulatory body wh Ieh Intends to use the concapt of cost effeet lveness as a n1i'\lor
faetor In reach I ng declslons aboot Improveoants to exlstlng plant shaJ I d declde at the outset whether to
conslder on Iy avertabl e off-slte costs or whether to cons Ider on-slte costs as ... 1I. I f It Isa Iso Intended
to adopt a set of (,DQ; for exl stlng pi ants, the conpatlbility of these wI th the coneept of cost effeetlveness
of Inprovements shoul d be examlned.
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6 OJ~USIONS
lhe rraln concluslons to be drawn fram the ~rk descrlbed above are as foll&5:-
(al If the quantitative screening crlterla for the Dffl functlon, stygested here, whlch are based on the US
i'llC's proposed QDO for Ind lvi dua I RI sk, "'re applled to exlstl ng US lJ>IR, It I s II ke Iy that soma plants
wou I d fall to maat the cr 1ter lau nIass the I soorce terrT5 I can be redJced. I-bwever, 5 Ince the QSC are
Intended to be used In a Ilexl bl e rrenner, an Inltla I fa I lure to rreet tharn shoul d be regarded on Iy as an
Indl catlon that a range of poss IbIe alternatives for maet Ing the ovara 1I i;OQ; ShOl Id be examl ned Inorder
to find the optllllJm solution.
(bl If the Ilml t to cost effeetlve expendlture for Improvement of the Dffl functlon were based on avertable
off-slte costs on Iy, and glven the exlstlng 'source terms' for savere accldents to US lJ>IR, It Is doubtful
whether sloff Icl ent Improvement cOlI d be made In all cases to maet the stygested c;6C, even I f th Is were
the least e'1'ens Ive solution for meeting the overall QDO. However, I I the limit to exendlture ",re based
on avertable on-s Ite costs, the Ilml ts woul d be substantlally h Ig,er and thus the possl bl IIty of fal 11 ng
to maet the c;6C wlthln the limits of cost effeetlve expendlture would be redu::ed. lhls dlfference
betrieen the two Ilml ts on e>t>endl ture wou I d be accentuated by a decrease In the "soorce terfIBlI tor severe
accldents.
(c) The concept of Ilml tl ng the cost 01 back-f IHlng to a Ieve I wh Ich Is cost effeetlve may be a useful one
In regulatory ana lysis but a clear dellnltlon of the basl s lor ca Iculatl ng the limits to the e'1'endlture
Is rEXlulred at the outset.
(dl The design target adqlted by the UK utl IItles sheul d be severe enaJgh to ensure cO'lJlllance wlth the lega 1
requI rements that the rlsks Irom raaetor accldents should be made 'as 10\4 as raasonably practlcable'.
Th Is design target Implles the use of a large rlsk aversion factor, of order 10; a redJctlon In the
'soures tarns' for severe ace Idents h()ul d Increase th I5 factor st 11 I further.
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Probabilistic risk assessment techniques are finding increasing
application as decision tools in regulatory programs of the US NRC.
One area where they are being applied is in the Systematic
Evaluation Program, which is a review and evaluation of older
operating nuclear power plants in the Uni ted States against
current licensing criteria and safety standards. In this program
deviations against current safety requirements are identified and
assessed. Where necessary, modifications are suggested in plant
hardware, operating procedures or Technical Specifications. For
selected issues within this program, probabilistic risk assessment
techniques were applied to identify the significance of deviations
from current safety requirements. These techniques were also
utilized to determine the risk/benefit from various proposed
corrective actions and to help select the most effective of
various alternatives.
BACKGROUND
In the later 1960s and early 1970s, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's
(now Nuclear Regulatory Commission) scope of review of proposed power reactor
designs was evolving and somewhat less defined than it is today. The require-
ments for acceptability evolved as new facilities were reviewed. In 1967, the
Commission published for comment and interim use proposed General Design
Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants (GDC) that established minimum requirements
for the principal design standards. The GDC were formally adopted, though
somewhat modified, in 1971, and have been used as guidance in reviewing new
plant applications since then. Safety guides issued in 1970 became part of the
Regulatory Guide Series in 1972. These guides describe methods acceptable to
the staff for implementing specific portions of the regulations, including
certain GDC, and formalize staff techniques for performing a facility review.
In 1972, the Commission distributed for information and comment a proposed
"Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power
Plants," now Regulatory Guide 1.70. It provided a standard format for these
reports and identified the principal information needed by the staff for its
review. The Standard Review Plan (SRP, NUREG-75/087) was published in December
1975 and updated in July 1981 (NUREG-0800) to provide further guidance for
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improving the quality and uniformity of staff reviews, to enhance communication
and understanding of the review process by interested members of the public and
nuclear power industry, and to stabilize the licensing process. For the most
part, the detailed acceptance criteria prescribed in the SRP are not new;
rather they are methods of review that, in many cases, were not previously pub-
lished in any regulatory document.
Because of the evolutionary nature of the licensing requirements
discussed above and the developments in technology over the years, operating
nuclear power plants embody a broad spectrum of design features and require-
ments depending on when the plant was constructed, who was the manufacturer,
and when the plant was licensed for operation. The amount of documentation
that defines these safety-design characteristics also has changed with the age
of the plant--the older the plant, the less documentation and potentially the
greater the difference from current licensing criteria.
SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
The Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) was initiated by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 1977 to review the designs of older operating
nuclear power plants in order to reconfirm and document their safety. The re-
view provides (1) an assessment of the significance of differences between
current technical positions on safety issues and those that existed whena
particular plant was licensed, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differ-
ences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented
evaluation of plant safety.
The original SEP objectives were:
(1) The program should establish documentation that shows how the criteria for
each operating plant reviewed compares with current criteria on significant
safety issues, and should provide a rationale for acceptable departures
from these criteria.
(2) The program should provide the capability to make integrated and balanced
decisions with respect to any required backfitting.
(3) The program should be structured for early identification and resolution
of any significant deficiencies.
(4) The program should assess the safety adequacy of the design and operation
of currently licensed nuclear power plants.
(5) The program should use available resources efficiently and minimize re-
quirements for additional resources by NRC or industry.
Many of the plants selected for review were licensed before a compre-
hensive set of licensing criteria had been developed. They include five of
the oldest nuclear reactor plants and seven plants under NRC review for the
conversion of POLs and FTOLs. The plants to be considered under the original















The Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) review procedure represents a
departure from the typical NRC staff reviews conducted to support the granting
of a construction permit or operating license for a new facility or a license
amendment for an operating facility. A typical licensing review starts with
the submittal by the utility of a safety analysis report (SAR) that describes
the design of the proposed plant. The staff reviews the SAR on the basis of
the Standard Review Plan (SRP), Regulatory Guides, and Branch Technical
Positions (found in the SRP) that constitute current licensing criteria. The
guidelines in the SRP represent acceptable means of complying with licensing
regulations specified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR).
The SEP was initiated by NRC, and not by the licensee as part of an ap-
plication for a license or request for a license amendment. The SEP procedure
involves several phases of data gathering and evaluation so that an integrated
assessment of the overall plant safety can be made. The various phases and
their interrelationships are described below.
Selection of Topic List
A list of significant safety topics was derived from existing safety
issues during Phase I of the program. More than 800 items were considered in
the development of the original list; however, a number of these were found
to be duplicative in nature or were deleted for other reasons. The number of
remaining issues varied by plant. Generally, approximately 100 significant
issues remained for the detailed SEP review.
Topic Evaluation Procedures
Each remaining SEP topic was reviewed to determine whether the correspond-
ing plant design was consistent with current licensing criteria such as regula-
tions, guides, and SRP review criteria, or the equivalent of such criteria.
Where the plant was not consistent with current licensing criteria, and no
acceptable utility actions have been taken, the differences from these criteria
were evaluated as potential candidates for modification. The final phase of
the SEP involved an "integrated assessment" of topics not in compliance with
current regulations.
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INTEGRATED PLANT SAFETY ASSESSMENT
The objective of the integrated plant safety assessment is to make
balanced and integrated decisions on when to modify SEP facilities to current
licensing criteria. Factors considered important in reaching decisions on
modification include safety significance, radiation exposure to workers, and,
to a lesser extent, implementation impact and schedule. To provide insights
on the safety significance of the various areas of nonconformance with current
NRC regulations, probabilistic risk assessment techniques were utilized in the
integrated assessment phase.
Where possible, PRA techniques were applied to the SEP topics. Not all of
the issues identified are easily addressed by well-defined PRA techniques. In
particular, issues which address the ability of the power plant to safely deal
with events for which the frequency and/or effects on plant systems are unknown
are not evaluated in this study. PRAs generally examine accident scenarios for
which the initiating event frequencies are relatively well known and
probabilities of system failures are estimted by detailed consideration of
system configuration, random component failures, and system interactions. Thus
the issues evaluated are those which address systems or plant features during
normal operation or accident situations of relatively well-known frequency.
Examples of these topics is given in Table 1 below.
TAßlE 1






Thermal - Overload Protection for
Motors of Motor-Operated Valves
Requirements for Isolation of High
and low Pressure Systems
ESF Switchover From Injection to
Recirculation Mode (Automatic ECCS
Realignment)
Independence of Redundant Onsite
Power Systems
Testing of Reactor Trip System and
Engineered Safety Features, Including
Response-Time Testing
Issues excluded are those dealing with seismic, tornado, or flooding
events for which the frequency of a'given severity event, or any such event,
is not well known. Also excluded are issues dealing with high energy line
breaks, where it is not the frequency, but the effects on systems, which is
not known. Treating these issues in the framework of PRA would generally be
at the edge of the state-of-the-art (since event frequencies, etc., are not
well known) and thus our confidence in the risk-based categorization of these
issues would be less than for the results of our analysis of those issues
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whith fit well into present PRA considerations. Table 2 below indicates
topics which fall into these categories.
TAßlE 2






Classification of Structures, Components
and Systems (Seismic and Quality)
Wind and Tornado loadings
Design Codes, Design Criteria, load
Combinations and Reactor Cavity
Design Criteria
Pump Flywheel Integrity
Organic Materials and Post-Accident
Chemistry
RISK ASSESSMENT
The probabilistic assessment technique adopted in this study (for those
topics amenable to PRA analysis) was to examine the impact of the proposed
resolution of each issue on the reliability of plant components or systems or
on the likelihood of accident sequences. The impact of an issue on component
unavailabilities was determined first. The changes in component unavail-
abilities were used to calculate system unavailability changes and these were
used to estimate core melt frequency changes. If the changes in component or
system unavailabilities as a result of resolution of an issue were determined
to be insignificant, the analysis was not carried to the next level. Fault
tree methodology was used for modelling of the systems or subsystems under
consideration.
The above process provided an assessment of the impact of a proposed
SEP modification upon the availability of plant systems.
The same multi level procedure was used to rank the significance of
resolution of an issue with r~spect to risk. If the resolution of an issue
had an insignificant effect on the unavailability of a component or system
under consideration, the risk significance of the issue was ranked low. If
the resolution of the issue had a significant effect on the unavailability of
the system under consideration, plant specific or surrogate PRAs were
utilized to determine if the systems impacted by proposed SEP modifications
would likely appear as important elements in dominant core melt accident
sequences. If the effect of resolution of the event was found to be
insignificant with respect to the core melt sequence frequency, the risk
significance of the issue was ranked low. If the effect on the particular
co~e melt sequence frequency was found to be significant but not dominant to
the overall core melt probability, the risk significance of the issue was
ranked as medium. Finally, if the resolution of the issue had a significant
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effect on the overall co re melt frequency, the significance of the issue was
ranked high with respect to risk.
If an existing PRA was available for the plant under consideration, the
fault trees and quantitative results of the PRA were utilized. Otherwise,
when necessary, fault trees were developed and quantified for the systems under
consideration. For the plants that a PRA was not available, results of other
PRAs performed in the Interim Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP), Reactor
Safety Study Methodology Application Program (RSSMAP) and Reactor Safety Study
on similar plants were considered. These were used for insights on the
importance of systems and accident sequences. In almost all the plants
studied the measure of importance of an issue was its contribution to the
total core melt frequency. The only exceptions were for the cases of Big Rock
Point and Millstone 1 where PRAs, including offsite risk estimates, were
available for our study. For these plants the existance of plant specific
PRAs allowed the quantification of risk reduction potential and estimation of
man-rem reduction due to the resolution of each issue evaluated.
With the exceptions above, although the analysis was quantitative, results
were reported as high, medium or low with respect to risk significance. This
was done because uncertainties and lack of confidence in approximations such as
the use of "similar" PRAs do not warrant the precision that numerical results
might suggest or imply. Figure 1 provides an overviewof the methodology used
in this study.
EXAMPLE OF TOPIC EVALUATION
An example of one of the issues analyzed for the Haddam Neck Plant, a
582 MWe PWR with full power operation in 1968, follows.
The Standard Review Plan (SRP) guidelines for ECCS switchover from
injection to recirculation states that automatie transfer is preferable to
manual transfer. However, in case of manual transfer, the guidelines suggest
that there should be sufficient time (about 20 minutes) for the operator
to complete this action.
The switchover from Emergency Core Cooling injection to recirculation
in the Haddam Neck Plant is currently performed manually. The time available
to the operator to perform this task, given a large LOCA and full flow
operation of the high and low pressure safety injection pumps and charging
pump, is of the order of 6 minutes. If the switchover from injection to
recirculation is not performed in time, the water level in the Refueling Water
Storage Tank (RWST) would become low enough for the safety injection pumps and
charging pumps to be cavitated and possibly damaged. The charging pumps are
required for the long-term two-path recirculation of the water so that boric
acid precipitation can be avoided. Given that the plant does not satisfy the
letter of the SRP guidelines, the issue is whether any of several proposed
modifications should be required of the licensee.
To resolve this issue, the core melt frequency as a result of operator
failure to switchover from ECCS injection to recircu'lation following a LOCA
FIGURE 1 Overview of the Methodology Used in this Study
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must be evaluated. If the contribution of core melt frequency due to this
scenario is determined to be significant with respect to the total core melt
frequency, system modification that could reduce the core melt frequency must
be analyzed.
A fault tree for the failure of the recirculation system was developed
and quantified. A simplified version of this fault tree is shown in Figure 2.
The results showed that the failure probability of the current Haddam Neck
recirculation mechanism, considering both hardware failures and human error,
is 3.1xl0-2 . Based on an assumed large lOCA frequency of 1.0xl0-4 per year,
this leads to a frequency of 3.1xl0- 6 /year for this particular core melt
scenario. The total core melt frequency for the Haddam Neck Plant has never
been calculatedj hence the importance of the scenario is evaluated by comparing
the above core melt probability with the typical core melt probabilities
developed for similar PWRs in the IREP, RSSMAP and Reactor Safety Study. Based
on these evaluations, the overall core melt frequency is in the range of
3xl0- 5 to 2xl0- 4 /year. At the lower end of this range, complete elimination of
the injection-to-recirculation switchover failure scenario would have an effect
on core melt frequency of approximately 10%, but it would not change the order
of magnitude of the frequency. This issue is therefore ranked as having medium
significance from the risk point of view.
Two alternatives to this configuration were analyzed. In the first case,
addition of a set of redundant annunciated level instruments to the RWST was
considered. The licensee has in fact made a commitment to add a redundant set
of alarmed level indicators. This change resulted in reduction of the
estimated failure probability of the recirculation system to 3.9xI0- 3 , which
is an order of magnitude smaller than for the present configuration. This
leads to a core melt frequency of 3.9xI0- 7 /year, due to recirculation failure.
Judging from previous PRAs, this is insignificant at the available level of
precision.
A second modification involving redundant alarms and an automatie switch-
over mechanism was also evaluated. Although some further benefit (reduction
in system failure probability) was derived from the addition of the automatie
switchover, the addition of redundant alarmed sensors alone was deemed
adequate. The same PRA based approach was applied to all SEP topics amenable
. to these techniques. The final risk importance of all evaluated topics on
Haddam Neck are given belpw in Table 3. It should be understood that these
risk results were only one of several decision tools utilized by the US NRC for
determination of modification requirements.· Due to limitations and uncertain-
ties in the risk results, deterministic analysis, and engineering judgment were
also heavily relied upon for guidance. Details of the SEP plant evaluations
can be found in NUREGs 0820-0827.
TABlE 3






Independence of Redundant Onsite Power Systems
Station Battery Test Requirements
DC Bus Voltage Monitoring
Ventilation Systems














































Requirements for Isolation of High and Low
Pressure Systems
ESF Switchover from Injection to Recirculation
Mode (Automatie ECCS Realignment)
Loose Parts Monitoring
Thermal Overload Protection for Motors of
Motor Operated Valves
Reactivity Control System Including Functional
Design and Protection Against Single Failure
RCPB Leak Detection






Onsite Emergency Power Systems - Diesel
Generator
Radiological Consequences of Failure of Small
Lines Carrying Primary Coolant Outside
Containment
Steam Generator Tube Rupture (System and
Radiological Consequences)
CONCLUSIONS
Our experience has shown that this kind of analysis can be quite valuable
in prioritization of different issues when dealing with a large number of
topics. This will enable the analyst to focus the deterministic and more
detailed probabilistic analysis on those issues which are important with
respect to risk. More specifically, it was found that many proposed modifi-
cations that might intuitively 'be expected to be important may' in fact be
quite insignificant when viewed in the context of public risk associated with
the operation of a plant. However, when a proposed modification does turn out
to be important from the standpoint of risk, the quantitative probabilistic
analysis usually provides very strong and convincing support to be considered
along with other deterministic factors. Overall, we believe that probabilistic
analysis can often be used very effectively in evaluating different regulatory
requirements and in choosing among alternative ways of meeting the
requirements.
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PRA - TO WH AT DEPTH?
(The "Bed of Nails" Effect)
H. Fuchs and L. Miteff
Motor-Columbus Consulting Engineers
Parkstrasse 27, CH-5401 Baden, Switzerland
ABSTRACT
A common feature of probabilistic risk studies for nuclear power
plants is a very uneven distribution of the main contributors to
the core melt risk.
A partial PRA for a 3-100p PWR confirmed this picture of an im-
perfeet "bed of nails": having shortened the most prominent
"nail" (risk contributor) by further analysis/plant improvements,
an ever increasing number of the next-longest nails called for
suitable treatment. Realistic analysis and plant improvements may
weil bring down the calculated core melt risk by more than an
order of magnitude compared to Rasmussen but the many "nails" to
be treated lead to diminishing returns for the sharply increasing
amount of work required.
INTRODUCTION
Both the Rasmussen report [1] and the German risk study [2] show a
very uneven distribution of the main contributors to the risk of core





the small LOCA represents by far the most prominent contributor for a PWR
as illustrated qualitatively below:
a) b) c) d)
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Each of these four contributors to the core melt risk is composed of a
number of components (sequences) with widely varying risk contributions, so
that the detailed risk profile for a) - d) looks like a very imperfect "bed
of nails":
a) b) c) d)
The length of the nails corresponds to the core melt frequency per
year induced by the various sequences. Each sequence describes a combina-
tion of fallures in the safety systems which might lead to core melt.
Which amount of effort should be spent by the PRA-team/plant operator
towards a reduction of the most prominent risk contributors, i. e. towards
a more usable "bed of nails"?
Having shortened the most prominent nail by deeper analysis and/or
modifications in the plant - one drops upon the next highest nails and so
on - until one realizes that the way to a more perfect bed of shorter nails
is paved with a rapidly increasing amount of effort needed.
The paper describes some lessons learned from PRA work which was
started to dig deeper (or to improve a "bed of nails" ... ).
HOW THE PRA STARTED
In 1978 a working group, including members from Swiss licensing bod-
ies, nuclear utilities and a consultant started to tackle the questions:
- What is the appropriate basis for emergency planning, especially for
cases with ground contamination?
- How far can results from the Rasmussen study be transferred to
reactor plants in Switzerland?
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Taking as a reference plant a 3-100p PWR, both differences in contain-
ment and systems to the Surry-1 plant were taken into account, as described
in [3]. The result was a core melt probability about an order of magnitude
smaller than for Surry. Meanwhile, more results from the German Risk Study
became available and were taken into account. This resulted in 1981 in a
core melt frequency of 1.7 • 10-5/a as compared to 8.6 • 10-5/a (German
Risk Study) or 1.3 • 10-4 /a (Rasmussen).
The most important contributors to this figure of 1.7 • 10-5/a were:
Sma11 LOCA 71 %
Intermediate LOCA 12 %
ATWS 12 %
The small LOCA included the following main sequences:
Cool down with 100 K/h 57 %
HP Injection 25 %
LP Inject ion 12 %
HOW THE "BED OF NAILS" WAS ATTACKED
(Incentives for a deeper analysis)
The working group and especially the plant owner felt that the analys-
is had not gone tosufficient depth to take credit of various extra fea-
tures of the reactor under investigation. On the other hand, new evidence
[4] showed that the (licensing) criteria for success of ECCS functions in
case of a small LOCA were overly pessimistic. It was therefore decided to
refine the analysis, especially for cooldown and for HP injection. In order
to limit total expenditure, no major computer effort was planned, no new
tools were to be developed.
Work thus concentrated upon differences in plant features, which were
critically evaluated. As far as available, new results on,realistic success
criteria (instead of the licensing criteria) were used (so-called "best-
estimate" criteria).
COOL DOWN WITH 100 K/H
If a "small leak" is smaller than about half the upper limit of the
small LOCA in the German Risk Study, then the primary circuit has to be
cooled down by auxiliary feedwater, so that low pressure (10 bar) is
reached before the reactor water storage tanks are empty (a bigger "small
leak" looses energy fast enough so that no excessive heat-up of the core
occurs before low pressure conditions are reached - in this case, the
100 K/h - cool down is not absolutely necessary). However, since the size of
the break cannot be determined shortly after the onset of the break, the
cool down would be started even for the smaller "intermediate break".
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In the reference plant of the German Risk Study (Biblis B), a manual
procedure was foreseen for cooling down with 100 K/h: the temperature/time
gradient had to be derived from a strip chart and was the basis for the
manual control of the valves. The 3-loop plant investigated in this paper
uses a semiautomatic procedure:
- special type of a acoustical and optical alarm
- upon this special alarm, the operator triggers ...
- ... the automatic cool down devices
If, for whatever reasons (e. g. beca~se of a faulty control system),
the cool down is too rapid, then the protection logic interpretes this as a
break in the secondary side and isolates containment. The 3-loop plant has
introduced a special feature which allows a timely reset of containment
isolation, provided the operators correctly and timely identify the alarms
for containment isolation.
There are two different ways to remove heat during the cooldown: by
blowing off steam from the main steam lines to the atmosphere or to the
condenser.
Neglecting the latter possibility, the failure probability of the
100 K/h-cooldown was assessed to roughly 5 "10-4 Two "na ils" (main risk
contributors) showed up:
the risk contribution by the only device giving the set point for
the cooldown gradient to all of the 3 loops/control systems
- the risk of failure to reset containment isolation
As a consequence
- all three control systems for the cool down were equipped with inde-
pendent set point devices
- reset of containment isolation was made possible from the control
room
As a result of these modifications, the failure probability was re-
duced by a factor of 5 to 1 • 10-4 • If the possibility for blow down of
steam to the condenser is taken into account, the failure probability for
the 100 K/h-cooldown decreases to about 6 • 10- 5 • This figure is in good
agreement with the corresponding results from [5].
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HIGH PRESSURE (HP) INJECTION
In the case of a small or intermediate leak, the high pressure injec-
tion system has to compensate for the water 1055 through the leak until the
low pressure injection system can take over (at about 10 bar primary pres-
sure) the task to remove afterheat.
The main features of interest for the investigation were:
- the peculiarities of a 3 primary loops - 4 x 50 %HP injection
trains - combination
- the use of more realistic success criteria for HP injection based on
"best estimate" emergency core cooling calculations [4J
- the 1oc at ion of the "small" or "i ntermedi ate" 1eak
- the behaviour of the 3-way valves which direct the HP water tö the
hot or the cold leg of the primary circuit
- the effect of a potential miscalibration of the pressure sensors
which trigger the switch over from high pressure to low pressure
injection mode
For the 3 loop - 4 trains problem, leak locations and sizes may deter-
ministically be postulated where the (n-2) criterion might not be literally
met. However, taking into account:
- the behaviour of the 3-way valves (pressure drop needed for a
switch-over, relative pressure drop of the valves)
- the probability for "special" break locations for which the (n-2)
criterion might not be fully met (because too much water is lost)
- realistic (best estimate) success criteria
- the efficiency of the procedure to calibrate the pressure sensors,
it turned out that "special" break locations accounted for less than 10 %
of the total risk contribution of the HP injection, the failure probability
of which was calculated to lie within the interval
1.8 • 10-4 4.5 • 10-4
7.0 • 10-5 3.5 • 10-4
(small leak)
(intermediate leak)
depending on the assessment of the calibration procedure for the pressure-
sensors. The higher numbers referto a rather conservative judgment as in
[2J, the lower ones to a "realistic" approach for the common-mode proba-
bilities for
- incorrect switching over from HP to LP injection
- nonactivation of the ECCS
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The numbers quoted above show that the "nail" HP injection could be
shortened; however, it remains a prominent nail - this points to the poten-
tial merits of a 3 loop - 3 train configuration.
SHORTENING FURTHER "NAILS"
The following items led to further risk leduction ("nail-shortening"):
- effect of 6 accumulators instead of 4 as in the reference plant of
the German Risk Study: some risk reduction for large and intermed-
iate leaks
- ATWS: a more detailed investigation of pressure peaks during trans-
ients allowed a reduction of this risk contribution
- intermediate leaks: the combined effects of the accumulators and the
HP injection were taken into account
These considerations led to some further reduction of the total fre-
quency per year of core melt. This gave the following rounded results:
100 K/h cooldown:
HP injection:










giving a total core melt frequency of about 5 • 10-6/a.
MORE OF THE "BED OF NAILS" EFFECT
The numbers quoted above show clearly the evolution of the relative
importance ("length of nail") of the various sequences and subsequences
leading to core melt: having succeeded in shortening the most prominent
nails by deeper analysis/plant improvements, the next longest nails call
for similar treatment - or they become dominant. We experienced that the
effort needed to shorten further nails increases sharply while the result-
ing decrease of the total risk gets more and more modest. The assessment of
human failure becomes more important, as illustrated by the 100 K/h cool-
down:
In the assessment of 1981, the subsequences
- failure of the special alarm calling for cool down
- failure of the operator to initiate automatie cooldown upon the
special alarm signal
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contributed roughly 10 %to the core melt frequency of the 100 K/h cool-
down. After deeper analysis and the above-mentioned plant modifications,
their relative contribution jumped to about 50 %. This may be somewhat
artificial because we took over the lower limit for human failure proba-
bility of 10-5 (median) of WASH-1400.
Another example is the analysis of the HP injection where the two
common-mode (GM) failures probabilities mentioned in Ghapter 5 accounted
for 43 %of the risk of the HP sequence - as long as success criteria were
defined according to licensing requirements. When "best estimate" criteria
were adopted, the two GM probabilities increased their relative contribu-
tion to over 75 % - again with a strong influence of operator behaviour.
The "bed of nails" effect does not only show up within an accident
sequence, h.'lt also for the set of sequences 1ead ing to core me lt. An ex-
ample to that is the relative contribution of the LP injection to the small
LOGA: it jumps from 12 % in the 1981 version to almost 60 %! Another ex-
ample are ATWS: their contribution to core melt rose from 12 %to around
20 %.
Gonsidering the amount of work involved: a reduction of core melt fre-
quency by a factor of around 5 (8.6 • 10- 5/a in the German Risk Study;
1.7 • 10-5/a as per 1981) needed a substantial effort - the further reduc-
tion by a factor of around 3 (i. e. to 5 • 10-6/a) even more so!
We feel that a further reduction by a factor of 2 would require at
least the same effort as for the prvious factor of 3. For budgetary reasons
this work should therefore be stopped way before an asymptotic, comfortable
"bed of nails" is reached.
Goming to the lessons learnt during the study, one should recall that
the "big" risk studies [1] and [2] gave rise to a large number of modifica-
tions in various plants and to design changes for newly designed reactors.
A transfer of the results of those studies is therefore very worthwhile and
- in the case of the 3-100p PWR investigated here - led also to some modi-
fications in the plant. For the purpose of emergency planning, the work
proved to be helpful, but could have been terminated somewhat earlier.
Areas for further study for the benefit of plant operators and designers
could be:
- more accurate and more specific values for the failure probabilities
of important mechanical and electrical hardware
- better assessment of human failure (operator behaviour, maintenance,
cal ibrations, tests ... ) ,
- better analysis of anticipated transients/without scram
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CONCLUSIONS
The approach to attack in each successive step the most prominent
risk contributors ("nails") is a very sound procedure at least for
comparative PRA's
The 3-loop PWR investigated in this study proved to have a number of
positive features (mainly in systems) and some more were added as a
result of tne PRA study
- Although it was possible to shorten the most prominent nails in the
"bed of nails", still a rather uneven distribution of risk contri-
butors remained. The effort necessary for the analyses increased
progressively, indicating some "law of diminishing returns" for the
effort in analysis, discussion, consensus finding, etc.
- As the risk contributions from the systems and components decrease
due to deeper analysis and plant improvements, the human failure
contribution gains relative weight
- The results were instrumental in limiting the scenarios used for
emergency planning. Further progress is expected from the world-wide
source term work where some improtant risk reduction ("nail-cutting")
is in progress.
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SEVERE ACCIDENT REACTOR RISKS AND
THE POTENTIAL FOR RISK REDUCTION
A. S. Benjamin, V. L. Behr, F. E. Haskin, and D. H. Kunsman
Sandia National Laboratories
Albuquerque, New Hexico, USA 87185
ABSTRACT
Sandia National Laboratories is performing the Severe Accident Risk
Rebaselining and Risk Reduction Program (SARRP) in order to in-
corporate insights from ongoing programs and task forces toward a
rebaselining of reactor risks and of the overall uncertainty. A
second objective is to evaluate the benefits and costs of proposed
new safety features designed to reduce the frequencies and/or con-
sequences of severe accidents. Results to date indicate that onsite
financial risks are generally higher than offsite financial risks,
that the uncertainties in the offsite risks are much larger than
those in the onsite risks, and that expensive safety options are
probably not cost-effective. These results will be a key input to
the Nuclear Regulatory commission's upcoming decision making on
severe accidents.
INTRQDUCTION
During 1985-1986, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will
decide which of several possible directions it will take on the sUbject of
severe accidents. Various possibilities include a rulemaking for fission
product source terms, special provisions for safety backfits, and the estab-
lishment of probabilistic safety goals. To provide the proper technical
basis for these decisions, the NRC is sponsoring the following activities:
(a) a variety of severe accident research programs, combined under the Severe
Accident Research Plan; (b) nation-wide task forces on containment loading,
containment response, and fission product source terms; (c) reviews of the
state-of-che-art by organizations such as the Arnerican Physical Society; and
(d) technical exchange meetings with the Industry Degraded Core (IDCOR) program.
One of the means for integrating this developing array of technical
information is the Severe Accident Risk Rebaselining and Risk Reduction
Program (SARRP), which is apart of the Severe Accident Research Plan
(SARP). The objectives of this program are as follows:
(l) Incorporate insights gained from the sources mentioned above
toward a rebaselining of reactor risks and of the overall
uncertainty in reactor risks.
*This work is supported by the united fltates Nuclear Regulatory commisslon
and performed at Sandia National Laboratories which is operated for the US
Department of Energy under contract number DE-AC04-76DP00789.
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(2) Evaluate the benefits and costs of proposed new safety features
designod to reduce the frequencies and/or consequences of severe
accidents.
The first objective (risk rebaselining) is being accomplished first for
specific plants that. have been analyzed previously in probabilistic risk
assessments, and then for generic plant categories derived by a risk-based
grouping of plant designs. Both a plant-specific and a generic perspective
on reactor risks will result from these analyses.
The plant-specific part of the rebaselining covers six reference plants
having the following types of containments: (a) PWR large-dry, (b) PWR
sUbatmospheric, (c) PWR ice condenser, (d) BWR Mark I, (e) BWR Mark 11, and
(f) BWR Mark 111. The generic part involves a cooperative effort with the
Accident Sequence Evaluation Program (Ref: F. T. Harper, these proceedings)
to establish general risk profiles on the basis of system design, containment
design, and siting factors. ASEP performs the systems evaluations, while
SARRP focuses upon the containment and siting aspects.
For the second objective (cost-benefit analysis) we are comparing the
risk reduction benefits of a variety of safety options to the costs of
implementation. We are directing the cost-benefit analyses primarily toward
existing plants, although some of the results can be extrapolated to new
plants.
The safety options under consideration include systems that prevent the
core from melting and systems that mitigate the consequences. Mitigation
options include: (a) hydrogen control systems, (b) filtered or unfiltered
containment venting systems, (c) increased containment pressure or temperature
capability, (d) additional containment cooling capability, (e) independent
containment spray trains, (f) passive or active core retention devices,
(g) containment water management schemes, and (h) missile shields. Prevention
options include: (a) additional trains of emergency core cooling or auxiliary
feedwater, (b) incorporation of feed-and-bleed capability, (c) automatie
primary system depressurization capability for PWRs, (d) reactor protection
system improvements, (e) improved onsite ac power reliability, (f) improved
service water reliability, (g) improved logic for crossover to recirculation,
(h) improved maintenance of check valves and floor drains, and (i) other
plant-specific modifications.
The first phase of SARRP will be completed during summer 1985. The work
to be accomplished by that time includes a complete iteration on the
objectives described above. This paper describes the fundamentals of our
methodology and presents some preliminary results for two of the reference
plants -- the PWR subatmospheric containment and the BWR Mark 111 containment.
PLANT-SPECIFIC REBASELINE
To discuss the elements that contribute to the rebaselining of reactor
risks, it is convenient to represent the risk in the following way, as the
sum of a product of factors:
RISK = EE FREQ . CFM . CONS (FP )
K IJ I I,J K I,J
Here RISKK is the mean risk associated with consequence K, and
FREQr frequency of accident sequence I.
CFMI,J
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probability of containment failure mode J,
conditional upon occurrence of accident sequence
I.
mean magnitude of consequence K, given fission
product releases FPI,J for containment failure
mode J of sequence I.
Our evaluations of risk include societal risks (e.g., early fatalities and
latent cancer fatalities per year) and individual risks (e.g., mortallty
probability for an individual living close to the plant).
When considering plant modifications that have the potential for reducing
risk, and for which the risk reduction benefit must be weighed against the
cost of implementation, it is convenient to generalize the risk equation,
above, to a "financial risk" equation. Financial risk may be defined as
follows:
FRISK E RISK COST
L K K K,L
where FRISKL is the mean financial risk based on a method of evaluation L,
expressed as dollars per year or per life of the plant, and COSTK L is the
cost associated with consequence K in evaluation method L. Four ~valuation
methods that we use in cost-benefit analyses of plant modifications are:
(1) Offsite Financial Risk -- The mean financial risk resulting
from the offsite costs of severe accidents (e.g., offsite
property damage and the cost of early and latent fatalities).
(2) Onsite Financial Risk -- The mean financial risk resulting from
onsite costs (e.g., replacement power and cleanup costs).
(3) Total Financial Risk -- The sum of offsite and onsite flnancial
risks.
(4) Financial Risk ALARA Guideline -- A surrogate measure of
financial risk, based on evaluating population dose at $1,000
per person-rem.
Accident Seguence Freguencies
The rebaselining of plant-specific sequence frequencies ls being provided
to us by the Accident Sequence Evaluation Program. ASEP utllizes inslghts
obtained from probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) experience and from
reported precursor events to update the accident sequence frequencies
provided in the original PRAs.
A sampling of ASEP results is given in Table I. In general, ASEP has
found that core melt accidents resulting from reactor coolant pump seal
.failures and station blackouts are more probable than originally estimated,
while certain other sequences are less probable.
At this time, the ASEP plant-specific frequency rebaselining includes
some but not all of the plant modifications that have occurred since the PRAs
were originally performed, and some but not all of the credits for improved
procedures. ASEP will more fully evaluate the potential effects of post-PRA
improvements on sequence frequencies during the next several months. As a
result, same of the numbers in Table Imay change.
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Reactor coolant pump seal leak
resulting in plant shutdown, followed
by failure of emergency core cooling
in the injection phase.
Loss of offsite and onsite ac power
(station blackout).
Transient followed by failure to scram,
10ss of main feedwater, and fai1ure of










THL Transient with loss of main and
auxiliary feedwater.
6xlO-6 4x10-6




Transient event with loss of main
feedwater and residual heat removal.
Transient event followed by failure
to~scram.
Transient event followed by fai1ure
of all water delivery systems.







"'Higher frequency for TMLB' applies if loss of reactor coolant pump cooling
causes a large pump seal LOCA.
containment Failure Hode Probabilities
SARRP is performing a study for the NRC Accident Source Term Project
Office (ASTPO) to reassess the various ways in which containments are
threatened and to reevaluate the failure mode probabilities. To perform this
analysis, we are developing comprehensive containment event trees for each of
the six reference plants. The event trees delineate the various pathways that
the accident can take following the loss of core cooling (or in some cases
the loss of containment cooling). Thus, they include not only containment
failure events but also events that describe the progression of core
degradation and tho state of the plant.
To quantify the event trees, and hence to determine the probabilities of
the various accident pathways, we are drawing upon information from a wide
variety of sources. These include NRC-sponsored studies, such as the Con-
tainment Loads Working Group, Containment Performance Working Group, BatteIle
source term analysis for ASTPO (BHI-2l04), and Severe. Accident Sequence
Analysis (SASA) program; also Industry-sponsored sources, such as the Industry
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Degraded Core (IDCOR) program. The study will be completed at the end of
this year and documented as apart of the ASTPO final report (NUREG-0956).
Figure 1 shows some sampIe results. Each probability in Figure 1 is the
summation of the probabilities of the various accident pathways that lead to
a particular containment failure mode, given the occurrence of a particular
initiating accident sequence. The containment failure mode probabilities for
each accident sequence sum to unity.
Three separate estimates are given in Figure 1 -- optimistic, central,
and pessimistic. Basically, these correspond to the low, medium, and high
estimates of containment loading and response provided by the containment
Loads and Performance Working Groups. In some cases, the differences between
the three estimates reflect differences between sources (e.g., BMI-2104
results compared to IDCOR results).
The analysis at this time is quite preliminary and somewhat incomplete.
For example, containment failure from steam explosions and from direct
coupling of core debris energy to the atmosphere ("direct heating") have not
yet been included. They will be included before the study is completed.
In general, we are finding that the original PRAs underestimated the
probability that containment survives a core melt without failure. They may
also have IInderestimated the probability of containment leakage resulting
from penetration failures at high pressure or temperature. For some
sequences, the original PRAs overestimated the probability of containment
failing early during the accident timeline, a situation which can lead to
high consequences. In other cases they may have underestimated that
probability.
Fission Product Source Terms
The plant-specific rebaselining of fission product releases to the
environment are provided by the BatteIle calculations for ASTPO in BMI-2104
and by the NRC-sponsored project entitled Quantitative Uncertainty Estimate
of the Source Term (QUEST). We use the BKI-2104 calculations for the central
estimate and the QUEST calculations for the optimistic and pessimistic
estimates. SampIe results from these studies are given in Figure 2.
In general, the BKI-2104 calculations have produced lower source terms
than those used in the original PRAs, which were based on WASH-1400. The
amount of difference varies strongly between reactor plants, accident
sequences, and containment failure modes. The calculations indicate that the
source term is very small if the containment sprays continue to operate
th~ough the sequence or if the containment survives to late times. However,
these calculations do not account for late-time reevolution of fission
products from the primary system due to decay heating of the surfaces.
Accident Costs
The Regulatory Analysi~ Program provides us with information about the
costs that would be incurred from severe reactor accidents (Ref: R. K.
Burke, these proceedings). Briefly, the costs of early and latent fatalities
are inferred from the expenditure that society has traditionally been willing
to make to prevent deaths (typically $105 to $107 per death, based on
data from various sourees). Property damage costs are obtained from CRAC-2
code calculations. Onsite consequence costs, such as the coats of
replacement power and post-accident cleanup, are estimated from industry
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*Containment failure from steam explosions and direct atmospheric heating are not yet included in
the rebaseline; see text.
**A large leak is defined as one which precludes containment failure from gradual overpressurization--
i.e., at least 2S sq. cm.
Figure 1. Sampling of Interim Rebaselined"Containment Failure Mode Probabilities
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Figure 2. Sampling of Interim Rebaselined Fission Product Source Terms
experience. The costs are usually present-value discounted at a fixed
percentage rate (e.g., 4 percent per year) to account for the difference
between the prevailing interest rate and the rate of inflation.
Financial Ri sk
Figure 3 shows some estimates of offsite and total financial risk for the
PWR subatmospheric and BWR Mark II! reference plants. The results should be
conaidered preliminary and subject to modification as new information becomes
ayailable. We present them as sampIe interim results which depict the general
character but not necessarily the final values of the results to be published
in 1985.
Two point estimates and four uncertainty bands are illustrated for each
case. The first point estimate (A) provides a financial risk estimate
corresponding to the results provided by the original PRA; The second point
estimate (0) derives from rebaselined central estimates of the sequence
frequencies, containment failure mode probabilities, fission product source
terms, and accident costs. The first uncertainty band (A) examines the
effects of sequence frequency uncertainties on the rebaselined central
estimate. The others add to each previous band the uncertainties associated
with (B) containment failure mode probabilities, (C) fission product source
terms, and (D) accident costs.
Two plant configurations are examined. The first includes only those
post-PRA plant improvements which have been formally included in the ASEP
frequency rebaselining. The second estimates the potential effects of credits
that are currently being considered by ASEP but have not yet been incorporated
into their estimates. For the PWR subatmospheric plant, these post-PRA
credits include (a) reactor protection system improvements, (b) auxiliary
feedwater cross-tie, (c) primary system feed-and-bleed capability, (d) emer-
gency procedures for depressurizing the secondary system, and (e) credit for
attaining cold shutdown during certain slow-to-develop sequences. For· the
BWR Mark 111 plant, they include (a) reactor protection system improvements,
(b) new operating procedures for automatic depressurization system, (c) emer-.
gency procedures for unfiltered containment venting (low volume), and
(d) incorporation of a hydrogen igniter system (ac power dependent).
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Figure 3. Interim Rebaselined Offsite and Total Financial Risks
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It is apparent from Figure 3 that the total financial risk for these
plants is considerably larger than the offsite financial risk, indicating the
importance of onsite costs such as power replacement and cleanup. The overall
uncertainty in the total financial risk, however, is considerably smaller
than that for offsite financial risk, because the onsite costs are basically
independent of containment failure mode and fission product source term. The
rebaselining based on central estimates results in a cons~derable reduction
in the offsite financial risks, compared to the original PRAs, primarilY
because of the less conservative containment end source term treatment.
However, the central-estimate rebeselining for the PWR plant leads to an
increase in the total financial risk because of the higher core melt prob-
ability. The post-PRA credits discussed above have a potential for reducing
both offsite and total financial risks by an order-of-magnitude or more for
the BWR, somewhat less for the PWR. Generally, the estimates of financial
risk based on the original PRAs fall within the overall uncertainty range of
the rebaselined estimates.
Benefits Versus Costs
Figure 4 shows some preliminary estimates of benefit versus cost for
three safety options applied to the two reference plants. To conserve space,
only the two point estimates and the total uncertainty band (D) are included
in the illustrations. The benefit is evaluated as the difference between the
financial risks before and after the implementation of the safety option
(i.e., the averted financial risk). The cost is the expenditure required for
retrofitting'the safety option into the reactor plant, including possible
down-time costs. The cost estimates were provided by vendors and architect-
engineering firms.
Figure 4 illustrates that despite the large uncertainties, certain
proposed backfits can strongly be shown to be not cost-effective. These are
the cases for which the benefit is unequivocally less than the cost. (i.e.,
the filtered venting system and auxiliary feedwater train in Figure 4(a) and
the residual heat removal train in Figure 4(b).) In cases where the benefit
and cast uncertainties overlap, the determination of cost-effectiveness is
less clear.
CLOSURE
The information being generated in this program will address severe
accident issues in the following ways:
(1) By displaying the state-of-the-art of risk assessment, it will
help to clarify whether risk assessment can be used as a tool
for regulatory decision making.
(2) By portraying quantitatively how the overall uncertainty in
financial risk is distributed between various sources, it will
help to prioritize phenomenological r~search.
(3) By providing a ranking of potential safety options in terms of
relative costs and benefits, it will indicate which safety
options ought to be considered for further analysis and
possible implementation.
The results will thus provide a key input to NRC's upcoming severe
accident 'decision making.
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Figure 4. Interim Rebaselined Cost-benefit Comparisons for Three
Safety Options
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SEVERE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AND RISK ASSESSMENT
FOR TWO BOILING WATER REACTORS*
R. A. Bari, I. A. Papazoglou, W. T. Pratt,
K. Shiu, H. Ludewig, and N. Hanan
Department of Nuclear Energy
Brookhaven National Laboratory
Dpton, New York 11973, U.S.A.
ABSTRACT
Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) has been involved in two
comprehensive probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) activities for
boiling water reactors. Specifically, detailed reevaluations
of the PRAs have been performed for the Limerick Generating Sta-
tion and for the General Electric Standard Plant, GESSAR-11.
The purpose of this paper is to present the insights and conclu-
sions from these studies, and in particular, to focus on the
similarities and differences between these studies in terms of
methodologies, assumptions, and results.
I. INTRODDCTION
Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) has been involved in two compre-
hensive probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) activities for boiling water
reactors. Specifically, detailed reevaluations of the risks have been per-
formed for the. Limerick Generating Station and for the General Electric
Standard Plant, GESSAR-II relative to those presented in the initial stud-
ies. The initial studies were performed by the Philadelphia Electric Com-
pany [l], and the General Electric Company [2], respectively, and BNL was
chartered by the D.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to perform the indepen-
dent peer reviews.
The purpose of this paper is to present the insights and conclusions
from these peer review studies, and in particular, to focus on the similari-
ties and differences between these studies in terms of methodologies, as-
sumptions, and results. In addition, we discuss the peer review processes
for these studies. .
The risk assessments were performed for two distinct purposes • The
Limerick PRA was performed as a condition for the operating license because
it was perceived by the NRC that, because of the plant' s location near a
high population density area, it might pose risks that would be a dispropor-
tionately high component of total societal risk from D.S. commercial nuclear
reactor operation. The construction of Limerick-I is essentially complete
and public hearings are currently being held in connection with (and prior
to) its operation. The GESSAR PRA was performed as part of the standard
*This work was performed under the auspices of the D.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
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plant safety analysis report which is being reviewed by NRC in connection
with its final design approval process for new construction permit applica-
tions. The GESSAR PRA is a180 being evaluated in connection with NRC I S
activities on severe accident rulemaking [3] for standard plant design cer-
tification.
References 1 and 2 did not include within their scopes the assessment
of the risks from in-plant fires or from seismic initiators. However, in
subsequent studies, both organizations did s'upplement their initial PRAs
with assessments of the risk from in-plant fires and from seismic initi-
ators. These subsequent studies were also reviewed by Brookhaven National
Laboratory. The external events analysis for Limerick was reported in the
Severe Accident Risk Assessment [4]. The GESSAR-II external events analysis
was reported in supplements to Reference 2.
In the case of Limerick, BNL performed a limited review of the Severe
Accident Risk Assessment [4] and this is reported in Reference [5]. In Ref-
erence 5, BNL concluded that Reference 4 appeared to carry out a state-of-
the-art evaluation of the core melt frequency due to seismic and fire initi-
ating events. A limited requantification of the core melt frequency was
performed in an attempt to replicate results and to highlight sensitivities
to model assumptions.
BNL also performed an assessment of the containment failure modes and
fission product release related to seismic initiators and this is reported
in Reference [6]. Reference 6 provided teahnical support information for
the Draft and Final Environmental Statements on the Limerick, Generating
Station by the D.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. As per request by NRC,
BNL performed an assessment of the fission product source terms in which the
WASH-1400 methodology was followed to compute the radionuclide releases to
the environment.
In the case of GESSAR, the BNL assessment of the risks from seismic and
fire initiators is ongoing at the time of this writing and therefore will
not be discussed further here. Thus the remainder of this paper will focus
on the internal event contributors to the risk assessments.
11. DESCRIPTION OF PLANTS
Abrief description of the plants is presented in this section.
Limerick is a BWR/4 with a MARK-II containment and is rated at 3293
MWt, It is sited in eastern Pennsylvania, near the city cif Philadelphia.
Details of the plant design can be obtained from Reference 1 and from the
Final Safety Analysis Report on Limerick.
GESSAR-II is a BWR/6 with a MARK-III containment and is rated at 3579
MWt. Much of the GESSAR-11 design description can be obtained from the
Safety Evaluation Report [7] on GESSAR-II. In that report, it can be seen
that GESSAR-II is similar to other BWR/6, MARK-III plants such as Grand
Gulf, Clinton, and particularly, Perry. The GESSAR-II PRA was performed for
a given Nuclear Island Design which does not include the following balance
of plant facilities: turbine building; service water building; switchyard.
In addition, the offsite consequence analysis was not performed for an
actual site but, rather, it was performed with reference to Composite Site
#6 of WASH-1400.
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Both the Limerick and GESSAR-II designs represent modern BWR technol-
ogy. In particular, both plants utilize high and low pressure coolant in-
jection systems with automatic depressurization and both plants have reactor
protection systems which feature alternate rod insertion, recirculation pump
trip and standby liquid control.
111. METHODS AND RESULTS FOR THE TWO STUDIES
In this section a synopsis of the principal methods and results of each
study is presented.
111.1 The Limerick PRA
The Limerick PRA used the methods and approaches of WASH-1400 as per
request from the U.S.N.R.C. Specifically, the U.S.N.R.C. requested the
Philadelphia Electric Company to produce a study which used the basic
approach and techniques of WASH-1400, but which accounted for plant-specific
design differences between Limerick and the WASH-1400 plant (Peach Bottom)
and included site-specific analyses of offsite consequences.
The accident sequences that dominate the core melt frequency are tran-
sients (and not accidents initiated by loss of coolant inventory). These
include: 1) transients that do not cause feedwater and power conversion
system unavailability, coupled with failure of these systems, failure of the
high pressure injection systems and failure to timely and manually depres-
surize the reactorj 2) loss of offsite power transients coupled with failure
of the high pressure injection system and failure of either the low pressure
injection 'system or failure to timely and manually depressurize the reactorj
3) transients that imply loss of feedwater and power conversion system, fol-
lowed by failure of the high pressure injection system and failure of either
the low pressure injection system or failure to timely and manually depres-
surize the reactorj 4) a transient coupled with a failure of the containment
heat removal function that leads to containment failurej 5) a transient
coupled with failure to scram.
In contrast, WASH-1400 concluded that transients coupled with a loss of
containment heat removal function are the type of accidents with the highest
frequency. Next, in the WASH-1400 assessment come anticipated transients
without scram (ATWS) sequences, and last, transients followed by loss of
high and low pressure injection functions. This inversion in the order of
importance is due partly to differences in the methodology used, as weIl as
to differences in the design of the plants. The methodology employed in the
Limerick study is more detailed and realistic than that employed in WASH-
1400, particularly in Hs inclusion of the possibilHy of recovering un-
available systems. This is important for the containment heat removal sys-
tem since there is aperiod of 20 hours after the initiation of the accident
during which the system can be recovered. The system for containment heat
removal in the Limerick station is more reliable than that considered for
the WASH-1400 plant. Finally, the ATWS sequences do not contribute signif-
icantly to the frequency of core damage for the Limerick station because the
design of the plant incorporates the alternate-3A modification in the ATWS
prevention/mitigation system suggested by the NRC staff, and because the
modeling and quantification of the ATWS sequences in the Limerick PRA are
more realistic and, hence, less conservative than in WASH-1400.
The core ~eltdown analysis for Limerick [1] was performed with a modi-
fied version of the MARCH code (INCOR). The CORRAL and CRAC codes were used
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to compute fission product transport and offsite consequences, respect-
ive1y. Four accident c1~sses were defined:
C1ass I: core damage sequences with 10ss of coo1ant makeup;
core damage before containment fai1ure;
C1ass 11: sequences with fai1ure of 10ng-term heat removal
function; containment fai1ure before core damage;
C1asses 111 & IV: ATWS sequences with core damage prior to and
fo110wing containment fai1ure, respective1y.
In the Limerick PRA, C1ass I contributed almost 90% of the total core
damage frequency and C1ass IV contributed 1ess than 1%; C1asses II & III
contributed almost equa11y to the remainder of the total core damage fre-
quency. Based on these accident c1asses, containment event trees were
deve10ped and five characteristic fission product release categories were
defined. The (point estimate) source term analysis was simi1ar to the
treatment in WASH-1400 except that the design specHic features of the
MARK-lI containment were accounted for in the Limerick PRA and suppression
pool decontamination factors of 100 and 10 where used for both e1ementa1
iodine and particu1ates for subcoo1ed and saturated pools, respective1y.
The inf1uence of newer source term methods (beyond WASH-1400 methods)
was given 1imited consideration, in terms of an uncertainty analysis, in
Reference 1. A more extensive source term sensitivity study was inc1uded in
Reference 4.
The offsite health effects for Limerick are given in Tab1e 1. The
C1ass I sequences contribute significant1y to latent fata1ities which the
C1ass IV sequences are important for ear1y fata1ities.
Tab1e I Comparison of Riaks for Limerick PRA,
GESSAR-II PRA and WASH-1400 BWR
RISK INDEX LIMERICK PRA GESSAR-II PRA WASH-1400 BWR
Core Damage Frequency 1.5x10-5 5.0x10-6 5.7x10-5 (a)
Expected Ear1y Fata1i-
2.4x10-6 o (c) 3.0x10-5 (b)ties (per plant year
of operation)
Expected Latent Fata1-
1. 7x10-5 (c) 2;h10-2 (b)ities (per plant year 1.2x10-2
of operation)
(a) Mean Va1ue assuming log-normal distribution, median,
and error factor reported in WASH-1400.
(b) From Tab1e 5-6, Main Report, WASH-1400.
(c) Based on newer source term approaches than Limerick PRA or
WASH-1400.
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111.2 The GESSAR-II PRA
A summary of the GESSAR-II PRA is presented in Reference [8] and this
synopsis is extracted from there.
The methodology used in the PRA is essentially the WASH-1400 approach,
but it is augmented by the use of recent developments in the computation of
the core melt frequency and of the consequences of postulated accidents. A
combined fault tree/event tree procedure is used to delineate accident se-
quences. Transient and loss of coolant accidents define the initiators and
demand failures of the water makeup systems, decay heat removal systems, and
reactor protection systems are computed. As in this case of the Limerick
PRA, realistic success criteria are used to model system response.
The acc1dent sequences are grouped into accident classes which are then
related to radionuclide release categories with the aid of containment event
trees.
The physical phenomena associated with core meltdown, containment load-
ing, and fission product transport are modeled with the MARCH and CORRAL
computer codes. However, unlike the Limerick PRA, the GESSAR-II PRA uses
current information (e.g., NUREG-0772) to develop its (point estimate) acci-
dent source terms. Offsite consequences were determined with the CRAC code.
The GESSAR-II PRA predicted that there would be no early fatalities
from the accident sequences studied. This is due, according to GE, to the
effectiveness of fission product scrubbing in the suppression pool (relative
to that assumed in WASH-1400) and to their analysis of in-vessel retention
of fission products (which was ignored in WASH-1400).
Table I gives the computed risk indices for the Limerick and GESSAR-II
PRAs and the WASH-1400 BWR results are given for comparison.
IV. THE PEER REVIEWS BY BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY
IV.l The Peer Review of the Limerick PRA
In NUREG/CR-3028 [9], we reported that our point estimates of the core
damage frequency, expected acute fatalities, and expected latent fatalities
are greater than those given for the Limerick PRA (see Table 1) by factors
of 6.7, 20, and 15, respectively.
In the BNL revision, both a point value of the frequency of core damage
and the associated uncertainties were assessed. The 90% probability range
for the frequency of core damage of the BNL revision spans almost two orders
of magnitude from 6.6xl0-6 (5% percentile) to 3.3xl0-4 (95% percentile).
The median value is equal to 3.7xl0-5• It is noteworthy that according to
the uncertainty assessment of the BNL version there is an 80% chance that
the core-damage frequency will be lower than the BNL point estimate, a 65%
chance that the core-damage frequency will be lower than the mean value of
the Reactor Safety Study BWR estimate, and a 22% chance thatit will be
lower than the Limerick study estimate.
The difference between the Limerick and Brookhaven point values for the
core-damage frequency is mainly due to three factors. The first is related
to the dependences between reactor safety functions that exist as a result
of the use of common support systems for different safety systems, as weIl
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as dependences between the initiators and mitigating systems. The BNL re-
vision accounted for some of these dependences that were not in the Limerick
study. Second, Brookhaven found it necessary to make several corrections
and modifications to the event trees and fault trees. The third key factor
that led to a difference in the Limerick and Brookhaven results was that
different values were used for the frequencies of some of the twelve acci-
dent initiators.
The BNL revision is in qualitative agreement with the Limerick study on
the identification of the highest frequency accident sequences. These acci-
dent sequences were outlined in Section 111.1.
The increase in health consequences in the BNL study resulted largely
from the difference in the assessments of the core-damage frequency. A re-
evaluation by Brookhaven of the containment event tree analysis also in-
creased both acute and latent fatalities, but with less impact than the new
core-damage frequencies. The BNL analyses of fission product behavior had
little effect on acute fatalities and reduced latent fatalities. An in-
depth review -of the consequences (site) model used in the LGS-PRA was out-
side the scope of the BNL review. The consequence model used in the
Limerick PRA was based on the WASH-1400 model, but with changes to reflect
population and meteorology appropriate to the Limerick site. The BNL health
consequences were alsobased on the WASH-1400 model. However, because dif-
ferent versions of the computer code (CRAC) were used to determine conse-
quences for the Limerick PRA and by BNL, the increases in the health conse-
quences also reflect differences in the mathematical models. The BNL CRAC
model increased total mean acute and latent fatalities by a factor of ap-
proximately 3 relative to the version of CRAC used for the Limerick PRA.
The complementary cumulative distribution functions (CCDF) for acute
and latent fatalities are presented in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. The
figures depict the "point estimate" CCDF of the BNL version, the 5% and 95%
limits of the BNL uncertainty assessment, the point estimate of the Limerick
study, and the point estimate of the WASH-1400 (RSS) BWR CCDF. The BNL un-
certainty assessment reflected in Figures 1 and 2 does not include uncer-
tainty associated with the consequence (site) model. The prediction of
acute fatalities is very sensitive to the assumed evacuation model. Based
on an NRC staff model for evacuation, we recomputed the expected early
fatalities and found them to be approximately one order of magnitude greater
than those predicted with the WASH-1400 model.
Importance analysis was conducted for the frontline safety systems,
their support systems, and for other significant events with respect to the
frequency of core damage. Various importance measures were used: the
Fussell-Vesely measure, the risk degradation worth, and the risk improvement
worth and our results for these are given in Reference [10]. Recently, the
results of these importance analyses have been used by BNL in the develop-
ment of a prioritization scheme for startup and preoperational testing at
Limerick. The NRC regional staU must conduct these tests on systems and
components and, because of limited resources, these tests must be priori-
tized according to their importance to safe operation of the plant. This is
a very useful application to safety activities of PRA results which goes be-
yond the conventional statement of the "bot tom line" risk results.
IV.2 The Peer Review of the GESSAR-PRA
At the time of this writing, the review of the GESSAR-II PRA has not
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Figure 1 Complementary Cumulative Distribution
Functions for Acute Fatalities.
Figure 2 Complementary Cumulative Distribution
Functions for Latent Fatalities.
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Furthermore, because of the commercial proprietary nature of the General
Electric Company's work on GESSAR-II, we must refrain from reporting
material that is not already in the open literature (until adetermination
is made to do otherwise).
The review of the GESSAR-II PRA required several staff years of effort
at BNL, over an approximately two year period. Several meetings were held
with NRC staff and cognizant GE staff. The review process approximated an
interactive review in which BNL findings were presented to the GE staff at
meetings and in interim reports and this resulted in an open exchange on
some of the technical issues associated with the PRA. As was the case for
the Limerick PRA, BNL differed with the GESSAR-II PRA on the modeling of
support system dependences. Importance analysis was also performed on the
basis of BNL's revision of the GESSAR-II PRA.
In the areas of containment response to severe accidents and fission
product behavior, BNL reassessed the source terms for GESSAR-II by account-
ing for the most current, technically defensible, information on this sub-
ject. This included surveys and reviews of 1) GE's work, 2) the work of
IDCOR (U.S. Nuclear Industry's activity on rulemaking with respect to
degraded cores), 3) the work done under the auspices of the U. S. NRC' s
Accident Source Term Program Office.
With regard to the latter, BNL acquired most of the computer codes pro-
duced by that program and used them, in part, in the GESSAR-II source term
reassessment. Thus BNL' s evaluation of the GESSAR-11 source is in marked
contrast to BNL' s assessment (as weIl as Philadelphia Electric Company' s
assessment) of the Limerick source term. The latter basically followed a
WASH-1400 prescription, which is generally regarded to be conservative. BNL
did not do an offsite consequence assessment for GESSAR-II. Rather, BNL
supplied its accident source terms to the NRC staff who then performed the
consequence evaluation.
V. DISCUSSION
The peer review activities for the Limerick and GESSAR-II PRAs were
very detailed, manpower intensive, lengthy activities. Complex results were
replicated in detail. Computer codes (e.g., WAMCUT, WAMBAM, SETS, MARCH,
CORRAL, CRAC) were extensively used to verify results and to develop altern-
atives. Furthermore, the codes themselves and their input data sets were
scrutinized. Many meetings and conference calls were held in order to
obtain information and exchange differences of technical views. In the case
of Limerick, site visits were made by BNL staff.
Based on this review experience, several questions can be posed about
the peer review process for PRAs. Some of these are: 1) What is the proper
level of depth for a review? 2) Can the review process be standardized?
3) How should differences between review results and the initial study be
resolved? We provide our opinions on each of these.
With regard to Item 1, it has been the experience of BNL that there is
a need to verify the specific quantitative claims made in a PRA i.e., it is
not enough to ascertain that, for example, a state-of-the-art tool was used
in a particular area - one must verify that the appropriate analysis was
indeed performed. We are not implying that performers of PRAs are devious.
Rather, because PRA is still an emerging technology, there is much room for
differences in interpretations and/or assumptions.
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With regard to Item 2, we believe that some aspects of a PRA review can
be standardized and we at BNL have attempted [11] to do this. However, be-
fore a standard review process can be optimized, one would need standard
procedures for reporting the results of PRAs. Again, we have attempted [12]
to develop such standard procedures.
Finally, it appears to us that Item 3 would need to be answered if clo-
sure of the PRA performance/review process is desired. However, this may
not be needed on all issues for which differences may exist. For example,
if differences on a particular issue lead to minor differences in overall
risk, then it may not be worth the resources required to achieve resolution
[13]. On the other hand, if a particular end use of a PRA result requires
resolution of some issue, then it may be worthwhile to have the view of a
third (non-interested) party. If the issue involves one (or a limited num-
ber) of the many disciplines that are spanned by a PRA analysis, then per-
haps a panel of experts in that field could render a judgment on the nar-
rower issues.
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SEISMIC RISK ASSESSMENT AS APPLIED TO THE
ZION NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION*
James E. Wells
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Livermore, California 94550, USA
ABSTRACT
To assist the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its
licensing and evaluation role, the NRC funded the Seismic Safety
Margins Research Program (SSMRP) at Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL) with the goal of developing tools and data bases to
evaluate the risk of earthquake caused radioactive release from a
commercial nuclear power plant. This paper describes the SSMRP risk
assessment methodology and the results generated by applying this
methodology to the Zion Nuclear Generating Station. In addition to
describing the failure probabilities and risk values, the effects of
assumptions about plant configuration, plant operation, and
dependence will be given.
INTRODUCTION
A nuclear power plant is designed to ensure the survival of all buildings
and emergency safety systems in a worst-case ("safe shutdown") earthquake.
The assumptions underlying this design process are deterministic. In
practice, however, these assumptions are clouded by considerable uncertainty.
It is not possible, for example, to accurately predict the worst earthquake
that will occur at a given site. Soil properties, mechanical properties of
buildings; and damping in buildings and internal structures vary significantly
among plants. To properly analyze seismic risk it is necessary to consider
all significant sources of uncertainty as weIl as all significant
interaetions. Total risk is obtained by considering the entire spectrum of
possible earthquakes and integrating their calculated consequences. .
There are five steps in the SSMRP methodology [1] for calculating the
seismic risk at a nuclear power plant:
1. Determine the loeal earthquake hazard.
2. Identify potential accident scenarios for the plant which lead to
radioactive release.
3. Determine failure modes for the plant emergency safety systems.
4. Compute failure probabilities of the critical components in the
emergeney safety systems.
5. Compute probability of radioactive release using information from
Steps 1 through 4.
* This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. DOE by LLNL under
contract number W-7405-ENG-48.
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Abrief discussion of each of these steps is given below.
St~ Determine the Earthquake Hazard
The earthquake hazard at a given power plant site is characterized by a
frequency plot which gives the probability of occurrence (per year) of
earthquakes causing different peak ground accelerations. For the Zion Nuclear
Generating Station, located at Zion, Illinois, approximately 40 miles north of
Chicago, this curve is derived from a combination of recorded earthquake data,
estimated earthquake magnitudes of known events for which no data are
available, review of local geological investigations, and use of expert
opinion based on a survey of seismologists and geologists familiar with the
region in question.
In addition to computing the seismic hazard curve, a number (usually 30)
of random synthetic earthquakes are generated using the HAZARD computer code.
These earthquake time histories provide the random ground motion uncertainty
inherent in real earthquakes, and are used as input to the building response
calculations described below.
Step 2 - Identify Accident Sequences
In this step we identify the possible paths that a reactor system could
follow during a shutdown, given that an earthquake-related event has occurred
which causes shutdown. These paths usually involve an accident and a
subsequent failure of one or more safety systems and are referred to as
"acc ident sequences".
All the accident sequences result from one or more seismically-induced
initiating events (events requiring immediate shutdown of the plant). For the
Zion plant, seven classes of initiating events were considered. For each of
these initiating events, an event tree is constructed. Each branch of an
event tree is an accident sequence.
Step 3 - Determine Failure Modes of Safety Systems
To determine failure modes for the plant safety systems, fault tree
methodology was used. Construction of a fault tree beg ins by identifying the
immediate causes of system failure. Then each of these causes is examined for
more fundamental causes, until one has constructed a downward branching tree,
at the bot tom of which are failures not further reducible, i.e., failures of
mechanical or electrical components due to all causes such as fault tree are
called basic events. Fault trees are required for each safety system
identified on the event trees. For Zion, seven safety systems were modeled.
Most of the systems modeled required both electric power and service water, so
detailed fault trees were also developed for both these systems.
The basic failure events contained in the fault trees fell into three
categories: (1) human and maintenance errors, (2) other random failures, and
(3) seismically-induced component failures.
Step 4 - Compute Failure Probabilities of Critical Components in the Safety
Systems
To compute the failure of critical components and safety systems, it is
necessary to have both a measure of the maximum load or acceleration that the
component experiences during an earthquake as well as a measure of the load or
acceleration level at which it fails. Both the maximum load and the strength
at failure are random variables. The strength at failure of the buildings and
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the mechaüical and electrical equipment is never known exactly, for there is
usually wide variation in the results of tests to determine their failure
characteristics. Uncertainties in material properties, soil layering, wall
dimensions and joint connectivity influence the response of the building to an
earthquake. All of these uncertainties give rise to uncertainties in
calculating the response and onset of failure of each building and component
in the power plant. The most important feature of the SSMRP is that these
uncertainties are explicitly recognized and propagated through the
calculational scheme, so that the result is not a single number, but rather,
the statistical probability of the occurrence'of core melt and radioactive
release.
The buildings, foundations, major components, and p~p~ng systems are all
modeled by the finite element method. SSI and structure response were
calculated by the substructure approach. Piping analysis was performed by
multi-support time history analysis. To incorporate the uncertainties,
multiple analyses of the entire power plant are made. In each of these
repeated calculations, the magnitudes of the input parameters are varied in a
random fashion, and each calculation is performed using a different set of
three input time histories.
Component failure is defined as either loss of operatability or pressure
boundary integrity. Failure (fragility) is characterized by a cumulative
distribution function which describes the probability that failure has
occurred given a value of load. Loading may be local spectral acceleration or
moment, depending on the component and failure mode under consideration.
Contrary to previous work, fragility is related to the appropriate local
response, rather than being related to the free-field peak ground
acceleration.
A data base of the necessary fragility functions was developed. As a
first step, all components identified on the fault trees were grouped into 37
generic categories. Fragility functions for each generic category were
developed based on a combination of design analysis reports, experimental
data, and an extensive expert opinion survey. Statistical methods were used
to combine data from several sources.
Step 5 - Compute Probability of Core Melt and Radioactive Release
Accident sequence probabilities are calculated to determine radioactive
release probabilities. Core melt probability is the sum of the probability of
all acident sequences leading to core melt.
(a) Calculation of Cut Set Probabilities
Each accident sequence consists of the statistical union of sets of events
(successes or failures of components) which must occur together (min cut
sets). The computer code SEISIM [2] was written expressly to calculate the
probability of such component failure groups including all common-cause
failures. Given the individual component responses and fragilities (in terms
of the means and variances of their distributions) and given the computed
correlations between the responses (obtained from the 30 time his tory response
calculations at each earthquake level), SEISIM constructs a multi-variate
lognormal distribution for each component failure group, and then uses
n-dimensional numerical integration to compute the probability of the
component failure group occurring.
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(b) Calculations of Probability of Radioactive Release
Once the component failure group probabilities have been computed, the
probability of each accident sequence can be found using the expression for
the statistical union of independent cut sets, which is an upper bound to the
accident sequence probability. Then each accident sequence probability is
multiplied by the probability of the earthquake's occurrence and the
probability of failure of the containment to obtain the probability of
radioactive release. Several different contaimnent failure modes of different
severity were identified, ranging from rupture of the containment shell to
leakage of the containment isolation valves. Different containment failure
modes are assigned to different accident sequences depending on the
understanding of the physical processes involved. One accident sequence can
result in one or more containment failure modes.
Finally, accident sequence probabilities are assigned to different release
categories to reflect their severity with respect to radioactive release to
the surrounding population. These release categories relate to the type and
energy content of the radioactive fission product release, as weIl as the mode
and timing of the release. They range from rupture of the top of the
containment with a rapid, high energetic release (due to a fuel/water
explosion or steam overpressure) to slo\{ melt-through of the containment
concrete foundation, which is expected to have the least effect on the
surrounding population. The containment failure modes and the release
categories are those derived and used in the, Reactor Safety Study [3).
RESULTS
This section presents the results of the seismic risk analysis of the zion
Nuclear Generating Station [4). The calculations of the median core melt
probability and the confidence bounds are also described.
The base case described in this section is our best estimate of the
configuration of the zion plant and its emergency procedures. A number of
important assumptions have been made as described below.
1. It is assumed that "feed and bleed" emergency core cooling can
be performed after an earthquake. In this procedure, which is
employed if the auxiliary feedwater system has failed, the
operator makes use of the emergency safety pumps to pump cooling
water to the core. The resulting steam is bled-off through the
pressurizer relief valves.
2. The identified structural failure modes are assumed to have
their most serious consequences. Two structural failure modes
play crucial roles.
(i) The failure of the service water pump enclosure roof (at
top of the crib house) is assumed to fail all six service
water pumps beneath it. This results in loss of the
emergency AC power diesel generators, due to lack of
cooling water.
(ii) The failure of the wall between the turbine building and
the auxiliary building is assumed to cause loss of all
electrical wiring and control circuits, SO both power and
control to the reactor building are lost.
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3. Soil failure under the toe of the containment is assumed to
result in sufficiently large rocking motions so as to fail the
SIS, CHG, RHR, CSIS and CSRS piping between the AFT building and
the reactor building.
4. Failure of the vertical column supports under the steam
generators and reactor coolant pumps assumed to result in a
break in the primary coolant piping equivalent to a large LOCA
initiating event. It was assumed that failure of supports in
two different loops results in a reactor vessel rupture
initiating event.
These assumptions play an important role in the base case results.
Probability of Radioactive Release
The median frequency of radioactive release for the base case was computed
to be 3 x 10-5 per year. This value reflects inherent randomness in all the
input variables and the hazard curve, as well as modeling uncertainties in all
the input variables due to lack of exact knowledge of their mean values. The
10% and 90% confidence bands on the release frequency were found to be about 3
orders of magnitude apart. The median values and confidence bounds were
obtained by making repeated calculations of the release frequencies for the
base caSe, while varying the median values of all input variables according to
an experimental design. Fourteen repeated calculations were performed, with
new sets of structural responses, fragility curves, and hazard curves used for
each. The median value and confidence bounds were inferred from these
fourteen runs, as seen in Fig. 1. The core melt frequency is due primarily to
the failure of certain structural elements which result in common-cause
failures of the safety systems.
1.0 rr--~~--'---~-----.----,r------'
10-8 10-6 10-4 10-2
Frequency of core malt per year
Fig. 1. Uncertainty intervals on frequency of core melt (best estimate).
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Results for the Base Gase with Random Uncertainty Only
To illustrate the important accident scenarios, the results of a single
analysis of the base case are presented below. In these calculations all
input variables were assigned best estimate values for their medians and
standard deviations. The median hazard curve was used. In effect, this base
case calculation gives the risk at zion with no effects of modeling
uncertainty.
Table 1 summerizes the results of the risk calculations for the base
case. This table presents the probabilities per year of occurrence of the
seven release categories and the man/REM per year associated with each release
category. As can be seen from this table, the release categories having the
highest probability of occurrence are release categories 2 (containment
failure due to steam water explosion) and 7 (melt-through of basemat) with
probabilities of occurrence of 1.4E-6 and 1.5E-6 per year, respectively. The
man-REM/year released comes from release categories 2 and 3 (containment
failure due to overpressure). Note that the conversion of release category
probabilities to man-REM/year released is based on averaged values for a PWR
taken from NUREC/GR-2800 and are not specific to Zion. The total probability
of core melt is seen to be 3.6E-6 per year and the total release is 9.6
man-REM/year. These release category probabilities were found to be due
primarily to the failures of certain local structural elements and
inter-building piping which resulted in common-cause failures of the safety
systems.
Table 1. Base Gase (With Feed and Bleed and Structural Failures) Summary of
Release Probability and Dose

























In terms of both core melt probability and dose, it was found, that, of the
six earthquake levels studied, earthquake levels 2, 3, and 4 are dominant and
the probabilities and dose were significantly smaller at earthquake levels 1
and 6. This indicates that we captured the bulk of the risk in the middle
earthquake levels (2 to 4 SSE), and that the range of earthquakes considered
is adequate.
It was found that, at the three lower earthquake levels, the initiating
events are dominated by the transients. At earthquake level 4, it is
primarily the small and small-small LOGAs which are important. At earthquake
level 5 the initiating event probabilities are fairly evenly spread over the
initiating events and the LLOGA and RPV initiating events have become
significant. Finally, at level 6 the dominant initiating events are the RPV
and LLOGA events. Thus, we see that as we increase the level of earthquake
excitation the contribution of the more severe initiating events increases.
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Out of the total 9.6 man-REM/year, approximately 6.1 man-REM/year is due
to aeeident sequenees eaused direetly by the uplift and erib house pump room
roof failures, and 2.7 man-REM/year is due to failures of pairs of pipes
between the reaetor and AFT buildings. Thus it is seen that, for the base
ease eomputations of the seismie risk at Zion, the struetural failures and the
assumptions as to their eonsequenees play an overriding role.
Sensitivity of Risk Results to Basic Assumptions
To test the fundamental assumptions on whieh the base ease results were
predieated, three additional risk assessments of Zion were performed, with the
results shown on Table 2. In ease I, the effeets of the struetural failures
(the service water pump enelosure rOOll! roof, auxiliary building shear wall,
and soil failure and basemat uplift) were removed, but the "feed and bleed"
eapability was retained. In this ease, both the probability of eore melt and
radioaetive dose deereased by 50% relative to the base ease.
In ease 11, both the effeets of struetural failures and the "feed and
bleed" eooling eapability were removed. For this ease, the eore melt
probability inereased by a faetor of 2-1/2 over the base ease. This is
beeause if "feed and bleed" eooling eannot be performed, the auxiliary
feedwater system (AFWS) has no back-up, and thus eleetrieal eomponent failures
in the AFWS beeame melt-through (which is relatively benign) rather than
over-pressure failure of the containment.
In ease 111, the effeets of the structural failures are included, but no
"feed and bleed" eapability is assumed. This results in the highest (point
estimate) values of both core melt probability and radioaetive release. The
core melt probability is 3 times higher than in the base case, and the
radioactive release is 13% higher than for the base case.
In summary, it can be seen that, depending upon the assumptions made as to
the consequences of the localized structural failures and the credibility of
performing "feed and bleed" cooling, the core melt probability can vary by an
order of magnitude, and the release can vary by 250%.
Correlation Effects on Seismie Risk
In this section, we present the results of two sets of caleulations whieh
show that correlation can change the final risk result by an order of
magnitude if the risk is domina ted by pairs of component failures, while in
eontrast, correlation has little effect if the total risk is due primarily to
structural failures. These cases are illustrated in Table 3.
For the cases where structural failures are included and where these
structural failures dominate the total caleulated risk, one is dealing with a
situation in which the most important terms in the accident sequences are
singe failures, and hence the dominant cut sets. Correlation only affects the
computation of the union of cut sets. And since the effects of correlation on
the union of cut sets are usually relatively small, correlation need not be
eonsidered for those cases that are domina ted by single structural failures
since the final risk numbers will vary by only a small amount.
By contrast, however, in those cases in which the risk is dominated by
failures of pairs of equipment, one finds correlation to have a large effect
because eorrelation affects the probability of the eomponent pairs which
constitute the most important cut sets in the accident sequences. Thus, for
these cases we find that correlation plays an important role in evaluting the
total risk of the plant.
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Table 2. Comparison of Gases Analyzed to Test Effects of Fundamental
Assumptions
Base Gase Gase I
{with Feed & Bleed, (with Feed & Bleed,
with Structural Failures) No Structural Failures)
Release Probability man-REM Probability man-REM
Gategory per year per year per year per year
1 2.9E-8 0.2 1.9E-8 0.1
2 1.4E-6 6.5 1. 9E-7 0.9
3 5.4E-7 2.9 6.1E-7 3.3
4 0 0 0 0
5 8.3E-10 0 8.8E-10 0
6 1. 7E-7 0 1. 2E-7 0
7 1. 5E-6 0 5.3E-7 0
Total 3.6E-6 9.6 1.5E-6 4.3
Gase 11 Gase 111
{w/o Feed & Bleed (w/o Feed and Bleed,
w/o Structural Failures) with Structural Failures)
Release Probability man-REM Probability man-REM
Gategory per year per year per year per year
1 2.4E-8 0.1 3.3E-8 0.2
2 5.7E-7 2.7 1.5E-6 7.2
3 6.6E-7 3.6 6.0E-7 3.2
4 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0
6 2.8E-7 0 2.9E-7 0
7 7.6E-6 0.2 8.6E-6 0.2
Total 9.1E-6 6.6 1.1E-5 10.8
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Table 3. The Effects of Correlations of Structure Responses and Fragility
Functions on Release Frequencies and Dose, with the Assumption of
no Structure Failures and 00 Feed aod Bleed.
Release
Category Frequeocy/yr Man-rem/yr
Case 1 1 3.1E-8 0.2
(with full correlation for 2 7.4E-7 3.6
fragility functions and calculated 3 6.5E-7 3.5
correlations for structure 4 0 0
responses) 5 2.5E-ll 0
6 3.3E-7 0.1
7 1, 8E-5 0.4
Total 2.0E-5 7.8
Case 2 1 2.4E-8 0.1
(with no correlation for fragility 2 5.7E-7 2.7
functions and with calculated 3 6.6E-7 3.6
correlations for structure 4 0 0
responses) 5 8.8E-10 0
6 2.8E-7 0
7 7. 6E-6 0.2
Total 9.1E-6 6.6
Case 3 1 1.5E-8 0.1
(with no correlation for fragility 2 2.5E-7 1,2
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ABSTRACT
In the past ten years a relatively small number of Light Water
Reaetors (LWRs) in the United States (U.S.) have been the objeet of
intense risk analysis. These plants have been used as surrogates to
evaluate generie safety issues at other plants. There are many
problems with the surrogate approach to generie nuelear safety
research, the most obvious being that nuclear plants in the U.S. are
almost always different from one another in ways that affeet plant
risk. To address this problem, the Aeeident Sequenee Evaluation
Program (ASEP) is elassifying LWRs in the U.S. by dominant core melt
sequence eontributors exeluding external events. These
eontributors are identified through examination of approximately 100
U.S. LWRs. A1though the ASEP grouping seheme is eomplex, it should
be eonsidered in generie studies to better understand generic safety
issues.
I. OBJECTIVES OF THE ACCIDENT SEQUENCE EVALUATION PROGRAM
The ASEP is a critical element of the Severe Accident Research Program
(SARP) which is sponsored by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(U.S.N.R.C.). The SARP was established to support the U.S.N.R.C. in
evaluating severe accidents. There are four overall objectives for the ASEP:
1) to provide a comprehensive general set of accident sequences
(excluding external events initiators) for all Light Water Reactors
(LWRs) in the United States,
2) to develop associated likelihoods for these sequences,
*This work is supported by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, and performed at Sandia National
Laboratories which is operated for the United States Department of Energy
under contract number DE-AC04-76DP00789.
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3) to ascertain the dominant contributors to these sequences, and
4) to group LWRs by design and operational similarities.
The completion of the fourth objective is highly significant. In the
past, surrogate plants--grouped by vendor, by containment type, or by other
characteristics--have been used to simplify generic analyses. However, there
have always been questions concerning the proper method to classify plants
when studying a particular issue. Many of these accident analysts now depend
on ASEP for guidance when choosing surrogate plants. We are currently
classifying plants by core melt frequency and by dominant core melt
contributors. A scheme has been developed in which different plant classes
will be-estabiished for different severe accident issues. This paper will
summarize the methodology that is being used to establish plant classes and
will present the insights that come from this plant classification.
11. PREVIODS ATTEMPTS AT CLASSIFICATION OF D.S. LWRs
Our first attempt to classify the LWRs in the D.S. was to group them by
their functional responses to severe accident situations. Because the
functional responses of most reactors in accident situations are the same,
this effort did not produce very many groups. Functionally, LWRs can be
classified into three groups: two Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) groups and
one Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) group. We then classified reactors by
considering their systemic responses to severe accident situations -- although
the functional response may be the same, the systems that perform the
functions vary from plant to plant. We classified the D.S. LWRs in seventeen
different groups: six BWR groups and eleven PWR groups. Within each group
the systems that would respond to any accident initiator are the same.
We then tried to group reactors at the next level of detail: by system
configurations. We knew that the configurations of the systems used to
mitigate accidents had evolved over the years although the system names and
the system functions may have stayed the same. We therefore looked at
differences within the systems at plants. We found that, even though some
front line systems in different plants look similar, every plant is unique.
The usefulness of the three different grouping schemes described so far
is extremely limited. Grouping at the functional level is of limited use
because the groups are too large and too many differences exist within the
groups. Grouping considering differences within systems is also of limited
use because each plant is a group by itself. Grouping by systems can be
useful for many purposes but has the disadvantage that no support system
information is considered when the groups are formed -- many past
Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) have found 'that support systems, which
have the potential to fail several systems at once (e.g. the service water
system or the electrical system), are very important to core melt frequency.
We therefore developed an approach to support those programs that needed
more specific grouping information: we grouped plants by core melt frequency
and by dominant core melt contributors. In principle, the grouping of plants
by dominant core melt contributors should be the optimum grouping scheme. Any
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present or future research effort that addresses safety issues across the LWR
industry should be able to use this grouping format.
To group by dominant core melt contributors, it was first necessary to
find out what the contributors are. The methodology that we used to find the
dominant core melt contributors is summarized below.
111. SUMMARY OF THE METHODOLOGY USED TO OBTAIN
DOMINANT GORE MELT GONTRIBUTORS
The methodology used to obtain dominant core melt contributors consisted
of two major tasks: 1) the selection of accident sequences to be analyzed;
and 2) the modeling and quantification of these accident sequences.
III.1 Accident Sequence Selection
Because the ASEP scope includes such a large selection of plants, we
decided to limit the number of sequences to be analyzed for each plant. To
determine the sequences to be analyzed, we used information from past PRAs
published in the U. S. and from recent studies that provided new accident
sequence insights. The core melt accident sequences from the PRAs were
requantified using the most recent insights. Some examples of the new
insights that were used in the requantification are listed below:
o The potential for recovering offsite power is less than previously
thought.
o Small loss of coolant accidents with failure of the recirculation
cooJ.ing mode in PHRs are thought not to be as important as
previously thought.
o Th"ere are many sources of cooling in BWRs that have not been
considered in past PRAs that could !render some previously dominant
sequences insignificant.
o The recovery time for loss of decay heat removal sequences in BWRs
may be longer than previously thought.
This requantification has shown that only a few sequences contribute
significantly to the core melt frequency. Sequences initiated by transients
and small loss of cooling accidents, followed by failure of early core cooling
(PWR and BWR) or long term heat renloval (BWR only) , and Anticipated Transients
Without Scram (PWR and B1VR) are the types of sequences that have been shown to
be dominant. A study of actual events that have occurred in U. S. LWRs




The ASEP sequences (with the exception of the Anticipated Transient
Without Scram sequences*) were modeled and quantified as folIows: 1) Seventy
percent of operating and soon to be operating plants were surveyed (104
plants). 2) Simplified diagrams were drawn for the mitigating systems of the
identified dominant sequences. 3) Fault tree models at the pipe segment level
were constructed for those systems and their support systems; simplified
actuation and control systems were also modeled. 4) The accident sequences
were solved by Boolean reduction using the Set Equation Transformation System
(SETS) computer code and then quantified using the Set Evaluation Program
(SEP) computer code -- statistical uncertainties were propagated throughout
the SEP analysis. 5) Abounding analysis addressing the non-statistical
uncertainties was conducted after the initial quantification.
IV. RESULTS OF LWR CLASSIFICATION BY CORE MELT FREQUENCY
AND DOMINANT CORE MELT FREQUENCY CHARACTERISTICS
To illustrate the results of this grouping effort; we will look at plant
grouping in two PWR sequences and in two BWR sequences. Because of the length
limitations of this paper we will only be able to compare four PWRs and four
BWRs. The four PWRs and four BWRs represent actual plants -- the system
differences important to core melt frequency for each plant are described in
Table 1**. Due to the preliminary nature of these results, the plants are not
identified by their names.
IV.I PWR Results
The two PWR sequences that are considered for PWR grouping in this paper
are a transient induced Loss of Cooling Accident (LOCA) with a failure of the
high pressure injection systems to cover the core (T-LOCA-HPI) and a transient
event with loss of all feedwater (T-LOFW). The relative frequencies of the
two sequences are presented in Table 11 for the four plants considered.
















frequency presented in this paper. )
*The Anticipated Transient Without Scram sequences will not be discussed in
this paper.
**Table I can be found at the end of the paper.
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The frequencies for the T-LOFW sequence are comparable and the four plants
could be classified as one group for that sequence. The plants would be
divided into two groups considering the T-LOCA-HPI sequence frequencies:
Group 1 -- W4-A, W4-B, W4-C, Group 2 -- BW2. When considering this sequence,
the Westinghouse reactors group together, but are separate from the Babcock
and Wilcox reactor.
The classification of plants is not as simple as it appears in the
preceeding paragraph. Each sequence actually consists of five subsequences
with different initiating events. The five initiating events considered are:
1) a transient with the power conversion system initially available (T-PCS),
2) a transient with the power conversion system initially unavailable
(T-NOPCS), 3) a loss of offsite power transient (T-LOSP) 4) a loss of a DC bus
transient (T-DC), and 5) a loss of an AC bus transient (T-AC).
Considering the five subsequences, the number of grouping possibilities
increases tremendously. If the order of importance of the five initiating
events is considered for each of the two sequences, each plant would be
considered unique. If the frequency of the subsequence is used as a
classification criterion, then the plants can be grouped. However, the
grouping looks different for each subsequence. The grouping also looks
different for each subsequence if the dominant contributors to core melt
frequency are used to group the plants. The PWR grouping possibilities
considering the five subsequences are presented in Table 111*.
There are, however, some consistent grouping patterns that can be found
in Table IU:
A) Sequence T-LOCA-HPI insights
1. When grouped by dominant core melt contributors, plants W4-A
and W4-B group together for all initiators except T-AC.
B) Sequence T-LOFW insights
1. When grouped by subsequence frequency, plants W4-B and BW2
always group together.
2. When grouped by subsequence frequency, plants W4-A and w4-C
group together except in the T-DC subsequence.
3. When grouped by dominant contributors to core melt, plants W4-A
and W4-C always group together.
IV.2 BWR Results
The two BWR sequences that are considered for BWR grouping in this paper
are a transient event with loss of all reactor core injection (T-LI) and a
transient event with a loss of the decay heat removal function (T-LDHR). Thc
frequencics of the two sequences are presented in Table IV for the four plants
considered.
*Table 111 can be found at the end of the paper.
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lowest frequency presented in this
The BWR plants can be classified into the same two groups for both sequences:
Group 1 -- GE6-A, GE6-B, GE4-A, and Group 2 -- GE4-B. It is interesting to
note that the T-LI frequency for GE4-B is much higher than for the other three
plants and that the T-LDHR frequency for GE4-B is much lower.
The same five initiating events that were analyzed for PWRs are analyzed
for BWRs. Like the PWR sequences, the two BWR sequences consist of five
subsequences each and the problems of BWR classification while considering the
different subsequences are similar to the problems of PWR classification. If
the order of importance of the five initiating events is considered, plants
'GE6-A, GE4-A, and GE6-B group together for the T-LDHR sequence. The plants do
not group for the T-LI sequence. When considering core melt frequency or
dominant core melt contributors, the same sort of complex grouping pattern
that was seen in the PWR grouping emerges. The BWR subsequence grouping
possibilities are presented in Table V*. As in the case of the PWR some
consistent grouping patterns can be found:
A) Sequence T-LI insights
1. When grouped by dominant core melt contributors, plant GE6-A
and GE6-B always group together.
B) Sequence T-LDHR insights:
1. When grouped by subsequence frequencies, plants GE6-A and GE4-A
always group together; plant GE6-B groups with plants GE6-A and
GE4-A except for T-NOPCS subsequences.
2. When grouped by dominant core melt contributors, all four BWRs
usually group together. The only exception to this occurs in
the T-PCS subsequence when plant GE4-B cannot be grouped with
the other three.
V. CONCLUSION
To simplify safety research, LWRs must be grouped. In the past LWRs have
been grouped by many different descriptors -- systemic response to accident
*Table V can be found at the end of the paper.
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situations, containment differences, vendor, utility, etc. Whereas some of
these grouping schemes are adequate for specific programs, none of the schemes
are adequate for the large majority of nuclear safety research programs. The
ASEP grouping scheme -- the classification of plants by dominant core melt
contributors -- appears to be applicable to a large number of nuclear safety
programs. Our grouping scheme has one large disadvantage: the presentation
of the groups is complex. One particular plant may fall into many different
groups depending on what sequence is considered and what initiating event is
considered.
A thorough classification of LWRs requires a multi-dimensional matrix
that includes both the set of grouping descriptors used in the past and the
descriptors used to describe dominant core melt sequence contributors.
Accident analysts who are basing their generic analyses on groups classified
using an incomplete set of descriptors may be unintentionally producing
misleading results. To avoid presenting misleading results, analysts should
consider all grouping schemes before limiting their studies to a particular
plant or type of plant.
















Automatic Depressurization System (BWR primary side pressure
relief)
Auxiliary Feedwater (PWR secondary heat removal system)
DC Power
Electric Power
Either High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) or High Pressure
Core Spray (HPCS) -- (BWR high pressure injection systems)
High Pressure Injection System (PWR high pressure injection
system)
Low Pressure Coolant Injection (BWR low pressure injection
system)
Low Pressure Core Spray (BWR low pressure injection system)
Power Conversion System (BWR and PWR primary and secondary side
heat'removal, respectively)
Power Operated Relief Valve ( PWR primary side pressure relief
system)
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (BWR high pressure injection
system)
Safety Relief Valve (PWR primary side pressure relief system)











Electric Power Bus Failure
Common Element Failure (common component -- e.g., valve -- shared




Independent Failure of Loss of Offsite Power
Test and Maintenance Failure
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Table I. Summary of Plant System Differences
l'\1R
PLANT
TYP! Af\l RPlS KP sm
• Tw AC and oe div1Dlona per 0 !ight opeD loop PUllp' (four
unH per unh) for tvo nnlta
V4-A • Coemlon luetion betveen tvo • Cosaon netten end comon
MDP _nd one TOP trains '1njllc:tion batvt.aD puDpI
trdn!
• Tvo DOs per unH • 'ive c10aed loop puapl for
tvo unH,
• Pi'u 008 betveon tvo unit. • Ibn\! c:losad loop pusrpa for
one nolt
V4-1 • &eparau Ductton for ..eh
puap trdn (2 MDP train••
2 TDP trains)
• SaM IUI V4-A • Tbree AC end DC divillioDI
pU' unlt
• 'our open loop pWip. (tvo per
unH)
\l4-e • Coaon luet100 betvun tvo "S..... V4-A
MDP ud TOP train.
• Sau: 8JI \14-1 I'i Bix open loop PWlIP' for tvo
unito
• Pin elond loop pwiIl8 tor
tvo uolta
DUZ • Dual COEIOn luetion betveen 0 CoBzon BUCtion betwen puup • Tbrae AC end oe divbionl
tvo MDP end one TDP trains tuba per untt
• Bepllnta injec:tion per pwtp • COEBOn hydro-senentor ebaud
train betveen ,11 unHe
• Tvo open loop pUBpl for one
un"
HDP .. Motor Driven PlRf4I
TDfl .. Turbine Driven p~
SG ~ Stel1M Generator
OG .. Diesel Generator
SIIR
PLANT
TlPE leIC HPCS/HPCI LPes LPCI/RHR KP sm
GU-A • COllIIIOD luetton • HPes • 8inSlt MDP train LPCI: c Tbr.. AC and DC • '!bru open 100p
frOll eST "1th o Three dnale KDP dividons per unH pUBp" (one per
HPeS o CoBmon nc.tion trains train) for Olle
!rOll eST witb lCIC • 'lbree DGs per unH un"BBR,
• Ivo &inal. KIlP
train •
016-1 • Separate l'Uc.tian • OPCS • Sam .. GE6-A • Sne .. GE6-A • SIlDe ... GE6-A I Foul' open loep
than mCB froa pU!1lJl1 for one
eST • &eparate 8UCtion unH
than lCle fr01!l
eST
GEII-A • Corieon .ucUon • Coazon lueUon • Tvo trab.• tvo LPCI: • foul' AC end DC • foul' open 100p
frO'B CST vith frO'B CST vith lCIC HDh par train • Jour &inS!e MDP divi&io1Ul per unH puapl (tvo per
HPel train8 train) for one
o CO'IIIIOU injecUon • eo-on injocHon o Foul' 00. per unH unH)
patb vitb LPCS patb vith HPCI ..R,
o Some .. OE6-A
GE4-B • eo-on lucHen • Cocson luctlon o Tvo trainl. Wo LPCl/lUIR: o Suu .. OE4-A • Twelve open 100p
frOil CST vith !rOll CST vitb Wh per train Cl Tvo trains. tvo putlpl (thru per
HPGI lele MDPI per train train) tor three
unito
6E6 - General E!ectr1c BWR 6 Reactor KDP - Motor Ori ven PtznV OG ... Dtes.el Generator
GE4 - General Electr1c BWR 4 Reactor CST - Condensate Storage Tllnk
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Table 111. PWR Classification Possibilities
TRANSIENT INDUCFJ) LOCA WITH FAlLURE OF TRANSlENT WITH
HIGH PRESSURE INJEC'IION 1.0SS OF ALL FEEDWATER
(T-LOCA-.Pl) (T-LON)
SUBSEQUENCE DOMINANT CORE KELT SUBSEQUENCE DOMINANT eORE HELT
BEQUEMeE FREQUENCY CONTRIBUTORS FRF..QUENCY CONTRIBUTORS
INITIATORS GROUP GROUP GROUP GRDUP
RELATIVE RELATIVE
PLANT GROUP PLANT GROUP PLANT GRaUp PLAlIT GROUP ,
GROUPS FREQUENCYA GRaUPS CHARACTERISTlCS GROUPS FREQUENCY* GROUPS CHARACTERISTI~S
T-Pes 1, H4-A 1. I 1, H4-A 1. PORV 1, H4-B 1, 3000 1, W4-A 1. pes Fsilure
BH2 W4-B AC-HW,HE,Bus BH2 H4-C AFW-HW,TH,CM
BH2
2. H4-. 2. 10 2. H4-c 2. PORV, SKV 2. H4-A 2. 300 2. W4-B 2. pes Psilure
H4-C SW-CE, TM,CH W4-C AFW-BW,CK
AC-HW
3••H2 3. PORV, SRV
Slt-CM,RW
HPIS-cH,HW
T-Hopes 1, H4-A 1, 2 I. H4-A 1. PORV, SRV 1. H4-. 1, 2000 I. H4-A 1. AF'W-CE,CM,HW,TH
W4-B H4-B SW-CH,HW BH2 w4-c
.H2 H4-c HPIS-CH,CE,HW
BH2 2. H4-A 2. 700 2. H4-B 2. AFW-cM,Hll,TH
2. H4-C 2. 3 H4-c BH2
T-LQSP I. H4-A 1, 10 1, H4-A 1. PDRV 1, H4-A 1, 700 I. H4-A 1. AFW-eE,CH,IDl
W4-8 W4-B AC-eH,HW, TM H4-B H4-B De-TM,CK
W4-c H4-C H4-C AC-HH
2. H4-C 2. 2 BH2
BH2 2. BW2 2. PORV 2. BH2 2. AFW-CHfCl~,HW
AC-eM,HW,TH DC-TM
DC-cH,HW
T-De 1, H4-A 1, 3 L W4-A 1. PORV, SRV 1. W4-A 1, 3000 I. H4-A 1, AFW-HW,TH.CH
W4-B W4-B 2. SW-GE.HW.TM W4-B W4-B
BH2 .H2 3. nPIS-HW,TM .H2 H4-C
.H2




T-AC 1. W4-B I, 7 1. W4-B I, PONV I, H4-A I, 300 I, H4-A 1. APW-C'M,HW,TK
W4-C W4-C HPIS-TH,nw W4-B W4-B
BH2 BH2 SW-HW,TH H4-O W4-<:
'H2 .H2
2. W4-A 2. 30 2. H4-A 2. PORV, SRY
DOMINANT INITIATORS FOR TRANSIEHT INDUCFI> LOCAs DOMINANT INITIATORS FOR TRANSIENTS WITH LOSS OF ALL
Wirn FAlLURE OF HIGH PRESSURE IHJECTION SEQUENCE PERDWATER SEQUERCE IN ORDER OF lHPORTANCE
IN ORDER OF lMPORTAHCE (T-LOPW)
(T-LOCA-HPI)
W4-A W4-B H4-C BH2 H4-A H4-B H4-C BH2
PLANT TYPE PLANT TYPE PLANT TYPE PLANT TYPE PLANT TYPE PLANT TYPE PLANT TYPE PLANT TYPE
1. T-AC 1. T-LOSP 1. T-PCS I, T-AC 1. T-HOPCS 1. T-DC 1. T-LOSP 1. T-De
2. T-WSP 2. T-AC 2. T-AC 2. T-DC 2. T-DC 2. T-Nopes 2. T-HOPCS 2. T-PCS
3. T-DC 3. T-PCS 3. T-HOPCS 3. T-LOSP 3. T-LOSP 3. T-LOSP 3. T-DC 3. T-ROPCS
4. T-HOPCS 4. T-DC 4. T-LOSP 4. T-PCS 4. T-PCS 4. T-AC 4. T-AC 4. T-LQSP
5. T-pes 5. T-HOFCS 5. T-De 5. T-HOPCS 5. T-AC S. T-PCS S. T-pes 5. T-AC
Rotes:
W4-A,B,C - Westingheuae four leep plants.
BW2 -- Babcoek & Wileel{ tve loep plant.
*AU frequenc.ies are nonaalh:ed to tbe levest frequency presented in thiB paper.
1111a table 18 divided into tve·lI.ajor grouping posaibilities:
A) The top half of the table groupa the plants by botb c.ore uelt frequency and d01ll1nant core aelt contdbutora
for each sequence initiator of the tvo sequences, T-LOGA-HPI and T-WFW. Tbe d01ll1nant core .elt
c.baraeteristics are those failurea tbat dom1nate the core melt frequency. The failures are pru8nted vitl'lo
system designatora and faUure mode designatora. The epplicable eystem 18 listed first vitb tbe .pecific.
fsilures mode (s) folloving (see Sec.tion V for system end failure modes definitions).
B) The bottom half of the table lista, in the order of importance, the initiators for each plant type.
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Table V. BWR Classification Possibilities
TRANSIENT WlTIl WSS OF RRACTOR TRANSIENT WlTH
eORE INJECTION wss OF DECAY HEAT REHOVAL
('-LI) ('-LDBR)
SUBSEQUENeE DOMINANT CORE HELT SUBSEQUENCE DOMINANT CORE HELT
SEQUERCE PREQUENCY CONTRIBUTORS FREQUENey CONTRIBUTORS





GROUPS FREQUENCY'" GROUPS CHARACTERISTICS GROUPS FRtQUENCYIlI GROUPS CHARACTERISTlCS
T-pes I. GE6-A I. 30 I. GE6-A 1. pes 1. GE6-A I. 70 I. GE6-A I. pes
GE6-B LOSP GE6-B GE6-B SW-HW,CM
2. GE6-B 2. 200 GE4-A AC-CH GE4-A GE4-A RHR-RW,CM
Sll-GM AC-BW
J. GE4-A 3. 20 AllS 2. GE4-B 2. 20 LOSP
BP.RCIC-RW
4. GE4-B 4. 300 2. GE4-B 2. pes




T-Hopes 1. GE6-A 1. 10 1. GE6-A 1. AnS I. GE6-A 1. 3000 1. GE6-A L RHR-CH.,HW,'l'M
GE6-B GE6-B SW-CM GE4-A GE6-B SW-HW,CM
GE4-A RCle-lm GE4-A
2. GE4-A 2. 30 HP-Hll 2. GE6-B 2. 100 GE4-B
GB4-B




T-LOSP 1. GE6-A I. 20G 1. GE6-A 1. AC-Ql,HW 1. GE6-A I. 100 1. GE6-A 1. Ac-mI
GE4-A GE6-B DC-CM,HR GE6-B GE6-B SW-HW,CE,HE,CH
GE4-B SW-CE,HW GE4-A GE4-A RlIR-HW,CH
2. GE6-B 2. 700 GE4-B
2. GE4-A 2. OC-CM 2. GE4-B 2. 20






1. GE6-A I. 30 GE6-A I. AllS 1. GE6-A 2. 3000 1. GE6-A 1. RHR-HW,CH,TM
T-AC GE6-B GE6-B HP-RW GE6-B GE6-B SW-HW,CH,TM
GE4-A G[4-A RCIC-HR GE4-A GE4-A
GE4-B
2. GE4-B 2. 1000 GE4-B 2. SW-HW 2. GE4-B 2. 30
SR-TM
DOMINANT INITIATORS FOR TRAHSIENTS Wim LOSS OF DOMINANT INITIATORS FOR TRANSIENTS W'ITH LOSS OF
REAGTOR CORE INJECTION SEQUERCE IN DECAT HEAT RFJ{OVAL SEQUENCE IN ORDER OF lMPORTANCE
ORDER OF IMPORTANCE ('-LDBR)
('-LI)
GE6-A GE4-A GE6-B GE4-B GE6-A GE4-A GE6-B GE4-B
PLANT TYPE PLANT TYPE PLANT TYPE PLANT TYPE PLANT TYPE PLANT TYPE PLANT TYPE PLANT TYPE
1. T-LOSP 1. T-LOSP 1. T-LOSP 1. T-LOSP 1. I-AC 1. I-AC 1. T-AC 1. T-HOPCS
2. T-AC 2. T-HOPCS 2. T-PCS 2. T-DC 2. T-DC 2. T-DC 2. T-DC 2. T-AC
3. T-DC 3. T-DC 3. T-AC 3. T-PCS 3. T-HOPCS 3. T-HOPCS 3. T-HOPCS J. T-DC
4. T-pes 4. T-PCS 4. T-HOPCS 4. T-AC 4. T-LOSP 4. T-LOSP 4. T-LOSP 4. T-LOSP
5. T-HOPCS 5. T-AC 5. T-DC 5. T-HOPCS 5. T-PCS 5. T-PCS 5. T-PCS 5. T-pes
Notes:
GE6 -- General Eleetrie B\m6 Planta.
GE4 -- General Eleetrie BWR4 Plants.
*All frequendes are n0I1l181bed to the lovest frequency presented in this paper.
**Insighta snd frequeneies are the same for both T-AC and T-De initiators.
This table is divided into tvo major grouping poasibilities:
A} The top half of the table groups the plants by both eore melt frequeney and eore melt eontributors for
each sequenee initiator of the tvo sequenees, I-LI and T-LDHR. The eore melt eontributors are those
fsilures that dominate the eore trl.elt frequency. The !silures are presented along vith system designators snd
fsilure mode designators. The applicsble system iB listed first vith the specHie failure mode(s} following
(see Section V for system snd fsilure modes definitions).
B} The bot tom half of the table lists, in the order of importanc.e. the initiators for eaeh plsnt type.
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INTRODUCTION OF OPERATOR ACTIONS IN THE EVENT TREES
G. BARS, J.M. LANORE, C. VILLEROUX.
CEA/IPSN/DAS
ABSTRACT
In the PRA in progress in France for a 900 MW PWR plant, an effort is
done for introducing operator actions during accident sequences. A
first approach of this complex problem relies on an extensive use of
existing methods and knowledge in diverse fields.
Identification of actions is based on the operating procedures, and in
particular on the existence of special emergency procedures which
define the optimal actions during severe accidents. This approach
implies the introduction in the event trees of the notion of procedure
failure.
Quantification of the corresponding probabilities leads to several
problems including physics of the sequences, systems availability
and human behaviour for decision making and actions. This treatment
is illustrated by the example of the small break event tree.
INTRODUCTION
In the PRA in progress in France for a 900 ~~ PWR plant, an effort is done
for being as realistic as possible in the treatment of accident sequences. For
this purpose, it is obvious that operator actions must be introduct although it
is certainly one of the most difficult fields in a PRA.
In a first step, our approach is not the development of very new methods
or models, but a tentative to gather and structurate all the means available
for a more systematic and homogeneous treatment of identification, introduction
and quantification of operator actions.
OPERATOR ACTIONS IN A PRA
.!.Y.E.e_o.!. ~c!i~n~ : Among the actions which can have an effect on risk
probability , a main distinction can be made between actions during normal
operation of the plant and actions in accidental situation.
The first type is mainly errors during test and maintenance tasks with an
effect on system anavailabilities. This aspect is the best known today (Ref 1,
2). The THERP method (Ref 3) is generally recognized as suitable for this
problem which will not be developed further in this paper.
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On the contrary, during an accident, the operator actions are no more
routine .tasks but involve thinking process and knowledge. Human actions can
either increase or reduce the risk. This aspect is much more complex both for
identifying the possible actions and for assessing the corresponding
probabilities.
Identification : For identifying the significative human actions during an
accident,-itwould be necessary to imagine apriori all the possibilities, and
these may be extremely numerous.
An important investigation is this field is being performed for the
development of special emergency procedures. Indeed the safety approach in
France for severe accidents management is to complete the current accidental
and incidental procedures (A and I) by a set of emergency procedures (H and U)
(Ref 4) which identify the optimal actions even for out of design accidents.
Particularly an emergency procedure calIed "UI procedure" is conceived to
assure best possible conditions for RCS cooling and core safety, during any
situation for which event specific procedures may be inappropriate. This
procedure is based on the NSSS physical states (Ref 6).
Taking into account the existence of these emergency procedures we assurne
that in any situation, even very degraded, the operator (or the team of
operators) will always follow an existing procedure, without having to define a
strategy by hirnself. With such an assumption the identification of human
errors, even during an accident, can be based on an analysis of the operating
procedures (correctly or incorrectly applied). By this way, we can include in
the PRA an important set of operator actions, which are at least the most
likely.
Introduction in the PRA : The actions of the Hand U procedures (including
the Me- (;f- Cö~~m;,rrtary equipments) initiate sequences different from the
branches of the initial system event tree.
The possibility for the operator to change the course of an accident
sequence makes necessary the introduction of the notion of procedure success or
failure in the event tree. The construction of the event tree needs then a
systematic investigation of all procedures involved in the accident.
QUANTIFICATION
The term procedure is aglobaI notion including diagnosis, decision, task
execution and efficiency. To avoid complex and unuseful studies (and taking
into account the large uncertainties), the treatment is in a first step simple
and schematic in order to select the really important problems.
~e!i~i!i~n_o!~Rr~c~d~r~ !a!l~r~ : To define clearly what is the failure
of a procedure, we introduce the notion of key-action. Generally the key-action
is the important action (which may consist of several elementary tasks) which
must be achieved correctly and in time for the success of the procedure. The
procedure failure in then the failure of the key-action.
For some procedures, the key-action may be on the contrary an action to be
avoided. In some cases, there are two or more key-actions and, for a same
procedure, the key-action may differ according to the accident sequence.
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Fault tree of a procedure failure : The possible causes of a procedure
failure-are-represented -by a generte fault tree for each type of key-action
(key-action to achieve or to avoid). As an example, the fault tree fig 1
corresponds to the first case.
This representation is very schematic, since various correlations exist
between the causes. However this simple model is clear and allows a rough
assessment for selecting the most significant contributions.
Probability of the causes On fig 1 appear very different types of
causes,-needfng- very different approaches for assessing their probabilities.
For instance :
Leaves n° 6 and 9 are systems failures, assessed by reliability
calculation. These reliability studies must take into account possible changes
in reliability parameters due to the accidental situation.
• Leaf n° 2 in an error during execution of a task. This problem can be
treated by the THERP method.
Leaf nO, 8 is the physical efficiency of a procedure needing
thermohydraulics calculations for some particular situations. The statement of
the problem is generally clear but leads to very numerous parametric studies.
For limiting the calculations to a reasonable level, a carefull selection of
the parameters is necessary.
• The most difficult problem is the sub-tree 5, which includes diagnosis
and decision. Recent studies (Ref 3, 5) indicate that in this case the most
important parameter is the time available for acting. So according to the
literature we intend to use as a first approach a curve giving the probability
of failure versus time, established by a compilation of foreign results,
experts opinion, and some specific data (simulator or experience).
In a further step we intend to list all the human failures retained in the
PRA, and to ask to experts a relative ranking of the corresponding
probabilities. This global approach will provide a complementary information.
EXAMPLE
-,
Fig 2 is the event tree related to a small break initiating event.
Procedures involved : In this event tree three operating procedures have
been Tntroduced~- - - -
• H2 is the procedure 'related to a total loss of feed water. A feed and
bleed cooling mode is initiated by openning manually the relief valves of the
pressurizer.
• Ul is a general procedure defining the best actions for cooling the core
when the event procedures are inappropriate (multiple system failures
operator errors). Ul covers then a wide range of situations. In our example the
Ul action of interest is, in case of HPSI failure, a fast depressurization by
the steam generators which allows the operation of the LPIS system.
• Al.l is the small break procedure which states that the use of the
containment spray system can be replaced by using the RHRS for cooling the
primary water. This long term cooling configuration can be established either
directly (case of very small LOCAs) as soon as RHRS operating conditions are
reached, or delayed in case of a previous actuation of the spray system (for
more important LOCAs).
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Related studies : The assessment of failure probabilities for these three
procedures -leads - tö different type of studies, according to the specific
problems related to each one.
- For U1, the first question is the physical efficiency of the procedure.
More precisely for what break size, and within what delay is it possible to
reach the LPSI conditions before a core damage.
For this purpose a thermohydraulics study has been initiated and is
presently in progress.
- For H2, the most important parameter seems the human factor. The time
available for acting before unreversible damage is short (about 30 minutes) and
for several reasons the operator task is difficult
in this sequence there are two simultaneous accidents (a small break and
a loss of steam generators), so an increased difficulty for diagnosis,
the key-action (opening of the pressurizer valves) is not a current
action and the operator may be reluctant for acomphishing it. So investigations
in the field of human behaviour are necessary.
For A1.1, an important contribution to the procedure failure is the
system failure, since the RHRS is located inside the containment and will have
to run under accidental conditions.
Expected effects : In a general way it is important to note that the
introduetlon of- these procedures will have an obvious effect on the risk
probability related to the small break event tree by reducing the probability
of three dominant sequences.
Indeed the procedures appear as redundancies for systems.
The introduction of H2 and U1 will reduce the probabilities of core melt
for S2L and S2D3 sequences (respectively) by factors which are about the ratio
of success to failure of the procedures. The utilization of A1.1 leads to a
much lower benefit, since the failure of LPIS long term recirculation is domi-
nant. The importance of this procedure becomes obvious when considering as a
separate initiating event the case of steam phases breaks (PORV stuck open).
CONCLUSION
In the field of operator actions, and in a general way in the PRA in
progress, we do not. intend to develop very new technics, but rather to
integrate extensively our present knowledge in the field of PRA and also in
other fields like operating procedures, human factors, operating experience.
By a systematic research of the procedures involved in each sequence, a
clear identification of the key-actions and of the failure causes, and an
assessment of probabilities by use of all the means available, we obtain a
treatment which seems more complete and less arbitrary, ·where the really
important problems app,ear more clearly. The approach still needs numerous
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AU Reaetor Proteetion System
RISI High Pressure Injection System
BU Emergency Borication




EASI Containment Spray Injeetion System
EASR Containment Spray Recirculation System
RISR High Pressure Recirculation System
OP Manual Operation 01 Containment Spray System
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TREATMENT OF COMMON CAUSE FAllURES
IN THE BARSEBÄCK I SAFETY STUDY
G. Ericsson and S. Hirschberg
AKTIEBOLAGET ASEA-ATOM
S-721 04 Västeräs, Sweden
ABSTRACT
This paper presents the main features of the common cause failure analysis in
the Barsebäck 1 safety study. The qualitath'e part of the analysis has been
given the highest priority. A procedure, based on the generic cause approach,
has been deyeloped for systematic performance of think-through and walk-
through analyses. The method is relatiyely simple, requires reasonable resour-
ces and allows identification of significant common cause failures. Results of
the qualitath'e analysis form the basis for assignment of yarying beta-factors
which are extensively used in the quantitative analysis of dependencies.
Generally, the estimated common cause failure probabilities contribute signi-
ficantly to the analysed core melt sequences.
INTRODUCTION
The reactor safety study for the Barsebäck 1 nuclear power plant has been jointly
carried out by AB ASEA-ATOM and the uti!ity (Sydkraft). The reactor, a BWR, is of
ASEA-ATOM design and started commercial operation in 1976.
The importance of dependent failures has been clearly demonstrated by reactor
operating experience. Dominating accident sequences frequently iriyolye dependent
failures. Therefore, treatment of dependencies should constitute a crucial part of any
PRA study. General assumption of independence between systems (components) is non-
conseryative and usually leads to excessively optimistic results.
There are many factors which make the analysis of potential dependencies difficult.
Some of them are as folIows:
definition dilemma
existence of several systems of classification of dependent failures
controyersies regarding the use of qualitath'e models for identification of
dependencies
immense number of potential dependencies
treatment of human errors
lack of re!iable data sources
!imitations of methods for quantification of dependencies
uncertainties in the treatment of external eyents.
In view of these difficulties the need of thorough treatment of dependencies was
acknowledged at the initial stage of the project.
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EVALUAnON OF AVAILABLE METHODS
As a first step in the analysis of dependencies the m'aiIable models were eyaluated
[IJ • This actiyity was moth'ated by preyailing lack of guidance on how the dependency
analysis should be incorporated into a PRA-study. Se\'eral methods haye been deyeloped
for treatment of dependencies. The a\'ailable models ha\'e \'arying degree of complexity,
are based on different assumptions, and consequently differ with respect to applicability.
The following conc1usions were drawn:
1) Common cause failures (CCFs) constitute an important group of dependencies,
which requires special treatment. According to a general definition, CCFs are
multiple failures occurring at the "same" point of time (i.e. simultaneously or
in a short time inten'aJ), attributable to a common cause. Such a rather
inc1ush'e definition seems adequate for the performance of PRA studies,
where all potentially significant CCFs are to be identified.
2) If handling of large fault trees is possible, it is often adyantageous to model
dependencies originating from the system design directly in the fault trees.
This implies that the control signals, power supply, auxiliary systems, etc., are
modelled for each component sen'ed by these.
3) The qualitath'e analysis should be gh'en highest priority in the study of
dependencies. As a result of identification of potential critical dependent
faiIures, immediate measures are usually taken in order to eliminate (or
reduce) the risks. Furthermore, the qualitati\'e analysis constitutes the star-
ting point for a possible quantification.
lf) Ayailable methods for qualitath'e analysis of dependencies can be di\'ided into
three groups:
think-through and walk-through analyses
fault tree modification
generic cause approach.
Detailed knowledge of the plant and of the inyolyed processes is a prerequisi te
for a meaningful use of the methods.
5) Relatiyely small resources are needed for think-through and walk-through
analyses. These types of approach should lead to identification of significant
depencencies gh'en that systematic procedures are used.
6) Fault tree modification, traditionally the most popular of the qualitatiye
methods, requires rather extensh'e resources and does not guarantee identi-
fication of all significant CCFs.
7) Use of generic cause approach, based on identified minimal cut sets (MCS),
offers good chances to identify significant dependencies. Computer codes may
be used to automate the analysis to ii large extent. The method is systematic,
which creates a potential danger that the analyst is systematically missing
some irnportant items.
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8) Independently of which method is chosen great importance must be given to
the screening procedures for elimination of insignificant dependencies. Other-
wise the problem becomes impossible to handle. The necessary sorting can
make use of assignment of ranks to primary events, knowledge of components'
physicallocation, the existing barriers, etc.
9) There is a number of reliability models for quantification of dependencies. The
following examples may be mentioned: square root method, beta-factor
method, Marshall-Olkin specializations, common load model, Markov models.
10) None of the quantitath'e methods is universal. All models suffer from lack of
reliable CCF-data. Therefore, sensitivity analysis is a very useful tool for the
assessment of CCF-significance.
11) The final choice of method for qualitative CCFA depends upon the available
resources (personnei, time, funding, computer codes and computer capacity)
and upon the objectives of the study.
PRINCIPLES FOR QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
Based on the conclusions given above, a program for practical carrying out of the
CCFA has been formulated [2J.
The postulated dependencies ha\'e been classified according to their potential
causes:
1) Systems interaction
2) Normal external enüronment
3) Facility-related external phenomena
4) Site-related external phenomena
5) Design limitations and functional deficiencies
6) Human factor.
A much more detailed classification, explicitly specifying physical sources of
dependencies, has been presented [2J.
Before going into details concerning the practical treatment of the different types
of dependencies, some general comments regarding principles of fault tree construction in
the Barsebäck 1 safety study, are in place.
1) The fault trees are developed to an extremely detailed level (e\'en component
fault trees are included), which facilitates identification of dependencies
between components.
2) Certain human errors are included in the fault trees.
3) Tests and maintenance are repr,esented in the fault trees.
4) Equipment shared between se\'eral systems may be easily identified since a
unique code is allocated to each component.
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5) Dependencies which originate from the system-design features, e.g. signal
exchange, auxiliary systems, power supply, etc., are included in the fault
trees.
6) Common cause failures in redundancies are represented in the fault trees as
basic events (mainly in component fault trees, whene\"er they are available).
However, the nature of the common cause is not specified.
As a result of the principles governing construction of fault trees, no separate
treatment of systems interactions is necessary, since interactions associated with the
system design have been earlier incorporated into the fault trees.
Identification of dependencies which may arise through influence of normal external
environment has been performed using systematic think-through and walk-through
analyses. A general description of the applied methodology will be given in next
paragraph. Facility-related external phenomena are in principle handled in the same way
as normal external endronment.
Analysis of site-related external phenomena is outside the scope of the Barsebäck
safety study.
A large part of potential dependencies which orginate from design limitations is
co\"ered by systems interactions. Identification of functional deficiencies is a standard
part of the continuous safety work performed by utilities and by the plant supplier. The
procedures developed for think-through and walk-through analyses allow that searching
for such deficiencies is performed in a systematic way.
A simplified treatment of human errors as a source of dependencies has beeil apart
of think-through and walk-through analyses. In addition, aseparate study [3J concerning
potential dependencies caused by planned and unplanned maintenance, has been perfor-
med. For the analysed cases, it was concluded that dependencies generated by human
factor (and not modelIed in the fault trees), give negligible contributions to unavailability
of redundant equipment.
PROCEDURE FOR QUALITATIVE ANAL YSIS
A special procedure has been developed for systematic identification of dependen-
cies ~. Concepts and terminology of the generic cause approach [5J ha\"e been
transfer red to walk-through analysis. The methodology is based on:
examination of system documentation for safety systems of interest
study of de\"eloped fault trees
experience from treatment of CCFs in earlier reactor safety studies
use of check lists covering all important special conditions and secondary
causes for all relevant redundancies
use of questionnaires prepared for each special condi tion and for each
secondary cause
on-site inspection of the system under consideration.
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The main practical steps in the procedure are:
1) Identify redundancies within each system
2) Make a preliminary estimate of potential dependencies using the check list
3) Answer the questions in the questionnaires, but only for the special conditions
and secondary causes which were pointed out on the check list
4) Go back to the check list and assign ranks to each common cause candidate.
Use a six-degree scale extending from I (insignificant) to 6 Oarge significance)
5) Make a final choice of common cause candidates.
The same procedure may be applied to identification of dependencies between
redundant systems. In these cases more attention must be directed towards potential
dependencies between components with diverse functions. The analysis of dependencies
between redundant systems has 'been performed parallelly with the study of CCF-
contributions within individual systems. The proximity and physical separation between
systems of interest has been considered during the walk-through analysis.
SCOPE AND RESULTS OF QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
The described method for systematic identification of dependencies is especially
suitable for analysis of mechanical systems with relatively few components within each
redundancy. Core cooling systems and residual heat removal sy'stems in Barsebäck 1 fulfil
these conditions. The walk-through analysis of these systems [6J has been carried out by
a working group including personnel with long operating experience as weil as analysts
with "PRA-background". In this way there was a good chance to cover all important angles
of the analysis. Two types of dependencies have been considered:
1) Dependencies between redundancies within individual systems.
2) Dependencies between redundant systems.
The following systems from the first group have been analysed:
I) Core cooling systems
Feedwater Iines (312)
Condensate system (462)
Low pressure coolant injection system (323)
Auxiliary feedwater system (327).
2) Residual heat removal systems
Shutdown cooling system (321)
Containment vessel spray system (322)
Shutdown cooling water system (712)
Shutdown secondary cooling system (721).
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461 <Condenser and vacuum system), 721/712
461, 322
461,321.
205 potential dependeneies have been identified, including 198 dependeneies
between redundaneies within individual systems and 7 dependeneies between redundant
systems. None of the dependeneies motivates immediate application of measures such as
design modifications or procedural changes.
There are 13 cases with moderate significance (the remaining 192 dependeneies are
less significant). Most of them appear in the auxiliary feedwater system. This result is not
unexpected since the redundaneies in this system are characterized by lack of separation
and are particularly susceptible to dependeneies.
Generally, faeility-related external phenomena appear more frequently as source of
dependeneies than the normal external environment.
These components which are most sensitive to dependeneies have been listed [6J,
separately for each system. Furthermore, the dominating factors in the normal external
environment as weil as the faeility-related external phenomena which are expected to be
insignificant, have been pointed out.
Here, only the results obtained for the auxiliary feedwater system are accounted
for. The checklist is shown in attachment 1. In prineiple it is possible that all types of
dependency may occur but the majority of these does not influence the system reliability.
Therefore, none of the dependeneies with rank one (insignificant) has been indicated in the
checklist. A questionnaire concerning fire of auxiliary feedwater pumps is also enclosed
(attachment 2).
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
The beta-factor model [7J has been chosen for quantification of CCF-contributions.
The metbod is simple to apply, employs only a single CCF-parameter and is considered to
be adequate for calculations concerning systems with two redundant channels. The beta-
factor method is, however, expected to result in excessively pessimistic results when
applied to systems with higher redundancy levels [8J •
The choice of the beta-factor is in each particular case dependent on the
~ignificance factors assessed in the qualitative analysis. Three different values have been
used (0.01, 0.05, 0.10). Prineiples for assignment of beta-factors to identified redundan-
eies have been described [9J •
The preliminary results of the Barsebäck 1 safety study show that CCFs contribute
14 % of the total estimated core melt probability. The 10ss of residual heat removal 'is
dominated by CCF-contributions. Some of the dependeneies identified in the study have
10w significance but are in disagreement with basic design prineiples. In most cases,
modifications may be carried out at low costs.
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CONCLUSIONS
The characteristic features of common cause failure analysis in the Barsebäck I
safety study have been described. The main efforts have been concentrated on the
qualitative part of the analysis. A practical approach to the problem, based on the
principles of the generic cause method, has been developed. The described procedure for
identification of dependencies is simple, systematic and requires rather small resources.
In spite of certain limitations it is expected that the important dependencies have been
identified. Future developments may involve improved quantification of CCF-contribu-
tions from redundancies with three or more channels and detaiied analyses of site-related
external phenomena.
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CHECK LIST ATTACHMENT 1
DEPENDENCY
NORMAL EXTERNAL FACILlTY-RELATED HUMAN
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Auxillary non- influence surveil (ance
feedwater X exist. equipment
pumps Pl,P2 Leakage; drain con-
nected to system 31,S
Auxitiary
1/1/1Il/ / I / /il11
The pumps have never
noo- been subjecl tocondensate X exist maintenance orpumps P3, PI,
repair
noo- /1111// / / /, / ,II/'I/'V2,V3 X exist
non- / 11111// / I. /, I.1111.11. Same environmentVI, ,VI,2 X exist. as PI and P2
non- / 111111./1I / /1111.IX Same environmentV28,V29 X ex ist as P3 and PI,
noo- /1111IJ,11X11/111111. Same environmentV26,V27 X exist as P3 and PI,
non- / 1111111111.11IX1111
Impact - missiles
K lOS,K 106 ~ exist. from pumps; exposed
location
non- /1111111111111.1/11I 11V6,V9 X exist.
non- / /11~1111IJ,IJ,1// I.XV lS, VI7 X exist







CAUSE OF DEPENDENCY: FIRE
Fuelload. Whieh combustibles can be found in the room?
Oil in the pumps.
Which redundant components are affected by fire?
Almost all.
Effect on the system?
Loss of function.
Risk of ignition?





Fire propagation from and into the room?
Fire can propagate through the doors if they are left open. The turbine oil-system is
located in the adjacent room (separated by thick concrete walls).
Final opinion:
Fire has a moderate signifieance as a cause of dependency.
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PROBABILISTIC TRANSIENT sIMULATION
METHODOLOGY IN SUPPORT OF PROBABILISTIC SAFETY
EVALUATION STUDIES FOR ONTARIO HYDRO REACTORS
J.C. Luxat, A.P. Firla, E. Hussein, ~.P. Muzumdar, B.C. Choy
Ontario Hydro
Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5G lX6
ABSTRACT
A system of computer codes for probabilistic transient event
analysis is described. The system is designed as a versatile and
flexible tool that addresses the total analytical process within a
probabilistic framework. The major elements in the system are
discussed and the potential applications of the codes to various
aspects of safety evaluation for Ontario Hydro nuclear generating
stations are outlined.
INTRODUCTION
Analysis of the progression of events following a postulated initiating
failure forms an important part of safety evaluations for Ontario Hydrots
CANDU reactors. A key element in this analysis is characterizing the event
sequences which, in turn, involves determining the probable timing of state
transitions and estimating the resultant consequences associated with the
transitions. The analytical tools used for this purpose are deterministic
transient simUlations employed in conventional accident analysis, and fault
,tree/event tree methodology employed in probabilistic safety evaluation
(PSE). Transient simulation analysis explicitly evaluates time dependent
process system responses and the transitions in the physical process states
but, traditionally, has not been developed to directly handle uncertainties
within a probabilistic framework. PSE 'techniques, on the other hand,
explicitly account for the probabilistic nature of changes in plant state due
to system or component failures and operator interventions, but do not
directly incorporate modelling of the underlying physical processes and the
time dependency of process system responses. Despite these inherent
differences the two tools play important complementary roles in the safety
evaluations of nuclear generating stations.
In reality there is a vast shared common ground linking the two
analytical tools. At the most fundamental level the plant systems, the
underlying physical processes and the safety concerns are common elements of
the analysis. Similarly, the potential state of the plant at the time a
failure event occurs, the state of various systems that are called upon
during the progression of events and the underlying physical processes are
all sources of uncertainty with respect to characterizing the event
sequences. An overall probabilistic approach represents, perhaps, the most
effective analytical framework to rationalize and quantify uncertainties.
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The above observations have motivated the development at Ontario Hydro of a
system of computer codes for PRObabilistic ~ransient ~vent ANalysis (PROTEAN).
The major elements of the PROTEAN system are described in this paper.
Since it is a system designed to address the total analysis process, the
following discussion is not limited to probabilistic transient modelling.
Ultimately, probabilistic modelling is neither more nor less important than
deterministic modelling of fundamental physical processes.
OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
The analysis of event sequences and evaluation of physical process
uncertainties potentially requires many transient simulations spanning a wide
range of times with varying scope and complexity of system and physical
process modelling. Furthermore, any new analytical tool should not attempt
to replace existing tools that are established and effective in their
respective areas of application. Rather, a new tool should complement and
augment existing tools. In addressing these general requirements and
constraints the following objectives were adopted for the code development:
(a) Capability must be implemented to allow rapid generation of
simulation models and input data for interconnected and
interacting systems within astation. This capability must
allow easy reconfiguration of the structure of the models.
(b) The models must be kept as simple as possible to provide
inexpensive but acceptably accurate simulation capability.




(c) There should be a flexible, easily configured facility to
interface models of a particular system that have different
levels of modelling complexity.
In order to meet these objectives the PROTEAN system is being developed
as a set of interacting codes that perform specific tasks in the analysis
process, as shown in Figure 1. A key element in meeting the first objective
is automating, to the greatest extent possible, the generation of system
models and their associated input data. This requires a data base which
contains detailed design data for the various systems and a set of procedures
that will accept a user-input model specification and generate the required
model and data. These procedures would access and process data from the data
base and provide the linkage between the input data and the code subroutines
that implement the model. The models may be used either in the transient
simulations or in subsequent analysis that uses the output generated by the
transient simulations. The ultimate objective of this development is to
provide an analytical tool that allows more of the user's effort to be
directed toward the analysis with less effort requi~ed to put the analytical
models in place.
Additional details of the subsystems identified in Figure 1 are
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Structure of the System of Computer Codes
for Probabilistic Transient Event Analysis
THE DATA BASE
The data base contains detailed design data pertaining to the many
interconnected systems in a CANDU nuclear generating station. Each of these
systems may be considered as a' netlwrk in which some physical quantity, such
as an electric current or fluid, flows in specified directions according to
the arrangement of the components in the network and their operating state.
consequently, the data base has been designed with a logical classification
of the data into sets that form a complete description of the network
structure and components in a system. These sets of data are organized into
four files associated with each system. As shown in Figure 2, there are
three files describing, respectively, the network topology, physical
characteristics of components and network-to-network interconnections and a
fourth file that is a relational table providing the linkage between the
three descriptor files.
The network structure ofa system is contained in the topology file.
The top level of description consists of specifying the network topology in
terms of a directed graph which identifies the unique node points in a
network and the branches connecting the nodes. Each branch is subdivided
into a number of unique component types arranged in an ordered sequence that
corresponds to the manner in which the components are physically connected.
Figure 2 shows the directed graph and part of the ordered sequence of
component types, arranged in data records indexed by branch identifiers, for
the example network (system 1). It is important to recognize that there is a
limited set of basic component types. A particular component need only be
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The Structure of Files in the Data Base Showing
the Relationships between Data in the Files
1987
The description of a component in terms of physical attributes such as
length, diameter, material etc is not required in the description of the
network structure. Consequently, the physical characteristics of a component
are specified in the component characteristic data file. The data in this
file is not related to the location of the component in the network. In fact
there may be identical components 19cated in different sections of the
network; for example the pumps in the three branches B2, B3 and B4 of the
example network. The linkage between the network structure and component
physical data is provided by the master table file. The data in this file
links each uniquely identified component in the network to an associated
branch in the topology file and to arecord in the component characteristics
data file.
The final, logically separate set of data is the system interconnection
data file. The data in this file consists of sets of component identifiers
that specify which components in the system network being described are
connected to components that are part of another system. The linkage of this
data to the data describing the network is, once again, provided via the
master table file. Indexed sequential data file structures are employed with
data access and retrieval via "keys" [1].
ANALYTICAL MODELS AND DATA GENERATION
The general structure of the procedure to generate models and input data
for analysis purposes is shown in Figure 3. The model structure is specified
in a similar manner to the network description in the data base. It consists
of a topological description of the model and the identification of the
component model subroutines that are to be used. Associated with this
description is information identifying a one-to-one relationship between a
section of the model and a section of the system network description in the
data base. This information is used to retrieve the design data from the
data base and to control the subsequent procedures that per form the
mathematical operations to generate the derived data for the model.
Automating the process of model generation involves linking the sets of
derived data to the appropriate model subroutine and linking the model
subroutines to a network solution control procedure. These linkages are
structured by the user-specified model topology. This task is the most
difficult one to implement. The approach that has been adopted is to
implement this function in stages. The first stage involves automating the
input data generation procedure. This will be followed by semi-automation of
the model generation procedure. Finally the experience gained from the
preceding stages will result in the refinement and ultimate integration into
an automated procedure. This approach is dictated, in part, by the need to















Procedure for Automated Generation of System Models
for Transient Simulation Analysis
TRANSIENT AND POST-TRANSIENT ANALYSIS
As stated earlier, the intent of the code is to utilize low order
analytical approximation models to the greatest extent possible. The network
solution control procedure is also based upon applyinganalytical or
semi-analytical iterative solution schemes analogaus to lumped parameter
solution methods employed in electrical network and feedback control systems
analysis. These solution schemes are essential for ensuring the code meets
the objective of being an inexpensive and flexible simulation tool. Figure 4
shows the trends in pressure and flow in a CANDU heat transport loop
following a lass of coolant accident discharging coolant at a rate of 400
kg/s, as predicted with an approximate model for the heat transport system.
The model consists of four lumped nodes with an explicit solution for the
heat transport loop flows. These loop flows couple the mass and energy
balance salut ions for the four nodes. This modelling approach yields
pressure and flow distributions in the heat transport system that are within



















































Depietion of Probabilistie Proeess State Transition Modelling
and its Applieation within a PRA Framework
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Similar considerations are applied in uncertainty propagation
modelling. The uncertainties of interest can be classified asplant state,
empirical knowledge and physical process model uncertainty [2,3]. Plant
state uncertainties arise from the spectrum of possible operating states and
conditions in the various plant systems. They influence the conditions at,
and the timing of plant state transitions. The uncertainties in empirical
knowledge influence the prediction of transitions in the physical process
states (for example flow and heat transfer regimes) and the physical process
responses following these transitions. Finally, model uncertainties relate
to the ability of a particular model to provide a reasonable representation
of reality, within the constraints of the state of empirical knowledge.
Approaches to th~ treatment of plant state and empirical knowledge
uncertainties include Monte Carlo and response surface methods [3,4] which
treat a code essentially as a black-box and derive distribution functions
connecting the outputs to be inputs of the box"
In the PROTEAN code an alternative approach is adopted. Firstly,
uncertainty in characterizing transitions in physical states is
differentiated from uncertainty propagation in process variables and
parameters. The former is concerned with quantifying the probability of a
state transition occurring and the range in probable timing of the
transition. The latter, however, is continuous in time and, 'while
potentially influencing state transitions, is in part dependent upon the
process state. Secondly, process variables and parameters (code input and
outputs) have underlying causal relationships that are directly related to
the models; which, in turn, are conditioned by the process state.
Fundamental changes in the propagation of process variable uncertainties
occur at discrete time intervals when process state or plant state
transitions occur. The termination of one state provides the initial
conditions for the next state. In a given state, the uncertainties in the
set of input variables and parameters are first transformed into equivalent
uncertainties in the following fundamental physical quantities: mass,
energy, mass transport rate (flow) and energy transfer rate (power). The
transformations are determined directly from the models associated with the
particular process state. The transformed uncertainties can then be
propagated to other variables, for example coolant pressure or fuel
temperature, by quasi-linearized sensitivity analysis.
A simple, intuitive example is shown in Figure 4 where the mean trends
and uncertainty ranges in selected process variables are shown as a function
of time during a small loss of coolant accident in which delayed injection of
emergency coolant is postulated. The state transition models indicated in
this figure evaluate the probability of a transition to a stratified flow
regime in the fuel channels (state transition A) and the conditional
probability of any fuel element exceeding some elevated temperature
(transition B), given either stratified or non-stratified flow. In the
example, state transition B is only probable if state transition A occurs
within a limited time following reactor shutdown. Although this is an
oversimplified and somewhat contrived example, it demonstrates that, in
quantifying uncertainties with a probabilistic code, the results must be




A major application of the code will be in quantifying the effects of
uncertainties in system states and process parameters on both the probable
timing of transition events and the potential consequences associated with
the transitions. This probabilistic transient information can, for example,
be utilized within the context of probabilistic safety evaluations in the
manner depicted in Figure 4. Another major application area is in the
assessment of the effectiveness of safety system actions. The objective in
this application is to quantify the effect of uncertainties in the safety
systems, for example instrumentation response, the phenomenological safety
criteria employed and the effects of process and control system states and
actions, on the ability of these systems to meet safety design objectives or
production reliability targets. Finally, elements of the system, such as the
front-end data base and input data generation procedures, can potentially be
employed by other analysts to ass ist in data preparation for codes employed
in accident analysis.
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HOW FIRM ARE PRA RESULTS?
Sanford L. Israel
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555
ABSTRACT
The results of several PRAs and their peer reviews are discussed
in terms of changes in likelihoods and identification of dominant
sequences. Overall core-damage likelihoods appear to be affected
by the scope of the study and some of the underlying assumptions
in the analyses. Assumptions also play an important role in
identifying dominant contributors to core-damage or offsite
consequences. This paper presents examples of the impact of study
scope and assumptions on the results of PRAs. These examples
highlight the need for more attention to be given to the bases
that support the more sensitive assumptions.
INTRODUCTION
There have been numerous probabilistic assessments performed in the
United States over the past few years with many different objectives in mind.
Most of those sponsored by the utilities and submitted to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) in support of an ongoing licensing or regulatory
activity received rather intensive peer reviews to assess the validity of the
findings. In order to confirm the PRA results, the reviews examined the event
trees/fault trees, component failures, human errors, common cause failures,
assumptions, and interdependencies and also looked for omissions. Many of
these areas were simply audited and compared with the existing state-of-the-art
treatment; however, the more searching portions of the review required gaining
some independent familiarity with the plant design and operation and a
questioning attitude to ferret out marginal assumptions or lapses in logic.
Reviews of the various studies generally resulted in different estimated
core-damage likelihoods and differences in dominant contributors to core-damage
or risk.
Differences in PRA results are expected. The Lewis Committee [1] noted
"WASH-1400 is defective in many important ways. Many of the calculations are
deficient when subject to careful and probing analysis, with the result that
the accuracy of many of the absolute probabilities calculated therein is not
good as claimed." Further, the Committee said that they didn't know whether
the results were high or low and that the uncertainties were understated.
Uncertainty has become a hallmark of probabilistic assessments and considerable
attention has been focused on shortcomings of PRAs. At various times, the
culprits have been identified as insufficient data, inadequate treatment of
common cause failures and human errors, and modeling errors.
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In the following discussion, I have tried to highlight the observations
from peer reviews that led to different perceptions of core-damage likelihoods
or dominant accident sequences. ~opefully, this information will provide
some insight on where to focus attention when performing a PRA or reviewing
one in the future. In addition, I will discuss some of the more significant
findings of arecent survey [2] of the impact of various aspects of PRA
methodology on identifying dominant accident sequences. This survey,
sponsored by the NRC, attempted to pinpoint those aspects of the PRA
methodology which appeared to drive the PRA results.
My comments are directed primarily at core-damage assessments which
have received the most attention and presumably are the most mature. Similar
concerns about uncertainty and bias could be addressed in the con-
tainment and consequence analysis. These analyses entail much more
detailed phenomenological modeling with its associated uncertainty than the
core-damage assessments.
DISCUSSION
Protestations of large uncertainties not withstanding, the one parameter
that receives the most attention in a probabilistic assessment is the
estimated core-damage likelihood. It fixes our perception of risk. In the
United States, the core-damage likelihoods estimated by the various plant
studies range from 2xlO- 6 /RY to 2xlO- 3 /RY. This wide spread in estimates
reflects differences in plant design and operation as well as differences
in methodology (including the choice of the estimators). There are several
documented studies and peer reviews of the same plants in the United States
which allow us to examine the potential impact of different methodologies on
the estimated core-damage likelihoods. The comparisons of the studies
presented below are meant to identify the types of methodological considera-
tions that appear to influence the results without passing judgment on the
validity of any particular approach or result.
The Indian Point plants (Units 2 and 3) have been the subject of
considerable scrutiny over the past four years because of their location
in a high population density area. The first probabilistic study of the
plants [3] used an abbreviated characterization of the important plant
systems, a small prescribed set of sequences for internally initiated
events, and a simplified quantification based on failure probabilities from
the Reactor Safety Study [4]. The second study was a thorough investigation
of the plants that considered both internal and external events [5]. The
third study [6] was a quick estimate of core-damage likelihoods for internally
initiated events based on simplified event trees, a cursory knowledge of the
plant design, and an analyst's gross estimates of system unavailabilities
(no fault tree characterization). The fourth study [7] was a rather
intensive peer review of the in-depth probabilistic study. The estimated
core-damage likelihoods for internally initiated events from these studies
ranged from about lO-4/RY to lO-5/RY with the low estimates obtained by
the rudimentary studies and the higher estimates obtained by the more
sophisticated study and peer review.
Why the difference in the core-melt estimates? One's initial reaction
would be to suspect that the detailed event tree and fault tree analyses
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uncovered some hidden vulnerability; however, this is not the under-
lying cause. The differences are attributable to assumed LOCA frequencies
and different analysts perceptions. The analyst's perceptions that were
significant were assumptions that 1055 of reactor coolant pump seal cooling
would result in a seal failure (LOCA); its corollary that a break in the
component cooling water system would also result in a consequential seal
failure and loss of ECCS; and the quantification of human error probabilities
associated with switchover from injection to recirculation following a LOCA.
The assumptinns regarding the reactor coolant pump seal failure and the
component cooling water system are not unique to these plants; however, they
may have been illuminated by the more thorough studies. The different
estimates of human error probabilities that had an impact on the results do
not appear to correlate with the level of effort expended since widely different
estimates were obtained from similar efforts in References 5 and 7.
The analyst's role and impact is reenforced by the treatment of external events
in Reference 5 and its review in Reference 7. The review resulted in about an
order of magnitude increase in the estimated core-damage likelihood associated
with external events. Differences in judgment and knowledge accounted for
the different estimates and these judgments were not associated with features
particularly unique to the plants. Thus, in this instance, the analysts
appear to be a dominant factor in core-damage estimates.
A similar set of probabilistic assessments and reviews for the Zion
plants are reported in References 8 through 11. The estimated core damage
likelihoods ranged from roughly 10- 4 /RY to 10- 5 /RY for plants that are some-
what similar to the Indian Point units. Again, the differences in the
estimates were attributable to assumed LOCA frequencies and assumptions
about equipment operability under degraded conditions, not to weaknesses
uncovered by in-depth event tree and fault tree treatments. These results
may not be entirely independent since the study groups were essentially the
same as those used in the various Indian Point studies.
A peer review [12] of the Big Rock Point probabilistic assessment did
not yield any changes in core-damage likelihoods; however, a review of the
Limerick study [13] resulted in a factor of six increase in the estimated
core-damage likelihoods for internally initiated events. The principal
reasons for the differences are discovery of dependencies between initiators
and mitigating systems; interdependencies between major safety systems
(because of support systems); modifications to event trees and fault trees;
and different assumptions about initiating frequencies. The major impacts
were assumptions about initiating frequencies with deviations in the fine
structure having less significance.
The reviews cited above resulted in increases in the estimated
core-damage likelihoods by factors up to ten. The potential impact of
a review is controlled by the thoroughness ·of the originators and reviewers
and the regulatory process in general (we regulators may have a bias towards
the conservative). A factor of ten is certainly a significant difference in
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estimated core-damage likelihood, but it is not my intent to start a new
round of reviews to validate this finding. The important points to be noted
are that these reviews have confirmed the fidelity of the event tree/fault tree
analyses and have highlighted the analyst's judgment as a significant
variable in the process .. These judgments can affect the estimates because
of omissions, assumptions about initiating frequencies, and human errors.
These judgements may have some plant-specific origin but for the most part
are generic in nature. While these judgments may inject uncertainty in the
quantification process, they are also a rich source of insights regarding
potential weaknesses associated with severe accidents and as such should
be considered a significant product of the PRA if properly illuminated.
The influence of the analyst on core-damage estimates is also supported by
arecent survey of six PRAs [2]. This survey indicated that quantification
of human actions (both beneficial and adverse) had a potentially significant
impact on the estimates. It is well known that human error assessment is
very sensitive to the analy~t performing the evaluation.
Dur perception of dominant contributors to core-damage and offsite
consequences is also strongly influenced by the analyst. An assumption that
has attained prominence in recent PRA studies performed in the United States
is the 1055 of reactor coolant pumps (RCP) seals when seal cooling is lost.
This assumption impacts events involving 1055 of all AC power (station blackout)
initiated by a simple 1055 of offsite power or caused by fire, seismic, wind,
or flood events that produce the same effect. Prior to about 1980, the
station blackout accident sequence in PWRs considered only decay heat removal
through the steam generator and the independent failure of the turbine driven
auxiliary feedwater (AFW) train. If the RCP seals fail in a station blackout,
the resultirg LOCA cannot be mitigated because the emergency core cooling pumps
depend on AC power. Thus, the estimated core-damage likelihood for astation
blackout is increased by whatever credit one takes for the availability of
the turbine driven AFW pump. Until recently, there has not been a serious
investigation of the failure modes of the seals used in the different RCP
designs. One manufacturer had results from a single test indicating that
the seal integrity could be maintained for at least 50 hours without cooling,
while another manufacturer had operating experience that the seal would
survive at least 30 minutes. Using this limited information and their own
judgments, analysts assume that the seals either fail or not subsequent to
a station blackout type event. If one assumes that the seals fail, then
significant contributors to core-damage are Loss-of-Offsite-Power events at
Zion (about 30% [11]); component cooling water pipe breaks at Zion (about
50% [11]), Indian Point, Unit 2 (about 10% [7]), and at Indian Point Unit 3
(about 30% [7]); hurricanes at Indian Point, Unit 2 (about 10% after technical
specification change); and fires at Indian Point Unit 2 and 3 (about 5% before
modification [7]). These sequences would not be dominant contributors to
core-damage if one assumes that the seals do not fail in a short time frame
upon 1055 of cooling. The contribution of the simple loss-of-offsite-power
events associated with this assumption is small at the Indian Point plants
because of the high degree of redundancy in emergency power which is not
typical of most plants.
System success criteria can also influence our perception of dominant
core-damage sequences. At the Zion plants the component cooling water and
service water support systems are shared by the two units. The success
criteria for the minimum number of pumps required to operate in each system
1996
following a loss-of-offsite-power event has an important influence on the
importance of this sequence. A sensititvity study reported in the review [llJ
indicated a 50% reduction in the core-damage likelihood of loss-of-offsite-power
events if the criteria changed from 2 CCW pumps and 2 SW pumps to one CCW
pump and 3 SW pumps.
An example somewhat related to the subject of success criteria is the
loss of long term heat removal sequence for Peach Bottom in the Reactor
Safety Study [4]. This accident sequence was built on the assumption of no
operator action for over 20 hours while the reactor building overpressurized
and the subsequent rapid depressurization was assumed to fail the co re cooling
pumps. Subsequent PRAs such as Limerick [13] have identified additional
operator actions which would reduce the potential significance of this
accident sequence in BWRs. In this instance, the relative importance of the
sequence appears to be dependent on the analyst's persistence in
discovering alternate recovery modes for a sequence that evolves over
a long time frame.
Assumptions can also influence our perception of dominant accident
sequences leading to potentailly severe offsite consequences. Both the
Indian Point and Zion plants have redundant containment cooling systems
through the use of either the containment sprays or fan coolers. Several
accident sequences in these plants involved the loss of the low pressure
safety recirculation system which also provides the containment spray function
during the recirculation phase. Thus, the functionability of the fan
coolers for these sequences are an important factor in reducing the
probability of slow overpressure failure of the containment and significant
offsite releases. The fan coolers were not designed to operate in a post
core-melt environment so the analyst must judge the plausibility of their
operability under degraded conditions. Sensitivity studies presented in
the reviews of the Zion [11] and Indian Point [7] PRAs indicated that the
frequency of the plant damage state - core-melt without containment cooling -
could increase by up to a factor of three if the fan coolers have a conditional
failure probability of one in the degraded environment.
Omissions are another source of missing dominant contributors to
core-damage accident sequences. Omissions occur because of the limited scope
of the study or oversights. The impact of study scope was highlighted by the
Indian Point and Zion studies [5,10] which showed externally initiated events,
such as earthquakes, were important contributors to core-damage. Prior to
these studies, most PRAs conducted in the United States had little or no
treatment of external events because the relevant methodologies were in an
embryonic stage. Analysis of externally initiated events relies heavily on
judgment and modeling approximations which result in large uncertainties and
reduced confidence in the central estimates.
The inclusion of externally initiated events in the Indian Point and
Zion studies [5,10] increased the estimated core-damage likelihoods by a
factor up to five. More importantly, these events were dominant contributors
to offsite consequences because the resulting effect defeated co re cooling
and containment cooling simultaneously. A peer review of the Indian Point
PRA [7] provided different judgments about hazards curves, component fragilities,
and accident sequence definition that resulted in a substantial increase in
the estimated likelihoods of seismic, fire, and wind events. Fortunately,
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simple modifications were implemented to reduce the probability of the dominant
sequences so that extended debate about the correctness of the judgments was
not necessary.
The depth of the fault tree development can also be considered under
the scope of the study. The more detail included in the study, the greater
the opportunity for discovering vulnerabilities in the plant. The
probabilistic assessment of Millstone Unit 1, sponsored by the NRC [14],
examined control logic in greater detail than is normally pursued in a PRA
(except for the reactor protection system). During the course of the study,
the analysts uncovered a single failure in the logic that would have precluded
automatically loading equipment on the emergency buses following a 1055 of
offsite power event. This vulnerability, which was subsequently corrected,
resulted in a dominant accident sequence which would have been missed in
most PRA studies.
Another example of the importance of the depth of the study was flagged
in the review of the Zion PRA [11]. In this instance it was noted that
continued operation of pumps needed to mitigate certain events was dependent
on room cooling and that the thermostat which controlled the cooling system
was never tested to determine its operability. Surveillance procedures for
the room coolers have since been modified to include testing of the thermostat.
Oversights can also have a significant impact on the identification of
dominant sequences. The Indian Point and Zion studies illuminated the
significance of the 1055 of reactor coolant pump seal cooling as noted
earlier. Peer reviews of these studies [7,11] flagged an overlooked
accident sequence (involving a break in the component cooling water system)
that stems directly from the RCP seal cooling concern. The seals are cooled
by high pressure injection of seal water from the charging pumps and
cooling of the seal housing by component cooling water. Component cooling
water is also used to cool the charging pumps and the high pressure safety
injection pumps. Thus, a break in the component cooling water system could
result in 1055 of all RCP seal cooling, a consequential small LOCA, and
1055 of ECCS needed to mitigate a small LOCA.
Most of the examples cited above had shortcomings related to the scope
of the study or engineering judgements that are outside of the formal
event tree - fault tree - statistics portion of the assessment. Expanded
study scopes usually entail treatment of e0ternal events which are also
sensitive to the analyst's judgement. In large measure, all of these
judgements concern faults outside the design envelope of the plant and/or
components.
CONCLUSION
The analyst has been shown to be a strong influence on the PRA
results - both core-damage estimates and identification of dominant
contributors to core-damage or risk. This influence is a significant
variable in the analysis because judgements are generally inareas outside
of the design envelope and may not be supported by available'data. Thus,
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more attention needs to be given to the engineering bases for these
sensitive judgements. However, developing empirical support for these
judgements could be more resource intensive than the basic PRA itself.
An alternate approach is to provide a truly independent peer review
of the PRA. This would introduce a reasonable amount of skepticism that may
ferret out marginal assumptions. Past peer reviews have been successful in
identifying differences of opinion regarding plant/component response under
degraded conditions. A peer review is not foolproof because it relies on
the PRA documentation, to a large extent, for developing an understanding
of the plant design and operation. Thus it is important that the
documentation be fairly complete and unbiased in illuminating assumptions
used in the analysis.
Does this lack of firmness in the PRA results impair its usefulness?
I think not. The process of performing a PRA and the interaction with a
peer review group provides a very constructive framework for illuminating
potential weaknes~es in plant design and operation that may warrant
remedial action. The interactions sharpen the focus on subtle nuances that
may have significant safety impact. This interaction should include
utility personnel who have the most knowledge about plant operation and who
also have the most to gain from the risk perspectives obtained from the
safety analysis.
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ABSTRACT
A probabi 1isti e assessment was made of the effeets on pub 1 ie dose of
water hammer events in light water reaetors. The analysis utilized
aetual historieal water hammer data to determine if the water hammer
events eontributed either to system failure rates 01' initiating event
frequeneies. Representative PRAs were used to see if ehanges in
initiating events and/or system failures eaused by water hammer resulted
in new va 1ues for the domi nant sequenees in the PRAs. New eore me lt
frequeneies were determined and earried out to the subsequent inerease in
publ ie dose. It is eonel uded that water hammer is not a signifieant
problem with respeet to risk to the publ ie for either BWRs 01' PWRs.
INT RODU CTI ON
This paper summari zes a probabi 1istie assessment that was made of the
effeets of water hammer events that oeeur in 1ight water reactors (LWRs). It
is taken from work performed for the U.S. Nuelear Regulatory Commission in
support of their evaluation of Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-1: Water
Hammer. The opinions represented in this paper are those of the authors, and
do not neeessarily represent the offieial position of the NRC.
In the reeent report NUREG/CR-2781 [1], the results of aetual and
potentia 1 water hammer events oeeurring in LWR power p1ants is presented.
NUREG/CR-2781 also presented methods for thei l' prevention and miti gati on.
Water hammer damage appears to be primarily 1 imited to the piping support
systems. The frequeney and severity of water hammer events is greater in BWRs
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than in PWRs. The predominant cause of water hammer events is the presence of
voids or steam bubbles in pumped water 1 ines. A detailed 1 ist of known and
suspectedwater hammer events is gi yen in NUREG/CR-2059 [2 J. To date, no
water hammer event has pl aced a pl ant in an emergency condition. However, 18
of the reported 82 events in BWR plants did disable a safety system train. A
methodology was developed which was capable of utilizing the information in
these two reports to estimate, in a conservative way, the potential
contribution to public dose from core melt accidents involving water hammer
induced system failures.
METHODOLOGY
A general methodology was developed to evaluate the effect of water
hammer on plant risk from core melt. In order to do this, it was necessary to
compare the water hammer contribution to some basel ine measure of plant risk.
It was decided that the best way to da this was to see what affect could be
seen on the results of an already performed probabilistic risk assessment
(PRA) if water hammer events were i ncorporated into it. Thi s was necessary
since PRAs performed to date have not included water hammer as a specific
event. It was also decided that for the purpose of this analysis the measure
of plant risk utilized should be dose to the public, measured in man-rem.
This was selected because it is a useful measure for providing a generic
bounding quantification of societal ris~ and al so because this is the measure
which the NRC had selected to use for ranking the importance of generic
unresolved safety issues. Three specific power plants were selected for the
study, based on the availability of PRAs representing these plants. The
plants selected were a BWR-3 with isolation condenser, a BI~R-4, and a
Westinghouse PWR [3J. The selection of two BWRs and one PWR was based on the
review of water hammer studies which indicated, as previously mentioned, that
water hammer was a more important consideration in BWRs and further, that
water hammer experience cou ld be different for differing BWR types. The
ana 1ysi s i tse1 f was carri ed out in the fo 11 owi ng seri es of steps.
Step 1 - Freguency of Water Hammer Events
The frequency of water hammer events was determined for various systems
by plant type. The information used to do this was taken from NUREG/CR-2781
[lJ and NUREG/CR-2059 [2J. The list of systems considered were those systems
for which there was some history of water hammer occurrence (at least one
known or suspected water hammer event). The number of events having occurred
in each system were determined directly from the listings in the reference
documents. Only events which occurred during commercial operation were
counted. It was felt that events during start-up testing and system checkout
were not representative of actual plant performance. Classical point
estimates for water hammer frequency were generated for each system and plant
type based on the event count and the number of reactor-years of commercia 1
operation in each populatio~ For BWRs, frequencies were developed for three
groupi ng s, all BWR 3s and 4s, BWR 3s on 1y, and BWR 4s on 1y. The pu rpose of
this was to determine if there were actually any statistica11y significant
differences between the frequency of water hammer events in the same systems
in each plant type. In order to determine if there was a difference, 90
percent Chi-squared confidence bounds were generated for the water hammer
frequencies developed. Then, for each syste~ a subjective judgement was made
as to whether there was a significant difference between the frequency
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determined for the individual BWR 3 and 4 groups and the overall BWR
popu 1at ion. The judgement was based -to a 1 arge extent on the ov er1ap of the
90 percent confidence bounds. In general, if the confidence bounds of the
individual plant groups completely overlapped the confidence bounds of the
overall popul ation, then it was fel t that their was no significant difference
between the individual plant group frequencies for that system and the
population frequency estimate was used (the individual frequencyestimates
were rejected). Otherwis~ the individual plant group frequencies were used
and the overall population frequency was rejected. As stated above, this was
based on analyst judgement and was very subjective in nature. However, it was
felt that any error induced would be minimal, and though more complex
statistical analysis was theoretical ly possible, the marginal size of the data
base did not justify such treatment. For PWRs, the anal ysis of data by pl ant
groupings was not uti lized since we had chosen to perform only one PI,R
analysis. All P~JR data was combined into a single data base and the point
estimate frequencies were determined. Since the PWR plant analyzed was a
Westinghouse pl ant, it would have been reasonable to use just Westinghouse
data had it differed significantly from Combustion Engineering and Babcock and
Wilcox data. However, this was not the case, thus the system water hammer
point estimate frequencies determined for all PWRs were used throughout the
analysis.
Step 2 - Freguency of Water Hammer Induced Failures
In order to determine the frequency of water hammer induced fai lure, it
was necessary to combi ne the frequenci es of water hammer events from step 1
with a calculated value for the fraction of water hammer events in each system
which resul t in fail ures. This fract-ion was based on a detai led examination
of the descriptions of the water hammer events contained in the two NUREG
documents. The event descriptions provided the necessary information to
determine if any system fai lure had resu lted from the water hammer occurence.
Once again a simple classical calculation was utilized, that is, the point
estimate system damage fraction was determined by dividing the number of water
hammer events resulting in system failure by the total number of water hammer
events for that system. For systems where a fai lure had not occurred but
where the historical data indicated that it was possible to develop sufficient
force through water hammer to cause failure, a conservative bounding value was
used, based on the assumption that the next water hammer event in that system
would result in a fai lure. Depending on the system, the frequencies were
determined for various contributions to and types of systems failure. For
normally operating systems essential to pl ant operation, the frequency of a
water hammer induced transient initiator was determined. For standby systems,
the frequency of a water hammer induced fai lure in response to a demand was
determined. In this case, the failure frequencies were converted from per
year to per demand, based on the estimated number of tests per year, si nce
thi s i s the number requ ired for quant ifi cat ion these of systems in the PRAs.
The number of tests per year was assumed to be 10 per train for safety
systems, based on the standard technical specifications requirement for one
test per month and all owi ng for two months for refue1 i ng (no tests performed).
This is obviously a conservative assumption which would yield a higher than
actual demand failure rate. For all systems which interface with the reactor
coolant system, if the data indicated that water hammer forces could be
sufficient to cause a pi pe break, a LOCA contribution from water hammer was
determined, based on the same calculational technique. However, in this case
it was important to consider the expected location of the water hammer
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effects, since the location of the pipe break determined if any additional
failures (such as check valves) would be required for the pipe break to result
in a LOC~ Thus, the frequency of the water hammer induced pipe break was
adjusted to account for these additional failures and a water hammer induced
LOCA frequency was determined. The data for these additiona 1 fail ures was
taken from the Interim Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP) data base.
Step 3 - Contribution of Water Hammer to Total Event Freguencies
At this point, the potential contribution of water hammer induced failure
to system fail ures and initiating events was determined. The system demand
failure rates and initiating event frequencies excl uding water hammer were
extracted from the three PRAs used for this eval uation (the previously
referred to BWR-3 with isol ation condenser, Bt'iR-4, and Westinghouse PiJR PRAs).
The water hammer induced frequencies or demand fai lure rates determined in
Step 2 were added to the appropriate initiating event frequency or system
fai 1ure rate extracted from the PRAs. The new numbers determi ned were
compared with the old (water hammer excluded) numbers to determine if there
was a measurable increase due to water hamme~ Only those initiating events
and systems which showed a measurable increase were retained to the next step
in the analysis. Thus, the rest of the analysis was simpl ified by screening
out those events and systems for which the water hammer contribution was not
measurable.
Step 4 - Consideration of Event Phenomenology
In the p~evious steps, no evaluation was made of the precise conditions
which lead to the water hammer event. It was simply assumed, conservatively,
that these water hammer events could occur randomly at any time. Thus, the
new values calculated in the previous step were the maximum expected values
incl uding water hammer effects. In order to further refine the analysis and
reduce the number of cases which needed to be quantified in the final
analysis, it was necessary to account for the fact that these water hammer
events were not poss ib 1e under a11 cond itions. Therefore, the phenomeno1ogy
of water hammer in the parti cu 1ar systems was examined to determine under
which conditions they were possibl e. In order to ill ustrate this idea, let us
consider the following example. It was determined that water hammer was a
potentially significant contributor to isolation condenser (IC) fai lures.
However, an examination of the IC water hammer events and the system design
showed that due to the location of the IC, which is located very high in the
containment and has a steam riser line located at a nozzle above the level of
the steam 1ines, and the nature of IC water hammer, which requires that water
be forced into the steam rise~ the only way this event can occur is if there
is an extremely high water level in the reactor vessel (above the steam
lines). Water levels this high can only occur from level surge due to reactor
trip before feedwater trip, which is not possible during sequences initiated
by loss of feedwater or loss of offsite power. Therefore, sequences from the
PRA which were initiated by these two transients were not reevaluated for the
effects of isolation condenser water hammer events.
Step 5 - Reguantification of Release Category Freguencies
Each of the PRAs uti 1i zed contai ned a 1; st of domi nant sequences which
accounted for essentially all of the core melt frequency at that plant.
Further, these sequences had been carried out to the expected rel ease
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category, such that release category frequencies were shown. In order to
determine the contri buti on of water hammer to these frequencies, it was
necessary to requantify these release categories to include water hammer
events. Using the values calculated in step 3 and the phenomenological
considerations developed from step 4, the frequencies of the dominant
sequences from each of the three PRAs were requantified by applying the new
(water hammer incl uded) system demand fail ure rates and initiating event
frequenc i es to the ca 1cu 1ati on of the seque nce frequenc i es. The ca 1cu 1at i on
was carried out to the release categories, and new values were obtained for
the release categories which represented the inclusion of water hammer. Those
release categories which showed a measurable increase in frequency due to the
inclusion of water hammer were retained for the final step of the evaluation.
Step 6 - Determination of Effect on Public Dose
The release category frequencies, both before and after inclusion of
water hammer (the "o ld" and " new" values, respectively), were converted to
public dose in,man-rem per year. This was done by multiplying the release
category frequencies by the expected whole body dose to the public (in man-
rem) for the given category. These dose levels were obtained from two
sourees, thus two calculations were performed. The first calculation used
dose levels from a draft version of NUREG-0933 [4]. For the sake of
comparison, the other calculation used the dose levels from the draft version
of WASH-1400, the Reactor Safety Study [5,6]. The major difference between
the two sets of val ues is in two areas. The NUREG-0933 values were based on a
population dose model truncated at a 50 mile radius from the plant while the
WASH-1400 val ues are based on an "infi nite" popul ation dose model (no
truncation~ Als~ the NUREG-0933 model assumed an exclusion area of 1/2 mile
and a uniform population density of 340 persons per square mi le beyond that
while the WASH-1400 model used the Indian Point population demographies and
divided the final result by two. The dose estimates taken from each source
are shown on Table I. The old values were subtracted from the new values to
determine the contribution of water hammer to dose to the public for both
scales. These "delta-values" also represent the potential maximum reduction
in publ ic dose from the el imination of water hammer as an event.
RESULTS-BWRs
The analysis of water hammer in BWRs incl uded the effects of water hammer
events on nine BWR systems which had a history of occurrenc~ Table 11 shows
the results of the systems analysis for both BWR-3s and BWR-4s. The values
shown on the table are the values selected for the quantification after the
application of the statistical test performed on the samples as described in
the methodology section. Thus, in some cases a single number representing
both BWR types is shown and in some cases the water hammer histories were
sufficiently different as to require the use of specific values'for each plant
type. As can be seen, the fai 1ure frequencies due to water hammer are
rel atively small. The historical data showed that for most of the systems,
the most seri ous effect poss i b1e was a loss of system funct i on. I n on 1y one
case, the feedwater system, was there any need to consider the potential for a
water hammer induced pipe break and subsequent LOCA. This was because the
other systems are not subject to water hammer forces sufficient to cause pipe
ruptures. However, the frequency of LOCA due to feedwater system water hammer
was small because the location of feedwater system water hammer events has
2005
TABLE I
Estimated Publ ic Dose (Man-Rem) by Release Category
Release Category Dose (NUREG-0933) Dose (WASH-1400)
PWR 1 5.4E+6 3.8E+7
PI'IR 2 4.8E+6 3.6E+7
PWR 3 5.4E+6 3.9E+7
PljR 4 2.7E+6 2.2E+7
PWR 5 1.OE+6 6.0E+6
PWR 6 1. 5E+5 6.5E+5
P~IR 7 2.3E+4 9.5E+3
PWR 8 7.5E+4 2.6E+5
PWR 9 1. 2E+2 3.6E+2
BWR 1 5.4E+6 3.9E+7
BWR 2 7.1E+6 7.5E+7
BWR 3 5.1E+6 4.6E+7
BWR 4 6.1E+5 3.1E+6
BWR 5 2.0E+1 1. 3E+2
TABLE II
System Failure Frequencies Due to
Ijater Hammer Events in 'BWRs
System Plant Water Hammer Event Type Sig. Contrib.
Type Failure Freguency to Sys. Fail?
HPCI BWR-3 4.5E-4!demand demand fail ure No
BWR-4 5.5E-3/demand demand fail ure Ye\
IC BWR-3 3.2E-2/demand demand fail ure Yes
BWR-3 1. 9E-7 /year LOCA initiator No
LPCI/RHRa BWR-3 1.6E-4/demand demand fail ure Yes
B~JR-4 7.0E-4/demand demand failure Yes
LPCSa BWR-3 2.6E-3/demand demand fail ure Yes
BWR-4 5.7E-4/demand demand fai 1ure No
RCIC BWR-3 2.9E-3/demand demand fail ure Yes
BWR-4 7.0E-4/dernand demand failure Yes
RWCU BWR-3,4 8.0E-3/year transient initiator No
SCW BWR-3 7.5E-2/year transient initiator No
BWR-4 3.0E-2/year transient initiator No
PCS BWR-3,4 3.5E-2/year transient initiator No
FW BWR-3 1. 2E-2/yea r transient initiator No
BWR-3 9.6E-8/year LOCA initiator No
BWR-4 3.5E-3/year transient initiator No
BWR-4 2.8E-8/year LOCA initiator No
(a) values are per train (b) failure does not app1y to LOFW or LOSP events
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been in the area of the feedwater contro 1 val ves. A pipe break in this area
would lead to a LOCA only if the additional failure of the downstream check
val ves allowed backflow from the reactor coolant system to the break area.
When these additional failures were added to the feedwater water hammer pipe
break frequency, the overall water hammer induced LOCA frequency did not
increase the frequency of the large LOCA initiator.
Propagating the results shown in Table 11 throughout the PRAs yields the
new values for release category frequency and total core melt frequency shown
in Tab 1e I II. As 'can be seen from thi stab 1e, the effect of water hammer on'
total core melt frequency is negligible for both types of BWR. By negligible,
we mean that there is no change in the frequency when the calculated values
are rounded to two significant digits (i.e., -Ehe calculated change is less
than one percent). The tab 1e also shows that for the BWR-3 eva 1u ated, the
effect of water hammer is negligible for each individual release category. In
the case of BWR-4s, there was a measurable effect due to water hammer on the
frequencies of release categories 1 and 2, the high consequence categories.
The change was on the order of 7% for each of the two categori es. In tracing
back the cause of the effect, it was determined that it was due almost
entirely to water hammer induced failures in the residual heat removal (RHR)
system.
The final results of the BWR analysis are shown in Table IV. This table
shows the increase in public dose when water hammer is included in the PRA
analyses utilize~ As discussed in the methodology sectio~ this result is
shown using two dose models. As would be expected, the BWR-3 results indicate
no change in pub 1ic dose due to the consideration of water hammer. The BWR-4
results indicates an approximately 2% contribution on both scales from the
consideration of water hammer, which resulted from the 7% increase in the
frequency of re 1ease categori es 1 and 2.
RESULTS-PWRs
The PWR analysis turned out to be significantly easier than the BWR
analysiL Due to space limitations the results cannot be presented here on
the same level of detail as the BWR results, however, the results proved to be
quite interesting. The analysis of water hammer events at PWR plants showed
that water hammer did not have any noticeable effect on either systems failure
probabil ities or initiating event frequencies. Thus, once the analysis
reached this point it was obvious that it was not necessary to carry out this
calculation to release category frequency or subsequently to public dose.
Water hammer can be said to have a negl igible effect on core melt frequency
and pub 1i c dose for PWRs.
CONCLUSIONS
A methodology for the probabil istic assessment of the significance of
water hammer was developed and applied. The technique was kept simple in
keeping with the sparse nature of the avail able data. Because of this, the
answers obtained have very substantial uncertainties attached to them. In
order to control the effect of these uncertainties, the analytical technique
used for the analysis utilized a number of very conservative assumptions, thus
even the substantial uncertainties involved should not change the conclusions
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TABLE III
Increase in Release Category Frequencies Due to
Water Hammer Events in BWRs
Release Category
2 3 4 Sum
BWR 4
Category total
with water hammer 1. 4E-7 4.2E-5 1.7E-4 2.1E-4
w/o water hammer 1.3E-7 3.9E-5 1. 7E-4 2.1E-4
increase 7% 7% negl. negl.
BWR 3 w/isolation condenser
Category total
with water hammer 1.3E-6 8.2E-6 1.0E-4 2.3E-4 3.4E-4
w/o water hammer 1.3E-6 8.2E-6 1.0E-4 2.3E-4 3.4E-4
increase neg1. neg1. neg1. neg1. negl.
TABLE IV
Increase in Public Dose Due to
Water Hammer Events in BWRs













Total Public Dose With
Water Hammer Included 715 5,979
Total Public Dose Without 715 5,979
~Jater Hammer Inc 1uded









since it is more likely that the results are too high rather than too low.
Howeve~ it is extremely important to keep in mind that it is not possible to
prove thi s, and thus one must sti 11 consi der the uncertai nties to be
statistically significant. Bearing this in mind, we can present what we feel
to be reasonable conclusions based on the analysis.
The PWR analysis showed that water hammer did not even contribute to the
individual system fai lure probabi lities or initiating event frequencies. The
BWR analysis showed that although water hammer did contribute to some events,
this did not significantly impact the overall results. The BWR-3 results
showed no change in overall core melt frequency or public dose. The BWR-4
results showed no change in overall core melt frequency and a 2% change in
publ ic dose. Further, the absol ute man-rem per reactor-year change for the
BWR-4s was quite small for both dose models used. Therefore, based on the
results of this analysis, it is the conclusion of the authors that within the
limitations cited previously, it is possible to state that water hammer is not
a significant problem with respect to core melt frequency or public dose from
reactor accidents in either P\<JRs or BWRs.
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INTRODUCTION
The following is an attemptto show systematically the rela-
tionship between the deterministic and probabilistic approach,
which are often incorrectly seen as being fundamental opposites.




is started with the question
"How safe is safe enough?
Even in the case safety goals exist, which give definite answers
to this question, this is not enough, because it is not known,
what a safe plant looks like. Therefore a second question
arises:
"What does a safe plant look like?"
This question is at least of the same importance as the first
one. Whereas the answer to the first question is normally given
in probabilistic categories, the answer to the second question
is normally given in deterministic categories. This leads us
to the question to be handled in this paper:
"How fit the deterministic and probabilistic ways
together"
REMARKS TO DEFINE THE TERMS USED
The term "deterministic" is used in the field of nuclear
technology in two meanings:
- in the scientific/technological meaning, "deterministic"
means that a technical process or the result of a calcula-
tion is determined by clear scientific/technical causal re la-
tionshipSj
- in the licensing process the term "deterministic" is used
to point out that the actual design of the engineered safety
features is derived from pre-determined postulates. Such
2010
postulates may be design basis accidents or other design
basis principles such as those of redundancy, diversity,
safety factors, calculation prescriptions and the like.
They also include the radiological exposure limits es tab-
lished by the radiological protection ordinance. In so
far as such postulates have been validated and have proven
expedient, they can be established in the form of detailed
design specifications in technical rules and regulations.
The nuclear licensing procedure is largely based on the estab-
lishment and application of deterministic principles in the
derivation of the safety concept; the application of probabi-
listic procedures is of a complementary nature only (/1/,
criterion.1.1).
The term "probabilistic" is used in a variety of combinations
and meanings, some of which are:
- qualitative or quantitative evaluation of the frequencies
of events
- event tree and/or fault tree analysis, the task of such
studies can be different
to optimize systems by comparison of different alternatives
calculation of systems reliability as part of an overall
risk assessment
- risk assessment to get an overall picture of the risk in
connection with nuclear power plants
In this paper we deal with the trends to give more importance
to probabilistic methods in licensing procedures. We would
like to show, that it makes no sense to replace deterministic
criteria by probabilistic criteria only.
We also wouldlike to show that probabilistic methods are
helpful as additional tool, but they should not replace the
traditional deterministic way in the licensing procedure.
If we now go ahead with the comparison of deterministic and
probabilistic approaches, this concerns only that area in which
the term "deterministic" is used in the sense of the licensing
context (see above).
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KNOWLEDGE OF CAUSAL RELATIONS AS A PRESUMPTION OF BOTH THE
DETERMINISTIC AND PROBABILISTIC METHOD
The knowledge and application of causal relationships,
that is the determinism in the scientific/technological
meaning of the word, is a requirement both to the determinis-
tic and to the probabilistic approach.
This fact is evident for the deterministic method, but has
to be explained for the probabilistic way:
The main tools used in the probabilistic method, which are
- event trees and
- fault trees
are representations of the causal relationships between the
behaviour of the components, the different boundary condi-
tions and their consequences .
.This deterministic picture presented in event and fault trees
is transformed into a probabilistic tool only after inser-
tion of failure rates, which give statistical information
only in one respect of the behaviour of the components and
this is the frequency of component failures. There is a
fundamental problem with this statistical information, but
we will come back to this later on. Additional examples for
deterministic information in the scientific/technical meaning
necessary for probabilistic studies are
- efficiency conditions
- consequences of failures
- results of transient calculations (e.g.
pressures, temperatures)
- limiting conditions for components
- materials specifications to be met
PROBABILISTIC EVALUATION OF DETERMINISTICALLY DERIVED CONCEPTS
It is possible to evaluate and quantify the safety concept,
which has been gained on a "deterministic" basis, by means
of probabilistic risk studies. This involves posing the
question as to the
- frequency of occurrence and
- consequences
of event sequences that can not be kept under control by the
engineered safety features. Such a study related to German
conditions is available in the form of the German Risk Study,
Phase A /2/.
This and similar studies validate the deterministic procedure
used to a certain degree, as is evident from the fact that
these studies have not given reason to make any drastic
changes to the existing safety concept.
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We can conclude that the risk assessment has confirmed the
safety concept in the following way
- No important accident sequences have been forgotten
- The deterministic requirements were checked with the
possibility of
Optimization of details of the overall safety concept
. Reduction of extrem requirements
At the same time as they confirm the safety concept, the
risk studies also essentiallyvalidate the nuclear engineering
rules and regulations which establish the deterministic prin-
ciples and requirements on which the safety concept is based.
Thus, the safety level derived from the safety concept is
also the safety level defined by the body of technical rules
and regulations, at least to the extent to whichthis has
al ready been established. These relationships are shown in
Figure 1, from which two statements can be derived:
1. In principle it is equivalent whether the requirements
are specified in the form of safety goals to be complied
with or by a set of deterministic specifications in the
form of technical rules and regulations. Reference has
al ready been made to this elsewhere /3/. The type of
approach to be used should be decided solely from the
point of practicability.
2. Safety goals cannot be established isolated from
- the deterministic requirements of the
existing criteria, guidelines, rules and
regulations
- the safety level of plants already licensed
on the basis of the above mentioned require-
ments.
The safety goals have to be consistent with these, if
they define the same safety level. If this consistency
should not yet be existing, it must be established.
Thus, the establishment of safety goals is not a fundamental
problem but a problem of "conversion", provided the above
mentioned consistency is given. The conversibn can be done
by valuation of the safety concept of licenced plants by
means of probabilistic risk analysis.
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PRIORITY OF THE DETERMINISTIC APPROACH FOR LICENSING
For engineering purposes, it is more practical to derive
a safety concept from a catalogue of deterministic require-
ments /3/. . -4
The step from a glven safety goal for instance 10 /a for
core melt down events as proposed in the US/5/, to areal safe-
ty concept is not possible without additional information.
It is necessary to know which measures are available for the
designer to reach the safety level required by the safety
goal. The safety goals give an information how safe is safe
enough but not what a safe plant looks like. To know this
the creativity of engineers is necessary in addition to the
safety goal to reach the safety level required by the safety
goal.
In some fields it is possible to describe processes in
statistical terms according to the nature of these processes.
One example is the field of human actions. According to the
statistic nature it is not possible to standardize human
actions, even in the case of highsophisticated operator
training and things like that. The results are uncertain-
ti es in the safety analysis. In order to prevent imponderabi-
lities for the safety concept as a result of such uncer-
tainties, it may be advisable to introduce special techniques
with clearly defined causal structures.
The German safety philosophy has gone this way by reducing
the human influence by means of automation of all important
safety functions.
Now we come back to the problem of using failure rates as
a statistical description of the behaviour of components
as inputs for event trees and fault trees. It is clear
that the actual behaviour is determined by boundary and
systems conditions. What we do is, to treat unknown or
complex deterministic situations statistically in order to
simplify the problem. This method is weil established and
has its big advantages especially in the case of highly
complex situations. But it seems necessary to remember this
from time to time in order to prevent incorrect conclusions
as the result of probabilistic calculations.
In the light of these arguments, it is understandable that
in the licensing procedure in accordance with the BMI-safety
criterion 1.1 /1/ the probabilistic approach should be
attributed only a complementary role. Risk studies
- for the quantification of the residual risk
- to determine the balance nature of the safety concept
need not be performed in connection with each specific
licensing procedure.
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The German practice with the German Risk Analysis was satis-
factorily in this respect. The study was performed without
any connection to any actual licensing procedure.
When the results were available, some of them were help-
ful in connection with fundamental discussions
- to prove the actual safety concept of the German PWR
- to give hints for further optimization in details as
mentioned above
As another result the study identified some fields where
need for more information exists. Especially to get better
understanding of
- core melt events and
- identification of conservatism
and therefore a lot of R + D-Work was started. This has
also nothing t~ do with actual licensing procedures but
hopefuly will be helpful in fundamental safety discussions
in the future, especially in the sense of reducing such
requirements which are the results of overestimating the
consequences of safety problems.
CONCLUSION
Remember the following
If safety goals are given, the creativity of the engineers
is necessary to trans form the goals into actual safety measures.
That is, safety goals are not sufficient for the deriva-
tion of a safety concept.
- The licensing process asks
"What does a safe plant look like?"
The answer cannot be given by a probabilistic procedure,
but need definite deterministic statements.
The conclusion is, that the licensing process needs a
deterministic approach.
The probabilistic approach should be used in a complemen-
tary role in cases where
- deterministic criceria are not complete, not detailed
enough or not consistent
additional arguments for decision making in connection
with the adequacy of a specific measure are necessary.
But also in these cases the probabilistic answer has to be
transformed into a clear deterministic statement.
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ABSTRACT
Improvements of the atmospheric dispersion model of the German
Reactor Risk Study (GRS) , Phase B, are presented. Washout model
variations show the need of a realistic as well as practicable
modeling. Emphasis is further given to the lift off criterion
in the plume rise model, to the height dependent dispersion
parameters and to the mixing layer height. The partially
antagonistic effects of these modifications on the results of
the Reactor Risk Study (in terms of early and late fatalities)
are discussed.
1. INTRODUCTION
The German Reactor Risk Study (GRS) [1] applies the accident
consequence model UFOMOD [2] to assess the collective damage
of the population associated with potential nuclear power
plant accidents. Phase A of UFOMOD development was restricted
by the requirements of comparability with the U.S. Reactor
Safety Study (RSS) [3] concerning methodology and basic
assumptions. In Phase B this restriction is omitted for the
benefit of an advanced methodology and recent results of research
work.
The accident consequence model consists of four main components
the atmospheric dispersion model, the dosimetry joined with
the protective action model and the health effect model. This
report is confined to the meteorological model
2. THE METEOROLOGICAL MODEL
Proceeding from the accidental release of radionuclides the
atmospheric dispersion model calculates the spatial and temporal
2017
distribution of the activity concentration in the air and the
contamination on the ground downwind of the reactor site.
The temporal distribution of the activity is determined by
varying meteorological conditions. This is realized in the
model using sequences of weather data measured hourly. The
spatial distribution is affected by the rise of the activity
plume, by dispersion parameters, and by the depletion of the
activity inventory due to washout and dry depostion.
2.1 WASHOUT
The washout model in UFOMOD is based on the assumption that
precipitation will remove the airborne activity uniformly throughout
the depth of the activity plume. The amount of activity being washed
out is proportional to the local activity concentration of the plume.





t is the duration of rain and X is the washout coefficient. The
washout coefficient is regarded to be a function of the rain
intensity and is invariant in space and constant for each hour.
A considerab1e part of the precipitation data used in the GRS are
not available in form of recorded intensities but defined as key
numbers according to the wor1d weather watch code. Due to this
qualitative classification three intensity bands have been introduced
in Phase A each represented by a washout coefficient (Tab.I).
TAB. I WASHOUT PARA}IETERS USED IN UFOMOD






Phase A 5010-4 b 0.5
10010-4 c
2,9 010-5 3,7 010 -5 a
Phase B 1,22 010-4 1,1 010-4 b 0.5
3,40010-4 2,37010-4 c
arain intensity 0 1 mm/h-
brain intensity 1 3 mm/h-
crain intensity > 3 mm/h
2018
With the exception of the intermediate band the coefficients
of the Phase A agree with those of the RSS . In Phase B it is
differentiated additional1y between the wet deposition behaviour
of iodine and aerosols. The washout coefficients evaluated by
Brenk [4] and Schrödel/Urban [5] are based on literature
reviews.
The average duration of rainfall during one hour was assumed to be
0.5 h in agreement with the RSS. Evaluations for the site of the
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe (KfK) however show that this
assumption is only partially justified. From 10 570 hours of
rainfall data recorded from 1973 to 1982 with aresolution of
10 minutes an average rainfall duration occuring within one hour
has been calcu1ated for each of the intensity bands. As can be seen
from Tab. 11 the duration of the lowest band remains below the
assumption mentioned above while the others exceed it [6].
TAB. 11 AVERAGE RAINFALL DURATION AND INTENSITY WITHIN ONE HOUR

















The best approximation of the reality is to calculate the washout
coefficient as a function of the rain intensity i given during the
process of rainfall, and its actual duration by equation (1). This
procedure requires the measurement of precipitation and its duration
in time steps of at maximum 10 minutes . Using KfK data the model
named in the following the " realistic" approach has been applied
to UFOMOD.
Since precipitation data of this degree of resolution usually
are not available at nuclear power plant sites an additional
model is needed for general app1ication. So KfK data again have
been used to approach the realistic model mentioned above.
From rainfall intensities averaged across each intensity band




The constants a,b are different fot iodine and aerosol.
K is the number of rain hours recorded within 10 years.
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Assuming that each rain event affects another activity plume









The results are presented in Tab. 111. The rain duration of the
second and third band is increased, while the rain duration
of the lowest band and the washout coefficients are changed
slightly.
TAB. III H1PROVED WASHOUT PARMIETERS FOR PHASE B
Precipitation Washout Coefficient Rain Duration




0 - 1 Aerosol 0,34.10-4 0.50
Iodine 0,42.10-4 0.47
1 -' 3 Aerosol 1,17.10-4 0.73
Iodine 1,06.10-4 0.73
> 3 Aerosol 3,33.10-4 0.58
Iodine 2,33.10-4 0.62
In order to demonstratethe effect of these washout models on
the number of early fatalities calculations have been performed
with the release category " core melt down followed by steam
explosion" (FK1). FK1 is the release category, in which the
number of early fatalities is most sensitive to precipitation.
The first of the four models presented in Tab. IV applies the
conservative washout coefficients of Phase A and a rainfall
duration of half an hour, while the remaining models apply
the more realistic Phase B washout coefficients of Tab. I.
This explains the result of the first model to exceed the other
results by one order of magnitude. The Phase B model 11
illustrates that an underestimate occurs compared to the realistic
approach if only the coefficients are substituted and no attention
is payed to the rainfall duration. The improved Phase B model 111
agrees weIl with the realistic approach .
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The washout model 111 'is derived from the data basis of KfK
and has been applied in this comparison only to the nuclear
power plant locatiohs of the site region Upper Rhine Valley.














A general application to other sites is proposed but the parameters
have to to be verified as soon as appropriate precipitation data
are available.
2.2 DISPERSION PARA~mTER
UFOHOD uses basically a bi-gaussian function to describe the
distribution of the radioactive effluents within the plurne
perpendicular to the transport direction. The related
dispersion parameters 0y and 0z characterize the horizontal
and vertical extension of the plume. They are determined by
experiment and depend on meteorological and local topographical
conditions. Appropriate experiments have taken place at KfK in
different emis'sion heights between 60m.and 195m and at KfA Jülich
in heights of 60m and 100m. From all these experiments a dependence
of the dispersion parameters on the emission height is indicated.
In order to take into account this fact dispersion parameters
assigned to four emission height ranges have been introduced to UFOHOD
In Fig. 1 the o-parameters are shown for a neutral atmospheric
stratification. For the range below 250m experiments of appropriate
release height have been combined [7], while the curves of the
range above 250m are the result of an extrapolation procedure [8].
The dispersion parameters 0y' 0z reflect in general the
surface roughness as weIl as the release height of the plurne. The
effect of roughness however decreases with increasing emission height.
Because the occurring plume heights are ranged up to 1000 m the use
of height dependent parameters is regarded to be reasonable.
Nevertheless UFOHOD offers alternatively the option to use furtheron
dispersion parameters related to surface conditions.
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2.3 MIXING REIGHT
The vertical extension of the plume is in general confined by
an interception layer. which reduces considerably the turbulent
exchange upwards. The height up to this layer, the so-called
mixing height is considered to be dependent on the stratification
of the atmosphere. Compared to Phase A the mixing heights have
been decreased by fact ars of 1.25 up to 5 in order to be compatible
with meteorological soundings [9].
2.4 LIFT OFF CRITERION
The prediction of early health effects is strongly influenced by
the plume rise. An effect frequently discussed in this context is that
the buoyant plume may become entrapped in the wake of the reactor
building. The plume fails to lift off the ground if the windspeed u
exceeds the critical windspeed ucrit
(4)
where F is the buoyancy flux in [m4/s3] and Rb is the building
height [10].
3. RESULTS
In order to demonstrate the influence of the modifications discussed
before, UFOMOD calculations have been performed for each reactor
site of the GRS. The three release categories " core melt down followed
by steam explosion" (FKl) , "core melt down with a large containment
leak of 'I 300 mm " (FK2) and " core melt down followed by late
overpressure failure of the containment " (FK6) have been selected
from the group of eight categories defined in the Phase A of the GRS.
The results in terms of the relative number of early and late
fatalities are presented in order to highlight the meteorological
effects and to exclude the influence of modifications in other parts
of the model (Tab. V). As a reference the results of version UFOMOD/B3
have been taken [11].
The dominant FKl exposure pathway contributing most to the number of
early fatalities·is the external exposure by radioactivity deposited
on the ground. The increased washaut rate therefore causes an enhanced
number of early fatalities in case of FKl. Für FK2 weather sequences
without rain account predominantly for early fatalities, so there is
no change to be noted. No early fatalities are calculated in case
of FK6.
The height depending o-parameters have replaced the roughness dependent.
This accounts for a reduction of the calculated early fatalities in
case of FK1, where the plume heights exceed in general 250m and the
parameter set valid for this height range is used most frequently.
For FK2 the calculated height covers a broad range of heights assigned
to different parameter sets, which again accounts for a considerable
reduction of early fatalities.
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The reduced mixing heights do not affect early fatalities in case of FK2,
while for FKI an increase of 18% has to be stated. The mixing layer
height determines the· maximum 0z·parameter. For neutral atmospheric
TAB. V RESULTS DUE TO MODIFICATIONS IN THE ~lliTEOROLOGICAL MODEL
Release Early Fatalities Late fatalities
Modification category in re1. units
Washout FKI 1. 76 1.00
FK2 1. 00 0.99
FK6 - 1.01
height dep. FKI 0.57 1.01
o-Parameter FK2 0.47 1.01
FK6 - 1.08
reduced FKI 1.18 1.04
Mixing Height FK2 1. 00 1.02
FK6 - 0.97
Lift off FKI 1.46 1. 01
FK2 1. 03 1. 01
FK6 - 1. 01
all effects FKI 2.00 1. 03
inckuded FK2 0.49 1. 00
FK6 - 1.04
stratification these bounds are reached in a few kilometers distance
from the reactor site. Combined with the extended plume heights of
FKI this results in an increased number of early fatalities.
The application of the lift off criterion causes an enhancement of
early fatalities for FKI and FK2 respectively. In case of FKI
additional weather sequences become effective.
Having introduced all modifications into UFOMOD the number of collective
early fatalities for FKI is doubled whereas it is reduced in case of FK2
The number of late fatalities only varies between 0.97 and 1.08 and
is turned out to be relatively i~sensitive to variations of meteoro1ogical
parameters.
With respect to a more realistic approach compared, to Phase A a
series of modifications have been introduced to the meteoro1ogical
submodel of UFOMOD for Phase B. While the collective damage of early
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FIG. 1 HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL DISPERSION PARAMETERS
FOR DIFFERENT HEIGHTS
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Effectiveness of Early Evacuation of Small Areas,
Shelter and Relocation in Reducing'
Severe Accident Conseguences
James A. Martin, Jr.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555
ABSTRACT
Relatively moderate scale emergency response actions by the
public can provide substantial reductions in the number and
chance of early and continuing health effects in the event of
a major release of radionuclides from a nuclear power plant.
In the event of a core melt accident scenario, early, precau-
tionary evacuation of areas within 2 to 3 miles and sheltering
elsewhere in the early time frame can substantially reduce the
risk of early fatalities--to close to zero in some cases. In
the further event of an actual major release of radioactivity
to the atmosphere, expeditious relocation from highly contam-
inated areas would be necessary. This paper will discuss the
calculations and emergency response assumptions that lead to
these insights. Since emergency response is unlikely, the
applications of these insights are more likely to be found
in other areas such as emergency planning, siting and pro-
babilistic risk analyses.
Light water nuclear reactor (LWR) risk studies in the United States have con-
ventionally assumed evacuation by the public from an area within ja miles of
a nuclear power plant in the event of a large accidental release. This studv
has examined the benefits of a protective action strategy employing an early .
evacuation of a relatively small area near the site, plus sheltering by the
public in the remaining areas, and relocation from highly contaiminated areas
(hot spots) in the intermediate time frame.
The calculations were performed conditional upon a postulated SSTl l release.
This release is currently considered by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
to be characteristic of the most severe accidental releases possible from a
light water reactor and would result from a core melt accident sequence where no
fission product removal systems are assumed to be operable, where the containment
fails early, and material is released directly to the atmosphere in a puff.
The expected frequency of arelease ?f this nature has been estimated to be
about one per 100,000 reactor-years. In this accident, 100 percent of the
inventory of noble gases, 45 percent of radioiodine, and 65 percent of cesium
and tellurium in a reactor core are postulated to be released to the atmosphere
at a height of 10 meters, over a two hour period beginning 1.5 hours after
accident initiation. An initial protective action warning is assumed to b~
given by the plant operators one half hour before the presumed release beglns.
2026
Aversion of the CRAC2 eode2 providing for three emergeney response zones was
used for the e~leulations. The washout eoeffieient3(for rainfall) in CRAC2 wasredueed to 10- /see per mm/hr of rainfall (f30m 10- for stability eategories Athru D) to realistieally bound observations. No other revisions to CRAC2
were made. Meteorology typieal of the New York City area, in the CRAC2 da ta
sets, was used for the ealeulations.
Differing publ ie emergeney responses were assumed for three radial zones as
follows: (i) In the near zone, an evaeuation at an effeetive speed of 10 mph
of areas within 1, 2, 3 or 5 miles, with a one hour delay after warning was
assumed. Thus, movement begins one half hour after the beginning of the
release. (ii) In both the mid and far zones people were assumed to take
shelter until after passage of the puff. People in these areas were assumed
to be exposed to the full plume and, additionally, to four and eight hours
of eontaminated ground in the mid and far zones, respeetively. (Note that in
earlier estimates, people in the far zone were assumed tOle~nduet normal
aetivities for 24 hours before reloeation from hot spots. ' ) The mid zone
extended from the outer radius of the near zone to 10 miles while the far zone
extended to all distanees beyond 10 mil es. Proteetion faetors for the early
evaeuees were taken to be 0.5 for eloud and ground exposure and 1. for inhalation.
Protection faetors of 0.33 were used for eaeh pathway for those people in shelters.
These proteetion faetors are eonsidered to be representative of one or two-story
wood frame houfe~ with basements, e.g., as would pertain for the northeastern
Uni ted States.' The sheltering times were chosen as estimates of the time
that would be required for hot spots to be identified by radiologieal monitoring
teams and for people to reloeate from them. Beeause of delays before release
and plume travel time, the elapsed time from aeeident initiation exeeeds four
(or eight) hours from the beginning of the aeeident, extending to six to twelve
hours depending on wind speed and distanee.
The potential mitigating effeetiveness of early evaeuations within 1, 2, or 3
miles is shown in Figure 1 for an 800 MW(e) reaetor loeated at a eoastal site
in the U.S. With a three mile early evaeuation (immediate shelter/reloeation
elsewhere), no aeute fatalities were ealeulated. The results for several for
other U.S. sites studied (not shown) ean be briefly summarized as follows: For
low power levels"e.g., 550 MW(e), no aeute fatalities were ealeulated assuming
a two mile early evaeuation. For the highest reaetor power levels, most aeute
fatal ities oeeurred at 0.5 to 1.0 miles where people were eaught by the front
of the puff release. \ For one relatively high population density site, where
zero early fatal ities was ealeulated for the highest reaetor power level
[1100 MW(e)], there were no residents within three miles in the CRAC2 data set.
This illustrates the potential benefits of leaving the nearby area before a
major release. Small members of aeute injuries were ealeulated for~ases,
but at low probability levels. These oecurred within ten miles in most eases,
but never beyond twelve miles. Peak aeute fatalities and injuries were always
assoeiated 'with rain, a sudden ealm after transport, or stable meteorology (low
wind speeds, narrow plumes).
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These results are in marked contrast to the large numbers of fc~te fatalities
estimated in earl ier studies for an accident of the SSTl type'. Large
absolute uncertainties must be associated with all such calculations. In
particular, not all sites would have the same shelter characteristics as
assumed here. Nevertheless, the relative worth of the emergency response
strategies assumed in this study are clear. Such perspectives should be
considered in emergency response planning and LWR risk studies.
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ABSTRACT
Models to be used for analyses, of economic risks from events which
may occur during LWR plant operation are developed in this study.
The models include capabilities to estimate both onsite and offsite
costs of LWR events ranging from routine plant outages to severe
core-melt accidents resulting in large releases of radioactive
material to the environment. The models can be used by both the
nuclear power industry and regulatory agencies in cost-benefit
analyses for decisionmaking purposes.
The newly developed economic consequence models are applied in an
example to estimate the economic risks from operation of the Surry
Unit #2 plant. The analyses indicate that economic risks from
U.S. LWR operation, in contrast to public health risks, are
dominated by relatively high-frequency forced outage events. Even
for severe (e.g., core-melt) accidents, expected offsite costs are
less than expected onsite costs for the Surry site. The
implications of these conclusions for nuclear power plant operation
and regulation are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study was to develop models to be used for analyses
of economic risks from unanticipated events which occur, or might occur,
during LWR plant operation [1]. The models estimate the economic consequences
of LWR forced outages and accidents from the societal perspective and can be
used together with estimates of event frequencies to calculate the expected
losses from LWR oper!tional events of various severities. Both "onsite"
costs, which either occur at onsite locations or most directly affect the
plant licensee, and "offsite" costs, which most directly affect the public
surrounding the plant, are estimated in the models. The models are used in an
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example analysis to estimate the expected losses from both routine forced
outage events and severe accidents during the remaining lifetime of the Surry
#2 plant. The results of the analyses have important implications for both
LWR plant licensees and regulatory agencies.
MODEL DESCRIPTIONS
The economic consequence models estimate the following onsite costs which
either occur at onsite locations or most directly affect the plant licensee:
- power production cost increases (replacement power costs) due to LWR
outage time,
- physical plant capital losses caused by severe accidents,
- plant decontamination costs,
- plant repair costs,
- early decommissioning costs after severe accidents,
- plant worker health impact costs.
The power production cost increases caused by the need for using generating
facilities with higher fuel cycle costs during LWR outages are the dominant
loss contributors for unanticipated forced outage events which do not result
in core damage. These costs are estimated using models developed at Argonne
National Laboratory which account for regional variations in the mix of
generating facilities used to provide replacement power and the costs of
replacement fuels [2]. These costs range from approximately $250/MWe-day to
$1000/MWe-day of outage depending on the LWR plant location in the U.S. Plant
repair cost estimates for forced outage events which do not result in core
damage are based on operating experience in the U.S. The costs of plant
repair for these events have generally been small relative to replacement
power costs.
For more severe accidents, power production cost increases, physical
plant capital losses, and plant decontamination costs are the most important
onsite cost contributors. Plant decontamination costs are modeled based on
experience with the Three Mile Island Unit #2 cleanup program and engineering
studies of post-accident decontamination [3]. Thesecosts are estimated to
range between ~$lxl09 and ~$2xl09 depending on the physical progression and
severity of the accident. Costs associated with decommissioning before the
end of the planned plant lifetime and the costs of plant worker health effects
do not contribute significantly to the expected onsite losses from either
routine forced outage events or severe accidents. In addition to the onsite
cost components included in the consequence models, electric utility business
costs, nuclear power industry losses, and onsite litigation costs were
addressed in the development of the consequence models. These costs could be
very important to specific organizations after severe accidents.
Economic consequence models were also developed to estimate the offsite
costs of severe accidents. Offsite costs are calculated probabilistically
based on the estimated frequencies of specific releases of radioactive
materials (source terms) and the meteorological conditions at the time of a
release. The economic consequence models can utilize information regarding
atmospheric dispersion, deposition, and public health effects calculated with
CRAC2, UFOMOD, MARC, or other similar consequence calculation codes [4,5,6].
The models include the following offsite costs of public protective measures
and health impacts for severe LWR accidents which might result in a
significant release of radioactive material to the envirionment:
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- evacuation costs,
- additional temporary population relocation costs,
- agricultural product disposal costs,
- land and property decontamination costs,
- land interdiction costs,
- permanent population relocation costs,
- health impact and medical care costs.
The costs of evacuation and temporary population relocation'include the food,
housing, and transportation costs to move individuals either prior to a
release of radioactivity or from areas contaminated immediately after a
release occurs. The loss of productivity of individuals moved from
contaminated areas is also included in the relocation costs. Agricultural
product disposal costs are the estimated market value of contaminated goods
which are not suitab1e for consumption. Land and property decontamination
costs are based on cost estimates for acheiving specific exposure reduction
factors in rural and urban areas. In addition,"the cost of population
relocation during decontamination is also included in the offsite cost models.
The costs of land interdiction are estimated using present value discounting
and the estimated tangible wealth contained within areas which cannot be
decontaminated to acceptable levels for habitation. The costs of permanent
population relocation from interdicted areas, including possibleperiods of
productivity losses, are also calculated in the models. Fina1ly, the purely
economic costs of offsite health effects, including lost productivity and
medical care costs, are included in the models.
Analyses performed using the above models indicate that the costs of
population evacuation, temporary re10cation, and possible agricultural product
disposal are important for severe accidents which result only in very sma11
releases of radioactive material to the environment. The costs of
decontamination or interdiction of offsi te land and property become important
for severe accidents resulting in larger releases of radioactive material, and
dominate the offsite costs of 10w probability accidents with very large
releases of radioactive material.
A data base of D.S. LWR operating experience was deve10ped as part of
this study to estimate the frequency-severity spectrum of unanticipated forced
oucage events. The data base includesonly forced outage events with causes
related direct1y to plant operation. Forced outages caused by direct
regulatory orders were not included in the data base but were analyzed
separately. The forced outage data base includes a total of 367 reactor-years
of operation which occurred during the period 1974-1980 at 67 D.S. p1ants.
Table I shows the forced outage frequency statistics for the 67 plants during
this period. Both the mean and median plant-specific forced outage
frequencies for this period are approximately 10 events per reactor-year, with
a range of forced outage frequencies from 2 events per reactor-year to 24
events per reactor-year. The mean duration for all forced outages during this
period is approximately 83 hours, and the median duration is approximately 15
hours. Thus, during the 1974-1980 period of study, forced outages occurred
frequently at D.S. LWRs causing an average plant avai1ability loss of 10% per
reactor-year of operation. The broad distributions of plant forced outage
frequencies and durations demonstrate that certain plants have been successful
at minimizing forced outage losses, while others have experienced very
significant forced outage problems.
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Tab1e I. Statistica1 Parameters of Forced Outage Frequency
Data for 67 U.S. LWR P1ants, 1974-1980
Statistica1 Parameter PWRs BWRs All LWRs
Total Number of P1ants 41 26 67
Mean P1ant-Specific Forced Outage 11. 3 9.4 10.6Frequency (per Reactor-Year)
Median P1ant-Specific Forced Outage 11.2 9.6 10.4Frequency (per Reactor-Year)
Variance of P1ant-Specific Forced 24.4 17.0 22.1Outage Frequency
Standard Deviation of P1ant-Specific
4.9 4.1 4.7.Forced Outage Frequency
(per Reactor-Year)
Minimum P1ant-Specific Forced Outage 2.8 2.3 2.3Frequency (per Reactor-Year)
Maximum P1ant-Specific Forced Outage 24.3 21. 0 24.3Frequency (per Reactor-Year)
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EXAMPLE APPLICATIONS AND ANALYSES
The onsite and offsite economic consequence models have been combined
with the 1974-1980 forced outage data base and the severe accident frequencies
from the Reactor Safety Study (RSS) [7] to estimate the economic risks from
plant operation over the remaining lifetime of the Surry #2 plant (uncertain-
ties associated with the analyses are discussed in Reference [1], and, in gen-
eral, are not expected to influence the conclusions presented here). Table 11
shows the expected losses from both routine forced outage events and severe
(core-melt) accidents for the remaining lifetime of the plant (estimated to be
approximately 30 years). The present values of expected losses for the
remaining plant lifetime are expressed in 1982 D.S. dollars and are shown for
discount rates of 0%, 4%, and 10%. The expected losses for routine forced
outage events are based on the average operating experience for all plants in
the 1974-1980 data base and estimated replacement power costs for the Surry #2
plant. The expected severe accident lasses are based on the median core-melt
accident frequencies and source terms from the RSS [7] with onsite and offsite
economic consequence calculations performed with the new models in conjunction
with the CRAC2 code [4]. Table II shows that the expected losses from severe
accidents are small ($1-$6 million dollars) relative to the expected losses
from routine outage events ($84-$270 million dollars) fo~ the remaining
lifetime of the Surry plant. This results from the relatively high frequency
of forced outage events and the substantial power production cost increases
for LWR forced outages. Table 11 also shows that even for core-melt
accidents, expected onsite losses are substantially larger than expected
offsite losses for the Surry plant.
Estimated complementary cumulative distribution functions (CCDFs) of
core-melt accident economic costs for the remaining lifetime of the Surry #2
plant are shown in Figure 1. Each CCDF shows the probability of an accident
with costs greater than a specified magnitude occurring at some time during
the remaining lifetime of the Surry #2 plant. CCDFs are shown for (1) offsite
costs excluding health effects, (2) offsite costs including health effects,
(3) onsite re placement power and capital costs only, (4) onsite replacement
power, capital, and plant decontamination costs, and (5) total onsite and
offsite costs. The curves for onsite costs show that the most likely
core-melt accidents are predicted to result in onsite costs much larger than
offsite costs. The variations in onsite costs shown in the distribution
function result from the dependence of replacement power costs and capital
losses on the timing of an accident in the plant life. A core-melt accident
which occurs near the end of plant life, when most of the capital cost of the
plant has been recovered, would have smaller onsite costs than one which
occurs near the beginning of plant life. The variations in offsite costs
shown in the distribution functions result from the dependence on the specific
release of radioactive materials and the weather conditions at the time of the
release. The distributions of offsite costs show that only for very low
probability events are offsite costs predicted to be larger than onsite costs.
The offsite cast distributions also show that the costs of offsite health
effects are predicted to be small relative to offsite property damage costs.
This conclusion is supported by the results of previous studies [8] which have
augmented dollar values for offsite health effects (e.g., $1,000,000 per
fatality) to represent all of the negative attributes of health impacts rather
than only the purely economic costs which are included in this study.
A breakdown of offsite cost components estimated using the economic
consequence models for both a large release of radioactive material (the PWR-2
release category in the RSS) and a smaller release (the PWR-5 release category
in the RSS) is shown in Table 111. All costs are expressed in 1982 dollars
Table II. Present Value of Routine Outage and Severe Accident
Economic Risks for Remaining Life of Surry Unit #2 Plant

































*Estimated rists for core-melt accidents based on RSS PWR core-melt
accident frequencies and source terms with consequence calculations
performed for the Surry #2 plant with new economic consequence models.
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Figure 1. Comp1ementary Cumulative Distribution Functions of
Core-Melt Accident Economic Consequences for the
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c orrslTE COSTS EXClUDING HEAl TH HFECTS MEAN = 3.7E+05
o orrslTE COSTS INClUDING HEAlTH ErrECTS MEAN = 4.3E+05
• ONSITE R. POWER AND CAPITAl COSTS ONlY MEAN = 1.9E+06
+ ONSITE R. POWER. CAPITAl, AND ClEANUP COSTS MEAN = 5.3E+06
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Table III. Onsite and Offsite Accident Costs Conditional Upon RSS Category






Population Relocation During Decontamination
Land and Property Decontamination
Land and Property Interdiction
Interdicted Population Relocation
Offsite Health Effects and Health Care
Total Offsite Cost
Mean Costs (1982 U.S. Dollars)
PWR-2 Release PWR-5 Release















Other Attributes from Economic Models
Total Population Dose Incurred, 0-100 Years
Total Population Dose Avoided by Protective
Total Dose to Decontamination Workers
Labor Required for Decontamination Program
Number of Decontamination Workers Required
for Completion of Program in 90 Days
$3.3xl09 $3.3xl09
PWR-2 Release PWR-5 Release
1.5xl05 Person-Sv 5.9xl03 Person-Sv
Measures 3.1xl05 Person-Sv 1.3xl03 Person-Sv
2.6xl03 Person-Sv 1.7xlOl Person-Sv
1.lxl04 Person-Years 1.7xl02 Person-Years
4.6xl04 Persons 6.9xl02 Persons
2036
and are mean estimates conditional upon release occurrence. The table shows
that costs associated with land and property decontamination and interdiction
are the most important contributors to offsite costs for a large release of
radioactive material, and that costs associated with evacuation, agricultural
product disposal, and health effects and health care costs become more
important for smaller releases. However, the comparison of total offsite and
onsite costs in Table 111 shows that offsite costs are negligible relative to
onsite costs for the PWR-S source term. Even for the PWR-2 source term,
onsite costs are larger than total offsite costs for the Surry site. Table
111 also shows other attributes of the post-accident recovery program which
are calculated in the economic consequence models. The estimates of
population exposures avoided by protective measures are useful for performing
cost-benefit analyses in developing protective action criteria. The
attributes of the required decontamination program, including exposures to
workers and labor requirements, are useful for determining if resource
limitations would be a problem in post-accident recovery operations. For
example, Table 111 shows that a large number of decontamination workers would
be required to complete the recovery program in a short period of time
following a very large release (PWR-2) of radioactive material.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
The analyses of LWR outage frequencies and economic risks from LlvR
operation performed with the models developed in this study lead to the
following conclusions:
1. In contrast to public health risks, economic risks from U.S. LWR
operation are dominated by high frequency, small consequence forced
outage events. Most of the costs of these events result from reduced
plant availabilities and capacity factors and the need for use of
higher marginal cost fuel sources for generation of electricity.
2. The economic risks from U.S. LWR operation aredominated by onsite
losses resulting from replacement power costs for short-term outages.
Severe accident economic risks are also dominated by onsite lasses
including replacement power costs, plant capital losses, and plant
decontamination costs. For Surry, only very low probability
core-melt accidents with large releases of radioactive material could
result in offsite costs as large as onsite costs.
3. There is a strong economic incentive to reduce the frequency and
durations of unanticipated ·forced outage events. Reduction of forced
outage frequencies should result in a reduction in economic and
public health risks from transient-induced severe accidents as weIl.
These conclusions have important implications for LWR licensees and
operators. The analyses indicate that reduction of the frequencies and
durations of forced outage events would result in large economic benefits from
increased plant availablities. Thus, an increased emphasis on improving LWR
plant operations and maintenance to reduce forced outage losses is warranted
on an economic basis. Reduction of forced outage frequencies should also
result in a reduction of economic risks form transient-induced severe
accidents. The analyses also indicate that risk management programs in the
LWR industry should direct special attention to plants in the first few years




The conclusions of this study also have important implications for
regulation of the LWR industry. Although reduction of core-melt accident
frequencies and consequences is important for controlling public health risks,
economic analyses indicate that limited societal resources might be more
productively used in controlling routine forced outage losses. Reduction of
routine outage frequencies would also reduce the frequencies of plant
transients and thus might have some impact on core-melt accident frequencies
and public health risks as well. Finally, expenditures for core melt accident
prevention are likely to produce larger economic benefits than expenditures
for systems which only mitigate the offsite consequences of core-melt
accidents since a large portion of the expected costs result from onsite
losses (replacement power, capital, and cleanup costs).
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Impact of Assumptions Concerning Containment*Failure
on the Risk from Nuclear Power Plants
David A. Lappa
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Livermore, California 94550, U.S.A.
ABSTRACT
We describe the containment failure mode and release category
assumptions used in the seismic risk study of the Zionnuclear
power plant, which was performed by the Seismic Safety Margins
Research Program (SSMRP). We then, for the dominant accident
sequences, reassign containment failure modes and release
categories based upon current thinking. We reca1cu1ate the
seismic risk from the Zion faci1ity using the new assumptions.
Last1y, we discuss the impact of the new assumptions on the
resu1ts and the re1evance of the assumptions tOifalue/impact
ana1yses.
INTRODUCTION
In 1978, the United States Nuc1ear Regulatory Commission began the
Seismic Safety Margins Research Program at Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory. The primary goals of the SSMRP were to deve10p too1s and data
bases for evaluating the risk of earthquake induced radioactive releases from
commercial nuc1ear power plants. In order to perfect and demonstrate SSI1RP
methods, a seismic risk assessment was performed for the Zion Nuc1ear Power
Plant, a twin 1040 ~me Pressurized Water Reactor faci1ity 10cated on Lake
Michigan 40 mi1es north of Chicago, I11inois.
Limited demonstration ca1cu1ations were made as part of Phase I of the
SSMRP. The ca1cu1ations were comp1eted in February, 1981. A 9-vo1ume final
report was issued during 1981-1982. The containment fai1ure modes and release
categories are discussed in the 'report for the systems analysis portion of the
project [1]. The Zion plant seismic risk assessment was comp1eted in October
1982 and reported in NO'ifember 1983 [2]. All references to the SSMRP report in
this study are for the Phase 11 results and final methodo1ogy.
This work was supported by the U.S. NRC under a Memorandum of Understanding
with the U.S. Department of Energy.
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The general methodology employed in the SSMRP is a familiar one in the
probabilistic risk assessment field. Using the general design of the plant as
a guide, analysts defined a set of initiating events which could result from
an earthquake at the Zion site. There were seven of these initiating events:
1) Reactor Vessel Rupture; 2) Large LOCA; 3) Medium LOCA; 4) Small LOCA;
5) Small-small LOCA; 6) Class 1 Transient; and 7) Class 2 Transient. Each of
the events is capable of initiating reactor accident sequences which lead to a
core melt and arelease of radioactivity from the plant.
For each initiating event, an e",ent tree was defined by the analysts
based upon the safety systems at the plant, which are designed to mitigate the
effects of reactor accidents. The event trees define the combinations of
successes and failures of safety systems which make up the various accident
sequences. A total of 219 accident sequences were defined and evaluated in
the study. Of these, 178 lead to a core melt.
DEFINITION OF TER}!S
Containment Failure Modes:
The SSHRP defined 5 ways in which the containment could fail. These five
failure modes are represented by the first five letters of the Greek alphabet:
ALPHA, BETA, GAMlli~, DELTA, and EPSILON.
ALPHA: Reactor Pressure Vessel Steam Explosion
In this mode, the molten core contacts water in the vessel. This
produces a steam explosion which fractures the reactor pressure vessel and
disperses large amounts of core material into the containment atmosphere. Thc
result is a suddcn, large increase in containment atmosphere pressure and
temperature which could fail the containment structure. Additionally,
energetic missile fragments may be produced which can fail the containment
spray equipment and, possibly, penetrate the containment.
BETA: Containment Leakage
In this mode, one or more of the normal penetrations into the containment
fail to seal properly, thereby providing a leakage path for the
radioacti',ity. This mode includes the passage of radioactivity from the
containment to the outside ',ia normal piping which may not be isolated
effectively.
GMn1A: Hydrogen Detonation
In this ease, hydrogen which has accumulated in the containment building
over the course of the accident is ignited. This ignition produces a rapid
temperature and pressure spike which ruptures the containment.
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DELTA: Containment Overpressure
In this mode, the gradual bui1dup of pressure within the containment
atmosphere resu1ts in a fai1ure of the containment walls. This pressure can
be due to the steam being generated by the degraded core as we11 as by other
processes, especia11y the production of hydrogen and carbon dioxide du ring a
core/concrete interaction.
EPSILON: Containment Basemat ~[e1t Through
In this mode, the mo1ten core, which has me1ted through the bottom of the
pressure vesse1 and come to rest on the basemat f100r beneath the vesse1, eats
comp1ete1y through the containment basemat. Once it has done so, it continues
to move through the supporting soi1 for severa1 feet before fina11y coming to
a halt.
Release Categories:
In addition to the containment fai1ure modes, the SS~ffiP specified what
the severity of the radioactive release wou1d be given a particu1ar accident
sequence and containment fai1ure mode. These release categories are numbered
1 through 7, each one representing a different type of release. Tab1e I 1ists
the release categories a10ng with the pub1ic exposure assumed to be associated
with them by the SS~ffiP [4].
Tab1e I


















ORIGINAL CONTAINMENT FAILURE ASSUMPTIONS
In the SSlffiP, the assignment of the containment fai1ure modes and release
categories for each of the accident sequences was based 1arge1y upon the
ana1yses from WASH-1400, the Reactor Safety Study [3). This was possib1e
because the WASH-1400 study inc1uded an analysis of a Pressurized Water
Reactor whose safety systems were similar to those at the Zion Nuc1ear Power
Plant. In fact, the SSI1RP e"lent trees list, for each accident, an equiva1ent
accident sequence definition from the WASH-1400 study.
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Table 11 below lists the most probable accident sequences from the Base
Case of the SSMRP. (The Base Case is one of several case studies made and
represents the best point estimate of seismic risk at Zion.) Together, these
eight accident sequences account for an annual probability of core melt of
3.0e-6, which is 85% of the total core melt annual probability of 3.5e-6.
Table II
Dominanta SSMRP Accident Sequences
Accident
Initiating Event Seguence Definition
1) Class 2 Transient T2-4a K L B..!:..Q.C
2) Small-small LOCA S2-35 1&L C F
3) Small LOCA Sl-21 1&C R.l. F.!!
4) Small LOCA Sl-28 1&C D F
5) Large LOCA A-13 ..Q.D ~
6) Reactor Vessel Rupture R-7 C F
7) Large LOCA A-28 C D F










a Based upon contribution to core melt frequency.
Key to Accident Sequence Definitions:
B Bleed & Feed System (B&FS)
C Containment Spray Injection System and Containment Fan
Cooler System - Injection Phase (CSIS & CFCS(I»
D Emergency Coolant Injection (ECI)
E Containment Fan Cooler System - Recirculation Phase (CFCS(R»
F Residual Reat Removal System (RRRS)
R Emergency Coolant Recirculation (ECR)
J Emergency Core Functionability
K = Reactor Protection System (RPS)
L Auxiliary Feedwater System & Secondary Steam Relief
P Safety/Relief Valves Open (S/RV-O)
Q Safety/Relief Valves - Reclose (S/RV-R)
Note: ~ - underscore implies system success.
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Tab1e 111 be10w 1ists the eight dominant accident sequences identified in
Table 11 along with the containment failure and release category assumptions
made during the SSI1RP. For each of the eight dominant accident sequences, the
probability of the various containment failure modes is given along with the
release category assumed for that containment failure mode. For example, the
fifth entry, A-13 (Large LOCA sequence #13) is assumed to have a 1% chance of
failing the containment via the ALPHA mode. In that case, there would be a
category 3 release. Likewise, A-13 is assumed to have a 99% chance of failing
the containment -,ia the EPSILON mode, with a category 7 release resulting in
that case. Finally, the BETA mode of failure was considered possible, but had
less than a 1% chance of occurrence.
Note that, for each accident sequence, the containment failure mode
probabilities are normalized to 1.0. This reflects the assumption by the
SSlffiP that, given an accident sequence that leads to a core melt, containment
failure must occur at some point.
Table IU
SSlffiP Containment Failure Mode Assumptions
for Dominant Accident Sequences
Accident Containment Failure Mode Assumptions
Seguence ALPHA BETA GAMMA DELTA EPSILON
1) T2-4a 1(.01) 2( .24) 2( .56) 6(.19)
2) S2-35 1(.01) 2 (*) 2(.12) 2( .04) 7(.83)
3) Sl-21 1(.01) 3(.99)
4) Sl-28 l( .01) 7(.49) 7(.50)
5) A-13 3(.01) 5(*) 7( .99)
6) R-7 1(.06) 2(*) 2(.91) 2(.03)
7) A-28 1(.01) 4(*) 7( .49) 7(.50)
8) S2-21 1( .01) 6(*) 3( .99)
Note: a * implies less than .01 probability of occurence.
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SSI1RP RESULTS
Using the above assumptions regarding containment fai1ure modes, release
categories, and pub1ic doses resu1ting from radioacti've releases, the SSMRP
ca1cu1ated thc seismic risk, in man-rem/yr, from the Zion Nuc1ear Power
Plant. This risk was found to be 9.6 man-rem/yr.
The seismic risk found at Zion is unquestionably sma11. If the seismic
risk at Zion is tru1y on the order of 10 man-rem/yr, then we need not concern
ourse1ves with the seismic integrity of the plant. Unfortunate1y, all
probabi1istic risk assessments contain some degree of uncertainty. The SS}ffiP
Zion study is no exception.
We are uncertain about both the core me1t frequency and the pub1ic risk at
Zion. The SSMRP Phase 11 report [2] contains the resu1ts of an uncertainty
ca1cu1ation which was performed as an integral part of the Zion seismic risk
assessment. The uncertainty ca1cu1ation resu1ted in a 90th percenti1e core
me1t frequency 8.e-04/yr, i.e., there is a 90% probability that the actua1
core me1t frequency is 8.e-04/yr or 1ess. This va1ue is rough1y a factor of
200 1arger than the mean va1ue of 3.6e-6/yr.
We cannot say how the total risk sca1es with increasing core me1t
probability in the uncertainty study. For a single accident sequence, the
prob~bi1ity of core me1t is mere1y a linear factor in the expression for man-
rem/yr. Thus, if the probability of the accident sequence increases by a
factor of 5, then so does the man-rem/yr risk from that accident sequence.
However, as total core me1t probability increases, the relati've contributions
from the various accident sequences may change, causing the risk in man-rem/yr
to scale in an unpredictab1e fashion.
Neverthe1ess, given that a core me1t frequency estimate 200 times 1arger
than the mean is within credib1e limits, and given that the uncertainty study
performed in the SS}ffiP did not involve many facets of the methodo1ogy,
inc1uding the systems analysis and the containment fai1ure assumptions, we can
see that it is important to reexamine the consequence models used in the SSMRP
in light of the experience gained since the WASH-1400 study was performed.
REVISED CONTAINMENT FAILURE ASSUMPTIONS
Using resu1ts avai1able to us from the ongoing source term assessments at
the U.S. NRC, as we11 as other experience gained in the years since the WASH-
1400 study was performed, particu1ar1y the Three Mi1e Is1and accident, we have
updated the assumptions of containment fai1ure probabi1ities and release
categories. Tab1e IV presents the resu1ts of our reassessment.
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Tab1e IV
Revised 8SHRP Containment Fai1ure Mode Assumptions
Accident Containment Fai1ure Hode Assumptions
Seguence ALPHA BETA GAMl-1A DELTA EPSILON
1) T2-4a 2( .Ol) 7(.79) 7(.20)
2) S2-35 2(.01) 7(.79) 7( .20)
3) Sl-21 2( .01) 2(.01) 3(.98)
4) Sl-28 2( .01) 7(.79) 7(.20)
5) A-13 5 (.01) 7(.99)
6) R-7 1(.01) 2(.01) 6(.78) 7(.20)
7) A-28 2(.01) 6(.79) 7(..20)
8) 82-21 2( .01) 2( .01) 3(.98)
In general, we notice that the probability of having ALPHA, GAMMA and
EPSILON containment fai1ure modes is now sma11er. In contrast, the BETA and
DELTA mode probabi1ities have increased. Notice that, as before, we assume
that containment fai1ure must occur, i.e., the total probability of
containment fai1ure is norma1ized to 1.0 for each accident sequence.
Notice also, that, for some accident sequences, the release categories
have decreased in severity for a given containment fai1ure mode. This
ref1ects the effects of de1aying containment fai1ure upon the severity of
release.
RESULTS USING REVISED A8SUHPTIONS
Reca1cu1ating the seismic risk at Zion using the assumptions given in
Tab1e IV yie1ds a va1ue of 3.6 man-rem/yr. Comparing against the original
SSHRP risk va1ue of 9.6 man-rem/yr, we see that the best estimate of seismic
risk has decreased by 6 man-rem/yr because of our new assumptions. The
probability of core me1t is, of course, not affected by the assumptions and,
thus, does not change.
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Tab1e V be10w presents the contribution to risk from each of the dominant
accident sequences, using both the original and revised containment fai1ure
assumptions. Notice that, under the original assumptions, over half of the
total seismic risk was contributed by the G1ass 2 Transient sequence T2-4a.
Under the revised assumptions, this sequence is almost neg1ib1e.
Gonsequent1y, we find that almost all of the risk is contributed by on1y two
sequences: 3ma11 LOGA sequence 31-21, and 3ma11-sma1l LOGA sequence 32-21.
P1ease note that the total of 8.6 man-rem/yr risk from the dominant
sequences examined is 1ess than the total seismic risk of 9.6 man-rem/yr, the
difference being the contribution of the remaining 170 accident sequences
studied in the 33MRP.
Tab1e V
Risk Gontribution from Dominanta Accident 3equences
Accident Gontribution to Risk (man-Rem/yr)
Initiating Event 3eguence Original Revised
1) Glass 2 Transient T2-4a 5.1 0.1
2) 3mall-small LOGA 32-35 0.3 0.0
3) 3mall LOGA 31-21 1.8 1.8
4) 3mall LOGA 31-28 0.0 0.0
5) Large LOGA A-13 0.0 0.0
6) Reactor Vesse1 Rupture R-7 0.8 0.0
7) Large LOGA A-28 0.0 0.0
8) 3mall-small LOGA 32-21 0.6 0.6
TOTAL: 8.6 2.5
a Based upon contribution to core melt frequency.
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CONCLUSIONS
The original point estimate of seismic risk at 2ion of 9.6 man-rem/yr is too
low to be of any concern. Thus, what we are primarily concerned with is the
possibility that the containment failure mode and release category assumptions
would, upon being updated, induce a sizable increase in the estimated risk
from the facility. Certainly, one of the most obvious conclusions which can
be drawn from the results is that this is not the case.
The other conclusion we can draw relates to the effects of containment failure
mode and release category assumptions upon 'Jalue/impact assessments.
R~levence to Value/Impact Assessments
In 1983, a value/impact assessment was performed to determine the effects
of proposed changes to the U.S. NRC Standard Review Plan sections 3.7.1, 3.7.2
and 3.7.3, dealing with seismic design criteria [5]. As part of that
assessment, a study was made of the effect upon seismic risk of strengthening
the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST). It was found that strenghtening the
tank actually increased the seismic risk at the hypothetical PWR being
studied. This result was directly attributed to assumptions concerning the
containment failure modes and release categories which would follow the
defined accident sequences.
Briefly, the phenonmenon which was observed was the following. As the
RWST was strengthened, the probability of having successful Emergency Coolant
Injection increased. HowcJer, the stronger RWST had uo impact on the
probability of successful Emergency Coolant Recirculation or heat removal from
containment. Thus, strengthening the RWST only ser.ed to ins ure a supply of
water with which to produce steam in the containment. This served to increase
the likelihood of containment oJerpressure, the DELTA mode, followed by rather
severe releases.
In contrast, a failure to inject emergency coolant resulted in a "dry"
reactor cavity. Thus, when the core melts through the reactor 'JesseI, it
reacts only with the concrete basemat, eventually ending with an EPSILON mode
of failure, which is thought to have generally less severe consequences than
the containment overpressure mode.
Table V above shows that the majority of the seisrnic risk under the new
containment failure assumptions arises from sequences SI-21 and S2-21. Each
of these sequences is characterized by successful Emergency Coolant Injection
followed by unsuccessful heat removal from containment. Thus, under the new
assumptions, we would expect that we would see the same type of relationship
between risk and RWST strength as for the hypothetical PWR.
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Clearly, there are a great deal of assumptions operative in the
analysis; for example, the assumption that a failure to have successful
emergency coolant injection results in a "dry" reactor cavity. If there is a
total failure of the ECI system pumps, then this may be a valid assumption.
If, instead, a partial pumping failure results in classifying the injection
phase a failure, then we might still have a considerable volume of water
available in the reactor cavity.
Another major assumption involves the severity of release which follows
when the containment fails due to steam overpressurization. It is not clear
whether the presence of large amounts of steam in the containment atmosphere
at the time of rupture will act to improve or worsen the degree of radioactive
release. Clearly, this assumption would impact the results of the above
analysis.
At .present, the U.S. NRC is engaged in a major reassessment of the source
term from a nuclear power plant accident. mlen this work is completed, it may
be possible to obtain more definitive results from value/impact assessments
which involve consequences other than core melt frequency.
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AN ESTlMATION OF THE LOCA CONSEQUENCES OF A RESEARCH REACTOR
LOCATED lITTHIN A LARGE POPULATION CENTRE
J.G. Kollas
N.R.C."Democritos l1
Greek Atomic Energy Commission
Aghia Paraskevi, Attiki, Greece
ABSTRACT
The LOCA consequences of a 5 W1 swimming pool type research reactor 10-
cated within the limits of Athens, Greece- a large population centre-
are estimated. Twenty isotopes are taken into consideration in the
source term. Doses and individual cancer risk from exposure to the ra-
dioactive cloud are calculated to a distance of about 20 km from the
reactor site. Collective exposure and latent health effects due to
early and chronic exposure are estimated for the over three million
inhabitants of the Athens region.
I NTRODUCTI ON
Many studies have been done in the past on the risk associated with nuclear
power plants. However, little emphasis has been placed on the risk of research
reactors and especially on the social risk of those research reactorslocated
within a large population centre, which in some 'instances can not be neglected.
This issue is dealt with in this present study and attention is focused to de-
limiting the consequences of a severe accident of the Greek Research Reactor
(GRR).
GRR is a swimming pool type, light water moderated and cooled, research
reactor with }ITR type fuel elements!. It is located near the north-western foot
of the Immitos mountain in the district of Aghia Paraskevi, Fig. 1, at a distan-
ce of about 8 km from the centre of Athens city. The reactor is operated by the
Greek Atomic Energy Commission and went critical in July 1961 at low power.
In April 1964 the reactor star ted its operation at maximum power of 1 W1 and
seven years later in June 1971 the reactor reached its current maximum opera-
tion level of 5 W1. GRR is fueled with highly enriched uranium (about 90%) and
is used ,for a number of purposes such as radioisotope production, reactor phy-
sics experiments, neutron diffraction and spectroscopy works, cross section mea-
surements, solid state physics and radiation damage studies, activation analy-
sis etc., and as a large gamma source for sterilization purposes during the shut-
down period. .
GRR has operated since 1961 without any major incident with adverse conse-
quences either for the personnel of the Greek A.E.C. or the population around
the reactor site. Nevertheless and in the framework of an ongoing safety
analysis it was decided to estimate the potential consequences of a severe
accident in order to delimit the consequences of the reactorls presence wi-
thin Athens area, the largest population centre of Greece with over three mil-
lion inhabitants and to assess the necessity of installing or not special engi-
neered safeguards, assuring thus that an adequate level of safety is provided
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Fig. 2 Typical wird rose used for the calculatkxls.
REACTOR ACCIDENT SODRCE TER}!
The accident consequence calculations described in this study were per-
formed using aversion of the CRAC2 code 2 ,3, the improved version of the D.S.
Reactor Safety Study consequence model 4 • The model describes the progression
of the radioactive cloud released from the reactor building and predicts its in-
teraction with and influence on the environment and man. One-year weather
data are input to the dispersion model in the form of hourly observations of
wind speed and direction, atmospheric stability and accumulated precipitation
and radionuclide concentrations within the cloud are depleted by wet and dry
deposition and by radioactive decay. Integrated air and ground concentrations
are calculated for downwind distances. The consequence model uses the calcula-
."ted airbornE! ..,and ground radionuclide concentrations to estimate the population
exposure to both external and internal radiation, the latter being calculated
over the lifetime of the exposed population. From the calculated exposure the
number of early and late health effects that would result from the accident are
estimated. The early effects include fatalities and injuries and the late ef-
fects latent cancer fatalities plus benign and malignant thyroid nodules.
Among the accidents postulated for GRR the one with the most severe po-
tential consequences on the environment and the public is a Loss-of-Coolant-
Accident (LOCA) accompagnied by a partial melting of the reactor core. This ac-
cident is designated as the design basis accident (DBA) of GRR, i.e. as the
postulated accident for which the potential risk to the public is greater than
that from any credible accident and for the mitigation of the consequences of
which engineered safety systems may be needed. The credibility of the DBA is not
under consideration and in the analysis we just postulate its occurence.
In order to assess quantitatively the coremelt level an analysis of the
accident in which either the out let Or the inlet coolant .pipe connected to the
bottom of the reactor tank is completely ruptured is performed, using the
cürrent version of a three-dimensional computer code ThEAP-l, developed in NRC
IDemocritos" 5 • From a whole COre analysis of GRR under the most severe LOCA
conditions it was concluded that the core is likely to enter the melting condi-
tions, and the amount of melting is roughly and conservatively estimated to be
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Tab1e I. Inventory of radionuc1ides in the 5 MWth GRR core and associated
parameters
Radionuc1ide Radioactive inventory Half-1ife
Deposition Rain
No. (Ci x 10- 4 ) (days) ve1ocity(m/s) dep1etionsource
1 Krypton-85 0.03822 3919 0.0 0.0
2 Krypton-85m 4.738 0.1867 0.0 0.0
3 Krypton-87 8.477 0.05278 0.0 0.0
4 Krypton-88 13.76 0.1167 0.0 0.0
5 Stront ium-8 9 4.940 52.00 0.01 1.0
6 Strontium-90 0.3007 10260 0.01 1.0
7 Strontium-91 13.26 0.3950 0.01 1.0
8 Yttrium-91 6.102 58.80 0.01 1.0
9 Zirconium-95 6.608 65.50 0.01 1.0
10 Niobium-95 6.725 35.10 0.01 1.0
11 Ruthenium-103 3.000 39.59 0.01 LO
12 Ruthenium-106 0.2974 369.0 0.01 1.0
13 Tellurium-131m 0.7030 1.250 0.01 1.0
14 Tellurium-132 5.700 3.250 0.01 1.0
15 Iodine-131 3.250 8.040 0.01 1.0
16 Iodine-132 17.29 0.09521 0.01 1.0
17 Iodine-133 11.52 0.8667 0.01 1.0
18 Iodine-135 15.86 0.2744 0.01 1.0
19 Xenon-133 7.587 5.290 0.0 0.0
20 Xenon-135 14.47 0.3821 0.0 0.0
21 Cesium-136 0.0067 13.00 0.01 LO
22 Cesium-137 0.2803 10990 0.01 1.0
23 Barium-140 6.800 12.79 0.01 1.0
24 Cerium-141 6.096 32.53 0.01 1.0
25 Cerium-144 5.309 284.4 0.01 1.0
of the order of 20%.
Ta ca1cu1ate the source term resu1ting from this accident twenty-five iso~
tapes were taken into consideration. GRR has an operating schedu1e of eight
hours/~ay! f~ve days/week. Under these conditions the source term was esti-
mated at the time of maximum fission product inventory, i.e. immediate1y
after the weekend shutdown preceding a fue1 loading. Tab1e I presents the
inventory of radionuclides in the 5 M\~ GRR core and its associated parameters~
The ca1cu1ation of the source term emerges from a conservative estimate of fis-
sion product release to the reactor operating f1eor and further under the con-
setvative assumptions of no filter mitigation and a ground release to the envi-
ronment through 1eaks of the reactor bui1ding. Specifica11y the fo11owing
6
fi-
gures, which represent the upper limit of the release fractions, are used~
Noble gases :100%
Iodines : 50%
Other fission products: 1%
In order to estimate the DBA consequences of GRR the fol1owing additional
assumpt;lons are made: Ca} the duration of the·re1ease. is ten hours and its
initiation is immediate1y after the accident, (h) the sensible heat of the re-
lease is neg1igible, Ce) an exc1usion ·area of 400m around the reactor is esta-
blished exc1uding thus the Greek A.E.C. personnel from the analysis, and (d) no
emergency measures are taken to mitigate the accident consequences.
For estimating doses and hea1th effects the fo1lowing factors are adopted:
C10ud shie1ding factor 0.75 .
Ground shie1ding factor .:- 0.33
Individual breathing rate: 2.66,10- 4 m~/s
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Tab1e 11. Summary of one year Athens area meteoro1ogica1 data using weather
categories
~~~~~~E_~~~~~~E~__~~E!~!~!~~~:
R- Rain starting within indicated interval (km)
S- Slowdo\qn occuring within indicated interval (km)
A-C, D,E,F- Stabi1ity categories






























































































~urthermore for estimating latent health effects the BElR method is employed.
~ffiTEOROLOGY AND POPULATION
The meteorological record used in the consequence calculations consists
of the site wind rose, Fig. 2, and 8760 hourly observations of wind speed,
atmospheric stability and accumulated precipitation. The record is completed
by an unstable mixing height taken equal to 1,200m? An analysis of 6 years
of meteorological data of the National Observatory of Athens led to the se-
lection of 1979 as the most representative meteorological year of the Athens
region for the period analyzed, and its meteorological record is used in the
calculations.
To take properly into account the very low probability sequences with
high consequences, such as the rain sequences, the importance sampling method
is used 3 ,B. The entire year of meteorological data is sorted into the twenty-
nine weather categories (bins) defined in Table ll. Each of the 8760 potential
meteorological sequences is categorized and placed in the corresponding weather
category. Sequences are then sampled from each of these for use in the conse-
quence estimation. In this present analysis sixteen sequences were seleeted
from each weather category.
Finally, the demographie data were drawn from the most recent 1981
census. Athens area, the large population centre under consideration, contains
about 3,081,000 people, which amounts to 32% of the population of Greece.
(Details of the population distribution are included in Ref. 9).
LOCA CONSEQUENCES OF GRR
The consequences that could result from a severe reactor accident include
short-term effects such as early fatalities and long-term effects such as latent
deaths. The consequence analysis performed in this present study has shown
that only long-term effects are expected from the DBA of GRR and in fact that
mo~t of the effects are not significant.
In this section we present certain characteristic aspects of the social and
individual consequences resulting from GRR's LOCA which are due: (a) to the ini-
tial (early) exposure to the radioactive cloud, which includes direct irradia-
tion by the passing cloud, exposure from inhaled radionuclides and exposure to
deposited radioactive material, and eb) to both initial and chronic exposure
from inhalation of resuspended radionuclides and exposure to groundshine from
contaminated ground. Fig. 3,4 and 5 present the variation of doses and indi-
vidual. cancer risk from initial exposure with distance from the reactor site.
Figs. 6,7 and 8 present individual risk results at certain distances from GRR
in the form of complementary cumulative distribution functions (~CDF's), i.e.
the probability that a consequence such as a dose or cancer risk of a given
magnitude will be equalled or exceeded. Figs. 9,10,11, and 12 present social
risk results such as the whole body collective exposure and latent health
effects for the total Athens area population of 3,081,000 inhabitants.
Finally, in Table III a summary of the expected mean and peak values of the
latent health effects for various organs and the whole body collective exposure
of the population is presented.
CONCLUSrONs
The results presented in the previous section indicate. that most of the
consequences of GRR's design basis accident are of aratEer limited magnitude
with the exception of the nonfatal thyroid health effects. However, these
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Fig 3 Acute bane marrow dose vs distance from G R R Fig 4. Acute thyrold ~e V$, di!Stance from GRR.
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Fig. 9 Whole bad)! population dose CCDF
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Table 111. Summary of latent health effects and collective exposure
Effect Initial exposure Initial and
chronic exposure
Mean value Peak value Mean value Peak value---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
Whole body 0.22 3.91 0.79 14.5
Thyroid 18.5 374 19.3 388
Leukemia 0.04 0.73 0.17 3.09
Lung 0.26 5.30 0.38 7.42
Breast 0.05 0.79 0.18 3.32
Bone 0.02 0.34 0.08 1.45
GI Tract 0.02 0.38 0.06 1.15
Other 0.05 0.80 0.19 3.37
\\lhole body col-
lective exposure 1,340 25,000 5,030 91,800
(man. rem)
gating them with appropriate engineered safety systems. It would seem reaso-
nable also to assume that such a need would be borne for any similar research
reactor of equal or larger magnitude, which is located within the limits of a
large population centre. In the case of GRR to satisfy this need a simple emer-
gency core cooling system (ECCS) was installed 10 ; which by spraying large quanti-
ties of water on toe reactor core and cDoling it, would prevent itsmelting and
exclude thus toe release of radioactive materials to toe environment in the
event of a LOCA.
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